The House at War: the House of Representatives During World War I, 1917-1919. (Volumes I and II). by Horner, Richard Kenneth
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1977
The House at War: the House of Representatives
During World War I, 1917-1919. (Volumes I and
II).
Richard Kenneth Horner
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Horner, Richard Kenneth, "The House at War: the House of Representatives During World War I, 1917-1919. (Volumes I and II)."
(1977). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 3066.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3066
INFORMATION TO USERS
This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While 
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
V 1
1.The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have 
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper 
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to 
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is 
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver 
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing 
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as 
received.
University Microfilms International
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John's Road, Tyler's Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR
77-25,383
HORNER, Richard Kenneth, 1945*
THE HOUSE AT WAR: THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES DURING WORLD WAR 
I, 1917-1919. (Volume I and II).
The Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
Ph.D., 1977 
History, United States
Xerox University Microfilms , Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
THE HOUSE AT WAR: THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
DURING WORLD WAR I, 1917-1919
VOLUME I
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of History
by
Richard Kenneth Homer 
B.A., Abilene Christian University, 1967 
M.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1968 
May, 1977
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT
Candidate: 
Major Field: 
Title of Thesis:
Richard Kenneth Horner
th
History
THE HOUSE AT WAR: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DURING WORLD WAR I, 1917-1919
Approved:
L /  Major Professor and (airman
Dean of the Graduate/ School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Date of Examination: 
February 18, 1977
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is profoundly aware that many individuals were 
critically important for the completion of this dissertation.
Special thanks are due my faculty advisor. Professor Burl Noggle, 
who pointed this writer toward the topic and carefully read and 
critiqued the entire manuscript. Professors John L. Loos, Mark T. 
Carleton, and Frederic A Youngs, Jr. reviewed the study and made 
many helpful suggestions. Professor Patrick F. O'Connor of the 
L.S.U. Department of Political Science rendered indispensible 
advice on the use of quantitative methods and the computer. Appre­
ciation is also due Mrs. June Musso who demonstrated great patience 
typing several versions of the study. Finally, Jonathan Beasley 
and James L. Whitten, two close personel friends, offered valuable 
critical comments and needed editorial assistance.
My greatest debt is owed my parents who provided encouragement 
and love throughout.
PREFACE
The significance of this study lies in the importance of the 
times, the institution, and the historiographical issues involved.
The times are the years of American participation in the cataclysm of 
World War I. The institution is the House of Representatives, the 
65th session of which along with the Senate, voted for war and then 
sought legislation to win and end the conflict. The historiographical 
issues evolve out of some fifty years of work by historians on the 
war years and on the "Progressive Era" in general. The combination of 
the three elements— of time, institution, and historiography— present 
a number of issues for study. These can be summarized as follows: 
the institutional character of the 65th House, the response of the 
House to war mobilization, the attitudes of the House toward aliens 
and dissenters, the actions of the House on such important measures as 
Prohibition, and the relations between the President and the House.
In studying members of the House to determine their ideas on 
issues and their actions as a body, I have relied on traditional non- 
quantitative sources, such as personal papers of individual Congress­
men and the Congressional Record. At the same time, I have combined 
these sources with quantitative data obtained from computer analysis 
in order to identify groups within the House.
As a preliminary to such analysis, my first chapter deals with 
the historiography and methodology that provide the foundation for my
iii
discussion of House meiribership and the House as an institution. I 
then analyze the three sessions of the 65th House, covering the basic 
issues dealt with by each session. I conclude the dissertation with 
a summary of the more cogent findings.
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ABSTRACT
In this study the technique of roll call analysis has been 
combined with traditional non-quantitative sources in order to deter­
mine and analyze the response of the 65th House of Representatives 
to a broad range of issues. Particularly at question is the response 
of representatives to intervention in World War I; their attitude 
toward internationalism, mobilization of the economy and aliens and 
dissenters; their alignment and ideas on issues of a progressive 
nature; and their actions on such important measures as prohibition 
and women's suffrage. Secondarily, an effort has been made to 
investigate the party system, the organization of the House, and 
the prosopography of its membership. Voting records of the House 
were analyzed through use of the OSIRIS III package of computer 
programs, which was employed to correlate roll calls and to construct!' 
Guttman scales.
When judged by their response on recorded roll-call votes and 
by their expression of views on issues, representatives responsed to 
the war crisis in a variety of ways. The victory of House Democrats 
in 1916 on the issues of peace and progressivism placed them in an 
ambiguous position once Wilson asked for war and they shelved reform 
for the war's duration. Structural weaknesses also existed in the 
leadership and party systems of the House, a fact which helps account 
for its inability to forge an effective war or postwar program.
xi
Instead, President Wilson had to step in to direct the House into 
war, and, once in the war, to outline the basic war program. The 
fact of Presidential leadership often did not please the Republican 
members. As a result, the bi-partisan prowar coalition, which, sup­
ported the war mainly because of the havoc wrought by the German 
U-boat but also because of economic, regional, and security factors, 
soon melted away. It failed to form a consistent voting bloc that 
supported war measures during the conflict and internationalism 
after the war. In a similar fashion, progressive issues, such as 
taxation, railroads, prohibition, women's suffrage, and water power, 
created only a series of single issue coalitions. Progressivism was 
a definite force in the 65th House, but it had no general ideology 
and its influence was limited. Moreover, there was no postwar 
flowering of progressive initiatives or ideas as some historians 
have indicated. Progressivism's relation to parties was ambiguous 
with the Democrats at times adopting the progressive stance and on 
other occasions the Republicans so doing. Yet, contrary to the usual
thought, the Republicans more often supported the progressive position
n’
than the Democrats. Overall, regional and party factors were more 
important than progressivism in shaping House deliberations and House 
roll calls. These factors had significant roles in determining roll 
calls on the Revenue Bill, the Water Power Bill, prohibition, women's 
suffrage, and farm measures. Party and regional interests, attitudes 
toward Presidential leadership, and orientations toward international­
ism and progressivism all helped mold the House's reaction to war 
mobilization and reconstruction plans. The House never appreciated
xii
the rationalization and centralization affected by war mobilization. 
As a result, when peace returned, representatives only desired to aid 
economic stability and to restore prewar patterns rather than enact 
new schemes of government planning and regulation. Directly related 
to the House's desire for the restoration of normal conditions was 
its attitude against aliens and dissenters. ‘ Republican apprehensions 
during the first few months of the war had moderated some administra­
tion proposals on aliens and dissenters, but by the end of the war 
the Alien Deportation Bill and the Sedition Act were enacted with 
little opposition. The House played no small part in the ironic 
tragedy of the war for democracy that led initially to the Red Scare 
and eventually to "normalcy."
xiii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Summoned by President Woodrow Wilson to hear his address on 
grave questions of peace and war, members of the House of Representa­
tives gathered in their chamber on the night of April 2, 1917.1 They 
awaited the President's speech with expectancy, for Congressmen knew 
neither what Wilson would demand of them nor what course of action 
the nation should pursue.3 Wilson had shared these uncertainties, but 
as he now appeared before Congress, he read his decision with deter­
mination and strength.3 Declaring that the United States had no 
other course than to wage war with all power and force possible, he 
first spoke of the causes that compelled this action. He named as 
reasons German espionage in the United States, the Zimmerman intrigue, 
and, above all else, the submarine warfare against American commerce
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 118.
Fiorello LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, An Autobio­
graphy, 1882-1919 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 138.
Joseph Daniels, The Life of Woodrow Wilson (Will H. Thompson, printer, 
1924), 277. New York Times, April 2, 1917, 1. The Times reported that 
"Gussie" Gardner (Rep., Mass.) had introduced a resolution calling for 
war. But according to LaGuardia, probably a majority still favored 
'peace. New York Times, April 13, 1917, 1.
JArthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1956), 277. John M. Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Politics of Morality (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956), 121-30.
Both authors write of Wilson's deep distress before he reached his 
decision; however, once he made up his mind, he buried his doubts.
1
and lives. These hostilities against the United States, he maintained 
were not simply a violation of American rights but also were a vio­
lation of all law and justice. It was a "warfare against all nations, 
in which neutrality no longer afforded isolation and where the ways 
of peace had to give way to the demands of war. To prepare for war, 
he pointed out, would require a number of measures, some of which 
would need, the approval of Congress. He proposed a much larger army 
and navy, a selective service system, huge appropriations for military 
armaments, loan credits for both the United States and her new allies, 
and taxes heavy enough to finance the war "by this present generation. 
Then, he abruptly turned to a discussion of the issues and objectives 
for which the nation would fight. Chief among them was the destruc­
tion of "selfish and autocratic power,” which threatened liberty and 
all future peace. In what became the most famous sentence of the 
speech, he stated, "The world must be made safe'for democracy." The 
United States had no desire, Wilson added, for conquest, dominion or 
indemnities for itself and did not fight against the German people, 
but against their rulers. As to the German people in the United 
States, he professed his belief that they were most loyal but warned 
that disloyalty would be treated "with a firm hand of stem repres­
sion...." Wilson drew his message to a close with a ringing perora­
tion:
It is a fearful thing to lead this great
peaceful people into war, into the most terrible
and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself 
seeming to be in the balance. But, the right 
is more precious than peace, and we shall fight 
for the things which we have always carried near­
est our hearts— for democracy, for the right of 
those who submit to authority to have a voice in 
their own governments, for the rights of liberties
3of small nations# for a universal dominion of 
right by such a concert of free peoples as 
shall bring peace and safety to all nations and 
make the world itself at last free. To such a 
task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, 
everything that we are and everything that we 
have, with the pride of those who know that the 
day has come when America is privileged to spend 
her blood and her might for the principles that 
gave her birth and happiness and the peace which 
‘ she has treasured. God helping her, she can do 
no other.4
The Wilsonian ideals, as expressed in the conclusion of his 
war message, removed the lingering doubts of many congressmen and gave 
them hope for the future.*’ Yet, the members of the House knew that 
past conditions would combine with the myriad problems of warfare to 
form a new test of their convictions and abilities. The prewar 
vacillation might have been removed for many by Wilson's message, but
other urgent problems, which Wilson had suggested in his April 2
*>
speech, now required decisive action.
Representatives immediately faced the task of voting for or 
against Wilson's call for war upon the German Empire. Their decision 
either to support or to oppose the war resolution raised three questions 
for consideration. : Firstly, what motivations, reasons, or arguments 
did representatives offer for either sustaining or rejecting the 
resolution for war? Secondly, what- kind of groups supported either
4Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 281. See Cong. 
Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 118-20, for Wilson's 
speech.
^LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 137-40. LaGuardia main­
tains that many Representatives were undecided as to the course that 
the United States should pursue. The President's message helped them 
reach a decision. Blum, Woodrow Wilson, 129-30, stresses the in­
spirational quality of Wilson's speech, noting how it overcame 
the doubts of many Americans and gave them a belief that, after 
their tribulations, there would be a new freedom.
4position? Thirdly, what implications did congressmen see for American 
foreign policy because of involvement in the European war? Previous 
historical studies of American entrance into the war offer little, 
if any, information on these questions, since virtually all such 
studies have focused on the background to Wilson’s war message and 
have ignored the House after April 2, 1917. Given this limitation of 
past analyses, it appears in order to categorize the various inter­
pretations of American entry into war in relation to the three questions 
raised above.
Directly after the end of the First World War, historians split 
into two schools of interpretation on the causes of American interven­
tion. One argued that German plots against American liberty caused the 
United States to enter the war. The other school asserted that muni­
tion manufacturers, holders of European bonds, and their allies in the 
press pushed the country into a war to protect their economic interests. 
To these schools, the war represented a struggle to secure either 
world liberty or American prosperity. A third set of historians in 
the 1930's suggested that the ruthless German submarine warfare 
against the United States forced American intervention. After World 
War II, a fourth group of historians advanced the view that interven­
tion came only when Wilson realized the danger to American security 
from domination of Europe.6
g
Paul Birdsall, "The Second Decade of Peace Conference History," 
Journal of Modern History, XI (September, 1939), 362-78; Richard W. 
Leopold, "The Problem of American Intervention," World Politics, II 
(April, 1950), 405-25; Selig Adler, "The War Guilt Question and American 
Disillusionment, 1918-1928," Journal of Modern History, XXIII (March, 
1951), 1-28; Daniel M. Smith, "National Interest and American Inter­
vention, 1917: A Historiographical Appraisal," Journal of American
History, LII (June, 1965), 5-24; and Warren I. Cohen, The American
5As to the second question— which relates to the groups favoring 
or opposing intervention— several historians have delineated conflicting 
elements. John Milton Cooper, in a monograph on the pre-war pre­
paredness controversy, sees the existence of two main positions on 
American involvement before April 1917, with both positions including 
two sub-groups. One main group he labels isolationists, while the 
other he calls internationalists. Each group consisted of two sub­
groups, with isolationists and internationalists falling into both 
idealist and ultranationalists camps. He does not argue for an exact 
and neat dichotomy, because these prewar groups overlapped.  ^ The 
tendency of individuals, he maintains, was to fall into groups 
opposing involvement in world affairs or advocating a larger role in 
world affairs for reasons either having to do with American ideals 
or American self-interest.®
Besides naming isolationist and internationalist groups, his­
torians have also investigated the activities and positions of pro­
gressive elements. In an article, William E. Leuchtenburg, who bases 
his view on a study of non-Congressional progressives, argues that
Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago:
University, 1967).
^John Milton Cooper, The Vanity of Power: American Isolationa-
lism and the First World War, 1917-1919 (Westport Ct: Greenwood
Publishing Corp., 1969), 1-3.
®Ibid., 86-99, 132, 195-99. Cooper names a number of Congress­
men who served in the 65th Congress. Their activities as to U. S. 
entry into the war and as to American policy toward Europe will be 
traced in the body of the dissertation. Lloyd Ambrosius, "Wilson, the 
Republicans and French Security After World War I," Journal' of American 
History, LIX (September, 1972), 341-52, rejects the implication of 
Cooper's thesis that Republicans began to coalesce around an iso­
lationist position in opposition to Wilson's internationalism.
6most progressives were imperialists. The reason he gives for this 
conclusion is that progressives held a nationalistic belief in the 
American mission. A few years after the appearance of the Leuchtenburg 
article, Arthur Link offered the contesting thesis that instead of 
being interventionists, the progressives were isolationists. In his 
book Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, he wrote of the progres­
sive belief that since America had a special mission to purify herself 
and offer herself as an example, the United States should remain aloof 
from a decadent Europe. Also pulling them toward isolationism, he 
writes, was their assumption that munition makers, bankers, and 
special economic interest groups started wars.^
The wide divergence between Link and Leuchtenburg can be traced 
to the fact that they studied different progressives— Leuchtenburg 
non-congressional figures and Link mostly congressmen. Historians 
who have written since Link and Leuchtenburg's work appeared, bear out 
this distinction between the attitudes of progressives inside and out­
side Congress. Thus, J. A. Thompson, on the one hand, finds most 
progressive publicists of the war era coming to support intervention 
as a means of furthering reform.^ On the other hand, several
^William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The
Progressive Movement and Foreign Policy," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XXXIX (December, 1952), 482-504; Link, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive Era, 180-82; and Eric Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, A 
History of Modern American Reform (New York: Knopf, 1952), 270-73,
241-^2, agrees with Link. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform,
From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Knopf, 1956), 293-94, follows
Leuchtenburg, but Hofstadter does note a pacifist agrarian wing of 
progressivism opposed to war.
1°J. A. Thompson, "American Progressive Publicists and the First 
World War, 1914-1917," Journal of American History, LVIII (September, 
1971), 364-83. Walter Trattner, "Progressivism and World War I,"
Mid-America, XLIV (July, 1962), 131-45 concludes that it is
7historians agree that congressional progressives maintained a non­
interventionist orientation. To these writers— who include Walton 
Sutton, Howard Allen, Barton J. Bernstein, Franklin A. Leib, and John 
M. Cooper— most congressional progressives thought that preparedness 
and intervention were as likely to insulate reform as to stimulate it. 
With their convictions stronger for reform than for preparedness, 
congressional progressives reached a consensus opposing preparedness 
and American entry into war.
On the third question (about congressmen's thoughts on America's 
long-term foreign relations), historians have not offered many comments. 
Congressmen could not escape considering the question, however, for 
a war originating in Europe and requiring American troops in Europe 
raised completely novel problems to most congressmen. Either they 
realized this when they voted on the war resolution, or they increasingly
anachronistic to talk about the progressives and World War I. See 
also, Charles Hirschfield, "Nationalist Progressivism and World 
War I," Mid-America, XLV (July, 1963), 139-56. Allen F. Davis, 
Spearheads for Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971),
219-20, studied the social welfare side of progressivism, adds the 
interesting note that many social workers came to wholehearted support 
of the war once it began, even though they had originally opposed 
American involvement. Cf. J. A. Thompson, "An Imperialist and the 
First World War: The Case of Albert B. Beveridge," Journal of
American Studies, V (August, 1971), 133-50.
■^Walter Sutton, "Republican Progressive Senators and Prepared­
ness," Mid-America, LII (July, 1970), 155-76; Howard Allen, "Repub­
lican Reformers and Foreign Policy, 1913-1917," Mid-American, XLIV 
(October, 1962), 222-29; Barton J. Berstein and Franklin A. Leib, 
"Progressive Republican Senators and American Imperialism, 1898-1916:
A Reappraisal," Mid-America, L (July, 1968), 163-205; and John M. 
Cooper, Jr., "Progressivism and American Foreign Policy: A
Reconsideration," Mid-America, LI (October, 1969), 260-77.
became aware as the war ground toward a conclusion.12 Even if the 
congressmen understood how the decision for war would affect American 
foreign policy, the question becomes one of whether or not they agreed 
with the Wilsonion vision of the future. Publicists at the time and 
historians since have doubted that most congressmen agreed with Wilson' 
goals. It is, however, a question which has not been studied in
I O
relation to the House.
The historiographical literature on the entrance into the war, 
although it does not often touch directly on the war House, is a de­
finite aid for this study. By making use of this literature as a 
background, this study will delineate the thought and the groupings 
of the House on the issues of war and peace. First, quantitative 
techniques and non-quantitative sources can be used to locate indi­
vidual and group opinion on questions of war and foreign policy.
Second, groups will be studied for regional, partisan, and ideological
12It is difficult to measure the exact distinction congressmen 
made between American entry into war and aims of the war. One 
Congressman, C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa), in a personal letter did 
make this distinction when he noted in April, 1917, that Wilson has 
set the war on a high plane for democracy and for the democratization 
of autocratic Germany. C. William Ramseyer to personal (no name),
April 29, 1917, Ramseyer Papers, Archives, Iowa State University 
Library. In the House debates, usually causes and aims are not often 
clearly distinguished. Of course, as the war drew to a close, all 
Congressmen became aware of Wilson's goals.
13Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, XII (August 4, 
1917), 21, reported that very few Congressmen either understood Wilson' 
war aims or supported them. The historiographical debate over Wilson's 
aims, particularly for the League of Nations, and the response of 
Congress to his plans has centered on the Senate. Little has been 
written on the House. See Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables; The 
Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1970) for one study concentrating on the Senate. For 
historiography on the League of Nations controversy, see ibid., 189- 
195.
9characteristics. Once these are defined, the thought and behavior 
of each group can be characterized and compared.
Besides raising the issue of involvement in war and the future 
course of American foreign policy, Wilson's war message had implications 
for progressive reform at home. On one level, Wilson in his message 
called for the subordination of all the nation's energies to the over­
riding purpose of winning the war. At the same time, Wilson also 
fashioned progressive ideals to the service of the war and interna­
tionalism. This ambivalence— his shelving of domestic reform for the 
duration of the war, while at the same time proclaiming the aims of 
the conflict in the language of progressivism— has troubled his­
torians, since they can find evidence that the war ended progressive 
reform at home but also that it extended the reform mentality to the 
world— at least to Europe. W h e t h e r  reform gained strength, suffered 
an irreversible set-back, or changed into "liberalism" are some of 
the questions they have forwarded. However, they have not studied 
these questions in relation to the 65th House.
Historians are sharply divided over the war's impact on reform.
In a review article, Hebert Margulies notes that some historians, 
among them Eric Goldman and Richard Hofstadter, see both an in­
tellectual and political decline even before the start of the war.
l^This ambivalence is one of the most basic issues for the entire 
war. It took several different forms and cut across issues in varying 
ways. Thus, the war could be for democracy, yet there could be re­
pression at home. Or war measures were not advocated for their own 
sake but for the necessity of war; yet they would also be promoted as 
progressive. Or the nation would go all out to win the war, yet long to 
return to "normal" conditions. Groups in Congress became supporters 
of measures they would not normally support, and opponents of measures 
they normally supported. The resulting tension did not help clarify 
the House's response to the post-war world.
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By linking the war to Progressive values, Hofstadter argues, Wilson 
insured not only a decline, which was already occurring, but also 
disillusionment and reaction.Taking an opposing view is Stanley 
Shapiro, who argues that the war stimulated a period of positive in­
tellectual growth for the movement. Many citizens realized, as they 
never had before, the deepness and complexity of many social ills. 
Charles Hirschfeld adds the thought that the war experience also gave 
the ones having this new awareness a sense of the method by which 
government action and planning could handle the problems. He and 
Shapiro conclude that the ground work for a new "liberalism," which 
would fully develop in the 1930's, was thus laid.^® Robert Wiebe, 
the author of the important interpretation, The Search for Order, 
agrees that the period was one of development for the movement. But 
since he has a different interpretation of Progressivism, he does not
see the war as launching new reform plans. Rather, the progressive
:V
movement seized the war in order to discipline American society to the
Hebert Margulies, "Recent Opinion on the Decline of the 
Progressive Movement," Mid-America, XLV (October, 1963), 250-68; 
Hofstadter, Age of Reform, 272-82. See Charles Forcey, The Cross­
roads of Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961),
278-90, for a discussion of the disillusionment of three leading 
progressive intellectuals, Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Walter 
Lippmann.
■^Stanley Shapiro, "The Twilight of Reform: Advanced Progres­
sives After the Armistice," Historian, XXXIII (May, 1971), 347-64.
In another article Shapiro develops the argument of a brief flowering 
of reform in terms of a particular group and condition, namely labor 
and labor relations. See Stanley Shapiro, "The Great War and Reform: 
Liberalism and Labor, 1917-1919," Labor History, XII (Summer, 1971), 
323-44. There are others who take this line; for example, see Allen 
Davis, Spearheads for Reform, 219-22; also Charles Hirschfeld, 
"National Progressivism and World War I," Mid-America, XLV (July, 
1963), 154.
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1 7emerging bureaucratic order. Similarly, but from different per­
spectives, James Weinstein and Gabriel Koklo speak of the war as 
offering the progressive movement new opportunities, either as a "full
scale testing ground" for the new corporate liberalism, or as "the
18triumph of business in the most emphatic manner possible." Finally, 
some historians see the war and the period shortly thereafter as a 
time in which the progressive Wilsonion coalition split into discon­
nected and ineffective splinters.^®
All of these viewpoints, in one manner or another, suggest this 
problem: were the measures decided, the roll calls voted, the ideals
phrased, and the post-war reconstruction plans formulated in the 
context of an ongoing progressivism or in the context of a reaction 
against progressive reform? Once such a question is raised for con­
sideration, a more basic one inevitably demands attention: did
varieties of pre-war Progressivism exist, and, if so, did they find 
spokesmen in the war-time House? All writers recognize diversity in 
the Progressive Movement; all those who argue for a central nature 
also concede the coexistence of groups separate from the main
1 7
Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order (New York: Hill and Wang,
Inc., 1966), 287, 293.
James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State 
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1968), 214, 218. Gabriel Koklo, The 
Triumph of Conservatism (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963),
287.
19Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1974), 194. Also David Burner, "The Breakup of the Wilson 
Coalition," Mid-America, XLV (January, 1963), 18-35. There are some 
writers who maintain that progressivism continued even into the 1920's 
though on a reduced scale. See Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to 
the Progressive Movement in the 1920's," American Historical Review,
LXIV (July, 1959), 833-51.
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strain.20 A recent article, however, so emphasizes the theme of 
diversity that the very reality of an entity called "the Progressive 
Movement" is called into doubt. In a provocative article, Peter Filene 
cogently argues that great confusion exists in the historiographical 
literature as to various ideals and supporters of the movement. Since 
he thinks the snarl cannot be disentangled, it is, he concludes, time 
to write an obituary for the movement.2^
For this study's purpose, it is premature to recite a eulogy. 
Instead, it is more fruitful to pursue the lines suggested by three 
other recent writers, John Buenker, Howard Allen, and Jerome Clubb.
Like Filene, they agree that the diversity of progressivism poses 
methodological problems for the historian, but the solution, Buenker 
states, is not to dismiss progressivism as non-existent. Preferably, 
historians should delineate the divergent reform groups, carefully 
defining the characteristics of the different groups. Since none 
of these groups formed a majority by itself, the next job of the
20An example of a book which notes the diversity but still 
finds a basic commonality is Otis L. Graham, Jr., An Encore for Reform: 
The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967), 4-5, 14.
21Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for the Progressive Movement," 
American Quarterly, XII (Spring, 1970), 20-34. Filene argues that 
the whole problem of historiography on the Progressive Era is that 
historians are trying to define something which never existed. His­
torians, he maintains, in support of this view, have failed to under­
stand what is meant by the word "movement," which he says is a collec­
tivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change and 
which has a program, values, membership, and supporters. In these 
terms, he concludes that historians have never been able to find any 
common denominators for the progressives. The trouble with Filene's 
view, even though it correctly points out the great variety within 
progressivism, is that it only establishes another definition for 
progressivism— a methodological definition rather than a substantive 
one. Such an approach fails to deal with the period.
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historian is to analyze how these distinct groups united into coali­
tions for legislative reform.22
Buenker's solution to the problem of diversity is simply to turn 
from studying the whole to researching individual groups. Allen and 
Clubb take up this idea and apply it to the study of several of the 
Congresses during the Progressive Era, though they did not include the 
65th House. In one sense, they argue that Congress itself constituted 
a special group within the Progressive movement. This was because 
congressional progressives viewed reform in light of their constituents' 
interests. Since most House progressives' constituents were largely 
non-urban, representatives did not often favor the proposals of urban 
progressives. In a second sense, Allen and Clubb note that congres­
sional progressivism was also split between parties. Although this 
division created problems for reform, Republican and Democrat pro­
gressives did at times overcome the dictates of partisan concerns and 
joined together to pass reform legislation.23
Buenker, Allen, and Clubb suggest that the job of the historian 
of the Progressive Movement is to carefully define groups within the 
movement. It is, however, necessary to go beyond this and show the 
connection between the groups. For example, the connection between 
the major parties and progressive groups is of primary importance.
22John D. Buenker, "The Progressive Era: A Search for a Syn­
thesis," Mid-America, LI (July, 1969), 175-93.
2^Howard W. Allen and Jerome Clubb, "Progressive Reform and the 
Political System," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LXV (July, 1974), 131- 
33, 136-37. Another recent article with a similar conclusion as to the 
clustering together of groups for reform is David Thelen, "Social 
Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism," Journal of American 
History,LVI (September, 1969), 323-41.
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It has been already noted that progressives were split between parties, 
but Allen and Clubb also point out that most progressives were in the 
Democratic party. Also, if progressivism had its adherents in the 
House, conservatism had its supporters, too. What separated progres­
sives from conservatives? Finally, progressivism showed certain 
geographical divisions. In particular, writers have emphasized that 
the South often acted as a distinct group in opposition to other 
regions. They are less sure, however, of the extent of progressive 
leanings among Southern congressmen. In many respects, therefore, 
progressivism cannot be treated in isolation from other possible House 
groupings.24
24The following listing is not meant to be exhaustive either in 
terms of possible divisions (groups) in the House or of possible 
sources. Many other divisions exist such as ethnic, agricultural, and 
urban groups, but this study will not be able to analyze them in any 
great detail. As to the studies to be named in this footnote, all 
particularly errqphasize certain groups.
Seward W. Livermore Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1916-18 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), 36, 49, the only full
length book on the War Congress, develops one of the main divisions, 
the partisan one. He also notes the existence of other divisions, 
such as conservatives and reactionaries. For the role of urban masses 
during progressivism, see J. Joseph Hutchmacher, "Liberalism and the 
Age of Reform," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (September, 
1962), 231-41. For geographical and ideological divisions, see I. A. 
Newby, "States Rights and Southern Congressmen During World War I," 
Phylon XXIV (September, 1963), 34-50. This, by the way, is the only 
journal article written directly and exclusively on the War Congress. 
Several articles focus on the South and reform: Dewey Grantham,
"Southern Congressional Leaders and the New Freedom, 1913-1917," Journal 
of Southern History, XII (November, 1947), 439-59; Dewey Grantham, 
"Southern Senators dnd the League of Nations," North Carolina Histori­
cal Review, XXVI (April, 1949), 187-205; Richard Abrams, "Woodrow Wilson 
and Southern Congressmen, 1913-1916," Journal of Southern History, XXII 
(July, 1956), 417-37; Ann Scott, "A Progressive Wind From the South," 
Journal of Southern History, XXIX (February, 1963), 53-70. For a more 
general discussion of geography and reform, see Howard Allen, "Geo­
graphy and Politics: Voting on Reform Issues in the United States
Senate, 1911-16," Journal of Southern History, XXVII (May, 1961),
216-28. Also, "Progressive Reform and the Political System," ibid.,
134.
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As evidenced by this review, recent historiography on progres­
sivism has focused on the many overlapping and divergent reform groups. 
This emphasis on the variegated nature of progressivism suggests the 
difficulties in defining progressivism's overall nature and even in 
naming its individual components. One approach to this problem is 
to locate progressive issues and progressive groups supporting the 
issues. If this method (which includes the use of the computer to 
analyze voting records) uncovers progressive elements, then the 
effects of the war on progressivism and the characteristics of pro­
gressivism can be discussed.
Wilson suggested in his war message a basic subject for the 
House's attention, namely, the legislation necessary for the mobili­
zation of the populace and the economy against the German enemy. 
Historians are unsure of the role of the House in the formulation of 
the war program. Many see the House as simply an obstacle in the way 
of the Administration's proposals, or as of little importance in the 
creation of the war program. Such views not only overlook the fact 
that Wilson had to seek Congressional authority for most war measures, 
but they also ignore the substantial service the House rendered in
pc
the evolution of the war program.
One phase of the war program involved the outlining of general
plans for the mobilization of the economy. Robert Cuff, in a book on
the War Industries Board, implies that the House only grudgingly
2^Daniel Beaver, Newton B. Baker and the American War Effort,
1917-1919 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 27-30,
discusses the conscription bill in relation to the House, but assigns
it no particular role in creating the measure. See, also, M. F.
Dimock, "Wilson as Legislative Leader," Journal of Politics, XIX
(February, 1957), 17.
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supported the Administration's war industry policy. Although the 
Administration sought a centralized and integrated war economy, ele­
ments in Congress, which Cuff identifies as progressive and Bryanite 
groups, remained hostile to giant economic management. He concludes 
that these elements obstructed plans of the war agencies, resisted
certain Administration bills in Congress, and in general balked at
26the whole idea of close government and business interaction.
Other historians hold a much different viewpoint of congressional 
reaction to war planning. James Weinstein writes that a basic prin­
ciple of war-time mobilization was the replacement of obsolete compe­
tition between companies in favor of cooperation between them. He 
indicates that the House expressed its approval of the shift by passing 
such measures as the Webb-Pomerene Commerce Act, which permitted 
corporation combinations in foreign trade.27 In separate books, Wiebe 
and Kolko support Weinstein's argument, concluding that the war en­
couraged Congress to accept centralization of the economy and large-
A n
scald cooperation-between government and busin&ss.
Another phase of the war program involved the enactment into law 
by the House of many particular war measures. The demands of the war
26Robert Cuff, The War Industries Board (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1973), 3, 104-07, 243-44. Cuff's book only occas- 
sionally looks at the reactions of Congress to war planning. This can 
be said also of the other books that are cited on this topic. They often 
have decided viewpoints, but the evidence for the position is very thin.
27Weinstein, The Liberal Ideal, 218.
28wiebe, The Search for Order, 293, 297-98; Kolko, The Triumph 
of Conservatism, 280-287. Making a similar connection to the post­
war world is Paul Koistinen, "The 'Industrial Military Complex' in 
Historical Perspective: The Interwar Years," Journal of American
History, LVI (March, 1970), 819-39.
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on the economy created varied and often novel proposals for House 
consideration. For example, the fundamental requirement of adequate 
war finances resulted in the passage of two revenue acts by the House. 
In another area of war management, Representatives passed acts to build 
housing in order that industries might care for war workers.29
A third phase of the war program involved issues which had ante­
cedents long before the war. One such measure was for the harnessing 
of water power, now needed for national war industries.30 A more 
important matter of long standing was the women's suffrage amendment. 
Its advocates promoted the amendment by claiming that it would spur 
the patriotism of women and fulfill the democratic ideals of the
•31
war. Similarly, the debate on the Prohibition amendment, which of 
course had its origins long before the war, transpired in the 
context of.the advantages or disadvantages for the war program.
For both of these amendments, the war affected the debates on them
29On taxes, see H. Larry Ingle, "The Repeal of the Revenue Act 
of 1918," North Carolina Historical Review, XLIV (Winter, 1967),
72-88.
30On water power, see J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American 
Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907-1921," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XLIV (June, 1957), 29-57; and Samuel P. Hays, 
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation
Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-4,
261-75. Both of these works on conservation direct some comments to 
the 65th Congress. The significant thing, however, is their opposing 
viewpoints: Bates argues that supporters of conservation were battlers
against special interests and business control in the interest of 
democracy, while Hays maintains that conservationists were concerned 
with science and efficiency, not democracy, and often had the support 
of large business groups.
31Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. pt. 1, 769. Opponents also 
used the war as a reason to oppose the amendment. There are few 
direct studies on the passage of the women's amendment; in particu­
lar, there are no vote analysis studies.
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and probably influenced the choices of those voting for and against 
them.32
In his war message, Wilson also directed the vigilance of the
House toward the problem of disloyalty and dissent during wartime.
Implying that war required a new sense of devotion to the United
States, Wilson both praised the fealty of the German population in
America and also warned them against any lapses from loyalty. He
concluded that "a hand of stem repression" would be promptly lifted
33against any who would impede the war effort by word or action.
Shortly after the President's speech, Administration supporters 
introduced the Espionage bill, which provided for the punishment of 
spies and dissenters. Historians have studied this bill both for its
32The historiographical literature supplies some useful ideas on 
prohibition and classifications of prohibitionists. Wiebe, The Search 
for Order, 287, places prohibition in the context of progressivism 
and the period's effort to discipline aliens, slum dwellers, and 
Negroes to the demands of industrial society. Prohibitionists are 
classed as repressive. Similar is John Kobler, Ardent Spirits; The 
Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1973),
180-199. Placing the ideas of prohibition and the prohibitionist in 
a different and more positive classification are: Paul Carter,
"Prohibition and Democracy, The Noble Experiment Reassessed," Wisconsin 
Magazine of History, LVI (Spring, 1973), 189-201; Robert Hohner, 
"Prohibitionists: Who Were They?," South Atlantic Quarterly, LXVIII 
(Autumn, 1969), 491-505; J. C. Burnham, "New Perspectives on the 
Prohibition 'Experiment' of the 1920's," Journal of Social History,
II (Fall, 1968), 51-68; S. J. Mennell "Prohibition: A Sociological
View," Journal of American Studies, III (December, 1969), 159-175; 
and James H. Timber lake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 
1900-1920 (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 1-3, 178-81. Timberlake connects
prohibition to both Progressivism and the war. He has little direct 
analysis, however, of the prohibition debates and votes in the House.
The classic study of the passage of prohibition, Peter H. Odegard, 
Pressure Politics, The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1929), 20, 32-3, 98, 166-74, emphasizes 
the Protestant nature of the movement, but goes little beyond this 
in describing groups for or against it.
33Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 120.
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impact on the violation of civil liberties and for its reflection of 
the attitudes of various groups in American society toward aliens 
and dissenters. William Preston traces the wartime loyalty laws 
passed by the House to a longstanding conflict between two traditions, 
one favoring openness, mobility, diversity, heterogeneity, and variety 
of opinions, the other demanding unity, conformity, and homogeneity.
The second tradition won an increasing number of victories from the 
1890's on, culminating with its triumph in World War I as intolerance 
of aliens and political radicals surged over all moderating restraints.34
Agreeing with Preston on the triumph of the repressive tradition 
during the war, H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite as joint authors of 
Opponents to War divide Preston's group into several components. These 
included Rooseveltian nationalists who wanted a role for the United 
States in world affairs, moral fundamentalists who saw the struggle 
as between God and the devil, superpatriots who placed the war above 
any moral considerations, and self-interested patriots who wanted 
repression for economic reasons. By the end of the war, the combi­
nation of these groups passed the Espionage and Sedition laws plus 
restrictive alien and immigration acts through the House.35
Even the armistice, many historians maintain, did not bring 
an end to the intolerance. Instead it persisted, helping to propagate 
many of the cultural aberrations common during the 1920's. Into the 
Twenties by Burl Noggle sees the war generating long-term impulses
34William Preston, Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppres­
sion of Radicals, 1903-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1963), 6-8.
35H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), 12-16, 214-16.
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against radicals, so-called subversives, and conscientious objectors. 
Only a few scattered congressmen, he writes, evidenced any concern 
for the fate of the dissenters. An article by Paul Murphy also 
points to the emotions fanned by the war as one of the basic sources 
for the proliferation of bigoted and repressive organizations during 
the 1920's. It was not, he writes, that the war created intolerant 
attitudes, for they had long existed. Instead, the war, by demanding 
extreme national unity and by failing to meet expectations, created 
a climate in which antipathies toward minorities could flourish."*®
The role of the House in the evolution of this emotional atmosphere 
will be a prime consideration.
36
Burl Noggle, Into the Twenties; The United States from Armistice 
to Normalcy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 84-85, 95.
Paul Murphy, "Sources and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920's," The 
Journal of American History, LI (June, 1964), 60-76. A review article 
on the subject of liberty and repression during and after World War I 
is John Braeman, "World War One and the Crisis of American Liberty," 
American Quarterly, XVI (Spring, 1969), 104-112. The war also raised 
questions as to the position of another important minority group, the 
Negroes. See Jane Scheiber and Harry N. Scheiber, "The Wilson Admini­
stration and the Wartime Mobilization of Black America," Labor History,
X (Summer, 1968), 433-458. This article gives some attention to Con­
gress and their reaction toward Blacks in wartime; for-examplep-it- 
notes racist fears as one reason for opposition to conscription.
Other sources, which focus on persons and institutions other than the 
65th House, suggest some lines for inquiry. Richard Sherman, "Republi­
cans and Negroes: The Lessons of Normalcy," Phylon, XXVII (Spring,
1966), 63-79; and Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party and Black 
America from McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933 (Charlottesville: University
of Virginia, 1973) 118, 132-35, suggest, by implication, that a study 
of the House ought to include a look at Republican party attitudes 
toward the Negro. Many studies suggest that Progressives ought to 
be studied for their racial attitudes. See, for example, Howard 
Allen, Aage R. Clausen, Jerome M. Clubb, "Political Reform and 
Negro Rights in the Senate, 1909-1915," Journal of Southern History, 
XXXVII (May, 1971), 191-212; Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "The Progres­
sive Movement and the Negro, 1898-1918," South Atlantic Quarterly,
LIV (October, 1953), 461-477. This study will include some consi­
deration of the Negro and attitudes of the 65th House toward him.
21
In his war message and later statements, Wilson attempted to 
control one of the normal House sentiments when he appealed for an end 
to partisanship. After the speech, both Republican and Democratic 
national party leaders echoed the call for the tabling of partisan 
animus. In the House, Champ Clark, after his election to the Speaker­
ship, declared that in this crisis "politics finds no place in this 
House." When the first session of the war House was drawing to a close, 
Clark claimed that, in fact, partisanship had "been temporarily 
banished from this House."37
Despite remarks such as Clark's, historians have widely dis­
agreed over whether, in truth, the usual Republican and Democratic 
partisanship vanished in a great swell of patriotic ardor. On one 
side of the issue, Malcolm Moos maintains that partisan opposition to 
war measures was practically unknown during most of the war. As 
evidence for this burial of partisanship, Moos argues that Republicans 
gave at least as much support to Administration war measures as did
Democrats. Partisanship only revived, he continues, in October, 1918,
38when Wilson called for the election of a Democratic Congress. Selig 
Adler agrees with Moos that partisanship abated for awhile, but he 
thinks its revival came before October, 1918. In fact, it appeared
37Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 108; ibid., 
pt. 8, 7918. Other Congressmen voiced similar hopes. Speaking for 
the Republicans, Thomas S. Williams (111.) claimed that his party 
had loyally supported the Administration's war measures. Another 
Republican in a private letter also said "there has not been and 
will not be any partisanship in this House." C. William Ramseyer 
to (no name), May 5, 1917, University of Iowa Library, Ramseyer 
Collection.
38Malcolm Moos, The Republicans, A History of Their Party 
(New York: Random House, 1956), 306.
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some time before Wilson again pleaded in May, 1919, for another 
adjournment of political infighting.30
Seward Livermore, in his book on the War Congress, rejects the 
contention of these authors that partisan politics ever adjourned at 
any time. Making the question of partisanship the very center of his 
study, Livermore argues that although the war did restrain undue 
factionalism in rhetoric for awhile, partisanship was only camouflaged. 
Wilson never enjoyed harmonious bi-partisan cooperation; instead, 
Republicans continously assaulted him with "instrumentalities" for 
curtailing his war powers.40
Adler and Livermore have established the importance of partisan­
ship and its relation to the battle for control of the war program 
and to the struggle for political supremacy. Still, they have failed 
to ask the further question of how divisive partisanship was for roll- 
call votes on issues of war and peace and domestic policy. In other 
words, past research on the War House has failed to discuss the degree
of partisanship that existed on individual measures and on a set of
41similar roll calls.
39Selig Adler, "The Congressional Election of 1918," South Atlan­
tic Quarterly, XXXVI (October, 1937), 447-65. George A. Mayer, The 
Republican Party, 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967),
350, offers a similar view. ,
40Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1-5, 15-16, 48. 
Livermore's book is a very well-written account of partisan politics. 
However, his concern is both broader and narrower than this study's.
He traces Congressional campaigns which this study will not cover. He 
also covers most of the major issues in Congress, looking at their 
implications for partisanship. He does not, however, ask if the voting 
on an issue and on all issues together reflects partisan voting 
patterns. Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, Chapters 2-8.
41There has been some statistical calculation of roll calls in 
the House. See Moos, The Republicans, 306. Here Moos states that on
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When the issue of partisanship is viewed in this manner, several 
studies on previous Congresses suggest possible results. Howard Allen 
and Jerome Clubb argue that Congresses during the Progressive era dis­
played high partisan voting on roll calls. They further add that the 
partisan voting reflected meaningful differences on issues.42 However, 
Allen and Clubb's contention must be checked very carefully as to the 
existence of differences between parties on issues. This is because 
the parties, although they might oppose each other, may not support 
a consistent policy on the issue but, rather, may swing back and forth 
for purposes of partisan advantage.43 Finally, studies on partisanship 
suggest that parties are the most significant group in explaining voting 
patterns of the House. David Brady concludes from his study of the 
McKinley Houses that political parties better explain divisions on 
roll call votes than do geographical divisions, urban-rural splits, 
and ethnic conflicts.44
fifty-one roll calls between April, 1917 and May, 1918, Republicans sup­
ported seventy-two percent of the roll calls on war measures, while 
Democrats supported the same roll calls sixty-seven percent of the time.
42Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Pro­
gressive Years: The Senate, 1909-1915," Journal of Politics, XXIX
(August, 1967), 567-84. Clubb and Allen, "Progressive Reform and the 
Political System," ibid., 132-33, repeats the same point on the level of 
partisanship. Their articles, plus the work of their students, have 
covered the voting records of many of the Congresses during the Pro­
gressive Era, but none of the studies include the 65th Congress.
43Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty: The Senate, 1909-1915," 575.
Their study does not include the 65th House. See W. Wayne Shannon,
Party Constituency and Congressional Voting: A Study of Legislative
Behavior in the United States House of Representatives (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 1968), 44-75, for a discussion of the degree 
of policy content in party opposition.
44David W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era, A 
Study of the McKinley House and a Comparison to the Modern House 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1973), 5-9, Ch.
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Given conditions in past Congresses and the evidence from his- ' 
torians on the 65th House, it is likely that Wilson's call for poli­
tical unity was not heeded. Undoubtedly, partisanship greatly in-
i
fluenced the atmosphere of the wartime Congress and also the votes on 
House roll calls. Thus, this study will focus on partisan divisions 
as one of the main groups influencing the actions of the House.
Wilson in his address stated that he would take the liberty from 
time to time to present war measures for congressional consideration.
i
Noting that Congress would have a role in the war effort, he emphasized 
the need for it to evaluate closely the proposals of the Executive 
departments. In effect, he advocated Executive leadership of the war, 
with Congress assuming the function of advising and consenting to 
Executive proposals.
To note Wilson's belief in Presidential leadership of Congress 
is to raise the specific question of Wilson's influence over the 
legislation of the war House and of Executive-House relations in 
general. Congressmen in April, 1917, feared that they would have 
. little part in the framing of the war program. They insisted that
II. Brady statistically studied several groups besides parties as to 
their importance in roll call voting. This study will be able to 
include only one such group, geographical divisions.
45Several articles discuss Wilson's conception of Executive 
leadership and of party leadership in relation to Congress: See Arthur
S. Link, "Woodrow Wilson and The Democratic Party," The Review of 
Politics, XVIII (April, 1956), 146-56; A. W. MacMahan, "Woodrow Wilson 
as Legislative Leader and Administrator," American Political Science 
Review, L (September, 1956), 641-75; and Dimock, "Wilson as Legislative 
Leader," 3-19. All these articles describe Wilson as having a strong 
conception of the President's role. They, moreover, maintain that 
he was highly successful in both controlling his own party and in 
gaining passage of legislation.
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they would not simply dissolve and go home; instead, they maintained 
that the Administration must draw them into its confidence.4®
Historians, however, have tended to think that the House in the 
end failed to do much in the shaping of war measures. M. E. Dimock, 
recognizing that the legislative process requires compromise by both 
the President and the Congress, nonetheless stresses Wilsonian leader­
ship in directing war plans. Even stronger in his stress on Wilson's 
role, Henry Turner argues that Wilson dominated the War House. He 
concludes that all major legislation of the war years originated in 
the Executive Branch and that Congress passed the laws substantially 
as the White House desired.47
Prom what has been written, it appears that Congress, rather 
than shaping or offering war proposals of its own, simply endorsed 
Wilson's. If this is true— and the position requires further study—  
Executive ascendancy has implications for another important aspect of 
Presidential-House relations, namely the degree of friendliness or 
animosity in the relations between the President and the House. This 
issue is the very thrust of Livermore's Wilson and the War Congress 
and its emphasis on partisanship. Undoubtedly, if partisanship were 
both as extreme and as bitter as he suggests, it would explain much 
of the catastrophe of Versailles and after.4®
^Throughout the 65th House comments were made on the House's role 
in the war program. For some early examples, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 1, 496-99.
47M. E. Dimoch, "Wilson as Legislative Leader," 4, 17, and Henry 
A. Turner, "Woodrow Wilson: Exponent of Executive Leadership,"
Western Political Quarterly, IV (March, 1951), 98, 111.
A O
Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, 245-47.
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While historians have studied the basic features of Wilson's
address— as it relates to war and peace, Progressivism, civil liberties
and dissenters, Prohibition, partisanship, and Presidential-House
relations— in studies of other Congresses they have largely ignored
the wartime House of Representatives in their analyses. Richard
Hofstadter and George Mowry have assumed that many of the issues with
which they were concerned lapsed before the war commenced or shortly
afterwards. Other historians, lacking specific studies to attack,
have overlooked the 65th House. But the 65th House, the link between
the Progressive years and the disillusioned twenties, has received
49little scholarly attention.
The 65th House is deserving of attention, not only to test the 
validity of a number of historiographical theses, but also to examine 
the composition of the House and the manner in which it operated. Many 
issues have been suggested and investigated in studies of other Con­
gresses during the Progressive period. To overlook the wartime House 
would be failing to test fully the issues suggested in these other 
works. Even if this were not so, the House is still worthy of research 
because of the importance of its institutional character and because
4
it convened in times both chaotic and momentous for the nation.
49Direct studies on the House are very few, apart from Seward 
Livermore's Woodrow Wilson and The War Congress, and I. A. Newby's 
article on "States Rights and Southern Congressmen." A few disserta­
tions are either being written now or have been recently finished. A 
few studies touch on the House peripherally, such as Fite and Peterson, 
Opponents of War, and Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-
Saloon League. Most other studies go right up to the 65th Congress and 
either stop there or skip to the next Congress. As is obvious from this 
historiographical review, these studies, however, did raise basic ques­
tions, which, when reshaped to fit the 65th House and the requirements 
of this dissertation, have provided the basis for most of the issues 
for research.
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In the present study several basic techniques have been used to 
determine the behavior of 457 congressmen who served during the 65th 
House. First, biographical material on social status, occupations, and 
political experience has been collected on each member. This data has 
been coded on computer cards and then correlated for the purpose of 
describing, the backgrounds of members and comparing Democratic and 
Republican members. It will also allow some comments on the institu­
tional qualities of the House.
A second method used to study the House has been the scaling of 
congressmen on certain issues. A statistical test called Guttman 
scaling was used to rank members on an issue. The use of scaling re­
quires the existence of a closely-related group of roll calls. Such 
roll calls can be ranked on an ordinal scale.from easiest-to-accept 
(the lowest scale position) to hardest-to-accept (the highest scale 
position). The technique rests on the assumption that "each legislator
has a more or less fixed attitude on each issue and that he votes
50against measures that are too strong for him to accept. If the 
assumption is correct and a scale of roll calls can be properly 
defined, then each legislator may be assigned a scale position, based 
on his voting record on a particular set of issues.
Another method employed is a simple tabular presentation showing 
the regional and party divisions occurring on selected roll calls. 
Theoretically, it would be ideal if all roll calls could be placed in 
a scale, but many roll calls will not correlate with other votes. In
50Charles M. Dollar and Richard J. Jensen, Historian's Guide to 
Statistics; Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), 116.
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these cases, simple tables can be used, thereby allowing some analysis 
of the roll calls.5*1'
Finally, non-quantifiable sources such as newspapers, manuscript 
collections, and government documents have been surveyed to evaluate 
the content and meaning of the members' actions on roll calls and non­
roll call matters. These sources will not merely determine the meaning 
of roll calls but will also aid in the location of groups within the 
House membership. The purpose of utilizing this particular approach 
is that it facilitates delineation of groups regarding both voting 
records and thought processes.52
In the following chapters the results of the combination of quan­
titative data and non-quantitative sources are presented. The initial 
concern is to examine the Representatives as a body and as individuals. 
Chapter II is an institutional and biographical profile of the House 
and its members.
5^The biographical, scaling, and tabular methods will be explained 
in greater detail when they are first used. All the methods require 
the use of the computer.
52For a survey of the application of quantitative methods in 
history, see Robert P. Swierenga, "Computers and American History:
The Impact of the 'New' Generation," Journal of American History, LX 
(March, 1974), 1045-70.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND PROSOPOGRAPHY OF 
THE 65TH HOUSE
The House of Representatives, when it convened in April, 1917, 
was subjected to severe institutional stresses. The 1916 election 
campaign had fomented division in the country over the issues of war 
and progressivism, though it also produced a winning coalition for 
Woodrow Wilson and his Democratic party. Since these issues carried 
over into the sessions of the 65th House, they helped to shape the 
ideologies and the structures that thereafter developed.
When the voters went to the polls, many cast their ballots on 
the issues of neutrality, American rights, and preparedness.1 Within 
Republican ranks, the former Rough Rider and Bull Mooser Teddy
^ink, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 240; and George E. 
Mowry, The California Progressives, (Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks,
1951, 1963), 243-250. Link writes of the campaign in terms of progres­
sivism and peace. Mowry stresses the progressive aspect on the state 
level in California. Josephson, Jeanette Rankin, 59, in a discussion 
of the first woman representative, shows the issues in a local Con­
gressional district campaign: The progressive ones of protection of
children, social justice, and, of course, women's suffrage. Josephson 
does not mention the peace issue though ironically Rankin would vote 
against American entry into the war. See, also, John C. Board, "The 
Lady From Montana," Montana, XIII (July, 1967), 4-5. Livermore,
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 5-6, emphasizes the preparedness 
issue. He also brings out a sectional issue that Republicans used very 
effectively in the North against the Democrats. Ibid., 9-10. The con­
sensus of the historiography suggests that the basic issues were 
peace and progressivism.
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Roosevelt spoke of a fierce defense of American rights against German 
violations, a position that attracted the support of pro-allied voters. 
However, the basic Republican platform and many individual GOP con­
gressional candidates called for a "straight and honest" neutrality, 
a stance that appealed to some German and Irish Americans.2 Though 
initially uncertain of his stance, President Wilson allowed his re- 
election supporters to trumpet the slogan "he kept us out of war." By 
the end of the caitpaign Wilson and his party had adopted the peace 
theme to such an extent that it became the accent of their addresses. 
Many groups, such as hyphenated Americans and women voters, selected 
Wilson and Democratic congressional candidates because they more 
clearly favored peace than the Republicans.3
Also influencing the electorate was the position of party and 
congressmen on progressivism. By the fall of 1916 Wilson and the 
Democrats could claim that they had enacted into law nearly all planks 
of the Progressive Party of 1912. As a result Wilson declared in his 
campaign speeches that the Democratic party stood for justice and the 
working people because progressivism had enacted such measures as the 
child-labor law and the eight-hour-day limitation for railroad workers.4 
In the opposition camp, the issue of progressivism proved confusing and 
divisive. The Republican's presidential candidate, Charles Evans 
Hughes, never effectively fashioned a positive program and at best
2Ibid., 5-8. Link, Woodrow Wilson, 230.
2Ibid., 247, 241; Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Con­
gress, 8.
4Link, Woodrow Wilson, 241; Washington Post, November 3,
1916, 1.
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offered fumbling criticism of Wilson's progressive leadership.® To 
many voters# such as laborers, farmers# former Progressive party 
supporters, and a large minority of Socialists# the election finally 
became a contest between progressive and conservative ideals, neces­
sitating a vote for Wilson and against Hughes.® Only future events 
would tell if the Democratic victory in this campaign over peace and 
progressivism, which made the party accountable to the public for their 
stewardship of these issues, hid pitfalls for them. In the meantime, 
the confused and divided Republicans could only hope for developments 
that might unite them and weaken the Democrats.
Even in triumph the Wilsonian coalition showed signs of weakness, 
as the Democrats lost seats to the Republicans in the House elections. 
The result was that for the first time in history elections for the 
House ended in a dead heat between the two major parties. Each had 
215 seats, and the balance of power lay in the hands of five minor- 
party members: a Socialist, an Independent, a Prohibitionist, and two
Progressives. In the previous House the Democrats had a majority of 
twenty-three (228 to the Republicans' 205), but in 1916 the Democrats 
suffered significant lossed in the Midwest, especially in Illinois,
^Link, Woodrow Wilson, 244; Moos, The Republicans, 287-88; George 
H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967), 343-45; and Washington Post, November 4, 1916, 1.
®Link, Woodrow Wilson, 241; Mowry, The California Progressives, 
243-50.
^John J. Broesamle, "The Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," The 
Progressive Era, ed., Lewis Gould (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1974), 112. Statistics on House elections can be found in the U. S. 
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to the Present, Bicentennial Edition (Washington, D.C.,
1975), 1804. The Republicans won 7.8 million votes to the Democrats'
7.4 million in the House elections.
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Indiana, and Wisconsin. Adding to the Democratic setbacks were the one 
or two seats garnered by the Republicans in New Jersey, Main, and 
Oklahoma. Democrats, nonetheless, retained strong hopes of organizing 
the next House when they offset these nearly disastrous losses with 
gains of several seats in Ohio and California and scattered individual
p
seats across the country.0
Clearly revealed by the House election results was the sectional 
nature of the Democratic coalition. Although the coalition consisted 
of various social, economic, and issue-oriented elements such as 
agrarians, urban workers, small businessmen, immigrants, women, and 
socialists, which cut across the country, its sectional basis was more 
notable than its national qualities. To Arthur Link, the Presidential 
electoral results demonstrate that the Wilsonian coalition represented 
a fight of the South and West against the industrial Northeast.9 
On the House level, this sectional support is also evident. Table 2-1 
shows that the Democrats failed to penetrate appreciably into the 
industrial Northeast. Instead, forty-five percent of the Democratic 
House members elected in 1916' came from the states of the Old Confede­
racy. If the Border states are added to the sections total, Southern
Q
Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 10-11; Washing­
ton Post, November 7, 1916, 2; ibid., November 11, 1916, 3. Historical 
Statistics, 1083, gives different line ups for the Democrats and the 
Republicans from Livermore. For 1915-1917, they list 230 Democrats,
196 Republicans, and nine independents. For 1917, Historical Statis­
tics shows 216 Democrats, 210 Republicans, and six independents. See 
footnote 10 on the numbers in the House.
9Arthur s. Link, Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace,
1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 161-64; Link,
Woodrow Wilson, 250-51; Mowry, The California Progressives, 243-73; 
Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," 111-12; and Livermore, 
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 240.
TABLE 2-1 
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION AND PARTY
NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
% # % # % # % # % # % # % # % #
Democrat 2 6 13 30 12 27 4 10 45 103 16 36 3 8 2 5 225
Republican 12 29 28 65 28 64 13 31 1 4 5 13 2 6 5 12 224
Totals for each region include all individuals seated by the House of Representatives including 
partial term replacements for members who died or resigned during their term and those who lost their 
seats during their term through a challenge of their seat. The House in 1917 had a limit of 435; special 
elections and appointments added twenty-two more members who sat sometime during the session. Several 
deaths occured, but some notable members resigned such as Carter Glass to become Secretary of the Treasury, 
and Irvine Lenroot to become a senator from Wisconsin. The source of the table is the Osiris III package, 
available for use at the Louisiana State University Computer Center; it is designed by the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political Research (ICPT), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The regional codes in this 
table and all subsequent tables are a modified version of the ICPR codes. NE (New England) includes 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. MA (Middle Atlanta) includes 
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania. ENC (East North Central) includes Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; WNC (West North Central), includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, South Dakota. SS (Solid South) includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. BS (Border States) includes Kentucky, Maryland, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia. MS (Mountain States) includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New. Mexico, Utah, Wyoming. PS (Pacific States) included California, Oregon, Washington. The original 
source used by the ICPR for this information on a Congressman's region was Lawrence F. Kennedy (comp.), 
Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, 1971), hereinafter cited as 
Biographical Directory.
to
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Democrats constituted more than sixty percent of the party's House 
membership. City machines in certain areas, however, did give the 
Democrats some strength in the Midwest and North Atlantic regions. Of 
course, the table also shows that the Republicans almost completely 
failed to muster any electoral strength in the South; but they did have 
strength across the rest of the country. The electoral pattern was not 
insignificant to the 65th House, since the Republicans would use the 
uneven sectional support of the Democrats, particularly their reliance 
on the South, as an effective propaganda tool against the Democrats.10 
To overcome the Republican appeal, the Democrats would have had to 
construct policies favorable to the Plains States, Midwest, and East.
The 1916 election alignments fitted into the electoral patterns 
which emerged after the watershed election of 1896. On the national 
level this meant that the Wilsonian coalition, although showing some 
differences from the Bryanite alliance in that it contained more urban, 
labor, and liberal elements, continued the earlier reliance on the 
South and West.11 Similarly, the 1916 national Republican party 
evidenced few differences from the McKinley coalition. On the con­
gressional level, the 1916 election returns followed a stable pattern 
relative to party competition within districts. In perhaps as many as 
thirty states no competition existed between parties. Only in the
10For evidence of the sectional appeal see Cong. Rec., 65th Cong.,
1 Sess., Vol. 55, pt. 5, 5073; and ibid., Pt. 7, 7261. Livermore, 
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 9, 169-176, notes Republicans found 
the appeal of sectionalism against the Democrats a beneficial weapon 
in both the 1916 and 1918 contests. Further, Leah Marcile Taylor, 
"Democratic Presidential Politics: 1918-1932," I (unpublished disser­
tation, Louisiana State University, 1973), 14-17, notes the problems 
and divisiveness that sectional balances had for issues and patronage 
from 1916 on in the Democratic Party.
11Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," 84-85, 110-12.
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Border states, a few Midwestern states, notably Indiana, Ohio, and
Illinois, and two Northeastern states, New Jersey and New York, did
12real competition continue. The basic alignments were firmly fixed 
in 1896, and the 1916 election results showed no significant devia­
tion.
The decrease of competition meant that fewer new members entered 
the House. In fact only seventy-one new members were elected to the 
65th House, the fewest in twenty years.3*3 For Congressmen who had 
served one or more terms, re-election in 1916 proved to be relatively 
easy. Table 2-2 presents a breakdown of an incumbent's likelihood 
of return.^ It demonstrates that members with one or two terms 
usually faced serious electoral opposition. As a congressman's 
tenure became longer, his re-election became progressively easier, 
although it is true that constituents at times could reject long-term 
incumbents. It should also be noted that not all of the forty-two
i
defeated members were turned out of office by the opposition party. 
Rejection by the party at the nominating stage reduced to thirty-five 
the number of seats that actually changed hands between the two parties. 3
^2Ibid. Charles 0. Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Congres­
sional Seats," Western Political Quarterly,' XVII (September, 1964), 
461-75, discusses several different time periods, noting the number 
of changes in the House composition. Turnover has decreased even 
more since 1932.
^Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, X (March 31, 
1917), 261-62. The number of seventy-one is at the time of election.
^The table's breakdown on defeated members and their length of 
service at the time of defeat was compiled from the Biographical Direc­
tory. See Randall B. Ripley, Congress; Process and Policy (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Co., 1975), 193-95, for a discussion on incumbent's 
re-election success over the years.
•^ Washington Post, November 10, 1916, 2.
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TABLE 2-
RETURN OP MEMBERS OP 
TO THE 65th
-2
THE 64th HOUSE 
HOUSE
Term Returned Retired Defeated
1st - 2nd 181 7 25
3rd - 4th 71 10 9
5th - 6th 39 5 2
7th - 8th 30 3 4
9th - 10th 20 2 2
11th - 12th 8 2 —
13th and more 7
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The election of 1916, though a heated contest, did not produce a 
significant turnover either of individuals or of parties.
Low electoral competition and high stability of tenure had 
several implications for the House. First, the knowledge of House 
operations, procedures, and mores was high among the membership since 
most had acquired House experience. Second, the.membership was accus­
tomed to the organized procedures of the House. New members, on the 
other hand, had less time to become disciplined to following the rules. 
Consequently, they would more likely act in an unpredictable manner, 
thereby disrupting House procedures. Longer tenure can, however, 
have destabilizing effects, as older members carve out their own 
fiefdoms on committees, holding at arm's length the party leaders.
At the very least, their influence on policy matters increases. Thus, 
they might weaken the President's influence with Congress and might 
block his legislative program. In any event, the 1916 election 
results sent to the House a membership and leadership who had secure 
tenure and long experience.
In this House membership, a variety of backgrounds were en­
compassed. All members, of course, had formed their outlooks on 
politics and on issues from their social, educational, and political 
experiences. If these formative experiences had been highly diverse, 
instability in House operations could ensue. Diversity, however, 
could be moderated through the recruitment procedures of political
^Jones, "Inter-Party Competition," 476, evaluates the decline 
in competition as meaning increased institutional stability in terms 
of policy and leadership.
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parties. The experience of members, as filtered through political
17parties, affected House stability.
Most of the 455 Congressmen left little substantial material 
regarding their personal and political backgrounds. Some leaders and 
even lesser figures have merited biographies. In a few cases, members 
wrote autobiographical accounts of their lives. For the vast majority 
tiie main source of information is the Biographical Directory of the 
American Congress. Several other sources do offer biographical infor­
mation, but these were used mainly to check the Biographical Directory 
and to supplement missing evidence.*-® These sources serve as the basis 
for the biographical remarks.
When representatives entered the House for their first term, a 
number could look back to subsistence environments that did not suggest 
future success or importance. Instead, their families were hardly 
able to provide for their own necessities, let alone furnish opportuni­
ties for their off-spring to advance in life. There were no surplus 
funds to provide for an education, no personal friends to offer crucial
l^David J. Rothman, Politics and Power, The United States Senate, 
1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 135-36, argues
that Senators of the Guilded Age went through an apprenticeship in 
which they learned to accommodate to party leadership and institu­
tional process. Much of his argument is based on the similarity in 
their backgrounds.
My own dissertation includes biographical data because I believe, 
as Rothman argues, that one source of unity or diversity derives from 
congressmen’s backgrounds. Allen and Clubb, "Progressive Reform and the 
Political System," 137-39, includes a discussion of biographical charac­
teristics of reformers and conservatives, though not of congressional 
ones.
*-8The other main biographical sources are The National Cyclopedia 
of American Biography, XVI-LIV (Clison, New Jersey: James T. White 
and Co., 1917-1973); and U. S. Congress, Congressional Directory, 
Congressional Document, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., January 1919.
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aid, no family name to open opportunities. These future House members 
struggled by themselves (Table 2-3).
Congressmen from these subsistence families had similar experi­
ences in growing-up. During one House debate, Otis Wingo (D-Ark) 
digressed from the normal proceedings in order to remind his colleagues 
of their common hardships as sons of farmers. He recalled that as 
a youth he awoke at daylight and went out barefooted to hoe sweet- 
potato hills all day long, "the meanest work a boy ever did, unless 
it be 'suckering' tobacco."^9 Others could remember equally hard farm 
eiqperiences, but some grew up in city and labor class backgrounds.
Homer Snyder (R-N.Y.), who was to become a leading manufacturer of
bicycles, had no help from laboring parents, and was compelled to
20leave school after a primary education to work in a factory. For 
these Congressmen their earlier experiences instilled a deep desire 
to acquire profitable skills enabling them to climb up into the 
ranks of the successful.
A somewhat larger percentage of members (forty-eight percent) 
were reared in more substantial settings. Whether rural or urban, 
skilled laborer or professional, the families of these members were 
able to assist their sons. Though incapable of providing luxury,
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 4, 3541.
Enrique Lopez-Mena, A Biography of Homer Synder (New York: Van 
Rees Press, 1935), 2. James B. Aswell's (La.-D) parents were poor 
cotton farmers who gave this future state superintendent of education 
no aid toward an education. Sandra Stringer, "James B. Aswell: Edu­
cation and Politician" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1970), 1-2. Naturally others had fathers who were sub­
sistence laborers, such as Frank Greene (R-Vt.) and Kenneth Keating 
(D-Col.). Finding evidence on parents' occupation and status is 
difficult since the Biographical Directory provides no such in­
formation .
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TABLE 2-3
HOUSE MEMBERS’ SOCIAL ORIGINS 
(Percent)
Members
Subsistence
34
Substantial
48
Elite
18
Undetermined
Number (34) (48) (18) (355)
See Appendix A
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such families were prepared to supply fvmds for education. Some of 
the families earned a less tangible asset, good reputations, which 
would facilitate entry into occupations. Nevertheless success had 
to be earned.
Most members from substantial backgrounds had known a father who
was hard working and who had often demanded industry from them at an ‘yy*~
early age. Their advantage over the members from subsistence families 
was not the avoidance of labor, but some assistance in their future 
careers. John Nance Garner's (D-Tex.) father was a relatively pros­
perous farmer who played a leading role in a small community. He
also worked hard on farm activities, and he made John help him with 
21the jobs. Similarly, many others from substantial farm backgrounds 
could recall long hours of doing farm chores. Towns and cities pro­
vided fewer domestic tasks, but this did not mean that jobs could 
not be found. In the case of Carter Glass (D-Va.), his father, who 
wrote and edited the local newspaper, was successful only to the extent 
that he could provide Carter with a primary education. After that,
Carter had to go to work in his father's profession as a newspaper 
22printer. Circumstances were eased and some doors were opened, but 
success was still largely the result of individual initiative.
The percentage (eighteen) from elite backgrounds is signifi­
cantly smaller than from subsistence and substantial ones.23
2^Bascom R. Timmons, Garner of Texas, a Personal History (New 
York: Harper, 1948), 5.
22James E. Palmer, Jr., Carter Glass, Unreconstructed Rebel 
(Roanoke: The Institute of American Biography, 1938), 16-17.
23The percentage of members from elite backgrounds is perhaps 
inflated. Material as to social backgrounds was not readily available
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Of course, eighteen percent represents a greater number of affluent 
families than in the total American population, which indicates that 
affluence eased the pathway to the House. Elite members had atypical 
social backgrounds: their birth into wealthy and notable families
afforded them many opportunities denied to most Americans. The family 
wealth and status of August Peabody Gardner (R-Mass.) permitted him 
an education at Harvard where he studied law. He never practiced 
law, however; instead, he managed his estate. At the same time, he 
married the daughter of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, fought in the 
Spanish-American War, and entered politics.24 Although those from 
privileged families could not win respect from other members without 
a display of abilities, their affluence gave them freedom for political 
activities.
Educational backgrounds varied significantly among House mem­
bers (Table 2-4). While two congressmen received little or no formal 
school training, eighty-five either went through the primary grades 
or through high school. For most, their experiences included at 
least some exposure to a college and a professional curriculum (368 
members). In acquiring their educations, members attended a variety 
of educational institutions. On the lower grade levels, some went to 
the classic one-room school house or the "old field schools" of the
for most congressmen. The ones for which evidence was found were 
usually the more well-known leaders. It is possible that most leaders 
came from elite backgrounds, while the average member more likely 
sprang from subsistence or substantial backgrounds. If that was the 
case, the members from elite families are over-represented by the 
eighteen percent figure.
24Washington Post, January 15, 1918, 1.
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TABLE 2-4
EDUCATION OF HOUSE MEMBERS 
(Percent)
Members Number
1. No formal Education .4 (2)
2. 1st - 8th Grades .9 (4)
3. High School 17.8 (81)
4. High School Graduate 
and/or Reading Law 9.5 (43)
5. College with possible 
professional training 30.3 (138)
6. College Graduate and 
Professional training 41.1 (187)
See Appendix A
44
South. One attended an Indian agency school, while others received 
their education from graded city schools or private academies.
Those with more advanced education attended schools ranging from small 
rural colleges such as King College (Bristol, Tennessee) to pres­
tigious institutions such as Yale and Harvard. During a period when 
there was no standard procedure for the education of lawyers, their 
training varied from reading law in an attorney's office to studying 
in law schools.2®
The most striking fact about the members1 education was the large 
percentage who at least attended college. A full seventy percent had 
enough desire to advance their training as far as college. In a period 
when few Americans went beyond the primary grades, such an interest 
reflected the ambition and the tenacity of the future congressmen. 
Included within this group of college students is a significant number 
from subsistence families (Table 2-5). Fully fifty percent of the 
group managed to find the resources necessary for a college education. 
One example was Fiorello LaGuardia (R-NY), whose musician father died 
before Fiorello could attend college. He entered the diplomatic 
corps after high school. Following a tour of duty in Europe from 
1902 to 1906, he returned to New York where he translated Italian and 
other languages at Ellis Island in the day and attended New York 
University law school at night. He eventually was graduated at 
age twenty-eight.2® Future congressmen from substantial backgrounds 
found access to college is easier than did LaGuardia, with only
2®Source of information on education experience was the 
Biographical Directory.
Biographical Directory, 1255-56.
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TABLE 2-5
EDUCATION AND SOCIAL ORIGINS 
(Percent)
Subsistence Substantial Elite Number
1. No formal — — — —
2. 1st - 8th Grades — — — —
3. High School 41 13 — (20)
4. High School plus 9 10 — (8)
5. College plus 29 35 44 (35)
6. College Graduate plus 21 42 56 (37)
See Appendix A
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twenty-three percent deciding that college was not what they desired. 
That 100 percent of the members from elite families attended college 
indicates both the value that elite members placed on a college 
education and the ease with which they could acquire it. Ultimately, 
social origins for most members became less important than a common 
educational experience and a common achievement in accomplishing a 
task.
Once a suitable education was acquired, the future congressmen
launched into their careers. A survey of members' vocations shows
that the majority either engaged in the practice of law exclusively or
in a combination of law and some other pursuit (Table 2-6). Sixty-one
percent were so employed, while the next most popular activity, a
combination of business, commerce, and agriculture, involved only
twenty percent. Under this heading were members with a wide variety
of activities. Franklin Mondell, an influential and conservative
Republican member from Wyoming, engaged in mercantile pursuits, mining,
27railway construction, oil exploration, and town development. No 
doubt he was exceptional, but a number of members acquired versatile 
backgrounds before they came to the House. The other nineteen percent 
of the House membership earned their incomes in the professions such 
as medicine (1.1 percent), finance-banking (two percent), commerce and 
trade (7.3 percent), manufacturing (2.6 percent), industrial labor 
(four percent), and agriculture (0.7 percent). The last figure is 
surprisingly low, particularly when it is realized that roughly forty 
percent of the total population in 1916 still engaged in agriculture. 
The percentage does, in fact, underestimate the members involved in
27Ibid., 1424.
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TABLE 2-6
OCCUPATIONS
(Percent)
Occupation Members Numbers
Lawyers 50 (231)
Other Professions 1.1 (5)
Finance-Banking 2 (9)
Commerce-Trade 7.3 (33)
Industry 2.6 (12)
Agriculture .7 (3)
Laborer 4 (18)
Law and Other 11 (50)
Multiple Activities 20 (94)
See Appendix A
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agriculture, since the proper figure is obscured by agriculture's 
integration into multiple occupations. When this is taken into account, 
the total number of agriculturalists increases to 5.6 percent. Even 
with the larger figure, it is quite clear that agriculturalists were 
underrepresented by the House membership. On the other hand, the 
legal profession was overrepresented in comparison to the total 
population. This high percent of lawyers increased uniformity of 
experiences and added respect for legal and organized procedures.
Before election to the House, most members had won election to 
city, county, or state positions. A number of House members, all of 
whom were lawyers, had been prosecuting attorneys (Tables 2-7 & 8).
With numerous opportunities for capturing the public eye, the position 
of prosecuting attorney proved attractive to many ambitious lawyers. 
Lawyers continued to be influential in other political offices, but 
the other occupations now fully participated in the holding of poli­
tical offices. Through election to local positions such as a city 
councilman and city mayor, businessmen, agriculturalists, and even 
laborers could find opportunities for political experience. If the 
door to Congress did not open after a stint in local government, the 
aspiring politician could seek office at the state level. In fact, 
many House members from all occupations had served in both local and 
state level political positions. A small number of lawyers (ten 
altogether) held positions of prosecuting attorney, county or city 
official, and state representative before moving on to Congress.28 
More commonplace was the experience of real estate operator William 
F. James (R-Mich.), who entered city government in Detroit, became
28Ibid., 1859
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TABLE 2-7
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 
(Percent)
Political Position Yes Nuiribers No Nuiribers
Prosecuting Attorney 15 (72) 84 (383)
Local Government 30 (.138) 69 (317)
State Government 49 (226) 50 (229)
Governor 0.9 (4) 99.1 (451)
Party Official 47 217 52 (238)
See Appendix A
TABLE 2-8
OCCUPATIONS AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 
(Percentage)
Occupations
Prosecuting
Attorney
Local
Government
State
Government
Party
Official
Lawyers 24 35 55 50
Professions 20 20 20
Finance-Banking 33 77 44
Commerce-Trade 21 45 45
Industry 25 33 58
Agriculture 33 66 66
Laborer 38 33 44
Law and Other 20 34 48 50
Multiple Activities 19 42 41
mayor, and then won election to the state senate.^® An honor won by 
very few, regardless of occupation, was election as governor of a 
state. Only four members of the 1916 House had served terms as
i
governors before going to Washington. Many members from most occu­
pations acquired training from tenure on a party committee or from 
election as a delegate to a national convention. An interesting occu­
pational exception is the professions other than law, where four of 
the five professionals had acquired no party experience before their 
House election. The small number preconcludes definite remarks, but 
it is possible that the. four professionals who failed to hold party 
positions viewed politics not as a career but as a means to enact 
various policies. Congressmen from the other occupations, as indica­
ted by the large number (forty-seven percent), who served in party 
posts, considered politics a profession and election to the House as 
the apex of a career.
The degree of professionalism of the House membership is also 
reflected in the extent of their political experience (Table 2-9). 
Before election to the House, very few members (2.6 percent) had 
received extensive training in politics. They could not, as did 
Andrew Montague (D-Va.), claim election to the top state positions as 
governor and attorney general, appointment to diplomatic conferences, 
and selection to national party conventions. A greater number (28.8 
percent) could claim an average amount of party experience at the state 
or local level. For example, Irvine Lenroot (F.-Wis.) spent six years 
in the State House of Representatives, serving in four of those as 
speaker of the House.
29Ibid., 1182.
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TABLE 2-9
EXTENT OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 
(Percent)
Considerable Average Moderate Little or None
Members 2.6 28.8 ' 45.5 23.1
Number (12) (131) (207) (105)
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The majority of the 1916 group came to the House with a moderate 
amount of political experience (forty-five percent). Data from the 
Biographical Directory undoubtedly minimize the experience of a 
congressman. For example, Jeff McLemore (D-Tex.) published a newspaper 
and served in the State House of Representatives for four years while 
at the same time serving on the Austin city council. He also held the 
post of State Democratic Secretary for several years. Nonetheless, 
he was counted as having only moderate experience. Some representa­
tives (twenty-three percent) did, in fact, come to Congress with little 
experience. A good example of such members is William Kettner (D-Cal.), 
who had won only a one-year term on the city council of Visulia before
on
he ran successfully for a House seat in 1912. w Most representatives, 
however, by the time they arrived in Washington had served relatively 
long apprenticeships in politics. Invariably, they came to the House 
not as amateurs or dilettantes but as professionals. Their experience 
had equipped them to succeed in a legislative system.
Diverse backgrounds need not cause disruption in Congress,
I
especially when variety functions to increase skills necessary for 
tasks facing the institution. Other structural forces also operated 
to prevent institutional instability. The House membership revealed 
a clear demarcation between the representatives with status and the 
newer, less important members. Although such a situation would 
apparently foment disruptive rivalry, it instead generated deference 
toward seniors by juniors as the latter hoped to inherit the power 
of the former.
30Ibid., 1425-26; 1283; 1388; and 1230.
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When freshmen Congressman— the first Congresswoman— Jeanette 
Rankin claimed her seat, sh“ told the press that she did not intend 
soon to engage the attention of the House by long speeches or to 
participate in the give-and-take of debates. Rather, she deemed it 
advisable as a new member to begin slowly, allowing herself time to 
develop opinions and a grasp of House operations.31 Most other new 
members apparently followed this reasoning with the notable exception 
of Fiorello LaGuardia (R-N.Y.). This future mayor of New York City
entered the House in 1917 after narrowly winning election in a normally
I
safe Democratic district. In such a circumstance, he was forced to
compile an impressive record quickly. Besides, as he wrote in his
autobiography, he could see no reason why he should not participate
in House debates. Soon taking part in debates, he also even offered
amendments to bills. Republican party leaders might have been more
accommodating to him because of his immigrant background and his close
district. LaGuardia, in any event, was not a typical low status
32freshman representative.
With 435 members in the House, unrestricted debate on a given 
bill was impossible. For example, a special rule restricted debate on
31Washington Post, April 2, 1917, 2.
32LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 132, 133, 134; and Howard 
Zinn, LaGuardia in Congress (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958),
13, 15. Leaders did seem to allow LaGuardia a great deal of leeway; 
at least he took advantage of any openings to become involved. The same 
is also true of Miss Rankin. She did not participate much in debate, 
but leaders gave her special recognition. For example, when the House 
established a special committee to hear bills on women's suffrage,
Rankin campaigned for the Republican nomination for chairman. She lost 
only because a strong anti-suffragist and party leader in the Republican 
caucus, Joseph Walsh (Mass.) demanded that seniority be followed. See 
New York Times, December 13, 1917, 9.
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the Women's Suffrage Amendment to an afternoon, preventing such a
senior member as Henry Cooper (Wis.), the ranking Republican member
33of the Foreign Affairs Committee, frbm receiving time to speak.
Congressmen often sought to circumvent the time restrictions by asking
for unanimous consent to extend their remarks in the Record. However,
leaders at times would prevent younger members from abusing this
privilege by objecting to their extension of remarks.34
Some statistical evidence demonstrates that freshmen did not
speak very often on the House floor as compared to the veteran member
35and party leaders (Table 2-10). The Congressional Record list 
all occasions- on which a member spoke on the House floor. By counting 
the number of times a member addressed the House and then placing the 
number on a scale from the most (code 1) to the least (code 4), the 
speaking habits of a member can be compared with those of other mem­
bers. Random selections of freshmen members, of party leaders and 
finally of all members irrespective of their positions were made.
An average for each classification of legislator was computed, thereby
Henry Allen Cooper to Miss Mattie French, October 22, 1918, 
Archives of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Cooper Papers.
34Representative Joseph Walsh (R-Mass.) had a reputation as one 
who objected to extension of remarks. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 
56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 747.
33The statistics for the table were compiled from the indexes 
of the Congressional Record. The method was to select every fifth 
freshman member and every fifth average member. Every party leader 
was included in the survey. Who the leaders are is explained on 
page 65a and 74. Moreover, only two of the three sessions were sur­
veyed, the first and third. Of course, random selections are not as 
good as a complete survey, but time would not permit more than a 
sampling. The codes and the numbers under the code are arbitrary. 
They do appear to produce meaningful results, ones that allow com­
parison between members.
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TABLE 2-10
FREQUENCY OF SPEAKING ON 
THE HOUSE FLOOR
Frequent 
(100 or More)
Moderate 
(50 to 90)
Little 
(20 to 49)
Hardly at All 
(0 to 19)
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4
Randon Selection 
of Leaders 1.86
Random Selection 
of all Members 3.10
Random Selection 
of Freshmen 3.86
f
I
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allowing comparison between groups. The results indicate that fresh­
men were more seen than heard. Unfamiliarity with House rules and 
desire for more experience restrained the freshman's verbosity. On 
the other hand, figures show that the leaders spoke frequently, an 
average of 1.86 with 1 the most and 4 the least. The average for all 
the House membership was greater than the freshmen average, 3.10 as 
compared to 3.86. Prom the speaking patterns of the House, it can 
be seen that men of experience and position dominated debates, with
the average freshman and even the average member only occasionally
36joining the discussion.
Besides maintaining a low profile in speaking, freshmen did not 
propose new pieces of legislation (Table 2-11). This may have been 
because they were not confident that their measures would gain a 
hearing. In any event, first term members introduced fewer bills and 
resolutions into the House and offered fewer motions during debates 
them other members.3^ Apparently, the leaders did not spend their 
time introducing bills. Instead they concentrated on passing a few 
bills. The average member introduced more bills than did those in
3®This conclusion must be taken with the qualification that since 
there were only a few leaders (thirty-seven), compared to ninety-two 
freshmen and 336 other members, floor debates saw much more of the 
average than is inplied by the remarks. The point is made in terms 
of proportions. There is a significant difference between a member 
who speaks at least one hundred times and one who speaks less than 
twenty times.
3^On the bills introduced and motions offered, the same basic 
techniques of selection were followed as on speaking practices.
Military pension bills were not counted. Since Congressmen often 
introduced many such bills for individual veterans and their widows, 
it was not deemed a sign of activity on the part of a Congressman but 
only the expected thing to do. Pension legislation, therefore, was 
not counted in computing the averages.
57
TABLE 2-11
FREQUENCY OF INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND 
OF MOTIONS OFFERED 
(Nuiribers)
Frequent 
(30 or More)
Moderate 
(20 to 29)
Little 
(10 to 19)
Hardly at All 
(0 to 9)
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4
Random Selection of 
Average Members 2.7
Random Selection 
of Leaders 3.1
Random Selection 
of Freshmen 3.7
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the other classifications/ probably because he had developed legisla­
tive experience in the passage of bills. On the other hand, he had 
not yet come into positions of authority which would direct his 
attention toward floor debates and more significant pieces of legis­
lation. The data on the introduction of bills only indicates again 
the significance of experience and tenure in House operations.
To understand the differences between members with varying 
lengths of tenure and different levels of status, it is necessary to 
examine also the committees on which members served. Here most clearly 
the principle of seniority became manifest, since seniority in House 
membership usually resulted in the better committee assignments. In 
the eight most important committees of the House, only eight positions
- 3 0
were filled by first term members. No freshmen were appointed to
- Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules, usually considered the three
most weighty assignments. As the importance of a committee decreased,
more freshmen would appear on the committee's roster. Thirty-five
39found their way onto the second-rank committees, but freshmen, such 
as Alvan Fuller (Prog.-Mass.), in most cases found themselves relegated
^®The eight most important committees were: Appropriations,
Banking and Currency, Rules, Ways and Means, Judiciary, Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs. The 
selection is arbitrary, but it is based on the amount of business 
they conducted on the House floor. The information was collected 
from the Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 1919, p. 195-204;
U. S. Congress, Congressional Directory, 64 Cong., 2 Sess., 183-92.
At the same time the eight freshmen found their way to these prestigious 
committees, fifty members with longer tenure were appointed. The im­
balance is another indication of importance of experience on assign­
ments .
* 3 Q
The second rank committees were: Agriculture, District of
Columbia, Post Office, Rivers and Harbors, Immigration and Naturali­
zation, Indian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Labor.
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to such third rank committees as Expenditures of the Interior Depart­
ment. What made Puller notable was not his lowly niche, but the fact 
that he protested his assignment. In his protest, Fuller wrote Speaker 
Clark a tart letter on the worthlessness of the committee. Fuller's 
revolt, instead of gaining him a better seat, caused several older 
members to dress him down on the House floor.^0 His humiliation 
served as an abject lesson for others aspiring to advance more swiftly 
than the system would tolerate.
Seemingly, such a situation would result in conflict between the 
generations. No revolt arose, because freshmen accepted their insig­
nificant role in House operations, believing that they had to secure 
a firm understanding in House ways first. Freshmen also saw the 
advantages of the different rankings: they envisioned that they
would eventually gain some of its benefits. If they did not personally 
profit, the low status member could at least see possible benefits 
to his region and party from seniority.41 For these reasons low
7
status members did not attempt to disrupt House activities. Their 
exclusion from leading roles on the floor and in the committee rooms 
functioned to increase the influence of experienced members.
The diverse background, experience, and status of House members 
flowed into the parties. A common populist image of the early twen­
tieth century pictured the Republican party as the party of business
40cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 3, 2738-43. 
Washington Post, February 26, 2. Ibid., February 28, 6.
^C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa) to Grimes, January 19, 1919, C. 
WilliamRamseyer Papers, University of Iowa Archives, was a second 
term congressman, who saw the Midwest as gaining much from seniority 
in the next Congress. See Randall B. Ripley, Congress in Process 
and Policy,63-65, on seniority and apprenticeship.
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and wealth. If this image is correct for the World War I period, 
the Republican ranks should include many members from elite back­
grounds. Furthermore, the party's membership should count among 
its number more industrialists, businessmen, and financiers than 
lawyers. Finally, the populist view would imply that these elite 
members would have temporarily abandoned their enterprises for a 
short tour in Congress in order to protect their profits. The 
Democrats, on the other hand, ought to include more members from 
modest, even deprived beginnings, more lawyers and agrarians, with 
longer careers in politics than the average Republican. In short, 
the membership of the two parties was supposedly drawn from contrasting 
milieus, thereby reflecting the clas.s conflicts in American society.
Actually, this popular image bears only a small resemblance to 
the reality. The popular view of Republicans as business men would 
argue two possibly contradictory theses. Either the Republican ought 
to come from subsistence families (as in the tradition of Horatio 
Alger) or from elite families. Though the sample is only partial, 
statistics do not indicate either possibility (Table 2-12). Instead, 
both parties recruited their cadres from all social classes on the same 
percentage scale. In one sense the popular view does have some vali­
dity because the classifications do hide some family differences worth . 
noting. The Democratic elite members included at least three Vir­
ginians from families of the old Southern planter aristocracy: Claude
Kitchin, Andrew Montague, and Walter Watson. No Republican elite 
member had similar planter connections. Likewise, Democratic and 
Republican subsistence families probably varied, with more Democrats 
from poor tenant farm families, and more Republicans from poor
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TABLE 2-12
SOCIAL STATUS AND PARTY 
(Percent)
Origin
PARTY
Republicans Democrats
Elite 19 18 '
Substantial 47 48
Subsistence 34 34
Number (58) (42)
Number Unknown (355)
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itinerant peddler parentage.42 Yet, the similar percentages do 
demonstrate that, as organizations seeking to win elections, political 
parties endeavored to recruit men who would perform well for the 
organization, not necessarily ones from certain class origins.
Educationally, more differences between the parties are to be 
found, but similarities still predominate (Table 2-13). The Republi­
cans selected more of their members with only high school education 
(twenty-two percent against twelve percent of the Democrats). Fewer 
Republicans, consequently, attended college or pursued post-graduate 
professional training, but the variation is not as great as in the 
lower grades (thirty-seven percent of the Republicans and forty-five 
percent of the Democrats). As an explanation for the variance in 
education, the Democrats inclined more toward occupations that were 
more likely to require a college education (law) than Republicans, 
who displayed more preference for diversified activities (Table 2-14). 
To a degree, the divergence also comes from a geographical influence. 
In comparison to other regions, the Southern and Border States, 
which provided the Democrats with a large portion of their members, 
sent delegations consisting mostly of lawyers (Table 2-15),43 Though
42The data in Table 2-12 and in the following tables on party and 
member backgrounds was compiled from Biographical Directory. For 
information on the family backgrounds of Kitchen, Montague, and Watson, 
see Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1937), 4; William E. Laren, Montague of Virginia 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965, 4-6; and Walter
Watson, Nine Notes on Southside Virginia (Richmond: State Library,
1925), 264. The comments on subsistence families were not drawn 
from any particular source. Rather, they were based on the occu­
pational characteristics of the North and South.
43The Southern and Border states did send significantly more law­
yers than some regions, though some others are relatively similar. Also, 
the Republican's and Democrat's variance on lawyers is not as noticeable 
in some regions, particularly in the East North Central Region.
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TABLE 2-13
EDUCATION AND PARTY 
(Percent)
PARTY
Education Republicans Democrats
None 0.9 —
First - Eighth 0.9 0.9
High School 22 12
High School Plus 8 10
College Plus 29 34
College - Graduate 37 45
Number (223) (226)
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TABLE 2-14
MAIN OCCUPATION AND PARTY 
(Percent)
PARTY
Occupation Republicans Democrats
Lawyer 31 62
Professions 0.9 1.3
Finance-Banking 2.2 1.8
Commerce-Trade 6.7 7.5
Industry 4.5 0.9
Agriculture 0.4 0.9
Laborer 4.9 3.1
Law-Other 12.6 8.8
Multiple Activities 28.7 13.3
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TABLE 2-15
MAIN OCCUPATION, PARTY AND REGION 
(Percent)
Occupation
REPUBLICAN (Region Party)
NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS
Lawyer 28 21 54 59 50 23 33 33
Professions — 1.6 — 31 — 7.7 — —
Finance-Banking 3.6 — 3.1 — — 7.7 — —
Commerce-Trade 7.1 9.4 4.7 6.3 — 7.7 — 8.3
Industry 3.6 6.5 4.7 — 25 7.7 — —
Agriculture 8.3
Laborer 7.1 6.3 3.1 — — 15 — 8.7
Law-Other 14 10 14 9.3 25 7.7 16 16
Multiple Activities 35 43 15 21 — 23 50 25
DEMOCRAT (Region Party)
NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS
Lawyer 50 40 51 22 75 63 50 80
Professions — — 3.4 — 1.0 2.8 — —
Finance-Banking 2.9 2.8 — —
Commerce-Trade 16 26 13 22 1.0 — 12.5 —
Industry — 3.3 — — 1.0
Agriculture — 3.3 2.8 — —
Laborer 16 3.3 6.9 11 — 2.8 12 —
Law-Other — 10 10 — 8.7 13 — —
Multiple Activities 16 13 13 44 9.7 11 25 20
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differences existed on education between the parties, more notable 
was the similarity.
Occupationally, the variance between parties becomes significant. 
The Democrats, who came more from the rural Southern states, sent to 
Congress a high percentage of small-town lawyers. The Republicans, 
coming more from the industrial areas, nominated more business- 
oriented elements. This is clearly seen in the category of multiple 
occupations (Table 2-14), with the Republicans having twice as many 
so engaged as the Democrats (twenty-eight percent of the Republicans 
to thirteen percent of the Democrats). The popular view of the parties 
contained an element of truth. Even so, more than fifty percent of 
the Republicans had law-related backgrounds. By 1917 the political 
parties were seeking out men with similar occupational attainments, 
probably because the parties agreed that a certain type of man was 
better disciplined to the organized practices of the parties and of 
the House.
Politically, the types of political experience and the extent 
of political experience again emphasizes the similarity between party 
member backgrounds. Interestingly enough, the higher percent of 
lawyers in the Democratic ranks did not result in proportionally a 
higher ratio for Democrats in comparison to Republicans as prosecuting 
attorneys (Table 2-16). There was a leveling of differences, because 
only fifty-eight percent of the Democratic lawyers became prosecuting 
attorneys when seventy-one percent would have equaled their proportion 
to all Democrats. A variation is found in the larger number of Demo­
crats elected to local government positions, but experience in the 
state posts and in party positions again was similar. The Republicans
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TABLE 2-16
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND PARTY 
(Percentage)
Political Experience
PARTY
Republicans Democrats
Prosecuting Attorney 13 18.6
Local Government 21 39
State Government 45 54
Party Official 43 53
Number (223) (226)
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did tend to have fewer of their numbers in these positions, but the 
difference is not significant.
The GOP encompassed a larger percentage with little or no 
political experience (twenty-nine percent versus the sixteen percent 
of the Democrats, Table 2-17). Offsetting this was a higher percent 
of Democrats who had moderate prior exposure to politics in comparison 
to Republicans (fifty-one percent of Democrats versus forty percent of 
the Republicans). As a result both parties had nearly equal percen­
tages in the lower two categories, sixty-nine percent of the Republi­
cans in comparison to sixty-seven percent of the Democrats. The 
popular view of Republicans as businessmen who took time out of a 
career for politics may be true. However, an equal number of Democrats 
did exactly the same thing. In the higher categories, approximately 
equal numbers of both parties had received extensive tours in politics 
(thirty-three percent of the Democrats and thirty percent of the 
Republicans). As to prior political experience, the popular image has 
little validity. Neither party had its ranks filled with political 
novices, but sent to Congress cadres with at least moderate levels 
of political training.
Statistics on the length of service in the House also showed 
that both parties were equally determined to retain members for long 
careers in the House (Table 2-18). In the early days of the Republic, 
the esteem with which members held their positions was evidently low. 
Rather than serving for long periods, they declined re-election or 
they often simply resigned from the Congress to which they won election 
in order to take up a state post.44 By the 65th House, attitudes
44This remark is not based on any statistical evidence but
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TABLE 2-17
EXTENT OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 
AND PARTY 
(Percentage)
PARTY
Experience Republicans Democrats
Considerable 2.2 3.1
Average 28 29
Moderate 40 51
Little or None 29 16
TABLE 2-18
LENGTH OF SERVICE IN THE 
HOUSE AND PARTY 
(Percentage)
PARTY
Length of Service Republicans Democrats
1st Term 22 18
2— 3 44 35
4— 5 12 19
6— 7 5.8 11
8— 9 5.8 7.5
10— 11 4.0. 4.9
12— 13 3.1 0.4
14- 0.9 2.2
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toward holding a seat had changed, and lengths of service had in­
creased as more Democrats and Republicans saw the value of longer 
service. Those with the longest periods of tenure (eight to fourteen 
terms or longer) come almost equally from the two parties. In the 
range from four to eight terms, a difference between the parties 
becomes noticeable as the Democrats retained more members than did 
the Republicans. A possible explanation for this is that the Re­
publicans’setback of 1912 cost many Republicans their seats, including 
such party stalwarts as Uncle Joe Cannon, William B. McKinley (111.) 
and Nicholas Longworth (Ohio). These men were able to regain their 
seats in 1914, but most who lost in 1912 found themselves permanently 
ousted from the House. In any event, the variation of tenure afforded 
neither party an advantage. Both parties were equally committed to 
developing well-trailved members who were accustomed to the demands of 
House and party organization.
While the backgrounds of congressmen often transcended party 
lines, other structural features of the House revealed the influence 
of partisan divisions. Traditionally, the voting behavior of the House 
has been studied along party lines with the implication that political 
affiliation is the chief determinant of voting patterns. The utili­
zation of quantitative methods has not altered this emphasis on the 
party. Robert P. Swierenga, in a review of the quantitative litera­
ture on legislative voting behavior, concludes that political parties 
are the main influence on voting behavior.^ Explaining the
simply from a perusal of the Biographical Directory.
^Robert P. Swierenga, "Computers and American History: The
Inpact of the 'New' Generation," Journal of American History, LX 
(March, 1974), 1053.
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institutional behavior of the House exclusively in terms of political 
party has limitations. Yet, the role of party in the roll call voting 
of the House cannot be denied. ,
In assessing party voting in the 65th House, I have used several 
basic devices. Although these devices do not involve complex statis­
tical computations, some explanation of them is desirable. The first 
statistical device seeks to determine the frequency with which one 
party voted against the other. This is done by arbitrarily estab­
lishing some percentage level for what is called a "partisan vote." 
Such a vote occurs when at least a majority of a party votes yes and 
at least a majority of the second party votes no. Over the years, 
researchers have set different criteria regarding what constitutes 
the proper percentage for a partisan roll call vote in a particular 
Congress. In order to compare the 65th House with the findings on 
these other Congresses, the percentage level for calculating a par­
tisan vote has been established at two different ranks, ninety versus 
ninety percent, and fifty versus fifty percent. All the roll call 
votes of the 65th House were reviewed to determine the degree of par­
tisanship in the vote. Once this was found, the percentage of roll 
calls that fell into each category was determined.4®
46Lawrence Lowell was the first political scientist to estab­
lish a percentage for partisan opposition. He set the percentage 
at ninety versus ninety percent. Most writers believe this is too 
rigorous for American parties and, instead, use the much lower 
fifty percent versus fifty percent as the definition for party 
voting. Unless otherwise noted, when this study refers to a party 
vote, it is referring to the fifty percent versus fifty percent 
convention. See W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Con­
gressional Voting,(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1968), 3-5, 10-11.
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A second device utilized to assess party voting patterns finds 
party cohesion within individual parties on House roll calls. The 
particular cohesion device here employed was originally developed by 
Stuart Rice, and it simply shows the difference in percentage terms 
between the number of members of a party who voted "yea" on a par­
ticular vote and those in the party who voted "nay." When interpre­
tating the Rice Index, the score of the two parties should not be 
inferred as implying that the two parties voted against each other. In 
fact, it is possible that both parties voted together since the Index 
only measures unity within one party.4^ Another statistical tool 
finds the percentage of party members voting with the party majority 
on a roll call. Once a percentage is found for all roll calls, an 
overall average percentage of votes with the party is calculated. The 
purpose of the device is the same as the Rice Index, to determine 
cohesion within a party. A fourth device used in assessing the voting 
of parties involves tabulation of the times that party leaders voted 
with the majority of their party. By this device, a cumulative 
"party loyalty score" was calculated for the party leaders of the 
65th House.48
In evaluating the results obtained from these devices, a certain 
factor must be considered. Since the war brought before the House a
47See Anderson, et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 32-35, 
for a discussion of the Rice Index. The Rice Score can vary from 
zero to one-hundred.
48
The last two measures of party unity were suggested by Clubb 
and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 567-69. The 
percentage was included because Clubb and Allen calculated it for 
several Congresses, not because it added anything to the finding of 
the Rice Index.
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large number of war measures, the voting on a roll call was often
. 49unanimous or nearly so. All Houses have a certain number of votes
that are unanimous, since some votes are simply procedural, or the
issues are not very divisive. However, it seems that war measures
increased the number of indivisive ballots. The truth of this point
is evident when a comparison of the three sessions of the House, the
first two in wartime, the last after the war, is made as to the
numbers of unanimous roll calls (Table 2-19). The first and second
sessions have similar percentages of about thirty but the last session
drops to nineteen percent. Throughout the first two sessions the
Administration presented measures as necessary for the war effort,
and though Republicans may not have liked them, they voted for them
nonetheless. With the return of peace, Republicans dropped their
support of Administration proposals and unanimous voting declined.
In short, war-induced patriotism increased the number of unanimous
roll calls in the first two sessions. When peace returned, patriotism
wanned and unanimous voting fell significantly.
Obviously, these devices permit only limited analysis. Still, 
they do allow comparison with other Congresses that political scientists 
have already studied, thereby allowing classification of the 65th 
House as to the degree of its unity within parties and conflict be­
tween parties. From the classification of party leaders' loyalty, 
some comments on their role in unifying or disrupting the party can 
be made. Also, by making a classification of general legislative
49A unanimous vote is defined as occurring when less than one 
out of twelve voted against the majority. The ratio of twelve to 
one is a recognized statistical convention in determining unani­
mity.
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TABLE 2-19.
UNANIMOUS ROLL CALLS
1st Sess. 2nd Sess. 3rd Sess. Total
Percentage of 
Unanimous 
Roll Calls 29% 31% 19% 26.6%
Number of 
Unanimous 
Roll Calls (14) (45) (12) (71)
Number of 
Roll Calls 48* (146) (63) (266)
*The number of roll calls includes all ballots after the 
organizing ballots. The first nine ballots of the first session were 
votes organizing the House and were, therefore, partisan votes.
These "unrepresentative" organizing votes were deleted from the 
statistics. With them included the percentage of unanimous votes 
drops to twenty-four percent.
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issues and by ascertaining the Rice Index cohesion scores of parties, 
it will be possible to identify issues that tended to jeopardize 
party unity.
The first device-one measuring the number of times that a 
majority of Democrats voted in opposition to a majority of Republicans 
— shows the "party votes" in comparison to such votes in other Houses 
(Table 2-20). Given the general call for unity in wartime, the 
number of partisan votes should decline. On the fifty versus fifty 
level of party voting, the 65th House recorded fewer partisan votes 
(forty-seven percent) than any other Congress. Only the first Cleve­
land Congress (54th), when Congress experienced confusion from depres­
sion, free silver, and populism, and the first Kennedy Congress (87th), 
evidenced nearly as low an incidence of party votes. Most of the 
other Congresses were significantly higher in party voting, though 
the turmoil of the last Taft Congress (62nd) produced a vote more 
comparable to that of the 65th. On the level of the much more 
rigorous standard of ninety versus ninety, partisan voting in the 65th 
is still the lowest, with only ten percent of its roll calls dividing 
along party lines. Two Congresses, however, are very comparable with 
the 65th: the third Roosevelt Congress of 1937 (twelve percent) and
the Roosevelt War House of 1943 (eleven percent). At the other end 
of the spectrum are the McKinley House (fifty-one percent) and the 
Harding House (twenty-nine percent) both of which show a significant 
variation from the Wilson House. By any standard of comparison, there 
was a severe decline in partisan voting in the War House of 1917-18.
One might view the low partisan vote by the war time House as 
a reflection of "discord" that a party was sinply unable to agree
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TABLE 2-20
PARTY OPPOSITION VOTES 
(Percent)
Percentage of 
Roll Calls Which Congresses*
1st
Session
2nd
Session
Are Party Votes 65 54 55 61 62 63 67 87 75 78
90 Percent of 
Democrats Versus 
90 Percent of 
Republicans 10.9 51 29 12 11
50 Percent of 
Democrats Versus 
50 Percent of 
Republicans 47 53 76 79 60 75 70 52
♦Congress includes the Senate. All the percentages of the fifty 
versus fifty level except the 65th come from Senate voting records.
The results do not exactly compare, though there is no reason to 
suppose a great variation in the House in relation to the Senate.
This level does not refer to the combined House and Senate, but to 
the House alone for the 65th Congress and the Senate alone for the 
other Congresses. The ninety versus ninety percentages are all on 
the House and do not include the Senate. The computations at the 
ninety and fifty percent levels for the 65th House were compiled for 
this study. The statistics at the ninety percent level were drawn 
from W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency, and Congressional Voting;
A Study of Legislative Behavior in the United States House of Repre­
sentatives (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968),
5-10. The other figures at the fifty percent level were drawn from 
Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 571.
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on a position and, hence, rarely voted as a united bloc. This 
appears to be a sound interpretation of the last Cleveland Congress 
(1895-1897) and the last Taft Congress (1 9 1 1 -1 9 1 3 ),50 t»ut its appli­
cation to the 65th House is inaccurate. Partisanship declined due 
to greater unity of the parties, as both agreed in large measure to 
the war program. They were not voting against each other but with 
each other. Evidence for this fact is found in the high percentage 
of unanimous voting and also in the high cohesion rate for each party 
as recorded by the Rice Cohesion index and by the high average per­
centage of votes within each party. Despite the partisan voting that 
did occur, and whatever the degree of partisanship carried on covertly, 
the House during the war period was not rent by partisan conflict 
over roll calls.
Comparison with the voting records of other Congresses indicates 
the high internal party cohesion in the 65th House (Table 2-21).
During the first McKinley Congress and the first Harding Congress 
Republicans showed higher cohesion. For the other Congresses they 
were less united, particularly during the other Congresses of the 
Progressive Era. In comparison to the Republicans, the Democrats 
were slightly more unified in the 65th House. Compared with Democrats 
of other Congresses, they were very cohesive. Only during the first 
Taft Congress, when the Democrats were diligently striving to capi­
talize on Republican disunity, had they evidenced higher unity. The 
degree of Democratic cohesion is impressive particularly in comparison 
to the last Cleveland Congress (54th) and the first Kennedy Congress. 
(87th)
50Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years, 571-73."
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TABLE 2-21
AVERAGE PARTY UNITY SCORES
Congresses*
65 54 55 61 63 67 87
Democrats
Average Cohesion 
Score 73 51 71 78 70 71 57
Average Percentage 
of Votes With Party 86% 76% 85% 91% 86% 85% 78%
Republicans
Average Cohesion 
Score 67 57 80 64 62 71 62
Average Percentage 
of Votes With Party 83% 79% 88% 83% 83% 84% 83%
*The Table consists of the 65th House with all the other statis­
tics based on Senate roll call voting. The cohesion figures for the 
65th House were compiled for this study. All the other statistics 
were compiled by Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive 
Years," 571. The interpretation of the statistics for those Congresses 
comes from Clubb and Allen.
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Seemingly, the spirit of wartime helped to increase Republican 
unity and to maintain the high unity of the Democrats, while at the 
same time it tempered normal party differences. In the face of war, 
the House became as one, more than it ever had before. The Democrats 
were more successful than were Republicans in organizing party cohesion 
in the face of the war emergency, but this was to be expected. After 
all, the Administration was in the hands of the Democrats, and 
the natural tendency would be for the Democrats to support their 
Administration. In contrast, the Republicans faced conflicting 
pressures. In normal times, the dictates of partisanship and the 
desire to regain control of the government would have helped unite 
the Republicans against the Democrats. However, since the times 
were in no sense usual, the Republicans could not afford to oppose 
the Administration's war measures. If all Republicans had turned to 
support of the Administration's war measures, their cohesion average 
would have undoubtedly been higher. On various roll calls, however, 
some Republicans could not endorse all measures suggested by the 
Administration. On other roll calls, some Republicans found it im­
possible to support a partisan Republican vote on a war measure be­
cause they reasoned that the measure truly was needed for the war 
effort. In either event, Republicans' cohesion was lowered in 
comparison to the Democrats'.
Besides determining the average cohesion score on all roll calls, 
this study also computed an average cohesion score on individual 
issues. In order to ascertain this score, roll calls were arranged 
into sixteen categories in terms of the general issues to which they 
were relevant (Table 2-22). Then, the cohesion score was calculated
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TABLE 2-22
AVERAGE PARTY COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUES
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRAT
Average
Cohesion
Score
Average 
Percentage 
of Votes 
With Party
Average
Cohesion
Score
Average 
Percentage 
of Votes 
With Party
Number of 
Roll Calls
War Contracts 55 77% 61 80% . 4
Prohibition 68 84% 52 75% 5
Postal Services 61 81% 69 85% 5
Revenue 40 70% 88 94% 5
Railroad 51 75% 85 93% 3
Women's 
Suffrage 65 82% 10 54% 6
Conservation 40 70% 77 85% 11
Rivers and 
Harbors 37 69% 65 79% 13
Draft Votes 49 74% 49 74% 11
Veterans 58 79% 71 95% 5
Labor 61 80% 53 77% 14
Farm 47 74% 54 78% 17
Progressive 56 81% 63 84% 75
War 64 82% 72 87% 92
Economic 57 77% 54 77% 57
European Relief 35 67% 84 92% 2
Note. Determining which roll calls go into each issue category 
was done through evaluation of debates on the roll calls. Some roll 
calls may be misplaced, but the margin of error is probably small.
The Rice Cohesion Index and percentage voting with the party in this 
table must be read differently from the table on average party unity 
scores. The statistics in this table will show lower unity on most
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issues than the average on all roll calls for two reasons: first,
many of the unanimous votes which are included in Table 2-21 are not 
included in this table, because they were on procedural votes or were 
on trivial issues; second, the unanimous votes on the sixteen issues 
were excluded in this table, but not in Table 2-21.
Each issue was defined so as to logically include similar roll 
calls. Some roll calls fell into two or more of the issue categories. 
After a definition was decided for each issue, all the 266 roll calls 
of the 65th House were studied, usually by reading the debates in the 
Congressional Record before the roll call. Thus, the roll call could 
be determined as to which issue category it belonged. The definition 
of issues and examples of roll calls that went into an issue category 
are as follows: war contract were a set of roll calls over a bill to
give relief to contractors who had entered into verbal contracts 
during the war. Postal service includes the Burleson-Creel censorship 
and several roll calls on bills dealing with the postal service.
Revenue was defined as all roll calls on the 1917 Revenue Act. Rail­
road included three roll calls over the bill for the operation of the 
railroads under government control. Conservation was defined as all 
measures effecting the proper use of resources or wild life or water. 
Draft votes were defined as roll calls on the original conscription 
law and later roll calls which modified the original bill. Labor was 
defined as bills effecting the hours, wages, and conditions of govern­
ment workers or of all workers. Farm included all agricultural 
appropriation roll calls and other votes effecting the production of 
food. Progressive includes a number of different issues but the cri­
teria for inclusion was whether or not historians have labeled an 
issue progressive. Some examples of the roll calls included under 
progressive are: prohibition, women's suffrage, revenue, labor, the
declaration of war, conservation, aliens, draft, water power, and 
civil liberties. War was defined as any roll call which would not 
have occurred if there had not been the war. This includes many 
issues, from direct military bills, to revenue, to farm measures. 
Economic was defined as bills which involved increased government 
expenditures. All war measures were excluded, and it included mostly 
uninport ant bills on House operations along with military pension bills. 
European relief was a bill to provide food relief for Europe after 
the war.
on each issue, which thereby made it possible to find the issues 
that unified on divided parties. Both parties had high cohesion on 
the postal service and war legislation, and moderately high unity on 
the war contract, labor, progressive, draft, farm, and economic 
issues. On the first two issues the parties demonstrated nearly as 
high a cohesion as on all roll calls (See note on Table 2-22). On the 
latter six issues, the unity of the parties was nearly fifty or above, 
which shows a general agreement within the parties on the issues. In 
the case of the prohibition, railroads, and veteran issues, the parties, 
though united on the issues, were separated by ten or more points.
On the revenue, women's suffrage, conservation, rivers and harbors, 
and European relief issues, one or the other of the parties evidenced 
high disunity. The Republicans found unity elusive on revenue, 
conservation, rivers and harbors, and European relief measures.
Democrats found it similarly difficult to maintain any semblance of 
unity on the Women's Suffrage Amendment, and, in fact, recorded the 
lowest score for either party on an issue. But this was clearly the 
exception to the general Democratic tendency toward higher party 
solidarity than the Republicans.
In their study of the Congresses during the Progressive Era,
Howard Allen and Jerome Clubb conclude that divisive issues, while 
decreasing unity within parties from the high unity of the McKinley 
years, did not conspicuously affect party cohesion on roll calls.51 In 
the case of the 65th House, voting on roll calls transpired in times 
demanding unity, while simultaneously placing a premium on partisan
51-Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years," 
570-75.
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activity as each party jockeyed to benefit from the war. As a first 
result, partisan voting on roll calls declined from earlier Wilson 
Congresses, though it continued as a factor in nearly half the roll 
calls. As a second consequence, intra-party cohesion increased as 
cross-party division declined. In peace time, a party seeks high 
internal unity in opposition to the other party, but this was not 
the case during the 65th House. Instead, the high degree of unity 
flowed not from opposition but from agreement. Yet, this did not 
mean a real agreement on policy, since in wartime, when almost all 
measures of the first two sessions were billed as war measures, even 
greater unity might be expected. Partisanship in voting continued, 
but in more subtle forms.
The Republicans and Democrats organized their party activities 
through similar structures, consisting of a caupaign committee, a 
steering committee, a party caucas, party whips, and party leaders.
If political parties are nothing else, they are at least machines 
for the election of their members. To this end, each party organized 
congressional campaign committees, staffed by a chairman and several 
workers.
For the Republicans, Frank Woods (Iowa) served as chairman 
until the summer of 1918 when he was pressured out of his position. 
Woods had voted against the war resolution, which naturally rendered 
him a questionable leader of a party that hoped to attack the Wilson 
Administration for lax prosecution of the war. Adding to his de­
ficiency was his lame-duck status after his failure to gain 
re-nomination in the Iowa primary of August, 1918. Simeon
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Fess replaced him, a man whose war record could not be ques­
tioned.52
On the Democratic side, Scott Ferris (Okla.) replaced Frank 
Doremus (Mich.) in March, 1918, because of Doremus' poor management 
of the last two congressional elections. In their positions, Fess 
and Ferris worked to raise campaign funds, develop campaign issues, 
and place campaign influence in the districts where it would most 
count.53
For the House, campaign chairmen and election campaigns had 
their influence. The chairmen themselves gained a measure of party 
status and a higher rank in the House. During the tenure of Woods 
and Doremus, the chairmen, however, were sources of embarrassment for 
the parties, decreasing their ability to develop effective campaign 
issues. This weakness was overcome with the appointments of Ferris
52See the following on the removal of Woods: New York Times,
July 3, 1918, 8; July 7, 1918, 22; August 24, 1918, 5; August 28,
1918, 13; September 2, 1918, 5. Woods had no desire to retire, but 
resigned only after being charged as pro-German by a Republican 
member, and shortly before the rest of the campaign committee demanded 
his resignation. See, James Robertson, "Progressives Elect Will H. 
Hays Republican National Chairman, 1918," Indian Magazine of History, 
LXVI (September, 1968), 185-90, for a discussion of not only the Old 
Guard-Progressive split in the Republican party but also of the plans 
of Hays to harmonize the party behind a strong war program and to 
attack the Administration for its war program. By the time the actual 
fall campaign had rolled into full form, this issue had shifted from 
the war program to the Wilson peace program. Fess fitted party needs 
well here also since he was a strong opponent of Wilson's League of 
Nations. See John Lewis Nethers, "Simeon D. Fess: Educator and Poli­
tician" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1964), 
232-33, 235-40, for a discussion of Fess as canpaign chairman and of 
his view on the League.
53See Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 112, 191, 
206, 218, for a discussion of Ferris's elevation to chairman and 
of the activities of the party chairman.
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and Fess, both of whom became assets to their respective parties.
In the case of Fess, the Republican triumph in the 1918 congressional 
elections caused a short boom for him as Speaker among the newly- 
elected Republican freshmen.
The whole process of winning elections also colored the atmos­
phere of the House, with the parties periodically taking time out of
debates on House bills to extol their own virtues and castigate their 
55opponent's. Elections were never far distant from the considerations 
of members, but other structures of the parties entered more directly 
into House operations than did the campaign committees.
Each party had a mechanism by which it assigned members to com­
mittee posts. The Republicans made appointments through a Committee 
on Committees, chaired by Minority Leader James Mann (111.). Apparent­
ly, the Committee also had party-housekeeping and policy-suggestion
responsibilities. These latter activities, however, were insigni-
56ficant, at least as far as can be determined from the sources.
Operating under a different arrangement from the Republicans, the
Democrats appointed committees through the Democratic members of the
Committee on Ways and Means. Because of the doubling of function,
Ways and Means was the most important of House committee assignments
for the Democrats, and its chairman Claude Kitchin (N.C.) served also
57as majority leader.
S^Nethers, "Simeon D. Fess," 240.
S^See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 9, 9601-06, 
9656, 9856-62, for some examples of partisan speech making.
^Richard Bolling, Power in the House; A History of the Leader­
ship of the House of Representatives(New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1968), 100; Washington Post, February 8, 1917, 2; February 26, 1917,
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Placing party members on committees was a difficult job for 
party leaders. It nonetheless proved a useful means by which to 
punish or placate the recalcitrant members, as the case demanded, 
and to reward the faithful. It was also a means by which party 
leaders could adjust geographical imbalances if they so desired.5® in 
the case of the Democrats, leaders had to balance the power between 
states by downgrading the committee assignments of the South and Border 
states. Table 2-23 demonstrates that Democratic party leaders con­
sidered geography in making committee assignments. Only two committees, 
Judiciary and Foreign Affairs, favored the South and the Border states, 
and the Judiciary imbalance can be explained by the greater percentage 
of lawyers coming from these areas as compared to other regions.
For the most important committees of Ways and Means, Rules, and Appro­
priations, the South and Border states were unrepresented. Obviously, 
the Democratic leadership was aware of the geographical imbalance, 
with the consequence that they adopted a conscious policy of mini­
mizing the Southern predominance. Republican geographical strategy 
reveals less design. In making assignments, the members of the Com­
mittee on Committees tended to over represent the Middle Atlantic and
2; June 2, 1917, 6. Newspaper accounts noted the establishment of 
the Committee on Committees in February and later the selection of 
a steering committee in June, but after that there is little or no 
evidence of its activities.
^Bolling, Power in the House, 90. Washington Post, March 31, 
1917, 1.
88Bolling, Power in the House, 65, 92. George Goodwin, The Little 
Legislators, Committees of Congress (Amherst: University of Massa­
chusetts Press, 1970), 70-71. As an example of these criteria being 
cited on the House floor for the selection of a new committee, see 
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 1, 848-50.
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TABLE 2-23 
GEOGRAPHICAL BALANCE OF COMMITTEES
Percentage __________ Committees* (Percent)
Republicans of Members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
NE 12 11 11- 11 11 11 — 22 11 11 25 22 11
MA 28 22 11 44 33 33 25 33 44 33 37 22 22
ENC 28 33 33 22 22 33 50 11 22 11 25 44 22
WNC 13 33 22 11 22 11 25 22 — 22 12 11 22
SS 1 — 11 11
BS 5 11 11 22
MS 2 — 11
PS 5 — — 11 — 11 — 11 11 11
Percentage Committees* (Percent)
Democrats of Members 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
NE 2 — 8 18 8 — — 8 8
MA 13 8 — 18 16 16 25 17 9 16 17 9 8
ENC 12 25 16 — 8 16 12 8 — 8 8 18 23
WNC 4 8 — 18 8 — 12 8 9 — — 9 8
SS 45 50 42 45 41 50 37 50 54 50 58 36 46
BS 16 8 16 — 8 8 12 8 18 25 16 27 7
MS 3 — 8
PS 2 8 8 __ 9
*Committees: 1 = Argiculture; 2 = Appropriations; 3 = Banking and
Currency; 4 = Post Office; 5 = Rivers and Harbors; 6 = Rules; 7 = Mili­
tary Affairs; 8 = Naval; 9 = Judiciary; 10 = Foreign Affairs; 11 = 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce; 12 = Ways and Means. Source of the 
information is Congressional Directory, 65 Cong., Sess. 3, 195-204.
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East North Central states, but the imbalance was not noticeable, 
except perhaps on the Rules and the Banking and Currency committees. 
Both parties faced difficulty in assigning seats to the Mountain 
States and Pacific States, probably because of the low percentage of 
members from these regions. These two regions could feel a justi­
fiable slight by the assigning committees of both parties. Any elec­
toral advantages a party won by geographical appeals would have to be 
based on factors other than the geographical distribution of seats.
The nucleus of the two parties' organization was the caucus.
Before 1917, its exact function and significance for each party as a 
unifier had varied greatly, but by 1917 the dissimilarities between 
the parties' caucuses had decreased. After the overthrow of Speaker 
Cannon's system in 1910 and 1911, the Republicans tried several new 
methods. From 1912 to 1917, the party held open-public sessions 
instead of closed caucuses. These seldom met, because little unani­
mity on policy existed between the Progressive and Old Guard factions. 
By early 1917, attitudes were changing, as conservatives pushed for a 
return to closed meetings and progressives demanded a stronger caucus 
to adopt a party platform. Closed sessions were revived, but no party 
platform resulted from their return.
For Democrats, the caucus had entailed much more than merely a 
means of selecting leaders, which was more the case for the Republicans.
^Bolling, Power in the House, 99-100; Washington Post, January 
12, 1917, 6; and January 25, 1917, 2. The Post stated that since the 
overthrow of Cannonism, the Republicans had not been able to harmonize 
differences, which prevented them from presenting an elective counter 
program to the Democrats. The caucus as a result became unimportant. 
But in 1917, A. J. Gardner (Mass.), a Progressive, and J. H. Moore 
(Penn.), a Conservative, attempted to revive the caucus as a means of 
creating policy.
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When the Democrats had combined .successfully with insurgent Republicans
to overthrow Cannon, they superseded his power with the authority of
the caucus. Speaker Champ Clark (Mo.) and Majority Leader Oscar W.
Underwood (Ala.) devised the binding caucus in 1913 as a new means to
formulate party policy and to hold the Democratic rank-in-file to it.
The system operated successfully, but when Underwood moved over to
the Senate and Kitchin replaced him in 1915 as majority leader, the
caucus declined as a means of mobilizing Democratic majorities. The
reasons for this are not absolutely certain, but it appears that first
of all Kitchin declined to utilize the binding caucus because he
opposed the Administration on preparedness measures; and, second,
President Wilson took a more personal role in directing House 
60Democrats. Therefore, in 1917, the caucus, though diminishing in 
significance for the Democrats and gaining in importance for the 
Republicans, did not fully serve either party as a tool to mobilize 
party majorities or to develop party policy.
Also ineffectively used by both parties to activate members was 
the position of party whip. Speaker Clark spoke of the whips as the 
right hands of the minority and majority leaders, with their main 
function being to ensure attendance of members when the party needed
60Randal Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1969), 61-62. Caucus rules stated that when two- 
thirds of the party voted in favor of a measure, all members had 
to vote for it on the floor. Also Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan 
to Wilson," The Progressive Era, 103.
®*The Democrats held caucuses on policy matters, but these 
did not appear too effective. For example, they met early in the war 
and agreed to pass only war measures during the special war session.
But when they got down to a specific "hot potato," in this case the 
Rivers and Harbors appropriation bill, they could not make a decision 
that they could enforce. See New York Times, April 20, 1917, 6.
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it. Yet, curiously enough, during the 65th House the Democrats had 
no member formally designated as whip. From investigation of floor 
debates, it appears that Democrats utilized the chairman reporting 
the particular bill under discussion as a whip. The Republicans 
did have a whip, Charles M. Hamilton (N.Y.), but he was not very active 
in carrying out the responsibilities of the position, probably because 
the Republicans were in a minority and did not have much need for a 
whip.63
Similar to the whips were individuals who performed different 
liaison functions and who closely watched debates. For the Democrats, 
the most notable person of this type was John Nance Garner (Tex.). 
Because of Kitchin's poor White House relations, Gamer served as 
contact man for the Administration in the House. Besides holding 
conferences with Wilson regularly, he also funneled information 
between departments and the House and informed House Democrats of 
the Administration position.
For the Republicans, two members, J. Hampton Moore (Penn.) and 
Martin Madden (111.), performed actively on the House floor. Moore 
was a member of the prestigious Ways and Means Committee and was also 
one of the five members of the Republican steering panel of the 
Committee on Committees. Madden was a leading Republican member of 
the Postal Committee who had wide influence on many policy matters.
With a combination of self-assurance and partisanship, Moore and Madden
62Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations," New Per­
spectives on The House of Representatives, ed., Nelson Polsey and 
Robert Reabody (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), 199-201.
63Ripley, "The Party Whig Organizations," 199-201; and 
Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1917, 6.
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addressed themselves to a wide variety of topics. In fact, they spoke
to such a degree that only Minority Leader Mann equalled in quantity
64their speaking habits.
Another leader very visible in the party system and in floor
debates was the chairman of a committee. A common thesis is that
since the overthrow of Cannon, the independent power of chairmen
had increased. The corollary to this view argues that the decreased
control of the Speaker over chairmen weakened party discipline
64over the voting behavior of members. That there had been some de­
crease in party voting since 1910 cannot be doubted, but it is ques-
65tionable if the expansion of the chairman's power was responsible.
A method for determining the chairmen's possible negative influence 
is available by computing their party loyalty score. If their 
own voting records were less cohesive than the average member's, it 
would indicate that their independence was disruptive of party soli­
darity. However, if the opposite is true, some other factors must be 
sought for the decrease in party voting (Table 2-24).
64 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 499. For 
an instance of Moore's partisanship, see his remarks about civil 
service appointments to the diplomatic service: That such appoint­
ments meant that only Democrats need apply. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 2, 1883-85. For Madden's attempt to dis­
comfort the Administration over its exemption of draft-age employees, 
see Washington Post, June 22, 1918, 6.
^Boiling, Power in the House, 105.
6^Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years,"
572, note the decrease party voting since 1910 and particularly 
since 1945. There was a decline in the Progressive years in party 
loyalty from the McKinley years, but more recent times show an even 
greater decline.
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TABLE 2-24
COMMITTEE LEADERS'* LOYALTY
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRAT
Average Loyalty Leaders Loyalty Average Loyalty Chairman Loyalty
85 80 85 84
*Not all committee chairmen were computed, only the more impor­
tant ones. The selection of whom to include as important committee
chairmen was necessarily an arbitrary process. The House had many 
committees which met rarely and conducted few hearings, such as the 
expenditure committees on executive departments. Others may have held 
hearings, but their subject area was not of national or House importance 
— such as the ones on pensions. The important committees were: Agri­
culture, Appropriations, Naval, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, Ways and Means, Merchant Marine, Military 
Affairs, Public Lands, Rules and Rivers and Harbors. Democratic 
chairmen were: Asbury F. Lever, J. Swagar Sherley, Thetus W. Sims,
Daniel E. Garrett, Edwin Y. Webb, Joshua W. Alexander, S. Herbert'
Dent, Jr., Lemuel P. Padgett, Scott Ferris, John H. Small, Edward 
W. Pou, and Claude Kitchin. Republican leading members were: Gilbert
N. Haugen, Frederick H. Gillett, Everis Hayes, Henry A. Cooper, Frank 
P. Woods, Philip P. Campbell, Andrew J. Volstead, Julius Kahn, Joseph 
W. Fordney, and John J. Esch. In determining the party leaders' 
loyalty score, a random selection of roll calls was made. On this 
selection, the Rice Cohesion Index score was computed. The same pro­
cedure was followed for the average member's score. The chairmen 
and ranking members headed committees during the 3rd Session of the 
65th. Several chairmen had resigned by then. They are included on 
the general cohesion index of party leaders.
93
Committee chairmen were partisans, but to a lesser degree than 
the average party member. Even so, there is very little difference 
between the chairmen and the other members within the Democratic 
party (eighty-five for average members and eighty-four for committee 
leaders). In the Republicans' case, the difference is somewhat 
greater (eighty for chairmen, eighty-five for the average member).
The Democratic chairmen, then, were more loyal to the party, while 
Republican chairmen showed more independence. Possibly, the average 
Republican member, when he occasionally voted against his party, could 
feel justified because he could point to the votes of ranking committee 
members against the party. However, probably no disruption flowed 
from the slightly lower party cohesion of committee leaders. Nonethe­
less, their occasional independence did not increase party loyalty.
The majority and minority leaders also vitally affected the co­
hesion and direction of their parties. The average member, who tended 
to identify the leaders with the party position, looked upon the 
leaders' actions as the signals for party policy and voting. Part 
of the reason for this was that the majority and minority leaders 
possessed formidable power, consisting of the right to make committee 
assignments, to call a party caucus, and to direct floor debates. As 
in the case of Majority Leader Kitchin, who was chairman of the Ways 
and Means Committee, the leader might augment his power by important 
committee positions.66 Nonetheless, Kitchin, though liked by Democratic
66As an example of a freshman Congressman looking to the main 
party leaders, see the remarks of Louisiana Representative Aswell in 
Sandra Stringer, "James B. Aswell," 63-64. Minority Leader Mann did 
not have any committee assignments, probably because he wished to 
direct all his attention to floor debates. See Congressional Directory,
65 Cong., 3 Sess., January 1919, 216. Minority and majority leaders
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members and a man of great financial acumen and debating brilliance,
6 7confined his power to limited areas. Since he voted against the 
war declaration and opposed the conscription law, his relations with 
the White House were strained. At those times when he followed an 
independent course, he turned the direction of the party over to 
another member in sympathy with the Administration.®8 Kitchin also 
failed to use the binding caucus.69 A further restriction of his 
influence resulted because Kitchin limited his important floor 
activities to advancing only those bills which came from his committee. 
By so doing, he considerably decreased his presence on the House floor 
and hampered his direction of a general party program.
made committee assignments with the aid of other inqportant members and 
also with guidelines established by seniority, geography, and abilities. 
See G. Goodwin, The Little Legislatures, 70-71. Congressman James A 
Frear of Wisconsin wrote to James Mann asking for a change in com­
mittee assignment, arguing that he was qualified to serve on the Rules 
Committee because of experience, devotion to his work, and the support 
of the Wisconsin delegation. Frear to Mann, January 6, 1919, Frear 
Papers, Archives State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Madison).
6^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Mac-
Millian Co., 1948), p. 93; Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American 
Politics (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1920), 339; and James
Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper, 1958), 33. Byrnes
and Hull write that Kitchin was one of the finest characters they 
ever knew, as well as a dangerous debater. Byrnes also relates a 
story of Kitchin's unfriendly relations with Gamer and Postmaster- 
general Albert S. Burleson. This resulted because Garner and Burleson 
were able to push a man onto the Appropriations Committee whom Kitchin 
opposed. Such a personal conflict also limited a leader's effec­
tiveness. Kitchin's biographer praises his abilities. See Arnett, 
Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, 26, 84-85.
68After his vote against the war resolution, some newspaper 
reports said that there was a move afoot to replace him. This never 
got off the ground if, in fact, there ever was such a movement. Kitchin 
did, however, limit his standing with the White House by voting against 
war. See Washington Post, April 11, 1917, 1; New York Times, April 9, 
12; and Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 236-37.
69Broesamle, "Democrats from Bryan to Wilson," 103.
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Radically different from Kitchin's style was that of Minority
Leader Mann, who actively participated in debates on a wide variety
of topics.^ Another difference between Mann and Kitchin was the type
of emotion they evoked in fellow party members. Unlike Kitchin,
Mann was not loved, mainly because he could display a harsh demeanor
71and showed no tolerance for mistakes or laziness. He, .nonetheless, 
commanded the respect of his contemporaries of both parties. They 
wrote that Mann was an extremely diligent and precise student of 
legislative matters who paid great attention to issues and to parlia­
mentary procedure. In his autobiography, LaGuardia described Mann as 
the greatest parliamentarian of his or any other period.
Notwithstanding these abilities, his success as a party leader 
had its definite limitations. During the prewar period he had taken 
a moderate non-interventionist position which had aroused the hostility 
of the Roosevelt interventionist faction of the Republican membership. 
When the war started, many thought his past record disqualified him for 
leadership in wartime. He also incurred the displeasure of some mem­
bers by pursuing a generally conservative policy and by keeping most
^°Mann did allow the ranking Republican minority member of the 
committee reporting the bill to lead the debate, but he did not sit on 
the side lines without commenting as Kitchin usually did. As a result 
some members thought he robbed them of opportunities that were theirs on 
the House floor. Washington Post, January 15, 1917, 1; and February 
26, 1917, 2.
71Hull, Memoirs, 55, writes that Mann spoke in his "usual per­
verse tone and demeanor." For an example of his harshness toward a 
fellow member, see Cong. Rec., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 111.
72LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 135; Clark, My Quarter 
Century of American Politics, 342. For the examples of Mann's skills 
as a parliamentarian, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 2, 
2077; and Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 644-45.
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policy decisions in his own hands.73 More progressive Republicans 
pressed for an innovative program and greater participation in policy­
making, but no changes were forthcoming.74 Most important in limiting 
his leadership was a serious illness he suffered in July, 1917. Since 
he remained in Johns Hopkins hospital for the rest of the session and 
most of the next, the Republicans had to improvise leadership. What 
finally emerged consisted of co-minority leaders, Frederick G. Gillett 
(Mass.) and Irvine L. Lenroot (Wis.). Certain individuals, such as 
Uncle Joe Cannon (111.) and leading committee members, played major 
supporting roles as directors of individual bills. These men were not 
without skill, particularly Lenroot and Ex-Speaker Cannon, but the 
absence of Mann caused uncertainties in the direction of the party.7^
73"Republican Chairman," Nation, CVI (February 21, 1918), 200-01. 
This article refers to Mann as a Republican liability because of his 
moderate position on intervention and his conservatism. Such stances 
raised the ire of "Gussie" Gardner (R.-Mass.) along with other less 
clearly identified members. See also Washington Post, January 12, 1917, 
6; and February 26, 1917, 2, for activities of Gardner to push a party 
program. Mann had been associated with Cannon when Cannon was Speaker. 
See Blair Bolles, Tyrant From Illinois; Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment 
with Personal Power (New York: Norton, 1950), 55, 57.
74The failure of the Republicans to develop a party program 
probably reflected the difficulty of developing a program out of the 
divisions within the party. But just as likely was the Republican 
realization that as they allowed war events to take their course, they 
would be able to use events against the Democrats. In short, the Repub­
licans simply had to stay up with developments and let the Democrats 
make mistakes. For evidence of the Republican approach of using the 
war against the Democrats, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 55, 
Pt. 8, 7857.
75New York Times, November 24, 1917, 6; November 26, 1917, 8; 
Washington Post, November 25, 1917, 11. According to one Republican 
member, Mann was "forty times" more skilled than Gillett, who eventually 
took the main job of leadership when Lenroot went to the Senate in 
April, 1918. William Ramseyer to Grimes, February 19, 1919, Ramseyer 
Papers, University of Iowa Archives. LaGuardia, in his autobiography, 
wrote that cannon was still extremely able though he was in his 80's. 
LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent, 135.
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In the end, the divisiveness caused by Mann's pre-war positions and 
anti-reform sentiments, plus his long-term absence, undermined his 
effectiveness in unifying the party. He failed to win renomination 
as party leader in 1919.
The most important House leader, at least in theory, was Champ 
Clark, the Speaker, who had held the office since 1911. After the close 
election of 1916 both parties claimed that they could elect the Speaker 
and organize the House. In fact, neither party was sure of the out­
come because five independents held the balance of power. The inde­
pendents— Thomas D. Schall (Minn.), Alvan T. Fuller (Mass.), Charles H. 
Randall (Cal.), Whitmell P. Martin (La.), and Meyer London (N.Y.)—  
conferred several times during February and March, 1917, attempting to 
map out a course which would gain them leverage with the major parties 
on issues that they supported and for committee assignments that they 
desired. In the end they agreed to no common strategy, though four 
of the five cast their ballots for Clark rather than Mann.76 Also 
increasing the doubt of both the Democrats and Republicans as to the 
outcome of the race was the possible defection of members of their 
own party to the opposition. In the Democratic ranks, dissatisfaction, 
which foreshadowed the cultural tensions in the Democratic party of 
the 1920's, existed among representatives from the big Eastern urban 
machines, particularly from Massachusetts and Tammany Hall. They were 
distressed over their, committee assignments and over the prohibition 
tendencies of the party. Although several boycotted the Democratic
76Washington Post, January 31, 1917, 2; February 18, 1917, 2;
March 11, 1917, 3; March 10, 1917, 2; March 13, 1917, 2; New York 
Times, March 5, 1917, 1; March 8, 1917, 10; and Washington Post, April
3, 1917, 2. The fifth, Fuller, voted for Rep. Irvine Lenroot (R.-Wis.).
98
caucus on March 31, they voted for Clark on April 2, apparently be-
77cause the leadership agreed to give them better committee positions.
On the Republican side, a number of progressives and interven­
tionists were unhappy over Mann's failure to develop a party program 
and over his prewar non-interventionist position. There had been 
talk of a bipartisan organization of the House by certain Republicans, 
but members of this faction— who included Gardner (Mass.), Edward Gary 
(N.J.), Frederick Dallinger (Mass.), Reuben Haskell (N.Y.), and Frank 
James (Mich.)— were inspired in their opposition by Mann's policies, 
not by desires to offer a bipartisan gesture. When it came to the 
voting, although the Republican caucus did make some concessions, 
these five voted for other Republicans.^8 By the time of the roll 
call, a combination of Democratic unity and independent support, plus 
Republican dissension, handily gave Clark the Speakership for the
7 Q
fourth time.'
Clark retained a post that had been much diminished in status 
and power since the overthrow of Cannon. Clark did not retain the
^Washington Post, March 26, 1917, 2; New York Times, March 30, 
1917, 5; March 31, 1917, 4; Washington Post, March 31, 1917, 1. Eastern 
representatives did receive some good committee assignments in the 65th 
House: James A. Gallivan (Mass.) to Appropriations, Thomas F. Smith
(N.Y.) to Banking and Currency; Joseph V. Flynn (N.Y.) to Judiciary; 
Daniel J. Riordan (N.Y.) to Rules; and John Carew (N.Y.) to Ways and 
Means. Whether or not this was a result of the pre-speakership trading 
is difficult to tell. For source on committee assignments, see Congres­
sional Directory, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., January, 1919, 183-92.
^^ashington Post, January 15, 1917, 1; March 7, 1917, 1; New 
York Times,March 11, 1917, 1; Washington Post, March 22, 1917, 2;
March 24, 1917, 2; March 26, 1917, 2; March 28, 1917, 2; April 1,
1917, 1; New York Times, April 1, 1917, 6. Two other Republicans 
did make a bipartisan gesture and voted for Clark.
^Washington Post, April 3, 1917, 2; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 
Sess., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 105-16.
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powers to appoint standing committees and to control the House Rules
Committee that Cannon had earlier employed. He, nonetheless, retained
considerable power, since he still held the right to assign bills to
committees, to decide questions on rules during floor debates, to
appoint special and joint committees, and to select the presiding
80officers of the House. Whether these powers gave the Speaker 
sufficient ability to direct a legislative program is debatable. In 
actual practice Clark exercised his power in the limited fashion 
of the chief presiding officer, leaving others to direct the legislative 
program.
The leadership structures of the House did not augur well for 
a unified party or a coherent party program. The voting behavior of 
leaders did not help unify their parties (Table 2-25). Leaders of 
both parties continued to display lower loyalty than other party mem­
bers. At times, the disloyal votes of leaders, such as Speaker 
Clark's on the conscription bill, were disruptive for their parties, 
besides difficult to explain to the public. Further, party instability 
was increased by the disjointed fashion with which the leadership 
structures fitted together. Neither party had formally operating
88Bolling, Power in the House, 50-63; Ripley, Majority Party 
Leadership in Congress, 52. For an example of some of the Speaker's 
powers in the operations of the House, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 
Sess., Vol. 56, Pt. 4, 3390.
8^Bolling, Power in the House, 93-4, writes that when Underwood 
was Majority Leader, he, rather than Clark, was the real leader. I 
found no comments contrasting Kitchin to Clark. However, one Congress­
man in a letter, probably reflecting the way Clark ran the speakership 
rather than its inherent potentialities, maintained that the speaker 
acted simply as a moderator. William Ramseyer to Grimes, February 
19, 1919, Ramseyer Papers. A general study of leadership in Congress 
does maintain that the majority leader was now more important. See 
Ripley, Majority Party Leadership, 52.
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TABLE 2-25
PARTY LEADERS'LOYALTY*
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRATS
Average Loyalty Leaders' Loyalty Average Loyalty Leaders1 Loyalty
85 80 85 84
*For the names of the leaders who were chairmen or leaders of 
committees, see Table 2-24. The ones not named in the previous table 
but included in this one ares Democrats— William C. Adamson, James 
F. Byrnes, Joseph W. Byrns, Champ Clark, John J. Fitzgerald, John N. 
Garner, Carter Glass, Cordell Hull and Henry T. Rainey; Republicans—  
Joseph G. Cannon, Simeon D. Fess, Irvine L. Lenroot, Nichols Longworth, 
James R. Mann, Frank W. Mondell, and J. Hampton Moore. The same 
random selection method was used in selecting roll calls as in the 
committee leaders' loyalty table.
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whips, party caucuses met but failed to formulate policy, and com­
mittee chairmen operated in their own narrow domains. The top leader­
ship, who suffered from personal and policy deficiencies, unintentional­
ly limited their direction of party members to a restricted nuiriber of 
82policy areas. These structural limitations could be overcome, 
either by groups with clear ideological positions or by presidential 
intervention in House activities. The war and its aftermath would 
test the institutional qualities of the House as never before, deter­
mining its ability to handle issues of a national crisis.
82Democratic leadership was also weakened by the resignation of 
several key leaders: John J. Fitzgerald, chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, William Adamson, Chairman of Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee, and Carter Glass, Chairman of the Banking and Currency 
Committee. The exact results of the resignations would be difficult 
to determine, but all were party loyalists, particularly Glass who 
strongly defended the Administration.
CHAPTER III
FIRST SESSION OF THE 65TH HOUSE
*
President Wilson's call to arms before a joint session of 
Congress on April 2, 1917, provoked a dramatic House debate. Although 
opponents of war fought courageously, they could not block the declara­
tion of hostilities. Once the war resolution passed, the Administra­
tion and the House hastily developed a war program. On one level, the 
war program required the forging of a military machine by raising 
an army and funding armaments. Similarly, mobilization involved the 
censorship of press and speech, the suppression of radicals, the 
organization of industry and agriculture for war purposes, and the 
adoption of policies for financing the war. On another level, the war 
program created fundamental ideological, partisan, geographical, and 
institutional conflicts. These divisions within the House influenced 
much of the legislation that was enacted, but they remained largely 
hidden from public view behind a bi-partisan facade of unity. Though 
the war induced an ostensible agreement in favor of the war programs, 
complex partisan, regional, and ideological forces undermined the 
apparent harmony.
Resolution For War 
Immediately after the organization of the House on April 2, 
representatives took up Wilson's proposal for intervention, a subject
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upon which many members had often demonstrated definite tendencies 
toward non-intervention. Not more than a year before, during an 
earlier German-American crisis in 1916, many congressmen rallied behind 
a resolution introduced by Jeff McLemore, a Texas Democrat, which for­
bade American travel on armed merchant ships in submarine-infested
*
waters. Before the roll call a majority of Democrats probably favored 
it. However, strong pressure from the chief Executive forced all but 
a handful of recalcitrant Democrats to vote against the resolution.
When it came to a vote, three out of four of the 142 representatives 
who voted for the resolution were Republicans. Even after the break 
in diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, House 
isolationists, commanded by Henry A. Cooper (R-Wis.), sought to re­
strict administration action. They proposed an amendment which pro­
vided that American ships, which an administration bill intended to 
arm, could not carry munitions to the Entente Powers if armed.
Denounced by the Administration as another McLemore resolution, the
Cooper amendment rallied only token support and went down to defeat,
2
293 to 125. Given past House actions, it was not surprising that when 
the Foreign Affairs Committee introduced the war resolution to the 
floor two of the Committee's members rejected the majority report in 
favor of war, one of whom was Cooper, the leading Republican member 
of the committee. As the House undertook the task of deciding
•1-Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 211-14. See, 
also, Tim G. McDonald, "The Gore-McLemore Resolutions: Democratic Re­
volt against Wilson’s Submarine Policy," Historian, XXVI (November, 
1963), 50-74.
2Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 13.
3New York Times, April 5, 1917, 1.
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for or against war, non-interventionists stood prepared to withstand 
the clamor for war.
In the opening debate on April 5, which took place before a 
full House and jammed galleries, Henry Flood (D-Va.), chairman of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, phrased the necessity for war as a 
challenge..."thrown at our feet by the arrogant autocracy of Germany." 
The thrust of his argument for war, often repeated in the long hours 
of debate ahead, rested on an enumeration of German violations of 
American independence. Specifically, Flood charged that Germany had 
spied on the government and people of the United States, had disre­
garded its pledges to restrict submarine warfare, and had murdered 
"innocent women and children." His argument and similar ones also 
included a listing of ships sunk by Germany. At this point, opponents 
injected that England had similarly violated American rights. Floor 
countered by maintaining that British violations were of a different 
nature altogether, since no American lives were taken by her violations. 
His conclusion, endorsed by later speakers who followed his reasoning, 
was that America must stand up and defend herself against a power which 
was already waging war against American rights and citizens.4
Added to pro-war arguments was a technique that appealed to the 
emotions of patriotism and belligerent chauvinism. A mild form of 
this sentiment maintained that in a crisis the Congress had to stand
4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 1, 307-09. For 
similar arguments see ibid., 970, 344-48; C. William Ramseyer to 
Frank Shane, February 26, 1917; and Ramseyer to personal (no name), 
April 29, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Don Stephens to Matt S. Hartman, 
April 6, 1917, Box 26, Folder 199, Stephens Papers, Archives of
the Historical Society of Nebraska.
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by the President.5 In a more robust form, William Good (D-Ark.) 
declared that German actions ought to make the blood of American 
patriots boil for a fight. He also insinuated that the patriotism of 
the anti-war members left much to be desired.6 Pat Harrison (D-Miss.) 
unleashed an abusive diatribe against opponents, declaring that a 
preceding anti-war speech would have been more appropriate if delivered 
in the German Reichstag. Similarly, Thomas Heflin (D-Ala.) charged 
that non-interventionist speeches undoubtedly pleased Count von 
Bernstorff, the former German Ambassador to the United States. Both 
diatribes reflected a virulent nationalism which asserted that the 
United States could not tolerate mistreatment from Germany. As 
Harrison stated, the German "outrages" could not be accepted by a 
great nation which had "not forgotten the teachings of our fathers."7 
Harrison and Heflin's patriotism combined an inplied distrust of the 
loyalty of war opponents with a direct threat of intimidation of all 
opponents, American and German alike.
A much different appeal for war came from members who envisioned 
the conflict as a great clash between ideals of government. That 
advocates of war, particularly Wilson, demanded American entry because 
of idealistic values has largely been discounted by such historians as 
Arthur Link. According to Link's view, Wilson did not reach his
6Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 375-76.
6Ibid., 331.
7Ibid., 315-16, 348. Another remark by Heflin indicates the 
connection of patriotism to a sense of manhood. He said that "we 
were drawn into war, and no nation with any self-respect, no nation 
with an ounce of courage, no nation with a particle of national 
honor, would have endured longer the insults of the murderous 
Kaiser."
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decision for war because he wanted to protect democracy, but only later 
cloaked the rationale for war in idealistic terms.8 Even if Wilson 
came to an idealistic position after reaching his decision for war, 
it does not follow that all idealistic advocates evolved their position 
in a similar fashion. In any event, a few congressmen did phrase their 
support in idealistic terms.
The idealistic argument included two facets— one conservative, 
the other revolutionary. Augustus Gardner (R-Mass.) argued that though 
the German submarine warfare directly pushed the United States into war, 
the real spark came from another source: the American people realized
that a life and death struggle was occurring in which democracy's 
survival Rung in the balance. If the United States did not respond 
to the challenge, it would become impossible, Gardner argued, to
Q
preserve American ideals and democratic government m  Europe. But 
for George O'Shaunessy (D-R.I.) the war offered the opportunity 
for the revolutionary overthrow of tyrannical governments rather than 
the mere maintenance of democratic government. In his pro-war speech 
he called for the removal of all kings, starting with the German 
Kaiser but not exempting even the King of England, and for the forward 
march of the masses.10 In a less provacative fashion, Charles Linthi- 
cum (D-Mo.) also advocated the uprooting of autocracies and the
O
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 277-79, 281. 
Link modified this thesis in a later book when he noted a strong 
desire by Wilson to influence the peace settlement after the war in 
the direction of a world community. See, Link, Woodrow Wilson:
Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 410-415.
8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 668-69.
10Ibid., 391.
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establishment of free republics."^ Both O'Shaunessy and Linthicum 
reflected the feelings of oppressed European ethnic groups who hoped to 
harness American democracy to the cause of national self-determination.
Rising in opposition to the crusade, a determined minority 
resolutely denied that war was justified. Claude Kitchin, majority 
leader of the Democrats and the most prominent opponent of war, elabo­
rated what has been called the "un-neutrality thesis." Holding that 
Wilsonian policies were un-neutral from the start, Kitchin insisted 
that they consequently drew the United States into the maelstrom.
Moreover, there was no justification for American involvement since 
it was strictly a war for European dominion. Additionally, both sides 
had equally violated American rights, but the Administration had 
scarcely offered an audible protest to Entente violations. As a 
corollary to this argument, Kitchin insisted that the un-neutrality 
of administration policy permitted profiteers to wax rich, thereby 
enmeshing the country more deeply in the conflict. American traders, 
his argument continued, were given a free reign without proper controls.
As a consequence, Germany took retaliatory action via the only weapon 
at her disposal, the submarine. Kitchin implored the House not to 
send American boys to die in order to protect American trade and 
profiteers. In sum, the un-neutrality thesis, as stated by Kitchin
and others, stressed administration favoritism, British high-
1 0handness, and American trade entanglements.
11Ibid., 324, 319.
•^ Ibid., 332-33, 314, 345, 376, 327. See Arnett, Claude Kitchin 
and the Wilson War Policies,47-48, for a discussion of Kitchen's 
view on the war crisis.
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The anti-war sentiment, which flowed from a sense of the proper 
role of America in world affairs, expressed itself in two differing 
lines of thought: a nationalist and idealist. Like the pro-war
nationalists, the anti-war nationalists argued that the United States 
should defend its rights against German aggression. But the sphere of 
defense should be confined to the oceans, with the United States acting 
independently. To join an European alliance would, Frank Rearis 
(R-Nebr.) maintained, cut America from her traditional isolationists' 
moorings and violate the warning of Washington's Farewell Address on 
the dangers of entangling alliances.^ these isolationists, a 
defense of American rights involved unilateral action against Germany 
on the high seas, without encumbering European ties.14
From the nationalistic perspective of isolationism, the emphasis 
in the argument shifted to the upholding of high ideals. Seeing war 
as the "greatest crime against the human race," these isolationists 
supported their viewpoint with various ethical ideals. Edward King 
(R-Ill.) cited the teachings of Jesus, while William LaFollette (R-Wash.) 
appealed to the liberal ideals of human civilization. These war 
opponents also portrayed America as an example that ought to uphold 
democracy and humanity without the shedding of blood. Meyer London 
(N.Y.), the lone Socialist in Congress, argued that involvement not 
only would harm America's liberty.but would also adversely affect the 
development of German democracy. He believed in the liberation of
13Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 356, 372-73.
14Ibid., 318, 363-64, 353. The discussion and terminology on 
isolationism is partly influenced by Cooper's, The Vanity of Power,
2-4, 88, 99. Opponents of war can, to a degree, be placed in his 
classifications of idealist and ultranationalist orientations.
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oppressed peoples as did O'Shaunessy, but to him war did not advance 
the masses because they were the real sufferers in any conflict.15 
London's interpretation of idealism stood in direct contrast to the 
international idealism of Wilson, who advocated an aggressive advance­
ment of democracy throughout the world.
That the debates, influenced the votes of members cannot be denied. 
Equally true, many cast their ballots for reasons other than those 
revealed in the debates. Marvin Jones (D-Tex.) wrote later that more 
representatives objected to war in the cloak room than on the floor 
and that many only voted reluctantly for war.1® There were several 
reasons for this conduct, but the most important of these was the 
emotionally charged atmosphere in which congressmen reached their 
decision. From the vantage point of C. William Ramseyer (R-Iowa), 
the war atmosphere had set in motion processes of fate or history 
which all but dictated the choice for war. Never enthusiastic to 
enter the war, because he believed that it meant entangling alliances 
and protection of munition makers' profits, Ramseyer nonetheless felt 
that "destiny" demanded war.1  ^ Similarly, Edward W. Saunders (D-Va.)
stated during the debates that an "inexorable compulsion" created
18circumstances that House members must simply follow. In a less
15Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 335, 341, 371, 329; and 
Pt. 2, 1149.
15Marvin Jones, Marvin Jones Memoirs, 33, voted for war, so his 
comment is not a critical remark by an opponent of war. Kitchin's 
biographer makes a similar point; see Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 236.
17Ramseyer to P. T. Grimes, January 6, 1917; to Homer A. Roth, 
February 10, 1917; and to Robert Lumsdon, March 10, 1917, Ramseyer 
Papers.
1®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 345.
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fatalistic tone, Dan V. Stephens (D-Neb.), a Bryanite in sympathies, 
believed that the President dictated the path the country would follow. 
To stand in his way meant that one would "be branded a traitor."'1'9
Part of this pressure that Stephens detected operated upon
Jeannette Rankin (R-Mont.), who nonetheless still voted against war.
Her brother argued the justice of the war and warned that a negative
vote would end her political career. Women's suffrage leaders
gravely conferred with her regarding the harm that a nay vote would
have on the movement. She held her ground, however, for her dread of
sending American boys to death was greater than her fear of political 
20defeat. But in most instances, congressmen followed Philip Campbell's 
(R-Kans.) course. He knew that the war resolution would pass. A nay 
vote then would do no good, but in the circumstances might be construc­
ted as comforting the enemy. He voted yea.2-1- Of course, many pro-war 
advocates were firmly convinced that American honor, rights, and ideals 
demanded war. For a minority, however, support was the result of 
political and historical conditions that they could not oppose.
Factors shaping a member's vote on the war resolution can also 
be approached by quantitative analysis. Such an analysis suggests 
dimensions of pro-war and anti-war groups which would otherwise be 
obscure. The starting point is to correlate the war roll call with
1QDan Stephens to Frank Fowler, February 16, 1917, Box 25,
Folder 193, Stephens Papers.
20Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 73-77.
21Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 410. See 
Louis C. Crampton to Earl G. Fitz, April 11, 1917, File L, Folder 
lOd, Louis C. Crampton Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University 
of Michigan, for an expression of a viewpoint similar to Campbell's.
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all other relevant roll calls. By doing this a better definition of 
the issues that pro-war and anti-war legislators supported may be 
revealed. However, correlating the war vote with other war-connected . 
roll calls may show that it related to few other roll calls. In fact, 
this is the case, because the war vote associated at a level of statis­
tical significance with only eight out of 120 roll calls, which as a 
group did not all associate among themselves (Table 3-1 and note on 
page 113). Two of the roll calls dealt with prohibiting strikes during 
wartime, while another two granted a $50 million appropriation to pur­
chase seed grain for farmers during wartime. The four others included 
a draft vote, a vote on permitting associations in trade, and one to 
establish a commission on unemployment insurance. The final vote dealt 
with charges of treason against two members who opposed the war.
Although the war roll call correlates with these eight votes, an 
analysis of this relationship must be restrained. First, the votes do 
not correlate with each other at a level of statistical significance 
(See note on page 113). Second, since the war groups purposely came 
together only eight votes out of 120 votes, it indicates that they 
did not consistently work together in future votes. Given these 
qualifications, the opponents of war were members who rejected placing 
restraints on the rights of workers to strike and who favored pro­
viding seed for farmers. They further endorsed a volunteer rather 
than a conscripted army, desired an investigation of unemployment 
insurance, voted against trade associations, and protested charges 
of disloyalty because of their vote on the war resolution. In contrast 
most supporters of the war resolution took counter positions on these 
issues. In terms of attitudes and group orientations, opponents of
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Correlation 
Yule's Q
±.750
±.634
±.763
±.716
±.642
±.725
±.631
TABLE 3-la
BILLS AND MOTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
ROLL CALL ON THE WAR RESOLUTION
Motion
To agree to the amendment to H. R. 3545, (May 18, 1917), 
authorizing the President to increase temporarily the 
United States military establishment, which amendment 
eliminates the clause authorizing the President to call 
for 500,000 volunteers, so as to permit the increase to 
be made by a selective draft rather than through volun­
teers. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong. Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2,
1555.
To pass a bill H. R. 2316, promoting export trade. Ibid., 
pt. 4, 3584.
To expunge certain remarks from the record regarding 
Bill H. R. 4961, (40 STAT-217, August 10, 1917, providing 
further for the national security and defense by en­
couraging the production, conserving the supply, and 
controlling the distribution of food products and fuel, 
by eliminating certain words referring to two represen­
tatives as being traitors and in treason with anarchists 
and charging them with stirring up enmity to the draft 
law. Ibid., Pt. 6, 5757.
To strike out the Enacting Clause in H. R. Res. 189, 
providing for a commission to inquire into the advisa­
bility of establishing national insurance against un­
employment, invalidity, and sickness. Ibid., Pt. 1, 906.
To amend S. 383, (40 STAT-533, April 20, 1918), punishing 
the destruction or injuring of war material and war 
transportation facilities, by fire, explosives or other 
violent means and forbidding the hostile use of property 
during time of war, by including persons with intent to 
injure, interfere with or obstruct the U. S. or any 
associate nation in carrying on the war, and who conspire 
to prevent the erection or production of war premises, 
war material or war utility. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3124.
To amend S. 383, by making it lawful under the act for 
employees to agree together to stop work with a bona fide 
purpose of securing better wages or conditions of employ­
ment. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3126A.
To amend H. R. 7795, by eliminating the Enacting Clause. 
Ibid., Pt. 4, 4179.
113
±.694 To amend H. R. 7795, which appropriates $50,000,000 for
the purchase of seed grain and feed for live stock, to 
be supplied to farmers and stockmen and to create boards 
in the respective states to assist in carrying out pro­
visions of this act, by amending Section 4 thereof, so 
as to provide that the Secretary of Agriculture, at the 
next session of Congress, make a detailed report regarding 
all proceedings under the act. Ibid., Pt. 5, 4296.
aThe procedure followed in correlating the war resolution 
roll call and all subsequent roll calls is as follows: The OSIRIS
social science computer package offers a program called Correl which 
allows a researcher to correlate up to sixty roll calls at one time.
I first selected a number of roll calls which had some practical or
logical relation to the war resolution. Not all votes would have any
relation to each other and were not correlated. The ones that did 
appear to have a possible relation were coded into the Correl program 
for statistical analysis with the war vote. The Correl program 
printed out both a matrix of the correlations (Yule's Q) and a card
matrix. I then did two things: first, I ran a second Osiris program
called Cluster which placed in groups all similar-correlating— roll 
calls; second, I traced by sight the war vote with all other roll 
calls in the printed Correl program. Both methods are designed to 
find high correlations between roll calls. After correlating with 
over a 120 roll calls, only eight other votes were found that correlate 
with the war vote at a level of statistical significance. Significance 
is defined as a Yule's Q ranging from .700 to 1000 but it is permissible 
to drop to .600. Four of the votes correlate with the war vote at the 
.600 level, indicating a relation but not a great one. It must be 
emphasized that while the war vote correlates with the eight, the 
votes do not all correlate with each other. This procedure was 
followed on other roll calls. Many votes did not correlate with other 
roll calls or with only a few votes. In particular few votes fitted 
into a group of roll calls in which all simultaneously correlated or 
clustered with each other. The ones that did not correlate could at 
least be placed into party and regional tables, as was done with the 
war resolution vote. For those that correlated they could be further 
evaluated by the Gscore program. This program will be explained 
later.
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war favored labor and fanners, resisted militarism in the organization 
of the army and monopolism in the conduct of the export trade. It 
can be concluded that the anti-war element, at least when it voted 
together, indicated progressive tendencies.
An evaluation of the war roll call in relation to party and 
region yields more precise results (Table 3-2). Since the resolution 
passed by a wide majority of 373 to fifty, both parties overwhelmingly 
favored American entry into the war. A variation between parties none­
theless existed, in that twice as many Republicans (thirty-two) as 
Democrats (sixteen) voted against war. An explanation of the greater 
Republican opposition demonstrates the importance of leadership in 
the reaching of House decisions. None of the top Republican leadership 
opposed the war, but Democratic Majority Leader Claude Kitchin reso­
lutely fought American entry into the conflict. However, his influence 
with fellow Democrats was offset by President Wilson, the national 
leader of the party. A vote against Wilson by significant numbers of 
Democrats would have immobilized Wilson and his party. Democrats, who 
in their personal convictions abhorred war, feared more the political 
repercussions of a negative ballot. Similar restraints operated on 
the Republicans, but since their party did not occupy the White House, 
more ventured to vote as their conscience dictated.
Greater variation exists regionally than politically. On the one 
hand, the New England and the Middle Atlantic regions united in a 
common support of the war. On the other hand, the Midwestern states 
(ENC and WNC) harbored nearly all the Republican opponents of war. The 
Western states (MS and PS regions) for both parties expressed higher 
than average opposition. In short, the isolationist and the
TABLE 3-2
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION OF S. J. RES. 
1: DECLARATION OF WAR*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 6 25 25 62 23 45 8 18 94 3 29 10 6 4 3 10 194 177
Nay 1 16 2 12 5 4 2 2 2 2 16 32
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 100 100 100 100 96 74 80 60 95 100 88 100 75 67 60 83 92 85
Nay 4 26 20 40 5 12 26 33 40 17 8 15
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., 412.
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rural-oriented Midwest furnished the greatest number of opponents. The 
Western states, which were geographically far removed from the Euro­
pean conflict, were hesitant to support the war. On the other hand, 
the South and Border states were second only to the industrial North­
east in their emphatic support of the war.
Raising Men and Money
Passage of the war resolution dictated the future direction of
the first session and the legislative action of the House membership.
The opponents of war would now have to shelve their anti-war convictions
if they were to avoid being branded traitors. Since none wanted such
a label, they agreed with Kitchin that the war required opponents to
enter into the task of creating a war program even if their misgivings
continued.22 The supporters of the resolution more readily tackled
the job of forging a war program. Still they realized that war measures
would often violate their peacetime convictions. In the case of either
war supporters or opponents, many occasions would arise whereby war-
23time proposals would provoke disenchantment.
Immediately after disposal of the war resolution, the House 
quickly adopted a multi-billion dollar loan for the American and 
Allied war efforts.2^ But the foremost question crowding the House for 
a quick decision involved the raising of an army. The regular army
22Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 332-33.
23That both sides agreed to support the war program is seen 
in these articles: Washington Post, April 8, 1917, 1; April 9, 1917,
1; April 11, 1917, 2; April 20, 1917, 1. Much less agreement existed 
over the specifics, such as how the army was to be raised or who was 
to be taxed.
2^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 630, 650, 690.
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and militia were grossly undermanned for waging a world war. The 
Administration hoped to correct this dangerous situation by recruiting 
an army of two millian via conscription. Although it violated American 
tradition, Weir Department advisors justified this departure on the 
grounds that not enough men would forsake the lure of good jobs and 
high wages without compulsion.2^ Many House members rejected the 
military's viewpoint and looked upon conscription with a jaundiced 
eye. In 1916, the House membership had firmly defeated a War Depart­
ment proposal for a Continental Army which hinted at the draft con- 
26cept. Influential members such as Edward Pou (D-N.C.), Chairman of 
the House Rules Committee, advised Wilson of present House sentiment, 
warning him that conscription could not pass without first a trial of 
the volunteer system. Wilson, agreeing with his War Department advisors, 
could not be deterred and had the conscription bill introduced.2^
The bill first went to the House Military Affairs Committee, 
a caldron seething with opposition. The Administration tried to 
counter the opposition by sending Secretary of War Newton D. Baker 
before the Committee. He argued for the efficiency of the draft, but 
he found determined opposition from two types of volunteer advocates.
One element resisted the whole concept of a drafted army. Such com­
mitteemen listened sympathetically to anti-conscription advocates, 
among them Grant Hamilton of the American Federation of Labor and Jane
2^New York Times, April 6, 1917, 1; April 7, 1917, 3.
26Link, Woodrow Wilson and Progressive Movement, 184.
2 7 Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 6, 16-17; 
Washington Post, April 12, 1917, 1.
Addams, a leader of humanitarian causes. The second group did not so 
much oppose the draft as support the establishment of a special volun­
teer division for former Rough Rider Teddy Roosevelt. Representative 
Daniel R. Anthony (R-Kans.), who had charge of the Colonel's interests
in the Committee, pictured the Roosevelt division as a quick means to
• 28 place American troops m  the European trenches by fall.
In the face of the impending revolt, Wilson held several con­
ferences with Hubert S. Dent (D-Ala.), head of the Military Affairs 
Committee, along with other leaders. Also active was the Administra­
tion's chief lobbyist Albert Burleson, the Postmaster General. None­
theless, these administration effort's in the end proved ineffective 
when the Military Affairs Committee reported, thirteen to eight, a 
bill that provided for use of the volunteer principle first. If this 
failed, only then could the draft be implemented by the President.29
With the defeat of the Administration in the Committee, the House 
debates opened in an environment of confusion and tension, with the 
outcome in doubt. Reflecting the unusual conditions, the ranking 
Republican of the Committee, Julius Kahn (Cal.), directed the forces 
for the Administration's position. In the opposing camp, Chairman Dent 
along with the two chief Democratic leaders Kitchin and Clark, who had 
also deserted the President, led the forces in favor of the volunteer
28
Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, X (April 7, 1917) 
294-295; New York Times, April 8, 1917, 1; and U. S. Congress, House 
Committee on Military Affairs, Increase of the Military Establishment, 
Hearing on H. R. 3545, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3, 42-43, 17, 20.
29New York Times, April 10, 1917, 1; April 12, 1917, 1; April 17, 
1917, 1; April 18, 1917, 1; April 17, 1917, 1; and April 20, 1917,
1.
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30principle. Dent and his like-minded colleagues argued repeatedly 
that the volunteer system represented the historical tradition of the 
United States which at least ought to be given an opportunity to prove 
itself. Representatives in agreement with this viewpoint cited the 
"history of the Anglo-Saxon race," and the experience of the Revolu­
tionary and Civil Wars.31
According to this traditionalist argument, the fighting abili­
ties of volunteers were superior because they fought as men who had 
freely consecrated their lives to their country. As former Civil War 
officer Issac Sherwood (D-Ohio) stressed, very few draftees during the 
Civil War ever made good soldiers.33 The strength of the army, the 
traditionalist argument continued, would also be boosted as localities 
volunteered together to form regiments in which neighbors drew courage 
from fellow neighbors. Finally, the traditionalist viewpoint believed 
that the volunteer system drew vitality from the patriotism of the men.
The draft system, according to Speaker Clark, was a reflection against 
American youth, saying that they could not be trusted to volunteer.
The truth, Clark added, was that American men wished a free means 
through which to express their patriotic sentiment. Without idealism, 
without patriotism, the American army, the proponents of the volunteer 
system argued, would lack the fervor necessary to win the war.
30 .New York Times, April 25, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 2, 1182.
31See ibid., 1376, 1378, 1120-21, 1104 for examples of the 
traditionalist's argument.
32Ibid., 1201-03, 1205.
33Ibid., Pt. 1, 973, 962-63, 1029, 1037, 977; Pt. 2, 1119,
1099, 1147; and New York Times, April 25, 1917, 1.
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Linked with the traditionalist and patriotic argument was the 
fact that voluntary advocates had a strong distrust of the military 
in Ameri$jjjn life. This view first of all encompassed a desire to pre­
vent an impersonal military bureaucracy from taking away a person's 
choice. If men were not to become mere tools of the military, the 
argument ran, they must be allowed freedom of selection. Secondly, 
the argument questioned how a democratic country could employ auto­
cratic methods to wage war. Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) summarized this 
feature of the anti-militarist viewpoint when he stated, "Let us 
not pay Prussian militarism, which we are seeking to destroy, the 
compliment of adopting the most hateful and most baneful of its in­
stitutions.3^ Finally, the anti-militarists played upon the fears of 
congressmen by insisting that the draft was part of the military's 
long-term plan. Several volunteerists maintained that the "mili-
35tarists" did not want the draft just for war, but also for peace.
In the debates on the draft, two conflicting conceptions of 
American society battled for mastery. On one hand, the opponents of 
the draft drew on the ideals of anti-militarism and on visions of a 
voluntaristic and agrarian American society. On the other hand, 
supporters of the draft founded their argument on an organized and 
industrial American democracy. This argument, which can be labeled 
the modernist position, maintained first of all that American society 
had irreconcilably changed from the past. To them the volunteer 
system never functioned as well as the misty memories of Civil War
i
3^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess. 1, Pt. 1, 1052; and
Pt. 2, 1377, 1106-07.
35Ibid., 1091-92; and Pt. 1, 1028.
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veterans recalled, but now more than ever it would not work. Modem 
war required a wide variety of skills more complex than simple military 
ones. Secondly, in the modem system, according to conscription pro­
ponents, each member of society served as part of the military machine. 
It was not a system run by sentiment or spirit, but one run on scien­
tific and technical principles. Manpower had to be carefully placed 
in the right positions, particularly in certain key industries. 
Correspondingly, only the draft could allot men where they best served 
the war effort. The machine could not allow some to escape obligations 
while others served. At this point, the modernist argument branched 
off into a consideration of the "slacker" and of democracy, which it 
phrased as a question of equality. Captain Percy Reginald of the 
British army, before the Military Affairs Committee, maintained that 
the draft was the democratic method because all were obligated by the 
system. Congressmen picked up the point. As William Bankhead (D-Ala.) 
stated it, the country formed one fabric indivisible and homogeneous, 
which functioned as a unit with rights and obligations for all.
Citizens would equally serve the nation, with slackers forced to do 
their part.36 -
Finally, the modernist argument claimed that the draft also 
operated in the most efficient manner. The proponents, having a 
greater faith in experts and military specialists than the opponents, 
insisted that the voluntary system had not functioned well in past 
wars. It had not proved efficient in England either, since the best
36Ibid., Pt. 2, 1368, 1035, 1056, 1060, 1127; U. S. Congress, 
House, Increase of the Military Establishment, Hearings, 3; and Cong. 
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 1033, 972, 1097.
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of her citizens volunteered and then went to their death. England 
eventually replaced the system, and America, they concluded, should not 
heed the call of sentiment or tradition. Instead^draft supporters 
insisted that American democracy could organize scientifically as a
37modem industrial and nationalistic state and must do so immediately.
When the draft debates commenced, the supporters of the volun­
tary system believed that they commanded a majority in the House.38 
By the time the roll call was taken, however, the volunteer principle 
suffered an overwhelming non-partisan defeat, 313 to 109. To a degree 
the turnabout reflected the persuasiveness of the arguments of the 
draft supporters; but other factors also operated against the advo­
cates of volunteerism. First, they were divided among themselves.
Some were advocates of volunteerism only because they wished to secure 
room for Roosevelt’s outfit. Other advocates of the volunteer system 
rejected the whole idea of the Roosevelt division. In the Committee 
of the Whole House, the Roosevelt plan suffered an easy defeat. After 
this loss some Roosevelt advocates switched from the voluntary plan to 
the draft position. Anti-conscriptionists also suffered from advoca­
ting an argument that could only be weakened by time. At first it did 
not appear that the United States would need to send troops to 
Europe, and many representatives thought that the volunteer plan ought 
to be given at least a trial. Progressively they became conscious 
of the implications of modern warfare and the need for American troops
37Ibld., 974-77, 979, 983, 985, 969, 1066; and Pt. 2, 1368,
1200, 1213-15, 1229.
38Ibid., Pt. 2, 1376; and Stephens to C. D. Marr, April 28,
1917, Box 27, Folder 213, Stephens Papers.
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• 39in Europe. As a result, momentum for greater mobilization increasing­
ly pushed aside half-way measures.
Another factor that orignally influenced congressmen's attitudes 
was the South's opposition to conscription of the Negro. The Adminis­
tration quieted their anxieties as the debate progressed.^® Further­
more, draft opponents could not effectively counter the charge that 
they were "living in the cobwebs of the past." Not only were they 
going against the military experts and the President, they were also 
setting up an agrarian, nineteenth-century view of American society 
against a vigorous and disciplined industrial twentieth-century view.^ 
Finally, the draft opponents' appeal to traditional American democratic 
ideals was countered by the draft supporters. Postulating a democratic 
and equalitarian ideal that better meshed with a modern industrial 
society, the conscriptionists won an easy victory over the volunteerists.
Espionage and Censorship
Following passage of the Conscription Act, the House immediately 
took up another highly controversial measure, The Espionage Bill. Late 
in the last session of the 64th Congress, the Administration had in­
troduced similar legislation, which provided penalties for spies and
39Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1380-89; Arnett, 
Claude Kitchin, 246; Hull, Memoirs, 89; U. S. Congress, House, Increase 
of the Military Establishment, Hearings, 221; and Charles Merz, "At 
the Capital," 294-95.
^®Fears of the effect of the draft on white supremacy caused some
congressmen to vote against the draft. See, Ibid.; 294-95; and Beaver,
Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 31.
Stephens' to C. D. Marr, April 28, 1917, Box 27, Folder 213,
Stephen Papers, expressed his views of the draft opponents in these 
terms. That considerations of following the President affected votes can
be seen in Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 987, 554.
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individuals supplying war information to the enemy. It would have 
passed if it had not became enmeshed in the last-minute legislative 
tangle. Consequently, administration supporters reintroduced the bill, 
now modified by two amendments. The first new section established 
newspaper censorship and granted the President wide latitude in the 
detection and the punishment of violators. According to the Justice 
Department, which wrote the original draft of the bill, newspaper 
censorship was designed to suppress information worthwhile to the 
enemy. The second amendment provided that every letter, circular, 
postal card, pamphlet, or book in violation of the act or treasonable 
or "anarchistic" could be banned from the public mails.42 While the 
original espionage provisions stirred few misgivings with congress­
men, the newspaper and mail sections sparked lively apprehensions for 
the safety of American rights.
Before the bill reached the House floor, the Justice Committee 
held a short public hearing on it. A number of witnesses voiced 
alarm over the censorship provisions. Jane Addam^ the famous social 
worker, wondered if this bill would restrict advocacy of a postwar, 
international body for peace. In this case, the chairman of the Com­
mittee, Edwin Y. Webb (D-N.C.), reassured Miss Addams that the bill 
did not restrict support for that cause. Since other aspects the 
bill's application was less clear, many witnesses, along with news­
papers of the country, demanded changes in the bill's wording. The 
Committee made a slight concession to the opponents when it added a
42New York Times, February 6, 1917, 3; Washington Post, April
3, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1591, 
1595.
125
provision that required the President to issue a proclamation which 
would list prohibited subjects.4^
House debates on the revised bill revealed a variation in the 
ideas and motives of the censorship supporters. On one hand, they 
mistrusted the self-restraint of the press in the publication of in­
formation. In essence, the argument maintained that the press would 
publish any information that it could so long as it sold newspapers.
As evidence, Thaddeus Caraway (D-Ark.) cited newspaper stories during 
the Civil War that had irresponsibly revealed military secrets.44 On 
the other hand, they expressed a profound respect for the President. 
Chairman Webb, who argued that since wartime created special restraints 
on liberty, somebody simply had to be trusted to do the right thing.
He added that he placed his faith in the President rather than the
45press. 3
All supporters of censorship necessarily argued that the rights 
of the press were not unlimited. In the case of some, their emphasis 
centered on the limitations of free speech and press. As a premise, 
they reasoned that the press did not stand above the law or have 
special rights above the people. Given this, they contended that since 
citizens could not harm the nation, neither could the press. In wartime 
the danger to the nation was particularly acute, thereby necessitating
4^U. S. Congress, House, Espionage and Interference with Neu­
trality, Hearings on H. R. 291, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 50, 53, 18, 20, 46; 
New York Times,April 13, 1917, 3; April 16, 1917, 3; April 20, 1917,
1; April 25, 1917, 7; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 2, 1590.
44Ibid., 1770, 1754, 1605, 1601, 1695.
4^Ibid., 1590; and Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic,
XI (May 12, 1917), 52.
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the imposition of strong restraints. Though never directly stated, 
proponents of this restrictive thesis of press rights implied that more 
than spies and indiscreet editors should be arrested. With censorship 
broadly defined, radicals and pacifists might well also find themselves 
entangled in the bill's restrictions.46
The House conducted the Espionage debates in a charged atmos­
phere, which surged with partisan infighting. To the Democrats the 
press was a Republican bastion which sought every opportunity to em~ 
barras the Administration. If Congress could enact press controls, a 
major source of divisive criticism could be silenced. For the Repub­
licans, the situation was reversed because they believed that an un­
fettered press could more easily attack the Democrat's management of 
the war. Consequently, Republican opponents of censorship insisted 
that criticism prevented corruption, exposed incompetency, and stopped 
abuses of power. However, not all objection to the censorship pro­
visions as a restriction on the revelation of corruption came from 
partisan motives. Fiorello LaGuardia objected strenuously because he 
wanted to prevent conniption of the type which allowed contractors 
during the Spanish-American War to sell the army the contaminated 
meat that killed his father.47
4^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1710, 1809. 
Debates left unclear congressional intentions, but the following 
sources offer some inclination of attitudes: Stephens to Otto Ulrich,
August 22, 1917, Box 29, Folder 231, Stephens Papers; and U. S. Congress, 
House, Espionage and Interference With Neutrality, Hearings, 19-20,
26, 8. The debates and hearings, however, do indicate a good deal of 
confusion in the minds of supporters of censorship as to what the bill 
would include. For a general discussion on civil liberties and 
congressional attitudes in war-time, see Peterson and Fite, Opponents 
of War, 1917-1918, particularly pages 4-7, 12-13, 51, 61.
47Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1719, 1601,
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A more general argument rested on a constitutional foundation. 
Harold Knuston (R-Miss.) argued that the censorship section violated 
constitutional guarantees and meant nothing less than the stifling 
of American liberty. In a more moderate form/ this argument said that 
the Constitution, though permitting wartime restrictions, required that 
restrictions be carefully and fully defined. In either case, the argu­
ment found its substance in a fear of unlimited power. Minority 
Leader Mann, in commenting on the postal provisions, thought that they 
conferred autocratic powers on the Postmaster General. LaGuardia, 
who had a vivid appreciation of the abuse of power, suspected that 
even Wilson who would not resist becoming a despot if given the 
opportunity.
After four days of debate and amendment, the House started the 
final votes on the bill. Efforts to amend the mail provisions failed 
in committee, and no member attempted to overturn the decision by a 
formal roll call. Free access to the mails rallied only a few congress­
men, mainly because no major interest group felt its privileges at 
stake, while opposition to the censorship provisions came from the 
nation's press outside of Congress and the Republican party within.
The Republicans demanded a roll call, on which a few Democrats, moved
■' i
by constitutional scruples, voted with the Republicans. The combi­
nation proved adequate to defeat the provision, 221 to 167 (Tablje
iI
3-3:A) . Democratic floor leaders reacted quickly by offering the Gard
1699, 1700. At least one Democrat did agree with the Republicans on 
this point. See ibid., 1764. Mann, LaGuardia, The Fighter, 80.
^8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1704, 1717, 
1821, 1700, 1750, 1753, 1706, 1824, 1779.
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TABLE 3-3:A, B, C, AND D*
VOTE BY PARTY ON H. R. 291: ESPIONAGE ACT9
A. Remove Censorship Provision
_____________Party (Percent)
Vote Democrat Republican
Yes 27 (53); 86 (168)
NO 73 (142) 14 (28)
B. Agree to Gard Amendment
Party (Percent)
Vote Democrat Republican
Yes 89 (169) 13 (24)
No 11 (20) 87 (166)
C. Pass Espionage Bill
Party (Percent)
Vote Democrat Republican
Yes 95 (172) 47 (86)
No 5 (10) 53 (97)
D. Remove Censorship Provision
Party (Percent)
Vote Democrat Republican
Yes 22 (39) 94 (155)
No 78 (147) 6 (10)
*The numbers in the tables will not exactly match the statistics 
given in the body. This is the result of two factors: first, the
table statistics include only Republican and Democrats while the ones 
in the body include minor party members; and second, the tables include 
party members who did not vote but who indicated they would have voted 
either yea or nay if present.
aCong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Pt. 1, 1816, 1819, 1841; and 
Pt. 3, 3144.
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Amendment as a compromise. Since the amendment specifically stated 
that censored information must relate to national security, it molli­
fied several Democratic opponents. With their support, the conpromise 
won a narrow victory, 191 to 185 (Table 3-3:B). A few Republicans 
joined the Democrats, but most Republicans (eighty-seven percent) 
could not distinguish a difference between the Gard amendment and the 
original provision. A final roll call adopted the bill 260 to 107 
(Table 3-3:C). The greatly reduced opposition came almost exclusively 
from the Republicans.^®
The bill sped on to the Senate where the original censorship 
provision was reattached. In the conference committee, the House and 
Senate conferees agreed to a compromise. When the bill returned to 
the House, Webb claimed that the conference's provision better pro­
tected freedom of the press than the Gard Amendment. The Republicans 
rejected his contention as spurious, held a caucus, and reached a 
non-binding decision to oppose censorship. In what was shaping up 
as the first major partisan contest of the legislative session, Presi­
dent Wilson conferred with Democratic leaders, refused compromise 
amendments, and insisted that Democrats vote for the conferees' 
amendment. A party caucus followed, which concluded a non-binding
4QOn the original censorship provision, fifty-three Democrats 
voted with the Republicans, which represented twenty-seven percent 
of all Democrats voting. Twenty-eight Republicans voted with the 
Democrats. See ibid., 1816. Voting on the Gard Amendment saw only 
twenty Democrats voting with the Republicans, while twenty-four 
Republicans voted with the Democrats. See, ibid., 1819. On the 
final vote only nine Democrats voted with the Republicans, while 
eighty-six, or forty-seven percent, of the Republicans voted with 
the Democrats. See ibid., 1841; and New York Times, May 5, 1917,
1.
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decision to support the President.^0 Nonetheless, thirty-six Demo­
crats, including the author of the Gard Amendment, doubted the wisdom 
of the provision. The combination of dissentient Democrats and Re­
publicans defeated the amendment, 144 to 184 (Table 3-3:D). Ten 
Republicans, who stated that they distrusted the press' ability to 
practice self-restraint, voted with the main body of Democrats. The
newspaper censorship provision suffered a well-publicized defeat, but
51the restrictive mail provisions quietly entered the law books.
Conscription and Volunteerism Again
Shortly after the passage of the original Espionage Bill, a 
conference report on the conscription law created more partisan con­
flict. After the draft law left the House in April, the Senate added 
provisions for raising the Roosevelt division that friends of the old 
Rough Rider had envisioned. Going next to the conference, the bill 
provoked a protracted wrangle as the House conferees opposed the Senate 
on the volunteer division. In May, one of the Senate conferees 
eventually retreated, allowing the bill to return to the House with 
the Roosevelt provision deleted. During the original House debate, 
the Roosevelt division had lost easily on a non-roll call vote, with
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3131, 3140,
3144; New York Times, May 23, 1917, 1; May 26, 1917, 1; May 31,
1917, 5; Washington Post, May 23, 1917, 6; May 23, 1917, 2; May 26, 
1917, 2; and May 28, 1917, 2. Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the 
War Congress, 34, states that the Republicans reached a binding 
caucus decision. He quotes the New York Times, but the Times for 
May 31, page 1, states they reached a non-binding decision.
^New York Times, June 1, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3133, 3144, 3136-38. Some congressmen continued 
to express concern about the mail provisions, but not enough to force 
a roll call. See ibid., 3132.
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such important Republican leaders as Mann opposed. Since then the 
Republicans had united, while significant numbers of Democrats, who 
had voted for the voluntary system but not the Roosevelt division, saw 
the colonel's army as the last hope for volunteerism. Also promoting 
some changes from the first vote was the knowledge that the British 
and French looked with favor on the Roosevelt plan. So when the House 
voted to approve the conference report, the Roosevelt supporters formed 
a partisan and ideological coalition large enough to carry the division 
against administration opposition, 215 to 178. The vote proved, how­
ever, of no avail, as the second conference committee, under the 
strong pressure of the White House, made the voluntary division a 
matter of discretion with the President. Since Wilson had no intention 
of placing a political rival over a special outfit of troops, he frus­
trated Colonel Roosevelt's and the House's desires by never estab­
lishing the division. The whole affair ended with Roosevelt admirers 
charging Wilson with pettiness and Wilsonians accusing Republicans of 
partisan spite.^2
The roll calls on the draft mirrored the shifting currents be­
tween the debates in April and the conference report in May. On the 
first vote, which rejected the volunteer principle, non-partisan 
factors determined the breakdown of the ballot. Both parties with
near equality supported and opposed the bill, though slightly more
^ Washington Post, April 18, 1917, 1; May 8, 1917, 2; May 12, 
1917, 2; New York Times, April 28, 1917, 1; May 10, 1917, 1; May 11, 
1917, 1; May 13, 1917, 1; May 15, 1917, 8; May 16, 1917, 1; May 19, 
1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1380; Pt. 3,
2200-05, 2215; Ramseyer to Personal (no name), April 29, 1917,
Ramseyer Papers; to Don McGriffin, May 31, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; 
and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 20-21, 26-30.
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Democrats as compared to Republicans voted against the draft (Table
3-4). One of the non-partisan influences came from sectional divisions. 
In the Northeast (the NE and MA regions), the parties solidly favored 
the draft. A fourth to a third in the Midwest (MEC and NWC regions) 
and in the Southern and Border states voted against conscription. The 
greatest opposition to selective service surfaced in the Mountain and 
Pacific states. Another non-partisan force shaping the ballot was a 
congressman's attitude toward the war. The draft roll call was cor­
related to a number of war measures, in particular to other draft 
votes. No important correlation was discovered, even with the 
Roosevelt division roll call, except with the roll call on the war 
resolution. Abhorrence of sending American boys to war resulted in 
opposition to drafting them to fight the war. It is tempting to 
speculate that an anti-war coalition, though a minority and unable 
to prevent passage of war measures, was forming. Such is not the case, 
however, since the same configuration never joined again in opposition 
to war measures. Opposition to the war and the draft engendered 
similarily compelling obligations for displays of conviction. In the 
months to follow, the onward thrust of the war program neither created 
nor permitted similar demonstrations again.
Far different from the draft vote, the vote on the Roosevelt 
division largely followed partisan rather than geographical lines 
(Table 3-5). Eighty-five percent of the Republicans supported their 
former standard bearer while seventy-seven percent of the Democrats 
opposed him. Regionally, Republicans and Democrats who voted contrary 
to the party opposition fell into no overall significant pattern.
A variation from the party norms for the Democrats is found in the
TABLE 3-4
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3545: AN ACT TO
INCREASE THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 6 25 24 61 18 40 7 20 60 2 26 8 5 3 2 8 148 167
Nay — — 1 2 6 21 3 10 39 1 8 4 3 3 3 4 63 45
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 100 100 96 97 75 66. 70 67 61 67 77 67 63 50 40 67 70 79
Nay — — 4 3 25 34 30 33 39 33 23 33 37 50 60 33 30 21
*Cong. Rec. , 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1555.
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TABLE 3-5
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3646: 
ROOSEVELT VOLUNTEER DIVISION*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 17 4 46 10 50 1 29 17 3 4 11 3 5 3 7 44 168
Nay 4 5 17 11 11 10 7 1 76 29 5 2 3 151 30
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 33 77 19 81 48 84 13 97 18 100 12 100 38 100 60 70 23 85
Nay 67 23 81 19 52 17 87 3 82 88 62 40 30 77 15
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2215.
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East North Central states and the Pacific States. Similarly, the 
Mo tin tain, Border, Southern, and West North Central regions provide, 
more wholehearted support for the Republican position. No conclusion 
is possible except that the Far West, an old Roosevelt stronghold, 
accorded him more support than other areas. Correlation with other 
similar roll calls revealed no important connections. The Roosevelt 
vote united a temporary coalition of the dissatisfied: Democrats
determined to support the volunteer principle, Republicans resolved 
to satisfy the ambitions of their most popular national leader, and 
Westerners remembering the Spanish-American War. ^ 3
Financing the War
Interspersed with the controversial measures were the more 
conventional military appropriation bills. Though involving vast 
expenditures of money and effecting tremendous reorganization of in­
dustry, they provoked less divisiveness in House business. Such 
measures as the appropriation bills for 1918 and the new military and
naval supply bills received unanimous support in record-breaking 
54time. The measures did, however, force changes in House practices 
and foment controversy at times. For example, the unprecedented 
demand for fast action resulted in the consolidation of the appropria­
tion procedures of the House. No longer did several committees, par­
ticularly the military and naval committees, consider appropriation
53Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3031-20; Wash­
ington Post, February 16, 1917, 4; May 1, 1917, 2; New York Times, 
April 16, 1917, 1; May 1, 1917, 3; and Link, Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive Movement, 273.
3^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 120-21, 165,
285, 299.
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bills. Instead/ the Appropriations Committee took over their functions. 
Both parties agreed to the step/ but some discontent on the by-passed 
committees accrued.^ The Administration's desire to lump-sum appro­
priations also created a hostile reaction in the House. Since represen­
tatives considered the Congress as the constitutional body for appro­
priating funds, they felt that such a method would threaten their- 
integrity as an institution. In particular, Minority Leader Mann 
protested Wilson's request for $100 million secret fund. Mann 
thought that it ignored the powers of Congress; but Congressional 
leaders, including most Republicans, agreed with John Fitzgerald 
(D-N.Y.), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who argued that
C7
secret service operations required it. '
At times the military appropriation process also sparked divisive 
voting on roll calls. In one incident, critics demanded that the 
government hire the new employees provided for by the appropriation 
through the civil service. This quickly became a partisan matter, 
as ninety-one percent of the Democrats opposed eighty-nine percent of
5% e w  York Times, May 2, 1917, 3; April 8 , 1917, 1; April 10,
1917, 2; and Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, XIII 
(December 15, 1917), 186.
56
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 5105-06; 5130, 
3189, 1693, 3279, 496-99. In committee hearings, members displayed 
a concern for exactly what was being funded and how it was to be spent. 
See U. S. Congress, House, Urgent Deficiency Appropriation on Account 
of War Expenses, Hearings, on HR 3971, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 224-26,
182, 327, 722-23, 353. Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic,
X (April 21, 1917), 352-53, maintains that the criticism of lump-sum 
appropriations came from the congressmen's desires to force the military 
to spend some of the money in their own local districts. Some members 
did introduce bills requiring expenditures in their areas, but probably 
few really thought in such narrow terms.
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 496, 730; and 
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8 , 7905.
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the Republicans— the most partisan vote of the first session (Table 
3 - 6 ). More than mere partisanship had a role, however, as civil 
service reformers such as LaGuardia dreaded the war's impact on 
administrative practices.5® in a second incident, opposition de­
veloped to the Navy’s purchase of land along the James River in 
Virginia. Republican critics of the proposal charged that only land­
owners and not the Navy would benefit.8 9 The majority agreed with the 
critics, and though the voting divided on partisan lines, thirty- 
eight percent of the Democrats sided with the Republican position 
(Table 3 - 7 ) .
Wartime appropriations generated institutional and partisan 
tensions, while the actual financing of the appropriations fomented 
questions of good public policy and social justice. The House 
divided on both questions, the first of which involved the proper
ratio between the money to be raised by taxes and the sum to be
borrowed by bonds. In normal times, both parties stood squarely for 
the balanced budget. In wartime, however, they realized that a 
balanced budget represented an impossible goal. To what degree the 
balanced budget should be abandoned became the question. Linked 
closely with the first question, the issue of social justice involved 
the problem of who should pay the taxes. In 1913 progressive groups 
triumphed over reactionary elements with the adoption of the income
5 8Ibid., Vol. 5 5 , 1 Sess., Pt. 3 , 3063, 3 0 8 7 -8 8 , 3123.
S^ i b i d . f 3284 , 3287, 3293 , 3296 , 3539 . The Navy Department had
first asked for the appropriation for the land; later Wilson wrote 
Chairman Padgett of the Naval Committee that he supported the purchase. 
That many Democrats still sided with the Republicans showed the 
apprehension as to the soundness of the appropriation.
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TABLE 3-6
VOTE BY PARTY ON H. R. 3932: 
CIVIL SERVICE*
Party (Percent)
Vote Democrat Republican
Yes 9 (11) 89 (143)
No 91 (158) 1 1 (16)
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3123.
TABLE 3-7
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3971: 
JAMES RIVER LAND PURCHASE
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 1 9 4 5 6 1 4 57 2 15 1 4 1 3 93 21
Nay 5 17 1 38 9 34 6 19 2 0 1 1 4 3 5 3 8 58 125
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 17 6 90 1 0 36 15 14 17 74 100 58 2 0 57 25 27 62 14
Nay 83 94 1 0 90 64 85 8 6 83 26 42 80 43 100 75 73 38 8 6
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3296.
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tax amendment to the Constitution. To progressives, the income
tax represented a social equalizing tool which placed the tax burden
60on those capable of bearing it. Increasingly the revenue bills 
after 1913 reflected this philosophy. Thus, the February 1917 Revenue 
Act placed stiff levies on wealthy individuals. A new feature in 
the 1917 law was an excess profits tax on ballooning corporation in­
come.6 1  Advocates of graduated taxes controlled past policy and the 
momentum of war demands favored their continued domination.
In the Ways and Means Committee, which received guidelines from 
the Administration and wrote the specifics of the bill, several mem­
bers, led by Republican ranking member Joseph W. Fordney (Mich.), 
were less than pleased by past policy. Their distress was increased 
when Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo announced the Adminis­
tration' s plan .for raising $1 . 8  billion more by new corporation and 
income taxes. In place of this proposal they advocated a scheme which 
would raise more by bonds. Their argument, which conservatives 
repeated frequently during the debates, stressed the baneful inhibition 
that high taxes would produce on business initiative. Since they 
dominated the subcommittee that drafted the original bill, they pro­
vided only $1 billion more in taxes. This figure would require that 
at least three-fourths of the war cost be financed by bonds. In the 
Committee as a whole the thinking contrasted sharply with that of the 
subcommittee. Chairman Kitchin and leading Democratic members such
66New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; and Link, Woodrow Wilson: 
Campaigns for Progresslvism and Peace, 1916-1917, 60-65.
61New York Times, January 17, 1917, 8 ; March 2, 1917, 7; 
Washington Post, January 20, 1917, 1; March 2, 1917, 4; and Link, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 194-95.
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as Cordell Hull (Tenn.) pressed for a plan in which the government 
financed at least fifty percent of the war by taxes.6 3 The other 
Democratic and Republican members, though less sure of the exact 
percentage, nonetheless, desired to raise the full $1 . 8 billion as 
recommended by McAdoo. The committee threw away the subcommittee's 
draft, rewrote the bill, and increased excess profit, inheritance, and 
income taxes so as to provide the required funds. At the same time, 
the Committee agreed to an across the board ten percent hike in the 
tariff, a move which mollified the extreme protectionist sentiments of 
Fordney. Other proposals such as a tax on cotton sparked acrimonious 
discussion, but the committee eventually resolved all differences.
For the first time in fifty years, the revenue bill emerged with the 
unanimous approval of the committee.6 3
Debates on the House floor revealed a determined advocacy for 
the bill along with a resentment that the taxes were needed in the first 
place. The consensus was that never in peacetime would supporters vote 
for taxes such as those contained in the bill. Nonetheless, the 
proponents of the bill maintained that, as demanded by justice, the 
war had to be financed by progressive taxes and by the present genera­
tion to do otherwise; argued two Iowa Republicans, William Green and 
William Ramseyer, would condemn the Congress in the eyes of future 
generations.6^ It would also place the burden on the members of the
62New York Times, April 4, 1917, 2; April 12, 1917, 2; April 
28, 1917, 4. Hull, Memoirs, 89-90; Washington Post, April 9, 1917,
1; April 16, 1917, 1; and April 27, 1917, 4.
63New York Times, May 2, 1917, 6 ; May 2, 1917, 1; May 6 , 1917, 13; 
May 8 , 1917, 2; May 9, 1917, 1; and Washington Post, May 16, 1917, 2.
64New York Times, May 12, 1917, 1; Ramseyer to D. W. Matheny,
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community least able to pay taxes. In the meantime, the war manufac­
turers and speculators would reap huge profits from the blood of 
American boys. Arguments for justice became spiced with anger direc­
ted toward those profiteers thought to have caused the war. Claude 
Kitchin, who voted against the war resolution, was the chief proponent 
of this contention for high taxes. He and other former anti-war 
opponents made it abundantly clear that munitions manufacturers 
should pay for the war. But even strong supporters of war could agree 
with Kitchin since ostensibly America waged the war for democracy and 
not selfish profit. Opponents were unable to mount an effective counter 
argument, although they insisted that taxes ought to be added on cotton,
C C
trade, and poorer income groups. 3
After the general debate on the bill, the House started the com­
plicated process of amendment. Insurgents contested the income pro­
visions because they failed to tax the income of the rich sufficiently. 
Edward Keating (D-Col.), demanding that wealth ought to be conscripted 
as well as men, offered an amendment to impost a 1 0 0 % duty on all
income over $150,000. Though it attracted a few adherents, few
66congressmen could agree with its radicalism. More realistic and also 
more successful was the amendment offered by Irvine Lenroot to increase 
income rates twenty-five percent on incomes over $40,000. At first
May 2, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 
Sess., Pt. 3, 2225-26, 2124, 2806.
65flew York Times, May 11, 1917, 1; Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 241, 
250-51, 261; Stephens to N. L. Locke, May 13, 1917, Box 27, Folder 208, 
Stephens Papers; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 2142;
and Pt. 3, 2402, 2418-20, 2342, 2287, 2294, 2303, 2485-86.
^6New York Times, May 17, 1917, 4; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2403, 2303.
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Kitchin, who acted as floor manager of the bill, opposed all income 
boosts as an underhanded trick to later remove taxes on special inte­
rest. During the debate on the amendment, Kitchin received a call 
from Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo. Informed by McAdoo that the 
Revenue Bill needed to raise more than $1.8 billion, Kitchin dropped 
his opposition to the increase, though not his dislike of it. In
the roll call that followed, the hike in taxes on large incomes passed
67easily, 345 to sixty.
Both parties supported the income provision, but fifty of the 
sixty opponents came from Republican ranks who voted against their 
fellow party member's amendment (Table 3-8). Besides this partisan 
variation, geographical differences are noticeable as all but seven of 
the fifty Republicans represented the northeastern regions (NE, MA, and 
ENC). That Democrats of the same regions did not join the Republicans 
probably indicates that partisan influences held them in line. It may 
also relate to different types of local constituencies. Less expli­
cable is the fact that eight of the ten Democrats in opposition came 
from the South. A possible reason is that Kitchin, who did not want 
a trade-off between higher income tax supporters and lower postal 
rate advocates, voted against the amendment. His action likely in­
fluenced several fellow southerners to side with him. In general, the 
voting pattern marshaled northeastern Republicans, who thought the 
other regions were stealing their wealth, against the tax. On the 
other hand, both parties in the rest of the country favored a more 
graduated income tax.
6 ?New York Times, May 17, 1917, 1; May 18, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2419, 2462, 2482, 2815,; and Charles 
Merz, "At the Capital," The New Republic, XI (May 26, 1917), 108-09.
TABLE 3-8
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280: 
RATES ON INCOME TAX
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 5 14 24 37 2 1 47 1 0 28 87 1 32 8 7 5 5 10 191 150
Nay 1 1 0 — 23 — 1 0 1 7 2 3 — 1 — 8 50
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 83 58 1 0 0 62 . 1 0 0 83 100 97 93 33 100 73 1 0 0 83 1 0 0 1 0 0 96 75
Nay 17 42 — 38 — 17 3 7 67 27 — 17 — 4 25
*Cong. Rec. , 65 Cong./ Vol. 55/ 1 Sess./ Pt. 3, 2815.
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The amendment process next took up the tax schedules on corpora­
tions. Martin Madden opposed the whole section, arguing that its 
basic source of revenue, the excess profits tax, imposed unjust rates. 
Most other opponents of the section thought that adjustments, such as 
choosing a different base year on which to rest capital investment, 
would erase the defects. A majority of the House did not agree with 
Madden or even with the more moderate critics. They easily defeated 
all amendments in the Committee of the Whole House. When the Committee 
resolved back into the House, opponents made a final effort to change 
the corporation section. They forced a roll call on an amendment that 
delayed collection of the basic five percent corporation tax until a 
corporation earned an eight-percent profit. It lost on the relatively 
close vote of 173 to 235.88 Seventy-one percent of the Republicans 
supported the amendment. At the same time, eighty-six percent of the 
Democrats opposed it (Table 3-9). From a geographical perspective, 
the roll call demonstrated that Democrats of the Northeastern regions 
(NE, MA, and ENC) tended toward supporting the Republican position. In 
the rest of the regions except the Pacific states the Democrats aligned 
close to the party average. Republicans who broke party ranks came 
more from the New England States and the West North Central region. 
Generally, the Northeast areas and the Pacific states desired lower 
taxes, while the West North Central, South, and Border states fought 
to retain stringent taxes on business profits.
The final amendment vote came over a hotly contested provision 
on postal rates. The provision affected the newspaper, magazine,
8 8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2278, 2130, 
2545-51, 2816.
TABLE 3-9
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280: 
MANUFACTURERS TAX*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 3 9 8 43 6 53 1 15 6 3 8 1 5 3 7 28 143
Nay 3 15 16 17 16 4 9 14 89 33 3 7 1 1 3 174 57
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 50 38 33 72 27 93 10 52 6 1 0 0 73 13 83 75 70 14 72
Nay 50 62 67 28 73 7 90 48 94 100 27 87 17 25 30 8 6 28
* Cong. Rec., 65 Cong. , Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt . 3, 2816.
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and mall order industries by both establishing zone rates and by in­
creasing overall rates. Support for it manifested itself among two 
types of members. The economy-minded favored the amendment, because 
higher rates would decrease the postal service's ninety million 
dollars a year loss on publications. Support also drew substance from 
members, mostly Democrats, who disliked the great publishing houses of 
the East for their unfair criticism of the Administration.6 9 The 
opponents of the zone system adopted as their main counter thrust a 
nationalist argument: a free, vigorous national press would foster a
non-regional market place for the exchange of ideas.7 0 The division 
over the amendment split the House closely, with the result that in 
the Committee of the Whole House opponents eliminated the objectional 
provision. However, on final passage, Kitchin forced a roll call
71
where the zone system now won, 256 to 150.
As in the case of the corporation tax roll call, the postal
vote followed partisan lines (Table 3-10). The Democratic position
triumphed because of greater unity in their ranks, for ninety percent, 
as compared to sixty-five percent of the Republicans, voted with the 
party majority. Democrats also succeeded because a larger percentage 
of their members voted in comparison to the Republicans. Geographically, 
the postal zone system carried because most regions opposed the domi­
nation of the Eastern (NE and MA) publishing houses. Republicans who
69Stephens to J. P. O'Furery, January 22, 1917, Stephens Papers; 
and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2133, 2153, 2118.
70New York Times, May 19, 1917, 1; May 23, 1917, 1; and Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2278.
71Xbid., 2817.
TABLE 3-10
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280: RATES AND ZONE
SYSTEM FOR SECOND CLASS MAIL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 8 9 1 2 2 1 28 1 0 16 96 31 2 8 — 4 4 181 70
Nay 4 15 14 48 1 28 13 3 1 9 6 1 6 2 1 128
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D . R D R D R D R D R
Yea 33 35 39 2 0 96 50 100 55 1 0 0 97 18 1 0 0 80 40 90 35
Nay 67 65 61 80 4 50 45 —  1 0 0 3 82 —  1 0 0 2 0 60 10 65
*Cong. Rec./ 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2817A.
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broke with the party tended to come from the Midwest (ENC and WNC). 
Democrats who parted from their party's majority represented New 
England and Middle Atlantic states. In stun, the voting pattern 
divided along party lines, with variations from partisanship coining 
from the high support given the publishing interests by members of 
both parties of the Northeast.
The final two roll calls on the Revenue Bill consisted of 
efforts either to recommit the bill or to defeat it. The first roll 
call combined nearly all elements which desired revisions in the law.
If the bill had been returned to the Ways and Means Committee, un­
doubtedly income, corporation, and postal revisions would have re­
sulted, thereby gratifying desires for changes in the bill. From 
another viewpoint, the roll call can be seen as a Republican effort 
to change the bill, since almost all House members voting for the motion 
were Republicans. The breakdown on this roll call, where seventy-seven 
percent of! the Republicans voted for the motion and ninety-eight per­
cent of the Democrats opposed it, indicated the high partisanship 
(Table 3-11). The twenty-two percent of the Republicans siding with 
the Democrats followed no clear-cut regional pattern. There was a 
tendency among the East and West North Central Republicans to oppose 
the motion, but the variation was not significant. Specifically, 
twelve of the dissident Republicans were members of the Ways and Means 
Committee which wrote the bill. Documentary sources provide no clear 
evidence for their dissent from the party majority, which also appeared 
on the other roll calls. However, an explanation perhaps can be found 
in the compromises reached in Committee. There trading occurred, 
especially over the tariff, tobacco, and sugar provisions, which
TABLE 3-11
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280: 
MOTION TO RECOMMIT*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 17 1 52 2 34 2 0 —  3 1 2 6 — 7 4 156
Nay 5 6 23 9 19 18 10 9 97 — 34 8 5 3 201 45
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 17 74 4 8 6 1 0 6 8 69 —  1 0 0 —  1 0 0 —  1 0 0 — 70 2 78
Nay 83 26 96 14 90 32 100 31 100 31 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 30 98 22
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2817B.
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perhaps mollified Republicans.7 2 At least several Republican opponents
of the bill charged that the secret sessions held by the Committee had
allowed them to conclude several underhanded trade-offs. Another
possibility is that Fordney, who always said that he disliked the bill,
yet supported it, wanted the Republicans to gain some credit if the
measure proved popular. In the case it did not, Minority Leader Mann,
who directed Republican opposition, could then claim honor for his 
7 3party. In any event, the alignment on the recommitment motion 
indicates abnormal voting by the Republican Ways and Means members.
The last roll call on the Revenue Act was largely a formality, 
demanded by Mann. The bill passed the House by a wide margin of 329 
to 76, as all opposition came from the Republicans. Of five roll 
calls on the Revenue bill, the last four form a scalogram (Table 3-12 
and note on page 153). Measured by the scale is the readiness of 
representatives to accept higher taxes and to accept the Revenue bill. 
Sixteen percent (sixty-four members) opposed all tax provisions, 
twenty-four percent (ninety-five members) accepted one or two, and 
sixty percent supported three or four of the tax votes. Of the sixty- 
four congressmen unable to agree on acceptance of higher taxes, all 
were Republicans. The greatest number of these Republicans represented 
the Northeastern regions outside of New England (MA and ENC), though 
the highest percentage of opponents came from the Border states. At 
the medium rank of support, eighty-six came from the Republican party,
72New York Times. May 12, 1917, 1; May 20, 1917, 1; May 21, 1917,
1; Washington Post, May 11, 1917, 1; May 7, 1917, 6 ; May 8 , 1917, 2; and 
May 9, 1917, 1.
73Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 2124; and Pt. 3,
2806.
TABLE 3-12:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE 
REVENUE BILL: H. R. 4280
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 2 32 MM 14 4 3 mm 7 MM 1 MM 1 MM 64
Medium 3 13 3 18 2 28 1 2 — — 3 --------- 5 1 7 9 8 6
High 3 6 2 1 9 2 0 14 1 0 1 2 96 33 1 8 MM 4 2 195 44
TOTAL 9 2 1 24 59 2 2 56 1 0 28 96 3 33 1 1 8 6 5 1 0 204 194
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low „ 1 0 __ 54 25 14 —  1 0 0 MM 64 MM 17 1 0 MM 33
Medium 50 62 13 31 9 50 43 — - 27 - 83 2 0 70 4 44
High 50 29 8 8 15 91 25 100 43 1 0 0 1 0 0 9 1 0 0 MM 80 2 0 96 23
The order of the roll calls is 37, 35, 36, 34 
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 16, 8 , 12, 48 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .952
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TABLE 3-12:B 
SCALEOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4280
Scale
Position Notion
1 VAR 37 To pass H. R. 4280. 329-76; f = yea. Cong. Rec./
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2816.
2 VAR 35 TO amend in the nature of a substitute for section
1201, H. R. 4280, by reducing the rates for second 
class mail and applying to that class the zone system 
now in use for parcel post. 256-150; + = yea.
Ibid., 2817A.
3 VAR 36 To recommit H. R. 4280 to the committee on Ways and
Means. 161-247; + = nay. Ibid., 2817B.
4 VAR 34 To amend H. R. 4280, by prohibiting the collection
of five percent tax until the manufacturers enu­
merated shall have earned a profit of eight percent 
upon the actual capital invested. 173-235; + = nay. 
Ibid., 2816.
A NOTE ON SCALE CONSTRUCTION
The roll-call votes used for scale construction in this study 
were taken from the roll-call data sets for each House compiled by the 
ICPR. The computer programs used for scale construction were those 
in the ICPR's Osiris II package. By examining the content description 
of each roll call in the ICPR data set and the Congressional Record, 
all roll calls relating to similar issues in each House were listed 
to form a "preliminary universe of content." From this universe, a 
series of subsets relating to specific issues (e.g., the war, civil 
liberties, taxation) were selected. The uni'verse was then recorded 
by subset and the roll-calls were recoded and subjected to a program 
to compute Yule’s Q correlation coefficient for each pair of roll- 
calls in the universe. Yule's Q (which ranges from -1 to +1) is 
the generally accepted measure of the scalability of a pair of roll 
calls. A high value of Q between a pair of roll calls indicates that 
they scale— that is, few (if any) members will be found who reject an 
easler-to-support item and than accept a harder-to-support item. Every 
roll-call in a given subset was required to have a Q value of above 
+.7 with every other measure in that subset to be considered scalable. 
The Q limit was lowered to ± . 6  on several occasions in order to include 
certain desired items within a scalable subset, but in all cases the 
mean Q for each subset exceeded .7 and in most cases it exceeded .85. 
The computer-generated matrix of Q coefficients for the universe was 
then examined to determine which measures scaled within each subset and
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within the whole universe. To double-check the manual "clustering" of 
scalable roll-calls the matrix was subjected to a computer program to 
produce clusters of scalable votes on a particular issue. Those roll- 
calls in each cluster with negative Q values were "reflected"— the 
yeas and nays reversed to produce the correct response category 
indicating the positive position.
Each cluster of roll-call votes was then subjected to a scaling 
program which ordered the items in the cluster in a rank from largest 
passing set to smallest passing set and assigned a scale position to 
each member. In most cases, members who were absent for more than 
thirty percent of the votes in a scale were excluded from that scale. 
Similarly, those with more than one inconsistent vote (e.g., voting 
for a harder-to-accept proposition after rejecting an easier-to- 
accept proposition) were usually excluded from the scale except when 
the scale size could legitimately accommodate more than one incon­
sistent vote (referred to as an "error"). Careful use of the Q 
Coefficient and proper controls on errors and absences consistently 
yield valid scales. A further customary check on the adequacy of each 
scale is its coefficient of reproducibility which measures the per­
centage of responses on scale items that could be correctly predicted 
from a member's position on the scale. Scales with a coefficient of 
reproducibility above .9 are generally considered to be satisfactory.
For a discussion of scaling methods, see Lee F. Anderson,
Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call 
Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), ch. VI; and
Charles M. Dollar and Richard J. Jensen, Historian1s Guide to 
Statistics: Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), especially 116-21.
The explanation on scale construction has been adapted from Terry 
Seip, "An Economic Analysis of Southern Representatives During Recon­
struction,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 
1974), 143-44. The format used to present the scale results has been 
adapted from Seip, "An Economic Analysis." The initial table (A) in 
each act gives the distribution of scale scores by region and party 
the coefficient of reproducibility, the order of roll calls, and the 
percentage of each point on the scale. The second table (B) in each 
set identifies the items in each scale position, the vote, the positive 
position, and the citation to the Congressional Record.
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while only nine wore the Democratic label. Regionally, these Repub­
licans fell into a noticeable pattern, since they come from New England, 
East North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States. At the final rank 
of support, forty-four Republicans voted in favor of higher taxes. The 
West North Central (forty-two percent) followed by the East North 
Central (twenty-five percent) voted in this category. The contrast 
between Republicans and Democrats on the bill reveals itself best at 
this level, as all but nine of the Democrats supported the graduation 
taxation. In summary, advocacy of the Revenue Bill created no tension 
for almost all Democrats as they overwhelmingly backed a progressive 
tax policy. Though the majority of Republicans only moderately 
supported the bill, a number did break ranks, particularly from the 
Midwest (ENC and WNC regions). By so breaking ranks, these Mid- 
westerners indicated an ideological position in favor of a high tax 
to bond ratio and in support of stiff taxes on corporations and indi­
viduals. On the other hand, a number of Republicans, mostly from the 
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and Border regions, showed de­
cided conservative tendencies.
A singular combination of motives and ideas operated in the 
writing and passage of the Revenue Act. Narrow and often petty sec­
tional, partisan, and special interest considerations swayed the debates 
and amendment process. However, the popular portrayal of the bill as 
one written by the agrarian South so as to place taxes on the indus­
trial wealth of the Northeast is only in a limited sense true.7 4 No 
doubt the South favored the bill, but other regions advocated it also ,
7 4 Ibid., 2298-98, 2661, 2467, 2609, 2611; and Arnett, Claude 
Kitchin, 261.
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most notably the Midwest. Moreover, such a criticism of the bill
ignored the .motivations of many of its proponents. For one thing,
considerations of justice and public policy underlined the debates
and in fact governed the outcome. Otherwise, a coalition of Democrats
and insurgent Republicans could never have formed. These elements,
though not wholly satisfied, believed that much had been accomplished
in creating a judicious system. As one Congressman wrote, the war
had acted as an instrument which prodded members toward progressive,
even socialistic, positions.7 5 For a second reason, the bill fulfilled
the requirements for proper war financing as established by the Treasury
Department. Many observers did not agree that it served good public
policy, claiming that it would stir up immense amounts of class and
sectional animosity. Workers and farmers were unconvinced that wealth
was taxed enough, and business resented being made to carry much of
the burden. In the House, several members believed the measure crude
and even "monstrous," and hoped that the Senate would rewrite the
bill. Still, no congressmen advanced better proposals, and the revenue
bill eventually played an important part in the securement of a firm
7fifinancial structure for war.
Besides raising taxes, the House sought to mobilize the financial 
resources of the Federal Reserve System. Carter Glass (D-Va.), 
chairman of the Banking Committee, with the cooperation of the Treasury
7 5Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2272-74, 2294; 
and Stephens to Frank Dolegal, May 15, 1917, Box 24, Folder 189,
Stephens Papers.
75New York Times, May 23, 1917, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2806-11; Carter Glass to D. B. Ryland, May 23,
1917, Box 107, Folder 1917— War Revenues Bill, Carter Glass Papers, 
University of Virginia Library; and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the 
War Congress,61.
157
Department, wrote a bill. Originally Glass introduced it in the 64th
House, but it failed to pass. The Treasury Department during the 65th
House demanded action on it as necessary war emergency legislation.
Its provisions contained features to expand the financial capabilities
of the Federal Reserve System and the nation's banks. First, it
changed the required reserve of country banks .(i.e., banks not in the
major banking cities) from twelve percent to seven percent, all of
which now had to be carried in Federal Reserve banks. Further, the
first provision also reduced the required reserves of banks in central
reserve cities from eighteen percent to fifteen percent. The law's
purpose on this provision was to increase funds for lending. The
second main section provided for the liberalization of entry rules
7 7into the Federal Reserve System. These two features made up the 
bill as written by Glass, but a third provision not authored by Glass 
became the center of controversy during House debates.
Criticism of the bill came from advocates of the country banks. 
Ebenezer Hill (R-Conn.), member of the Banking Committee, argued that 
Glass designed the liberalization rules so as to drive state banks 
into the Federal Reserve System. He also saw a danger to country 
banks due to the removal of the reserve requirements.7 8 Few repre­
sentatives agreed with Hill, but many other country bank supporters 
criticized the bill because Glass failed to include a check exchange 
provision. Sponsored by Kitchin, this amendment allowed country banks
77Glass to T. James Fernley, February 7, 1917, Box 99, Folder 
Glass Papers; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2,
1577-80.
78Ibld., 1874.
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to charge an exchange fee on checks not to exceed ten cents per hundred
dollars. The virtues of the amendment, according to a bipartisan
coalition, sprang from its aid to comtry banks. Joseph Cannon and
Louis McFadden (R-Pa.), both with personal financial interests in
country banks, argued that without the check charge the banks would be
79forced into bankruptcy. Glass bitterly opposed the intrusion of this 
provision into his bill. Proponents of the Kitchin amendment, nonethe­
less, persisted in advocating it and thereby transformed a war measure 
into a battle between special interest groups.
Glass, with the aid of such Republicans as Nicholas Longworth 
(R-Ohio), maintained that an exchange fee lodged an excessive and unjust 
charge on industry. William Howard (D-Ga.) voiced similar conclusions 
from a farm-oriented perspective when he remarked that country banks 
made enough profit— out of farmers— already. At the first stage of 
the legislative process, Glass succeeded in having the Kitchin Amend­
ment thrown out on a point of order. The bill then passed without 
a roll call.8 0
In the Senate, Senator Hardwick secured the adoption of his 
check exchange amendment. In this form, the Senate passed the revised 
Glass bill and sent it to the conference committee. Before the House 
appointed its conferees, supporters of the Hardwick amendment demanded 
that the House instruct the conferees on the amendment. They forced 
a roll call and won an easy victory over Glass and his adherents,
240 to 117. Glass, who remained unalterably opposed to the amendment,
7 9 Ibid., Pt. 4, 3522, 3526, 3604.
8 0 Ibid., 3526, 3533, 3543, 3614; and Pt. 2, 1584-85.
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headed the House conferees. Not surprisingly, given Glass's hos­
tility, the conference changed the Hardwick amendment substantially.
In its new form, the amendment vested the Federal Reserve Board with 
the power of deciding if member banks could charge check exchange 
fees. ® 2
A new phase of the row erupted when the conference report
returned. Frank Mondell (R-Wyo.) charged Glass with "flagrantly and
contemptuously" disregarding the instructions of the House. Glass,
who obviously played a subtle game throughout, denied the charges and
told the House that he had only tried to perfect a crude amendment.8 3
New instructions to rewrite the conference report followed, but this
time Glass defeated the country bank advocates, 170 to 159. One factor
in the shift in voting may have come from the knowledge that Glass
favored the President's vetoing the bill if the Hardwick amendment was
made mandatory. Fear that Glass's influence would prompt Wilson in
fact to veto the bill caused some representatives, who reasoned that
"half a loaf" was better than nothing at all, to accept the revised
Hardwick amendment. Another pressure came from a Glass-inspired
84lobbying campaign by commercial and industrial elements. A final
83,Ibid., Pt. 2, 2078; Glass to William McAdoo, no date but 
probably late May, 1917; Box 102, Folder Hardwick Amendment, Glass 
Papers and to W. P. G. Harding, February 1, 1917, Box 99, Folder 1,
Glass Papers.
8 2 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3524-26.
Q O
Ibid.; and Palmer, Carter Glass; Unreconstructed Rebel, 131-33.
8^Glass to William McAdoo, no date but late May 1917 likely date, 
Box 102, Folder Hardwick Amendment; to George McRay, May 8 , 1917,
Box 99, Folder Kitchin Amendment; to Thomas A. Fernley, April 20, 1917, 
Box 99, Folder 1; to George G. McRay, May 8 , 1917, Box 99, Folder Kit­
chin Amendment; to Scott Ferris, May 19, 1919, Box 102, Folder Hardwick
160
roll call agreed to the conference report, 240 to 117.88
Analysis of the three roll calls by a scalogram demonstrates 
that the House closely divided over the check exchange provision 
(Table 3-13). Thirty-one percent of the House found it impossible to 
support the Hardwick amendment in any fashion. These strong opponents 
came from both parties in about equal numbers, with fifty-eight Demo­
crats following the leadership of Glass and forty-eight Republicans 
joining. A geographical breakdown indicates that the highest per­
centage of opponents were located in the Northeast area (NE, MA, and 
ENC). Twenty percent found it possible to vote once in favor of the 
Kitchin Amendment, but then turned against the Senate's Hardwick 
amendment on subsequent votes. As the crucial swing group, they voted 
to sustain Glass's action in the conference. They came equally from 
both parties, thirty-five apiece, which again indicates the bi­
partisan . nature of the voting. The Hardwick amendment gathered its 
least enthusiastic support in the Middle Atlantic region. Here, most 
of the members completely opposed the amendment or veered into the 
opposition camp after an initial favorable vote. High percentages 
within the Border and Pacific states were also in this swing group.
The final forty-nine percent, who represented both parties in nearly 
equal numbers, voted in support of the check exchange fee. Geographical­
ly, the Far West (Ms and PS), the South, and West North Central provided
Amendment; and E. S. Underhill, May 19, 1917, Box 102, Folder Hardwick 
Amendment, Glass Papers. The last three letters demonstrate Glass' 
hostility to the amendment, though he stated that he abided by the ori­
ginal House roll call in the conference. They actually reveal he in­
tended to "work things out" in the conference. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3620.
85Ibid., 3621.
TABLE 3-13:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON KITCHIN 
AND HARDWICK AMENDMENTS: H. R. 3673
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 3 9 7 17 1 2 17 5 16 13 1 1 1 1 3 58 48
Medium — 5 6 2 1 3 14 3 7 32 2 12 3 1 1 1 2 58 55
High 1 6 2 17 5 2 0 1 19 44 — 2 3 3 4 2 3 60 72
TOTAL 4 2 0 15 55 2 0 51 9 26 92 2 27 7 5 6 4 8 176 175
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 75 45 47 31 60 33 56 — 17 — 48 14 2 0 17 25 38 34 27
Medium — 25 40 38 15 28 33 27 35 100 44 43 2 0 17 25 26 33 32
High 25 30 13 31 25 39 11 73 48 — 7 43 60 67 50 38 33 41
The order of the roll calls is 30, 48, 49 
Percent at each point on the scale 31, 20, 12, 37 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .985
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TABLE 3-13:B 
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 3673
Scale
Position Motion
1 VAR 30 To instruct the managers of the conference committee
on H. R. 3673, (40 STAT-232, June 21, 1917), amen­
ding an act approved December 23, 1913, known as the 
Federal Reserve Act, as amended, to have the House 
agree in conference to the Senate amendment, authori­
zing any Federal Reserve Bank to receive checks or 
drafts on Non-Member Banks or Trust Companies, 
providing these Non-Member Banks maintain sufficient 
balance with the Federal Reserve to offset the items 
in transit held for its account by Federal Reserve 
Bank. 240-117? + = Nay. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 2078.
2 VAR 48 Oto recommit H. R. 3673, (40 STAT-232, June 21, 1917),
amending the Federal Reserve Act, to the committee 
on conference with instructions to report relative 
to Non-Member Banks and trust companies and their 
accounts with Federal Reserve Banks. 159-170; + = 
Nay. Ibid., Pt. 4, 3620.
3 VAR 49 To agree to the conference report on a bill, H. R. 
3673. 188-130; + = Yea. Ibid., 3621.
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average or above average support for the Hardwick amendment. Carter 
Glass, in a letter to a fellow representative, stated that "many banks 
in the South and West are insisting upon having" the "petty graft"
which they would acquire by charging for exchange of checks.8 6  He
correctly identified the South and West as basic building blocks of 
the Hardwick coalition, while overlooking the Republicans of the West 
North Central region who should also be named as strong advocates of 
the amendment.
Food For War
At the end of May, 1917, the House turned from financing the war
to providing for the food supplies of both the United States and her
allies. Originally the Administration introduced an omnibus food 
bill, but the House Agriculture Committee divided it into two bills. 
The first measure empowered the Agriculture Department to carry out 
a food survey and seed distribution program. The second and more 
important piece guaranteed the price of wheat and regulated food 
prices, liquor production, flour production, and food transportation. 
With food supplies running low, prices sky-rocketing, and with the 
allies suffering grave food shortages, many believed that the food
0 7
situation confronted the nation with its most immediate crisis.
86Glass to Augustine Lonergan, May 19, 1917, Box 182, Folder 
1917-Hardwick Amendment, Glass Papers.
87u. s. Congress, House, Food Production, Conservation, and 
Distribution, Hearingson H. R. 4188, H. R. 4125, H. R. 4630, 65 
Cong., 1 Sess., 1917, 17; Washington Post, April 21, 1917, 1; April 
22, 1917, 10; May 1, 1917, 1; May 2, 1917, 2; New York Times, May 
4, 1917, 8 ; and Raraseyer to R. R. Ramsell, April 14, 1917, Ramseyer 
Papers.
During the hearings on the food survey bill. Administration 
spokesmen and farm experts argued that the survey's necessity arose 
from war-induced conditions. On the other hand, critics of the bill 
denied its ability to improve conditions. The divergent viewpoints 
came from different assumptions. For those in favor, a survey would 
determine the quantity of American supplies and disclose the supplies 
of speculators. The seed distribution by farm agents would increase 
production by aiding needy farmers and by supplying production infor­
mation. To the bill's critics, the requisite efficiency for the 
survey would never materialize, with the result that money would be 
lost. Gilbert Haugen (Iowa), ranking Republican member and chief 
critic of the bill, also showed a rural hostility toward the farm 
experts of the Agriculture Department. He pictured the Department 
as hiring "experts" who knew little of farming and who would go "joy 
riding" in cars at the taxpayers expense.8® In one sense, the survey 
bill divided Agriculture Department supporters and skeptics of the 
Department because of attitudes about the efficiency and the economy 
of the measure and the value of experts.
Floor debates and the roll call revealed other dimensions of 
the survey issues. Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) objected to the extensive 
entry and subpoena powers granted the Secretary of Agriculture. In 
this instance, Agriculture Committee Chairman Asbury F. Lever (D-S.C.), 
who acted as floor manager for the bill, agreed to an amendment re­
stricting the Secretary of Agriculture's power. The criticisms 
from the hearings were heard again and opponents offered amendments
8 8U. S. Congress, House, Food Production, Hearings, 41, 92, 95, 
80-81, 55, 39, 116.
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incorporating the objections. As true in the Committee, the opposition
continued to have little success in changing the bill. When the motion
to recommit was taken, the bill's supporters easily turned aside the
89opposition, 221 to eighty -one. Though majorities of both parties
voted in favor of the bill, the opposition came almost exclusively
from the Republicans (Table 3 - 1 5 ). Only fifteen Democrats agreed with
sixty-six Republicans that the bill needed revision. Geographically,
no discernible pattern of support for recommitment emerged, except
that the Republicans of the West North Central region provided
slightly higher advocacy than average for the motion. Haugen, the
leader for revision, came from this region and Midwestern Republicans
may have been supporting his leadership. More likely, as a farm
90region they may have agreed with his rural skepticism. In short, 
a number of Republicans rejected the measure as ineffective, an im­
position on storage dealers, and a costly increase of the Agriculture 
Department's payrolls.
The food regulatory bill was presented by Secretary of Agri­
culture David Houston to the Agriculture Committee in April. Two 
main features of the bill granted the President power to control 
prices and to establish a food administration. James Young (D-Tex.) 
strongly opposed the price section, arguing that at just the moment 
farmers started to reap "magnificent" profits, the government proposed
89Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 5 5 , 1 Sess., Pt. 3 , 2903, 288 6 -  
8 7 , 2 891 , 3008, 3011 , 3012; and Pt. 4 , 4100 .
90The two roll calls with which the food survey bill correlates 
are on increased funding of agriculture research. These votes, along 
with the food survey, raise questions of economy as much as agriculture. 
See ibid., 2 Sess., Pt. 2 , 1 6 0 0 -0 1 .
TABLE 3-14
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 4188: 
FOOD SURVEY BILL
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 4 — 23 1 2 0 —  18 13 2 1 4 1 2 — 2 16 75
Nay 6 13 9 15 17 28 9 8 73 1 24 5 5 3 5 7 148 80
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 24 — 60 6 42 69 15 67 4 44 17 40 — 2 2 10 49
Nay 1 0 0 76 1 0 0 40 94 58 100 31 85 33 96 56 83 60 1 0 0 78 90 51
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3012.
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to rob them of their gain. Other critics, notably Haugen, charged 
that Secretary Houston favored city interests over farm interests.
If farmers must submit to this burden, he maintained that, city ele­
ments ought to agree to price controls on the products that they sold 
to farmers.9-*-
The bill's provision on the food administration drew a different 
volley of criticism. In the Committee, Young charged that the bill 
granted dangerous.and arbitrary powers to the food administration. 
Others on the Committee disagreed, because they thought that the food 
administration required dictatorial powers in order to prevent hoarding 
and speculation. In fact. Chairman Lever and Sidney Anderson (Minn.), 
a leading Republican, favored granting virtual arbitrary powers to 
the food administration. As a consequence, Lever, the Agriculture 
Department, and the proposed Food Administrator, Hebert Hoover, found 
the original bill deficient and drafted a new and more centralized
QO
measure. Lever introduced it May 23, 1917.
Since the Agriculture Committee did not report the rewritten 
bill to the floor until June 18, President Wilson's wrath was aroused 
by the slow progress of the bill. The massive inflation of over ninety 
percent in less than a year, the crying needs of the Allies, and the 
general dislocation of the ‘economy created a popular demand for action.
Q1
New York Times, June 16, 1917, 6 . U.S. Congress, House, Food 
Production, Conservation, and Distribution, Hearings, 3-4, 196-99. For 
a general discussion of the agricultural issue, see Tom Hall, "Wilson 
and the Food Crisis: Agricultural price Control During World War I,"
Agricultural History,XLVII (January 1973), 25-46.
9 2 U. S. Congress, House, Food Production, Hearings, 39, 289, 209, 
170, 215, 543, 424, 325. New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; May 23, 
1917, 1; and Washington Post, June 6 , 1917, 4.
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Employing this for purposes of speeding Congress, the President held 
conferences repeatedly with Lever and Haugen, seeking to overcome the 
bottlenecks in the legislative process.9 3 Meanwhile, in early April, 
1917, Wilson appointed Hoover to head the food section of the National 
Council of Defense. Late in May, Wilson issued a plan on the use of 
food, vesting Hoover with control in this area. Wilson's action was 
indirect criticism of Congress. Shortly before the House took up the 
bill, Wilson, even without formal legislation, told Hoover to begin 
the food saving campaign and ordered an embargo on food to neutral 
countries. As a final gesture, he wrote Representative William Borland 
(D-Mo.) that congressional delay was aiding food speculators. Even, 
though the Administration as well as Congress was responsible for the 
leisurely pace, Wilson used it to mobilize tremendous pressure for 
the bill.9 4
The House disliked Wilson's tactics but Wilson had created too 
much momentum for the development of organized opposition. The Repub­
licans called a party caucus, heard critics of the bill such as 
Haugen, but decided.not to make the bill a partisan issue.9^ None­
theless, some individuals still attempted to modify the bill by 
amendment during House debates. Haugen continued to claim the real 
aim of the bill was to lower food prices, not to stimulate food
93New York Tiroes, April 12, 1917, 2; June 7, 1917, 1; June 17,
1917, 1; and Washington Post, May 11, 1917, 2; and June 16, 1917, 2.
94New York Times, April 12, 1917, 2; May 20, 1917, 1; June 17,
1917, 1; June 19, 1917, 1; June 20, 1917, 1; Washington Post, June 16,
1917, 2; and June 17, 1917, 1.
^ Washington Post, June 18, 1917, 4; and June 22, 1917, 2.
New York Times, June 19, 1917, 1.
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production. Like-minded colleagues argued the virtues of a free market 
system and pointed to the evils of price controls. Other critics of 
the price-control provision voiced a city instead of rural viewpoint.
J. Hampton Moore, a Philadelphia Republican, argued that laborers 
received no guaranteed wages such as those which the bill proposed 
to give farmers. Similarly, city spokesmen reminded rural supporters 
that prices were already too high. All efforts to change the price 
section, however, in favor of either rural or city elements failed. 
Supporters of the price section stifled dissent because they claimed 
that it would stimulate farm production and still protect the ur­
banite.9 6
As in the Committee, the provisions on the food administration 
drew fire. Irvine Lenroot attacked the section licensing food com­
panies, claiming that it unconstitutionally delegated powers to the 
. Q7President. Supporters retorted that during wartime the Constitution 
allowed the granting of increased powers to the Chief Executive. To 
Speaker Clark, who maintained that the President could— and should—  
summarily arrest food speculators, the security of the nation came 
first.9 6  Lever rejected an amendment that Lenroot offered to limit 
the Executive's powers, but a similar provision offered by fellow 
Democrat Andrew Montague (Va.) won Lever's and Lenroot's approval.
It provided that the section's powers were delegated, not granted,
and that they would only operate during the war period. Since supporters
9 6Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 4034, 3859, 
4147-51, 3802, 4045, 3874-75, 4043-45, 3859, 3871-72.
9 7Ibid., 3802, 4075-79, 4091, 4096, 4147, 4152, 3896, 3937.
"ibid., 3821, 3901, 3832, 3848, 3816-17; and Pt. 3, 2842.
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believed that the Food Administrator required dictatorial powers for 
his job, they refused to accept other amendments restricting this 
delegation of authority.99
Another provision, heretofore not discussed, raised the highly 
volatile subject of prohibition. Inevitably the bill, since it 
contained food conservation provisions, raised the liquor, question. 
Opening their drive toward a national amendment,1 0 0 prohibitionists 
or "drys" claimed that prohibition would save the cotin try one hundred 
million bushels of grain a year. The Agriculture Committee wrote into 
the food bill a restriction on future manufacture of liquor, but not 
all prohibitionists were pleased. William Howard (D-Ga.) wanted not 
only the manufacture but also the sale of liquor with over three per­
cent alcoholic content banned. The chair ruled an amendment he 
offered to strengthen the prohibition section out of order.1 0 1  Not
surprisingly, anti-prohibitionists or "wets" vigorously opposed the 
102section.A A heated debate flared-up between antagonists. In the
frenzy, two members, Jacob Meeker (R-Mo.) and Clyde Kelly (R-Pa.), 
exchanged personal insults which had to be struck from the Record.
A vote followed and an amendment to strike out the prohibition section
"ibid., Pt. 4, 4077-79.
100A leading prohibitionist, Charles Randall (Prohibitionist- 
Cal.) had earlier attempted to add an amendment to the Espionage bill 
to prohibit the manufacture of liquor during the war. He went so far 
as to force a roll call, but only twenty members voted for it while 
336 voted against it. Evidently, most prohibitionists did not see 
the Espionage Bill as the appropriate bill to ±tach a rider to. See, 
Pt. 2, 1840.
1 0 1 Ibid., Pt. 4, 4153, 4161.
102One wet, Leonidas C. Dyer (R-Mo.), favored the section because 
it would lessen pressure for the national amendment. See ibid., 3880.
171
failed, 152 to 136. "Wets" did not force a formal roll call, probably
fearing that a prohibition victory would accelerate the movement for
103
a national constitutional amendment.
Opponents never effectively mounted an attack on the bill, with 
the result that when it came to a roll call vote, it passed 365 to 
five. Few could afford to oppose this essential war measure, but the 
bill's success also extended to the defeat of most amendments.■L 0 4 An 
explanation for this comes first from the weakness of the opposition 
and second from the vitality of the supporters. The basic means of 
opposing a bill, partisanship, failed to materialize as Republicans 
declined the role of opponents. Critics like Haugen were left without 
a starting base, and they were further weakened by internal divisions.
For example, they had no common plan for perfecting the price control 
section, as some opposed the section altogether while others wanted 
to add manufactured products to the section. The bill's supporters, 
on the other hand, had a concrete proposal advocated by the President 
and by the chairman, who both adamantly pushed the m e a s u r e . T h e  
bill also drew strength from wartime conditions. Even if a congressman 
rejected the measure, he could not deny that conditions were abnormal.
In particular, most congressmen were up-in-arms over the sinister 
dealings of food speculators and hoarders. Finally, though the bill 
was strictly a war measure, the hoarding and speculation provisions 
drew added support because a number of members saw them as establishing
103ibid., 4164, 4182; and Washington Post, June 24, 1917, 1.
1 0 4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 4190.
1 0 5 Ibid., 3793.
1 0 6
a precedent for peacetime. Unknown at the time, however, the bill's 
price-control provisions spelled future danger for Wilson and his
Transportation and Communication
War mobilization also required the organization of the nation's
internal and foreign transportation systems. The fast shipment of
goods had become a problem even before the war started, and after
April 6 , all signs indicated that matters would.grow worse. Eastern
railways and ports, the designated points for the shipment of supplies
and of troops to Europe, were threatened by labor strikes, which their
jammed conditions could not tolerate. Moreover, the transportation
problem included the simple proposition that without the construction
of more ships neither supplies nor men would be able to reach the
battlefield. In this context the House took up a series of measures
108for transportation regulation during the first session.
The first controls on shipping were included in the Espionage 
Bill. One section provided that the President could declare a national 
shipping emergency wherein he could formulate rules regulating the 
movement of all ships. Another provision granted to the President 
power over the movement of a neutral nation's ships if he thought 
that the ship might travel to a belligerent country. During the
1 0 6 Ibid., 3794, 3816, 4035, 4055, 3808; and Zinn, LaGuardia 
in Congress, 23-25.
^Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 48-50;
New York Times, June 16, 1917, 6 ; and June 22, 1917, 3.
108New York Times, March 17, 1917, 1.
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Espionage debates these sections received little attention as most 
interest focused on the censorship and mail provisions.1 0 9
Another bill, written by the Justice Department, covered trade 
with the enemy and indirect shipments to Germany, plus other subjects 
relating to Germany such as German patent rights, alien enemy-owned 
property, and censorship of mail and telegraph services from the 
United States to foreign countries. A final provision added by the 
Senate required that German language papers in the United States 
print English translations of war criticism.1 1 0 The bill's basic pur­
pose, as presented to the Interstate Commerce Committee by Secretary 
of State Robert Lansing, was to control exports. In particular, it 
sought to prevent exports from an American company to a German company 
in a neutral country. Moreover, other purposes aimed to secure the 
profits and property that Germans held in the United States and to. 
stop the flow of any profits to an enemy in Germany. To accomplish 
these latter intentions, an Alien Property Office was established. 
Little opposition surfaced in the Committee, but what did centered 
around the constitutionality of the bill. Several committeemen 
conjectured that it granted unconstitutional powers for peacetime.
When other members argued that war conditions required different 
standards of constitutionality, they quickly conceded that the bill 
was constitutional.1 1 1
1 0 9 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1599.
110New York Times, April 14, 1917, 20; May 26, 1917, 18; July 10, 
1917, 8 ; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7419.
1 ;1 1U. S. Congress, House, Direction of Exports in Time of War, 
Hearings on H. R. 3349, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3-4, 8-10; and ibid., 
Trading with the Enemy, Hearings on H. R. 4704, 65 Cong., 1 Sess.,
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Criticism became more Intense on the House floor as several
provisions drew energetic objection. Minority Leader Mann questioned
the definition and classification of an "enemy alien," wondering if
it did not include German citizens in the United States. LaGuardia,
who thought the definition encompassed even naturalized citizens,
112called it "vicious." In like manner, the definition of "enemy 
trading" raised questions in the mind of a third Republican, Irvine 
Lenroot. He thought that it was overly broad and in fact violated 
international law. The center of criticism, however, focused on the 
mail and telegraph censorship provisions. Mann emphasized the dicta­
torial nature of the powers granted. He also asserted that the 
Administration saw a "spy behind every doorstep. " 1 1 3 In general the 
opposition reflected a particular concern for legal processes and 
personal rights. Supporters of the bill either denied any dangers 
or maintained that the President ought to control aliens in order to 
prevent harm to the war effort. Apparently, the critics presented 
valid objections since the House agreed to several clarifying amend­
ments and completely struck out the mail and telegraph section. The 
bill then passed without a roll call.1 * 4
3, 43, 53, 58, 64, 21, 7-8.
1 1 2 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4865, 4916, 
4846-47.
1 1 3Ibld., 4848, 4856; New York Times, July 11, 1917, 8 ; and 
Washington Post, July 11, 1917, 4.
1 1 4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4912, 4915, 
4976, 4989; and New York Times, July 13, 1917, 13. The mail and 
telegraph regulations were written back in by the Senate. The House 
agreed to the Senate's action without dissent. Mann was ill by then—  
September 20, 1917. See Cong. Rec., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7420; 
and New York Times, September 21, 1917, 1.
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Two other shipping measures were passed during the first session, 
the first to increase ship tonnage and the second to foster the com­
petitive trade position of American companies. A shipping act in 
1916 established the Shipping Board with a capital of fifty million 
dollars. Its purpose was to build ships for the American merchant 
marine.11^ Shortly after April 6 , 1917, Joshua Alexander (D-Mo.) 
chairman of the Merchant Marine Committee, conferred with Shipping 
Board officials on ship construction for war purposes. In May, Presi­
dent Wilson announced a proposal for a vast ship construction bill with 
an appropriation of $500 million, which was later raised to $750 
million. He conferred with a number of Senators and Representatives 
and little criticism surfaced. Once it reached the House, action on 
the bill moved quickly, the only objections coming in the form of dis­
belief at the sums of money involved. Some members also expressed 
doubts as to the Shipping Board's ability to implement the program.
The bill passed as part of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation in 
late May.11®
The second measure, which became known as the Webb-Pomerene 
Export Bill, legalized cooperative selling associations among American 
exporters. Originally introduced in the 64th Congress and passed by 
the House, but not the Senate, it was not a war measure in the strict 
sense.1 1 7 Chairman Webb of the Judiciary Committee, nonetheless,
115Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 192.
116New York Times, April 9, 1917, 1; May 10, 1917, 10; May 26, 
1917; May 29, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 3, 2931.
117New York Times, January 6 , 1917, 11.
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maintained that the bill was required more than ever. His argument 
stated that trade conditions would be vigorously competitive after 
the war. American firms must be in a position to handle the competition 
and this bill would help toward that objective. Promoters of the bill 
added that it would aid smaller companies, who were the intended bene­
ficiaries, develop foreign trade. Singularly, small coorporations
could not compete against larger American companies and foreign
118cartels except by banding together into associations.
During the 64th Congress the bill provoked criticism from anti- 
monopoly elements. They objected that it did not bar companies from 
acting together inside the United States. Responding to the objections, 
the Judiciary Committee wrote a prohibition into the bill for the 65th 
House. Several critics were mollified but others remained in oppo­
sition to the bill. ^ - 8 Andrew Volstead (R-Minn.), concerned about 
possible grain monopolies by export millers, warned that the bill 
"practically nullifies the Sherman Act." Dick Morgan (D-Okla.), in 
agreement with Volstead, proposed an amendment which would have 
vested the Federal Trade Commission with supervisory powers over the 
trade associations. It failed on a non-roll call vote, and the bill 
itself passed easily, 241 to twenty-nine.
Historian James Weinstein has argued that the Webb-Pomerene Bill 
benefitted large corporate interests by enabling them to organize trade 
associations. Moreover, the bill symbolized the growing acceptance
■^8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3564-65,
3569-70.
1 1 9 Ibid., 3565-67.
120Ibid., 3681-85.
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by Congress of large corporate entities. Antimonopoly sentiments were 
declining, while advocacy of a liberal corporate state grew. In 
particular, the shift in orientation occurred within the Progressive 
Movement. Weinstein contended that the movement sought not to destroy 
corporations but, on the contrary, to rationalize American society 
along corporate lines. The export bill consequently meshed with the 
corporate ideals of the Progressive Movement.12^
Roll call analysis of the Export Bill can shed light on the 
Weinstein thesis. The nearly unanimous vote on the bill supports his 
argument that there was a developing consensus which supported the 
formation of a corporate state. The opposition which existed indi­
cates a slight partisan coloring (Table 3-15). Only four Democrats 
opposed the bill while the rest of the opposition (twenty-four) came 
from the Republican ranks. Of course the vast majority of Republicans 
voted for the bill (eighty percent). All that can be stated is that a 
faction of the Republican party opposed the bill. Geographically, 
twenty of the twenty-four Republican opponents came from the Midwest 
(ENC and WNC regions). Correlation of the roll call with other votes 
explains why they came from the Midwest: the export vote relates to
several farm measures. Volstead and other Midwestern agriculturalists 
rejected the bill because they foresaw the organization of price- 
fixing grain export monopolies. In sum, the opponents were mostly 
rural-oriented Republicans concerned with monopoly.
But to argue the corollary, as does Weinstein, that supporters 
were advocates of a corporate state appears unjustified by the debates.
121weinstein, The Corporate Ideal, 214, 218-19.
TABLE 3-15
THE WEBB-POMERENE EXPORT BILL
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 3 11 7 34 18 29 4 9 79 2 18 5 5 4 3 7 137 101
Nay 7 1 13 1 — 1 2 1 1 — 1 4 24
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0  1 0 0 1 0 0 81 80 41 99 100 95 71 83 80 1 0 0 8 8 97 81
Nay 19 20 59 1 5 29 17 20 — 1 2 3 19
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Supporters expressed two main interests: to promote American trade
and to promote the activities of moderate size companies in foreign 
trade. No member promoted the bill as furthering the trade of large 
corporations. Particularly, id congressman either directly or in­
directly viewed the bill as part of plans for a corporate state. The 
main goal of the bill, as its proponents saw it, was to place American 
trade in the forefront of the world, not to establish a liberal 
corporate state based on capitalism.^-2 2
Another transportation bill, the Rivers and Harbors Appropria­
tion, affected the external and internal water transportation of the 
country. During the last minute rush of the 64th Congress, the Appro­
priation Bill for fiscal 1918 died in committee. Since the bill had 
the unsavory reputation as the granddaddy of all "pork" legislation,
the Democratic caucus voted that Congress should not consider it
123during a national emergency. Chairman John Small (D-N.C.) of the
Rivers and Harbors Committee rejected the caucus decision and behind
the scenes promoted the bill as necessary to maintain projects already
in existence. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels boosted Small's
efforts when he recommended for naval reasons, an appropriation to
deepen the Hell Gate entrance to New York harbor. Through the Secre-
124tary's assistance, Small won time on the floor for the bill.
A spirited debate ensued, as determined opposition surfaced 
among elements of the Republicans. James Frear (R-Wis.), who was
1 2 2Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3570.
^23New York Times, April 20, 1917, 6 .
124lbid., May 19, 1917, 10; and May 20, 1917, 2.
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joined by Mann and a majority of the Republicans rank-in-file, directed 
o p p o s i t i o n . 5 Their motivations included both real concern over the 
economy and desires for political gain. Several Republican stalwarts 
such as J. Hampton Moore, however, deserted the party because they 
represented export interests. The divisions in the Republican ranks 
deepened the controversy present in the debates. Charges of "pork," 
"provincialism," "self-interest," "waste," and "partisanship" flew 
back and forth. Personal abuse and the depreciation of the opposi­
tion's motivation, rather than a reasonable discussion of the issues, 
often became the focus of the arguments.12^
Reflecting the hostility of the debates, the House squared off 
in the most protracted voting duel of the session. Six roll calls were 
ordered, which thereby allows for a close definition of the partisan 
and regional elements behind the balloting. A number of members 
(thirty-four percent) either could not support the bill in any manner 
or could do so only once (Table 3-16). The greatest number of these 
were Republicans, ninety-one Republicans as compared to only twenty- 
four Democrats. Regions giving above average support to the majority
•^2 ^Ibid., June 9, 1917, 13; June 27, 1917, 3; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3717, 3732.
•L2®Charles Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic, XI (June 23, 
1917), 218.
-*~2^New York Times, August 1, 1917, 7; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong. 
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3454, 3733. In one particular, the debates 
involved more than immediate questions, and that issue was a proposal 
to establish a waterway commission. Advocated for years by Senator 
Newlands, the commission was to advance multiple-purpose river develop­
ment. Newlands won inclusion of the commission in the Senate bill 
and the House agreed to it one on on one of the six roll calls. Presi­
dent Wilson, however, never appointed commissioners and the 1920 
Witer Power Act repealed the Commission. See Hays, The Gospel 
of Efficiency; The Conservation Movement, 238-40.
TABLE 3-16:A 
RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION BILL
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 2 13 13 5 34 4 20 , 5 1 3 5 4 3 1 2 24 91
Medium 1 2 2 8 9 1 1 8 — 6 1 3 2 — 1 29 16
High 1 4 1 0 19 6 1 1 2 6 78 1 23 5 1 1 2 7 123 54
TOTAL 4 19 1 2 40 2 0 46 6 27 91 2 32 1 1 8 6 3 1 0 176 161
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 50 6 8 __ 33 25 74 67 74 6 50 9 46 57 60 33 2 0 14 56
Medium 25 1 1 17 2 0 45 2 4 9 — 19 9 43 40 — 1 0 16 1 0
High 25 2 1 83 48 30 24 33 22 8 6 50 72 46 “““ 67 70 70 34
The order of the roll calls is 55, 56, 44, 52, 57, 51 
Percent at each point on the scale 27, 7, 4, 2, 5, 12, 43 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .946
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TABLE 3-16:B 
RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION BILL
Scale
Position Motion
VAR 55 To move the previous question on H. R. 126, pro­
viding that H. R. 4285, making appropriations for 
the construction, repair and preservation of certain 
public works on rivers and harbors, be taken from 
the speakers table, that the Senate amendments be 
disagreed, and that a conference committee on the 
same be appointed. 198-93; + = yea. Cong. Rec.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6 , 5628.
VAR 56 To adopt H. Res. 126, authorizing the House to take 
up H. R. 4285 from the speaker's table, and that 
Senate amendments be disagreed to and a conference 
committee on same be appointed. 188-103; + = yea. 
Ibid., Pt. 6 , 5633.
VAR 44 To consider H. R. 4285, making appropriations for
the construction, repair and preservation of certain 
public works on rivers and harbors. 189-119; + = yea. 
Ibid., Pt. 4, 3359.
VAR 52 To pass H. R. 4285, the Rivers and Harbors Appro­
priation Bill. 203-133; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 5,
4357.
VAR 57 To recommit H. R. 4285 to the Committee on Confer­
ence with instructions that House conferees disagree 
to Amendment 41, which creates a 7 member Waterways 
Commission to prepare a plan for the improvement of 
waterways, and appropriates $1 0 0 , 0 0 0  to defray 
expenses. 142-207; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 6 , 5732.
6 VAR 51 To recommit H. R. 4285, the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Bill, to the Committee on Rivers and 
Harbors with instructions to report back the bill 
with amendment, providing no money be expended for 
maintenance until the President has certified it is 
necessary for the commercial needs of the country 
or any new project unless for the successful 
prosecution of the war, expenditure to be approved 
by the President. 141-189; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 5, 
4356.
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Republican position were New England, the Midwest (ENC and WNC), and 
the Mountain states. Democrats going against the dominant Democratic 
position were from the New England, the West North Central, and the 
Mountain states. The medium place on the scale includes two motions 
to hear the bill, plus the roll call on passage of the appropriation. 
Only eleven percent of the members clustered in the swing position, 
and they divided about equally between the parties. The high category 
included two votes to recommit; or in other words, to vote against 
these motions required the greatest level of support for the bill.
At this level seventy percent of the Democrats supported the bill. 
Thirty-four percent of the Republicans were also able to support 
moneys for rivers and harbors. Regionally, the greatest advocates 
from both parties came from the Middle Atlantic, Southern, Border 
and Pacific states. Unsurprisingly, these are the regions of the 
country with the great seaports and rivers. The six votes had de­
finite partisan qualities since party majorities located on either 
end of the scale. However, the pattern demonstrates strong regional 
tendencies. In fact, they were so decided that the balloting might 
be evaluated as more regional than partisan. Both parties in the New 
England, Midwest, and Mountain regions either strongly opposed the 
bill or gave it only conditional support. The reverse is the case 
for the Middle Atlantic, Southern, Border, and Pacific states. Un­
doubtedly, some Republicans hoped to embarass the Democrats by oppo­
sing the bill, but in most cases regional interests overrode party 
advantages.
The railroads, as the main connecting link between the factories 
and the seaports, received the attention of the Administration and the
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House. The thinking of the Administration in the Spring was to regu­
late and control the railroads, while still allowing them to remain 
under private ownership. However, desiring to be prepared for all 
eventualities, administration supporters introduced a bill that 
permitted the takeover of the railroads by the Executive. It also 
included provisions for the regulation of railroad,car usage. At 
the same time, House members introduced an administration-backed 
bill for increasing the membership of the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission. I2® The first proposal provoked adverse remarks by some 
members because they saw it as another grant of broad and arbitrary 
power to the President. Critics, who feared possible government 
ownership of railroads, also claimed that the power was unnecessary 
since the railroads functioned adequately under their private managers. 
Meanwhile, the Senate modified the bill into a railroad car priorities 
measure. After the revision House opposition melted away and the bill 
passed without a roll call.
The second railroad bill engendered more formal controversy, 
particularly after the Senate added a new provision. In its first
form, the bill divided the ICC into three subdivisions and increased
the membership from seven to nine. By these administrative changes, 
the proponents of the bill hoped to improve the efficiency of the ICC.
No objection was made against these provisions, but this was not the
128washington Post, April 14, 1917, 2; New York Times, April 13,
1917, 1; May 22, 1917, 6; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 4, 3585.
• ^ Washington Post, May 16, 1917, 2; June 8 , 1917, 2. New York 
Times, June 17, 1917, 6 ; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt.
5, 4502; and Pt. 6 , 5847.
185
case with the new provision. It required that whenever a protest 
was filed against railroad rate increases, the commission had to sus­
pend the rates until a full investigation. Thetus Sims (D-Tenn.), 
chief advocate of the provision, explained that it aimed to block •<**■ 
a pending fifteen percent hike in rates desired by the railroads. The 
provision itself raised the question of whether or not the ICC would 
retain its discretionary power on suspending rates.-*-3 0
Critics of the provision maintained that it would tie up the ICC 
with cases, slow the decision process indefinitely, and severely limit 
the ICC's discretion. A second opposition view expressed distress for 
the railroads. According to George Graham (R-Pa.), the railroads were 
not prospering and the amendment would further injure their profit- 
making capacities. As part of the debate that had raged in the House 
for many years over the control of the railroads, arguments were shaped 
on the one hand by a hostility to higher railroad rates and on the other 
by a concern for railroad profits. The bill became less a matter of 
railroad regulation when the members expressed a concern over the 
discretionary rights of the ICC.1 3 1
Consequently, the combination of ICC and railroad advocates 
controlled the vote, defeating the Sims provision, 156 to seventy- 
six. * 3 2 Partisan divisions did not operate, as fifty-nine percent of 
the Democrats and seventy-six percent of the Republicans voted against 
the amendment (Table 3-17). Twice as many Democrats (fifty) cast an
J-3 0Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3585; Pt. 5, 
4369-4371.
1 3 1 Ibld., 4385.
1 3 2 Ibid., 4491.
TABLE 3-17 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE BILL
Region and Party (Nunibers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 4 7 4 8 30 9 2 3 3 — 2 50 24
Nay 3 15 13 24 8 23 9 32 1 1 2 5 2 3 3 4 73 84
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 8 33 23 100 47 48 43 29 60 50 — 33 41 22
Nay 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 92 67 77 -- 53 52 100 57 71 40 50 1 0 0 67 59 78
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affirmative vote as compared to the Republicans (twenty-four), which 
may indicate somewhat greater favor among Democrats for restrictions 
on railroads. A more noticeable trend reveals itself geographically.
Here the Northeastern regions, particularly New England and the Middle 
Atlantic, opposed the rate amendment at an above average percentage in 
comparison to the other regions. In contrast, the West North Central, 
the South, and Mountain states provided high support for the amend­
ment. In stim, both parties opposed restricting the discretion of the 
ICC, though more Republicans did than Democrats. Regionally, the 
industrial Northeast evidenced greater opposition to the restriction.
The more agrarian states of the Midwest, South, and Mountain regions 
tended to favor it.
Implementing and Critizing the 
War Program
With completion of the ICC bill in late June, the House had 
virtually nailed down the major points of the war program. During 
the ensuing legislative lull, attention shifted from the creation of a 
war program to the evaluation of its implications and operations.
When congressmen voted for war, few fathomed all that was involved in 
terms of men, money, mobilization, and transfer of power. In fact, the 
war vote would have been closer if they had known that they would be 
conscripting a vast army and sending it to Europe. Instead, congress­
men believed that the American role would consist of providing the
Allies with funds, ammunition, and other supplies, with fighting
1 3 3restricted to naval warfare. They progressively discovered the
Ibid., pt. 2, 1646; LaGuardia, The Making of an Insurgent,
140; and Ramseyer to Harry M. Neas, July 25, 1917, Ramseyer Papers. Some
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true situation, first with the draft controversy and then when allied 
deficiencies became apparent.
When they had fully adjusted to full-scale war, they were better 
able to clarify their thought on the aims of the war. First of all, 
representatives came to a general agreement that German attacks on 
American shipping provoked America's entry into the war. Nonetheless, 
a noticeable split developed over their interpretation of the meaning 
and implications of American involvement. For a number of House 
members, the talk of world democracy, humanity, and brotherhood made 
little sense. They believed that nations fought only to gain something 
for themselves or to defend t h e m s e l v e s . F o r  others, such a defi­
nition overlooked the nature of the adversary, which to them embodied 
a thorough-going autocracy bent on destroying democracy. As one 
representative wrote, "Germany knows no limits to her ambitions of 
world empire. It is a fight to defend our ideals." The destruction 
of autocratic power and the substitution of democracy in its place 
became a logical goal of the war for such representatives.13^ The 
division over this most fundamental of all war questions did not find 
formal outlet in roll calls, but it did foster an atmosphere of ten­
sion and confusion in the House.
members also learned to their dismay that the draft did not work out 
as they had expected. See Stephens (D-Neb.) who wrote Woodrow Wilson, 
September 25, 1917, Box 30, Folder 236, Stephens Papers, that the 
draft as means to exempt farm laborers was not working properly.
1 3 4 Ibid., to Don McGiffin, May 31, 1917, Ramseyer Papers, and 
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6 , 5898.
13^Stephens to Theodore Bests, June 16, 1917, Box 24, Folder 
183, Stephens Papers; to Fred A. Marsh, August 13, 1917, Box 28,
Folder 215, Stephens Papers; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess.,
Pt. 5, 4539; Pt. 6 , 5568; and Pt. 7, 7165, 7286, 7293-94, 7316.
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That the war and the creation of the war program engendered 
deep apprehensions can be best seen in the controversy over estab­
lishing the Committee on the Conduct of the War. The increasing demands 
that the Executive placed on Congress for new grants of power served as 
background to this controversy. As authority flowed to the President, 
doubts mounted as to the place of the Congress in the war effort.
Perhaps most members recognized that modem war was a matter of 
administration, which consequently left Congress largely out of the 
process.13® Still, they believed that they could advance the war 
program, particularly since they knew that the Administration was 
running into snags in the implementation of programs. The Shipping 
Board's affairs had become so disorganized that a public scandal 
erupted in the middle of July. Before all was lost, many congressmen
believed that it was time for Congress to assert its prerogatives and
137take over the management of the war effort.
The Senate in July started the row as Republicans and dissendent 
Democrats added the Weeks Amendment as a rider to the food bill. When 
the bill passed the Senate and went to the conference, the House 
conferees adamantly refused agreement on the rider. Bolstering them 
in their opposition, Wilson wrote Lever that he would veto the bill 
with the rider since it would completely undermine his running of the 
war. He compared the present scheme to the joint committee established
13®Stephens to Frank E. Plummer, February 7, 1917, Box 28, Folder 
219, Stephens Papers; New York Times, June 16, 1917, 6 ; Washington 
Post, May 27, 1917, 2; and July 11, 1917, 1.
13^Washington Post, July 22, 1917, 2; Charles Merz, "At the 
Capital," New Republic, XI (June 16, 1917); 186-87; Washington 
Post, July 11, 1917, 1; and New York Times, July 18, 1917, 1.
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during the Civil War, which he maintained had seriously impaired 
Lincoln's management of the war.-1-3 8 Lever, a vigorous Administration 
supporter, fully appreciated Wilson's sentiments. With the aid of 
his fellow House conferees and of Senator Francis Warren (R-Wy.), 
he defeated the proposal in the conference.-1-3 9
Lever and the conferees had earlier won instruction from the 
House against the amendment. At that time, House Republicans were 
divided. Kahn, the leading Republican of the Military Affairs Commit­
tee, opposed the war committee but Mann and Longworth strongly 
advocated it. Cannon and Gillett also favored it, though they were 
unwilling to wage a protracted campaign for it.-1-4 0 Their arguments 
rested on the contention that the committee had no evil design. Its 
purpose was simply to establish a means by which the House could moni­
tor war expenditures so as to prevent graft, not to hamstring the 
Administration. Not all House Democrats were happy with the Adminis­
tration but they lined up against the amendment, defeating it 169 to
101. On this non-roll call vote, thirty-one Republicans broke ranks
141and voted wzth the Democrats.
The Weeks Amendment was defeated on July 26, but the debate over 
it signaled the start of a running battle over the conduct of the war.
138New York Times, July 22, 1917, 1; July 23, 1917, 1; July 24, 
1917, 1; and Washington Post, July 24, 1917, 1. Representative Martin 
Madden (R-Ill.) had earlier— only days after the Declaration of War—  
introduced a similar proposal. No action was taken on his plan. See 
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, Sess., 1, Pt. 1, 497, 626, 630, 683.
139Washington Post, July 28, 1917, 2; and August 1917, 2. New 
York Times, August 3, 1917, 2.
1 4 0 Ibid., July 26, 1917, 1; August 4, 1917, 3; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 6 , 5527, 5739.
l^Ibid., 5527; and New York Times, July 26, 1917, 1.
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One phase of the conflict came over Republican efforts to attach 
amendments similar to the Week's proposal. Gillett and Joseph Fordney 
scored Wilson for insulting the Republicans of the Civil War era who 
served on the joint War Committee of that period. They tried to add 
the Committee as an amendment to the second bond bill, but Speaker 
Clark ruled the hostile amendment ungerxnane to the bill and therefore 
out of order.1 4 2  More commonly, the Republicans and some Democrats 
criticized individual aspects of war management. A long-standing 
complaint was the method of letting war contracts on a cost-plus 
basis rather than by competitive bidding. Chairman John Fitzgerald of 
the Appropriation Committee at various times objected to the method, 
but the Army replied that it offered the fastest means for the pro­
duction of war supplies.^-4 3 Other criticisms, mostly of a partisan 
nature, rained down on the Administration over the employment of dollar- 
a-year businessmen in war agencies, the production of small arms 
ammunition, and the inflation of food and non-perishable goods. While 
the opprobrium directed against the Administration remained within 
bounds, such criticism after July, 1917, always underlined House 
discussions. •L44
The resulting tense atmosphere served to ignite the most dramatic 
confrontation of the first session. Some members, particularly
142cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 6635-36; and 
New York Times, September 1, 1917, 1.
•^4 3Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3185; Pt. 7,
7218; and New York Times, September 12, 1917, 7.
•*~4 4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 8 , 7783; Pt. 7,
6808; New York Times, September 26, 1917, 9; September 5, 1917, 14;
Washington Post, August 7, 1917, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
55, 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 5071.
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Democrats, thought that the motivation for the criticism sprang from 
partisan bias.1 4 5 Thomas Heflin (D-Ala.), went farther by claiming 
that an element in Congress censured the President's program for 
treasonable interests. Throughout the first session, Heflin had in­
dulged in verbal blasts at unpatriotic elements, but during the debate 
over the Weeks amendment he unleased bitter remarks against two mem­
bers of the House. He charged that Fred A. Britten (R-Ill.) and William 
E. Mason (R-Ill.) purposely stirred up opposition to the war and the 
selective service. Both members came from districts with large German 
populations, and each had in fact introduced a bill on the draft,
Mason's to exempt draftees from going to Europe and Britten's to 
allow German aliens exemption from the draft. Heflin alluded to these 
particulars, connected Britten and Mason with anarchists and traitors, 
and further referred to these representatives by name, which went 
contrary to House rules. His remarks were stricken from the Record 
by a roll call, 190 to 122. Most members simply wrote the incident off 
as a typical Heflin performance.1 4 5
A much less easily ignored speech by Heflin came after State 
Department disclosures in September that the former German Ambassador 
to the United States, Count Von Bemstorff, had employed a $50,000 
fund for influencing Congress. Most observers interpretsted the fund's 
use as for propaganda, but Heflin concluded that the Germans employed 
the money as a slush fund for bribing congressmen. On the basis of
145Stephens to F. B. Knaps, July 16, 1917, Box 27, Folder 206, 
Stephens Papers.
1 4 5Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2937-38; Pt.
6 , 5756-57; New York Times, June 26, 1917, 7; and August 4, 1917, 1.
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this erroneous premise/ Heflin delivered a House speech, claiming in 
it that he could identify "thirteen or fourteen" congressmen who had 
received money from the fund. At this point he only linked Mason and 
Britten to the funds. William Howard (D-Ga.) supported Heflin, when 
he claimed that he could also name members who had taken the money.1 4 7  
Unleasing an uproar in the House, Heflin met with few supporters and 
much denunciation even from fellow Democrats. The House Rules Commit­
tee launched an investigation into the charges, while other members 
demanded the expulsion of Heflin. In the end, the incident fizzled- 
out. No members pushed matters to a climax, and the Rules Committee
14o
dismissed Heflin's charges as without substance.
Retrospect
Although the Heflin incident indicated a growing alarm over cri­
ticisms of the war program, the first session generally maintained 
a sense of proportion in dealing with possible discontented elements 
and with dissenters. They had twice rejected the restrictive censor­
ship provision of the Espionage law but accepted another one and over­
looked totally the other restrictive features of the bill. A number 
advocated the easy exchange of newspapers and magazines, and a 
majority voted to strike Heflin's attack from the House proceedings.
In total, the House went on record six times on civil liberties and 
dissent issues. These provide a basis for analyzing the groups
147New York Times, September 27, 1917, 1; September 23, 1917, 1; 
and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7305-06, 7360-61.
1 4 8 Ibid., 7361, 7461, 7369, 7463; Pt. 8 , 7711-15, 7786; New York 
Times, September 24, 1917, 1; September 25, 1917, 8 ; September 27,
1917, 4; September 28, 1917, 1; September 29, 1917, 1; October 7, 1917, 
3; and U. S. Congress, House, Alleged German Corruption Fund, Hearings 
on H. Res. 148, 149, 151, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 14-18.
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supporting or opposing repressive tendencies. Since all six of these 
votes scaled together, a scalogram pinpoints the members having the 
easiest time supporting repressive measures and those having the hardest 
time supporting them. (Table 3-18:A). Thirty-eight percent of the 
congressmen either could not vote for any repressive measures or found 
that they could vote for the passage of Espionage Bill but no restric­
tive positions. Of this first group, a mere ten out of the 147 
congressmen were Democrats while the rest carried the Republican 
label. Clearly some partisan factors were at work in the votes. In 
terms of geography, no pattern is noticeable except that New England 
Democrats lined up with the Republicans more than normally, and New 
England and East North Central Republicans gave slightly below average 
support to their party position. In the moderate category eighteen per­
cent of the membership swung from support of repressive measures to 
opposition. The partisan breakdown levels out as a number of Repub­
licans (thirty-five), who had found it possible to vote for a measure 
or two, moved into opposition against other restrictive measures. At 
the same time, an equal contingent of Democrats (thirty-nine) found 
that they also could not agree to such confining policy positions.
These Democrats resided in all sections, but greater numbers came from 
the East North Central and the Pacific states. The third category 
includes the supporters of the most repressive measures; they favored 
the original censorship provisions of the Espionage Bill and they 
opposed removing Heflin's inflamatory remarks. Partisan divisions 
returned as 145 Democrats supported the President's and Heflin's 
positions. Only seventeen Republicans so voted. These 162 members 
came from all sections though the South supported the measures more
TABLE 3-18:A 
CIVIL LIBERTIES
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION 0 R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 3 12 1 40 1 35 1 23 3 1 10 2 5 1 9 10 137
Medium 1 7 6 7 8 14 2 4 12 — 7 — — 1 3 2 39 35
High 2 3 15 4 12 6 6 2 80 — 24 2 5 1 145 17
TOTAL 6 22 22 51 21 55 9 29 92 3 32 12 7 6 5 11 194 187
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 50 55 6 78 5 64 11 79 —  100 3 83 29 83 20 82 5 72
Medium 17 32 27 14 38 26 22 14 13 22 — 17 60 18 20 18
High 33 14 68 8 57 11 67 7 87 75 17 71 20 —  — 75 10
The order of the roll calls is 29, 35, 27, 41, 26, 58 
Fercent at each point on the scale 19, 20, 9, 6, 4, 20, 22 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .937
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TABLE 3-18:B 
CIVIL LIBERTIES
Scale
Position Motion
1 VAR 29 To pass H. R. 291. 260-107; + = yea. Cong. Rec.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1814.
2 VAR 35 To amend in the nature of a substitute for section -
1201, H. R. 4280, by reducing the rates for second 
class mail and applying to that class the zone 
system now in use for parcel post. 256-150; + = yea. 
Ibid., Pt. 3, 2817A.
3 VAR 27 To amend H. R. 291, by prohibiting the wilful pub­
lishing of any information relating to national 
defense that may be useful to the enemy during any 
national emergency resulting from a war, and autho­
rizing the President to declare a national emergency 
excepting that nothing in this section be construed 
to limit or policies of .the government or the publi­
cation of same. 191-186; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1819.
4 VAR 41 To recommit H. R. 291, (40 STAT-217, June 15, 1917),
Espionage and Neutrality Bill, to the Committee of 
Conference with instructions, to agree to eliminate 
from the Bill Section 4, Title One, which describes 
specifically the character of information useful to 
the enemy. 184-144; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 3, 3144.
5 VAR 26 To amend H. R. 291 (40 STAT, June 15, 1917), punishing
acts of interference in the foreign relations, the 
neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United 
States and strengthening the criminal laws of the 
United States, by eliminating Section 4, authorizing 
the President to declare, by proclamation, the exis­
tence of a national emergency and to prohibit the 
publishing and communication of information relating 
to national defense which might be useful to the 
enemy, and also eliminating the provision that 
nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 
or restrict any discussion, comment or criticism of 
the acts or policies of the government or its repre­
sentatives or the publication of the same. 221-167;
+ = yea. Ibid., Pt. 2, 1816.
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6 VAR 58 To expunge certain remarks from the record regarding
Bill H. R. 4961, (40 STAT-217, August 10, 1917), 
Providing further for the national security and 
defense by encouraging the production, conserving 
the supply, and controlling the distribution of food 
products and fuel, by eliminating certain words 
referring to two representatives as being traitors 
and in treason with anarchists and charging them 
with stirring up enmity to the draft law. 190-122;
+ = Nay. Ibid., Pt. 6, 5757.
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strongly than the other regions. In summarizing the votes# partisan­
ship clearly influenced the balloting as most Democrats favored the 
repressive position while most Republicans were in opposition. The 
members who broke party ranks expressed either a liberatarian or 
authoritarian ideological, rather than a strictly partisan, position.
Of course, the positions, of the two parties also reflect ideological 
orientations, but more notable is the sinple partisanship of their 
stances.
The partisan voting on the civil liberties issues was unusual 
for the first session because extreme partisan voting nearly dis­
appeared as the House recorded only two percent of its roll calls at 
the ninety percent level of partisanship (Table 3-19:A). When compared 
to the eleven percent of extreme partisan votes for all sessions, the 
two percent for the first session indicates that the parties checked 
their partisan tendencies. Part of the reason for this is that par­
tisanship on a number of issues either did not influence the vote or 
operated only in a minor fashion. In this category are such vital war 
measures as the draft and food bills. Open partisanship did not com­
pletely vanish, however, as the first session recorded thirty-nine 
percent of its roll calls at the fifty percent versus fifty percent 
level. In this category are the Espionage Act, the Roosevelt division, 
some of the ballots of the Revenue Act, and the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation. On still other roll calls partisanship was noticeable, 
even though it falls below the statistical convention. On such votes, 
what opposition did exist came from a minority of one party. For 
example, all opposition to the final passage of the Revenue Act came 
from a minority of Republican party members. Then partisanship made
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TABLE 3-19:A 
PARTISAN VOTING
First Session Second Session Third Session Overall
Ninety Percent 
versus
Ninety Percent 2% 3% 22% 11%
Fifty Percent 
versus
Fifty Percent 39% 40% 56% 47%
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itself known through floor debates, criticism of the Administration, and 
attempts to wrestle control of the war program from Wilson. Although 
thirty-nine percent was a relatively low percentage of partisan voting, 
which compared favorably with the overall percentage of forty-seven for 
all sessions, the Republicans added a dimension of conflict to roll 
calls that otherwise would have been missing.
At the same time that roll calls recorded few partisan votes, they 
also indicated a high cohesion within parties (Table 3-19:B). Normally, 
high cohesion within parties is interpreted as a result of high partisan 
voting, as both parties internally unite against the other. The corol­
lary to this thesis is that low cohesion within parties reflects low 
partisan voting.14® However, the thesis is largely incorrect for the 
first session of the 65th House, because the high cohesion within 
parties actually represented a high agreement between parties on 
policy. Interestingly, however, the Rice Cohesion Index records a 
relatively small difference between the three sessions of the 65th 
House. Democrats recorded during the first session a cohesion score 
of seventy-four on all votes, which represented an increase of one 
over the average score for all sessions. The Republicans actually 
dropped one point from sixty-seven to sixty-six. A possible explanation 
is that while the parties united behind the war program, elements of 
both parties at times found it impossible to support the party posi­
tion. In this way the war program created internal party disunity, 
though the war program usually engendered surprisingly high unity 
within parties.
149Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive Years," 
570-77.
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TABLE 3-19:B
COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUES BY PARTIES*
DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
First Session 
Average 
Cohesion
All Sessions 
Average 
Cohesion
First Session 
Average 
Cohesion
All Sessions 
Average 
Cohesion
1. Overall 74 73 66 67
2. Revenue 88 88 40 40
3. Progressive 65 63 51 56
4. War
Legislation 72 73 61 64
5. Economic 50 54 52 57
*This table was constructed in a manner similar to Table 22 of 
Chapter two.
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The high cohesion was reflected in high unity on several issues 
of the first session (Table 3-19:B).*50 The Democrats maintained 
significantly high unity on revenue, progressive, and war measures. 
Whereas the Democrats were able to unite on these issues. Republicans 
achieved little unity on revenue legislation and only average unity on 
progressive and war legislation. On roll calls dealing with economy 
in government, the Republicans achieved a higher unity, but their score 
of fifty-two against the Democrats fifty cannot be construed as sig­
nificantly greater. The degree of unity on all issues except one 
was not greater than the average for all sessions. In the context of 
the fewer partisan votes, the lower cohesion.scores indicate that such 
issues, when they caused divisions at all, divided parties internally. 
Overall, the parties agreed to the war program, which resulted in high 
cohesion on issues.
Policy differences between Republicans and Democrats existed, 
but to characterize their positions as progressive or conservative 
is more difficult. The draft vote moved in the realm of liberalism. 
Since both sides claimed to speak for democracy and the parties did 
not divide, the progressive stance becomes impossible to pinpoint. 
However, the Revenue Act and the civil liberties votes suggest more 
recognizable liberal positions. On the Revenue Act, Republicans 
staunchly stood for conservativism as they opposed higher business 
taxes and favored revision of the bill. They reversed their alignment 
on civil liberties and voted for the liberal position. The Democrats
15°The cohesion scores on the issues will often be lower than the 
overall cohesion average. As an explanation, it should be noted that 
all unanimous votes were removed from the votes on issues, while the 
overall average, as the term implies, included all votes.
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followed a similar inconsistent pattern, since they adopted the oppo­
site stance on these two issues. Therefore, partisanship is probably 
more significant than ideology on the revenue and civil liberties 
issues, but elements of both parties broke ranks to express ideo­
logical orientations. Those who did so may be described as progres­
sives or conservatives.
If partisanship and ideology influenced the final decisions of 
the House, the war program gave substance and weight to all that tran­
spired. The House, though often directed by the Executive, formed a 
war program for troop recruitment, espionage, finances, food, and 
equipment of the army and navy. More than once the President and 
the press criticized the congressional -pace, but if not immediately, 
at least eventually, the required programs were forthcoming. Through­
out, the House insisted on its share in the war program. They in fact 
stamped their image on the draft, the Espionage Act, the Revenue Bill, 
and the Lever Food Act. They failed, however, to develop a program 
of their own and, rather, accepted an administration plan from which 
to work. Most of all, they failed to share in the implementation of 
the war program. As a result, many in the House, mainly Republicans 
but also some Democrats, uneasily accepted this lack of participation. 
The session closed in October, 1917, on a note of cordiality, but an 
undercurrent of frustration and tension flowed beneath the surface.
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CHAPTER IV
SECOND SESSION OF 65TH HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES
When congressmen assembled for the second session on December 2, 
1917, they were in a critical and suspicious frame of mind. Rumors 
of war mismanagement by the Wilson Administration filled the Capital, 
creating a tense atmosphere. Representatives vocally demanded infor­
mation from the Administration of military preparations and of the 
status of American relations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.3- But 
tension arose not only from concern over the war program but also 
from the legislative difficulties that confronted the new session.
Much of the legislation passed during the first session required 
revision because it had left out important war needs or had not pro­
vided enough money, men, and material to effectively fight the war. 
Also, the war spirit was generating pressures for two long time re­
forms, women's suffrage and prohibition. It was again clear that 
complex partisan, regional, and ideological forces would be active 
during the session as in the first session.
Adding to the tension and flux was the change in party leader­
ship and in the balance between the parties. Minority Leader Mann had
^New York Times, December 2, 1917, section VII, 2; and Livermore, 
Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 65.
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been absent since July, 1917, suffering from a nervous breakdown. 
Although he would periodically make an appearance during the second 
session, the Republicans had to find new leadership. At first they 
selected a two-man team, Frederick H. Gillett and Irvine L. Lenroot; 
Republicans also directed that several other party stalwarts, among 
them Joseph Cannon, assist Lenroot and Gillett. Shortly after his 
selection, Gillett took over sole direction of the party when Lenroot 
won a seat in the Upper House in April, 1918. In contrast to Mann, 
Gillett chose to work in concert with several other party leaders.
On the Democratic side, old leaders also had to be replaced. Two 
important committee chairmen resigned in December, John J. Fitz­
gerald, head of Appropriations, and William C. Adamson, head of 
Interstate Commerce. J. Swagar Sherley replaced Fitzgerald, and 
Thetus Sims took over the Interstate Commerce post. Though both men
had long experience in the House, they lacked the floor training which
3Fitzgerald and Adamson had acquired.
Meanwhile the control of House machinery could have passed to the 
Republicans if they had so chosen after the death of Ellsworth Bathrich 
(D-Ohio) and the resignation of four Tammany Hall Democrats, who pre­
ferred to reap the spoils of the Tigers' recent mayoralty victory 
rather than stay in the House. With the Democrats' ranks thus depleted, 
Republicans technically became the majority party. Although they 
decided that the Democrats ought to bear alone the responsibility for
2Ibid., November 25, 1917, 11. New York Times, November 26,
1917, 8; and December 4, 1917, 3.
3Ibid., December 13, 1917, 2; and December 15, 1917, 6. Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 304, 316.
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the conduct of the war, roll calls would now be more bitterly contested 
than during the first session.4
Resolution For War 
The actual legislative session started calmly enough when the 
House heard President Wilson deliver the State of the Union Address 
on Deceiriber 3, 1917. He declared that the goals of the war were just 
because America waged war for the vindication of principle and of 
right. Only a complete defeat of German autocracy and complete freedom 
for European people would achieve this purpose. In pursuit of this 
goal, Wilson explained, America’s war had to be expanded to include 
combat against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He suggested that the 
Hapsburgs were vassals of Germany and hinted that war against them 
would help to liberate the Empire's nationalities. On domestic matters, 
he very cursorily sketched legislation that the Executive would re­
quire from Congress during the session. As Wilson concluded his address, 
he had resolved the tensions over the ambivalent status of American 
relations with Austria-Hungary, but he had failed to resolve all 
doubts over American war aims.5
Immediately taking up the declaration after Wilson’s speech, 
the House membership quickly demonstrated that few followed Wilson's
4New York Times, December 25, 1917, 3. Eventually, the Demo­
crats were replaced. Since the replacements were other Democrats, 
control reverted to them. See ibid., March 7, 1917, 5; and Washington 
Post, March 15, 1917, 2.
5Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 21-23; New 
York Times, December 3, 1917, 1; and Washington Post, December
4, 1917, 2. Many members wished that Wilson had included Bulgaria 
and Turkey in his call for war against Germany's allies. See 
Washington Post, December 5, 1917, 5.
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reasoning or sympathized with his aims except for three members, J. 
Charles Linthicum (D-Md.), Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.), and Frederick 
Gillett. Phrasing the imperative for war in the terms of Wilsonian 
idealism, they also spoke of the war as one to lift humanity, establish 
international law, liberate subjugated nationalities, and achieve 
permanent peace.® The majority who finally opted for war on Austria 
supported the resolution because they believed that it would be an 
effective means of destroying German power. American might, they 
thought, should be directed against Germany's allies because they 
furthered her war-making potential. Such a narrow definition of the 
war's purpose could not encompass the idealism of Wilson.
A third group of congressmen diverged even more significantly 
from Wilson's view. According to Pat Harrison (D-Miss.), war 
against Austria grew out of the need to maintain American economic 
rights. In effect advancing an economic motivation for the war, 
Harrison and like-minded colleagues connected the wartime prosperity 
of the country to American's resistance toward the Central Powers.8 
Finally, members who had voted against the declaration of war on 
Germany often inplied that they still disagreed with the war's pur­
poses. Caleb Powers (R-Ky.), though he supported the Austrian War 
resolution, strongly objected to Wilson's claim that his view of war 
aims represented the only possible stance. Similarly, Jeannettee 
Rankin (R-Mont.) backhandedly alleged that commercial interests
®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,'Vol. 56, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 88-89, 92.
^Ibid., 51, 86, 91, 94, 96; and Charles Merz, "At the Capital," 
New Republic, XIII (December 22, 1917), 218.
8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 88, 85.
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controlled the direction of the war machine. She, nonetheless, voted 
for the Austrian weir resolution because she supported all measures that 
carried out the original war declaration. The only member to vote 
against the declaration agreed with Miss Rankin’s economic thesis:
Meyer London, claiming that he stated the Socialist position, sympa­
thized with Wilson's internationalism; he declared, however, that sel­
fish economic interests only turned Wilson's idealism to their own 
advantage in war.9 Debates demonstrated the cleavages within the 
House over the war issue, either because members did not agree with 
Wilsonian doctrine or because they did not understand its goals.
Prohibition and Women's Suffrage
After the settlement of the Austrian war issue, the legislative 
business of December and January consisted mostly of appropriating and 
raising money for the war. Several highly charged issues, however, 
disrupted the normal proceedings, the first of which was the national 
prohibition amendment. Since 1913 prohibition forces, directed by 
the Anti-Saloon League, had been demanding that Congress bar the 
manufacture and sale of liquor by the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment. In 1914, the drys made their first attenpt to pass the 
amendment in the House, losing 196 to 190. Still short of the consti­
tutional two-thirds requirement, prohibitionists redoubled their 
activity and waged a vigorous election campaign in 1916 that defeated 
several anti-prohibition congressmen in Indiana and elsewhere. By 
1917 they had augmented their already formidable ranks, and the
9Ibid., 94, 98-99, 90.
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onset of the war only mobilized the drys all the more for an offen­
sive. 10
Prohibitionists believed that the war presented their cause with 
a solid argument in their favor. They cited the insistence of the 
Secretary of the Navy on laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to soldiers 
and sailors. Though they failed to add a bone-dry provision to the 
Lever Food bill, prohibitionists could claim that the bill's provision 
barring the manufacture of most liquor products would conserve grain 
for food.11 In a similar vein, John G. Cooper (R-Ohio) maintained in 
a speech full of bathos that the American government had no right to 
remove a boy from the purity of his mother's home and return him 
spoiled by alcohol. Edwin Webb, floor leader for the Democratic pro­
hibitionists, connected liquor with the decline of the Roman Empire.
When the country was to face the challenge of the new "Vandals,"
America could not afford any weaknesses that alcohol would generate.12 
Wets tried to counter with a war thesis of their own, namely that 
prohibition would foster discontent at home. In particular, wets 
claimed that it would make the laboring people of the country unhappy, 
since they would feel they were denied relaxation and liberty.13 
However, the wets' rebuttal of the prohibitionists' war argument failed 
mainly because the drys more effectively dramatized of the issue.
10Odegard, Pressure Politics, the Story of the Anti-Saloon 
League, 98, 151, 166-174; and Kobler, Ardent Spirits; The Rise and 
Fall of Prohibition, 180-199.
11New York Times, May 23, 1917, 3; May 25, 1917, 2. Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1286-88; and Pt. 1, 429, 437.
12Ibid., 430, 468.
13Ibid., 428, 430, 446.
During the debates, one side would advance an argument which 
the other would then seize and reject. A favorite wet argument 
ridiculed the whole proposition because laws could never force the 
people to stop drinking.14 Discounting the likelihood of extreme 
violation of prohibition laws, Edward Keating sarcastically suggested 
that wets organize a movement to repeal all laws on theft. Laws, he 
maintained, were frequently violated, but that was not the question; 
rather, the issue was whether or not the law would help prevent some 
damage to the community. 16 Taking another approach, the wets advanced 
constitutional objections; a national amendment would violate states 
rights, would place a sumptuary law in a fundamental document, and 
would restrict the workings qf democracy.16 Prohibitionists countered 
by arguing that the states rights thesis had never been consistently 
upheld by its proponents: wets now employed it only as a scare
tactic. Further, prohibitionists argued that sumptuary law or not, 
the problem came from the existence of wet states next to dry states, 
which made dry state enforcement of prohibition laws impossible.
Only national action could ensure the integrity of dry states.
Finally, Webb discounted the issue of limitation of individual rights 
because the amendment followed the constitutional procedures. Be­
sides, as Frank Mondell (R-Wyo.) maintained, the people wanted pro­
hibition and they had the right to determine such laws as they desired.
14Ibid., 453, 463, 436.
15Ibid., 453.
16Ibid., 428, 457, 439, 432-33, 462.
17Ibid., 431, 435, 426, 453.
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Better organized and more determined, the prohibitionist, consistently
1Rdominated the debates.
Many congressmen during the debates implied that arguments would 
not influence their votes but rather that political considerations would 
determine them. Many political units across the country had held 
prohibition elections within recent years. Thus, the political power 
of prohibition was graphically evident to many congressmen. Joseph 
Cannon, not noted for his abstentious from strong drink, declared 
that he would vote to submit the amendment to the states. By so 
doing, he said that he fulfilled the expressed sentiments of his 
constituents.On the other side, Thomas Heflin, after arguing 
that prohibition would weaken the states' police powers, concluded 
that, since his district rejected a state constitutional amendment 
in 1909, he could not vote against his constituents' desires.2® Never 
unmindful of constituent desires, many congressmen, on this issue 
with its deep public passions, voted frequently not as conviction 
dictated but as political expediency required.
Despite the influence of politics on many representatives' 
stances, there were a number of strong prohibition advocates. Among 
them several attitudes, often overlapping, manifested themselves. 
Historians have attempted to classify prohibitionists into assimilative
•^8New York Times, December 18, 1917, 1.
•^®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3204. In 
private correspondence several members candidly expressed the necessity 
to vote dry because of constituent pressure. See Stephens to P. M. 
Barrett, February 28, 1917, Stephens Papers; Ramseyer to Harry M.
Neas, July 25, 1917, Ramseyer Papers; and Stringer, "Aswell, Educator 
and Politician," 66, 68.
20Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 458.
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or coercive reformers, true social reformers, efficiency proponents, 
and so forth.23- Such efforts are essentially futile because a congress­
man often combined several attitudes. Yet, in one sense a common 
denominator can be found that encompasses many of their attitudes. 
Running through their discussions was a characterization of liquor as 
"evil." The word "evil" itself was repetitiously mouthed by drys, 
while at the same time they drew sinister images of the "liquor 
traffic" and the "saloon." In their psychology this evil existed, 
not simply as an abstraction, but as a real and potent force that 
threatened to destroy much that they valued. A clearcut morality of 
right and wrong underlined many drys* beliefs, which fastened on 
"liquor" and the "saloon" as the source for many of the problems in 
the covin try.22
Since liquor was the source of untold graft, moral degradation, 
and social destruction, its abolition became a reform of the highest 
order. According to Congressman Keating, efforts to regulate the 
"liquor traffic" repeatedly failed because of the selfish interests of 
the liquor manufacturers. Reform in this case, he continued, required 
prohibition.23 Developing the reform concept, Patrick Norton (R-N.Dak.)
2•'■Four basic articles on the prohibitionist mentality are:
Robert Hohner, "The Prohibitionists: Who Were They," South Atlantic
Quarterly, LXVIII (Autumn, 1969), 491-505; Paul Carter, "Prohibition 
and Democracy, the 'Noble Experiment' Reassessed," Wisconsin Magazine 
of History, LVI (Spring, 1973), 189-201; J. C. Burnham, "New Perspec­
tives on the Prohibition 'Experiment' of the 1920," Journal of Social 
History, LI (Fall, 1968); and S. J. Mennell, "Prohibition: A
Sociological View," Journal of American Studies, III (December, 1969), 
159-175.
33Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 438, 442, 448,
453.
23Ibid., 453; and Keating, The Gentleman From Colorado, 391.
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spoke of prohibition as preventing the blight of "woeful wrecks of 
humanity" now found where the "evil" saloon existed. In broad terms, 
prohibitionists spoke of a rebirth of the best moral senses of mankind. 
Since liquor dulled moral sensitivity, weakened physical strength, 
and spawned criminality, its abolition would further the regeneration 
of man.24 The prohibitionist as reformer confidently looked toward a 
better day.
Besides retarding the reform of mankind, liquor also damaged 
the health and diminished the efficiency of workers. According to 
Webb, alcohol weakened infants of alcoholic mothers, undermined the 
intelligence of people, and deprived a person of his physical strength. 
Alben Barkley added that liquor robbed the nation of billions of 
dollars of industrial production by lowering workers' efficiency.
The growth of "scientific management" advanced the prohibition cause 
by demonstrating that industrial efficiency required sober workers.
Not unmindful of the value that most Americans accorded science, 
prohibitionists gladly claimed that science had given prohibition its 
imprimatur of approval.2*5
Prohibitionists also believed that alcohol threatened the 
existence of traditional values and the social fabric of the community. 
The prohibition movement, according to Webb and other spokesmen, 
sprang from the beliefs of Christian, God-fearing people who were 
trying to defend Americanism, motherhood, womanhood, homelife, moral 
purity, and "old time religion." In opposition to these fundamental
24Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 454, 435, 442,
448.
25Ibid., 426, 459-60, 442.
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values and institutions of the American people were alien and sinister 
forces which sought to undermine them.26 Usually, prohibitionists did 
not define the forces that attacked the community except in the general 
condemnation of liquor. John Tillman (D-Ark.), however, identified 
social groups that, if given liquor, became particularly insidious 
forces in American society. Although not denying the danger of whites 
"crazed" by alcohol, he singled out the Negro who, he insisted, could 
not resist the lures of drink. His intemperance, Tillman elaborated, 
"decreased the Negro's economic efficiency and increased the menace 
of his presence." Attributing the growth of prohibition sentiment in 
the South in large measure to the danger of the Negro, Tillman 
stressed that the South would do all it could to prevent the crime 
which it "regards as the blackest of all crimes." He completed the 
picture of sinister forces by linking "foreign names" to the control 
of the liquor industry.27 To some convinced prohibitionists, the 
suppression of liquor meant the protection of traditional values 
through the disciplining of alien and evil elements.
The strong moral fervor of the prohibitionists encompassed a 
variety of reform, traditional, and authoritarian attitudes. The 
congressmen who expressed the attitudes of the dry as well as the wets 
can be partially identified through quantitative analysis. First, this 
can be accomplished by correlating the prohibition roll calls, five 
altogether, in order to find if they cluster with each other. Since 
they do, the second step is to correlate the prohibition votes with
26Ibid., 468, 438, 430, 442.
27Ibid., 449.
issues that historians have named as overlapping with prohibition.
These issues include women's suffrage, progressivism, and labor 
reform, all of which have received computer analysis in relation to 
prohibition. All tests proved ineffective in uncovering significant 
links between prohibition and supporters and opponents of other issues. 
On the women's suffrage movement, three of the six suffrage votes relate 
to one of the five prohibition roll calls. Since the other votes do 
not cluster, only a slight connection is indicated between the advo­
cates and opponents of the two movements. As for progressive issues, 
James H. Timberlake makes a strong case for ties between the Pro­
gressive and the Prohibition Movements.2® His study reevaluates and 
defines the ideas of the Prohibition Movement in relation to Progres­
sivism; he did not, however, analyze congressional voting blocs.
Though Timberlake could be correct about the association of ideas, 
the inference that this would necessarily mean there were connections 
between supporters of prohibition and progressivism might be wrong.
In fact, this is the case, since tests between progressive and pro­
hibition issues revealed no correlations. Prohibitionists as a group 
did not function as a unit on progressive roll calls. In short, pro­
hibition transcended the interests and ideals of progressivism and 
women's suffrage and became a force of its own.
Nuala Drescher describes proponents of unionism as usually
n q
opposing prohibition. However, correlation tests with issues in
28James Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 
1900-1920 (New Yorks Atheneum Press, 1970), 1-3.
2®Nuala Drescher, "Organized Labor and the Eighteenth Amendment." 
Labor History, VIII (Fall, 1967), 280-283. Her study does not include 
an analysis of the 65th House.
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which organized labor had taken a position reveal no connection be­
tween labor and prohibition. During their debate both drys and wets 
claimed that they spoke for the laboring people of the country. One 
opponent of prohibition in fact waved before the House a letter from 
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in 
opposition to the amendment. As a rejoinder, John Cooper (R-Ohio), a
member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, cited the support
of his union, among others, for prohibition. It would seem that 
despite the Engineers support, labor would tend to oppose the abolition 
of the saloon because of economic, social, and class reasons, but no 
quantitative information sustains Drescher's position. No organized 
voting groups formed which consistently expressed antiprohibition 
and pro-labor positions.
Although no correlations exist with these other groups there 
appears to be some relationship between prohibition and farm issues.
A number of roll calls involved questions of farm policy and conse­
quently divided members supporting or opposing farm proposals. Since 
most farm votes do not cluster with each other, it could not be ex­
pected that prohibition roll calls would correlate with many farm
votes. Yet, three farm votes, two on a measure to stimulate farm
production and one to raise the guaranteed price of wheat, did corre­
late with the prohibition votes. This inconclusive relationship 
at least indicates that agrarian advocates tended toward prohibi­
tionist sentiments while farm opponents showed an orientation in 
favor of liquor. The farm and rural connection with prohibition
on
has been the most constant theme in historiographical literature.
30Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 429, 432. See
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These correlations partially verify that thesis.
Partisan and geographical groupings also operated during 
the prohibition roll calls/ though their significance varied widely.
The prohibition scalogram ranks menibers into opponents, moderates, and 
supporters of the amendment. The low position on the scale pinpoints 
those members who refused to support any prohibition measures (Table 
4-1sA). Since these representatives even continued to oppose pro­
hibition bills after the passage of constitutional amendment, the low 
category pinpoints those who refused to concede victory to the 
prohibitionists and consequently were the most inflexible opponents 
of prohibition. Predominantly from the Northeastern states, twenty- 
nine opponents were Democrats and sixteen were Republicans.
In the middle scale bracket, the party breakdown again shows 
that Democrats predominated over Republicans.- In the regional break­
down, members at this scale level, who switched from opposition to 
support after the ballot on the constitutional amendment, came from 
the Pacific wine-growing states, and the Border, New England, and East 
North Central States. At the highest level of support, prohibitionists 
carried the label of both parties, which indicates the non-partisan 
nature of the prohibition coalition. By regions, the West North 
Central, the South, the Border, and Mountain states supported the 
amendment more strongly than the rest of the country.
Overall, the most noticeable voting pattern revealed within the 
Democratic party was a geographical split. Although the Republicans 
had no significant geographical divisions, Democratic opposition to
Chapter I for historiography on prohibition and the farm.
TABLE 4-1: A 
SCALQGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON PROHIBITION
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 3 1 6 7 7 6 1 1 10 2 1 29 16
Medium 2 3 — 2 4 4 1 — 15 — 6 1 — 1 2 1 30 12
High 1 15 2 20 10 41 8 25 65 3 24 8 8 5 3 6 121 123
TOTAL 6 19 8 29 21 51 10 26 90 3 32 9 8 6 5 8 180 151
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 50 5 75 24 33 12 10 4 11 — 6 „ 12 16 11
Medium 33 16 — 7 19 8 10 — 17 — 19 11 — 17 40 12 17 8
High 17 79 25 69 47 80 80 96 72 100 75 89 100 83 60 76 67 81
The order of the roll calls is 161, 160, 174, 71, 177 
Percent at each point on the scale 9, 5, 3, 9, 21, 53 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .970
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TABLE 4-1:B 
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON PROHIBITION
Scale
Position Motion
VAR 161 To pass Bill S. 3935 prohibiting the sale, manufac­
ture, and importation of intoxicating liquors in 
the Territory of Hawaii during the period of the 
war, except as herein after provided. 237-30;
+ = yea. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,
Pt. 7, 6741.
VAR 160 To refer Bill S. 3935, (40 STAT-560, May 23, 1918), 
prohibiting the sale, manufacture, and importation 
of intoxicating liquors in the Territory of Hawaii 
during the period of war, except as hereinafter 
provided, to the committee on Territories with 
instructions to report back with amendment removing 
the two year limitation regarding appeal. 40-239;
+ = nay. Ibid., 6739.
VAR 174 To discharge the Committee on Agriculture from
further consideration of H. RES. 394, a resolution 
requesting the President to report to the H. of 
Rep. whether any order has been issued by the U. S. 
Fuel Administration restricting the supply of coal 
to persons engaged in manufacture of intoxicating 
liquors. 205 - 47; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 8, 8137.
VAR 71 To agree to S. J. RES. 17, proposing an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting 
manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating 
liquors. 282-128; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 1, 469.
VAR 177 To table H. RES. 399, requesting the President to
report to the H. of Rep. whether any order has been 
issued restricting the supply and transportation of 
materials and machinery for use in manufacture of 
intoxicating liquors or the transportation of such 
liquors. 142-159; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 8, 8358.
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prohibition clustered more nearly in the three Northeastern regions. 
These Democrats, representing city and Catholic ethnic constituencies, 
registered their protest against the party's dominant position. In 
1918, signs of the growing regional strife, which would divide the 
Democracy in the 1920's, were already appearing.
In January, 1918, the House took-up another constitutional 
amendment, this time on women's suffrage. The movement for the 
amendment had been gathering momentum for several years, but during 
1917, its forward progress accelerated. In January, 1917, suffragettes 
started continuous picketing of the White House. Hoping to dramatize 
their cause, they also desired to push Wilson toward more aggressive 
support of the amendment. Some congressmen, particularly anti­
suffragists, fumed against the tactic as an insult to the President.31 
The pickets continued, nonetheless, since they spotlighted demands of 
the movement. Meanwhile in Congress, suffrage leaders such as John 
Raker (D-Cal.) and Jeannette Rankin organized their cohorts. In 
September, 1917, they proposed creation of a special House committee 
on suffrage. The Judiciary Committee, which usually heard constitu­
tional amendments, was chaired by Edwin Webb, the leading opponent of 
the amendment. Since he had long refused to permit a favorable report 
of the amendment, suffragists hoped to bypass his committee with a new 
Women Suffrage Committee. They succeeded when the House agreed on a 
roll call, 181 to 107, to establish the new committee.32
^Washington Post, January 10, 1917, 1; and New York Times, 
January 19, 1917, 6.
32Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 94; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7, 7384.
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With this lopsided vote indicating the suffragists' strength, 
President Wilson increasingly moved toward open avowal of the movement. 
His previous stance had been that the Presidency had no constitutional 
role in the amendment process, since Congress exclusively initiated 
the amendment process. Moreover, Wilson, as he tried to side-step the 
issue, maintained that his party had not taken a position in favor of 
a national amendment. His statements, however, became progressively 
more positive. In October he told a group of suffragists that he 
favored the amendment, because the war brought to the fore fundamental 
issues and women's suffrage was one of the most essential. He still 
believed, nonetheless, that the states should settle the matter. In 
January, 1918, the President finally reversed course, and though he 
did not start to actively pressure Congress for passage until later, 
he now squarely supported the amendment. Many of his Democratic party 
members, particularly Southern ones, were not p l e a s e d , 33 but they 
could not stop the well-organized movement, now aided by war ideals 
and by the advocacy of the President.
The new Committee on Women's Suffrage held hearings on the 
Susan B. Anthony Amendment, starting January 3, 1918. The opposition 
witnesses were led by Mrs. James Wadsworth. They argued that women 
found their dignity only in the home, and that in New York, where 
a suffrage amendment had recently won, Socialists, pacifists and 
German sympathizers had given it the margin necessary to pass. Pro­
suffragist witnesses rejected out of hand anti-suffragist claims, 
arguing instead that the German-Socialist vote in New York affected
•^ Washington Post, January 10, 1917, 1; New York Times, October 
24, 1917, 1; November 10, 1917, 1; and January 10, 1918, 1.
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the outcome hardly at all. Turning to the attack, suffragists main­
tained that anti-feminist simply did not realize the great changes 
occurring in the world. As Carrie C. Catte, President of the National 
Women's Suffrage Association stated, female security no longer de­
pended on the reverence of the male, but on her rights before the law. 
Women, suffragists elaborated, had broken out of the home, and now 
demanded their inherent rights as protection against abuse by employers. 
The suffragist witnesses also maintained that their aim harmonized 
with the democratic ideals of the war and would help contribute to 
the war effort by boosting the morale of women.34
Backed by a favorable report from the Women's Suffrage Committee, 
general debate on the House floor commenced January 10, 1918. On one 
plane, the debate focused on the immediate implications of a favorable 
vote. On another plane, the debate probed into the fundamental 
attitudes for support or opposition. Supporters of the amendment 
argued that the war was being fought for the uplift of humanity and 
the advancement of democracy. Miss Rankin closed her speech with the 
rhetorical question, "How shall we explain to them (the peoples of the 
world) the meaning of democracy if the same Congress that voted for
r
war to make the world safe for democracy refuses to give this small 
measure of democracy to the women of our country?"35 The suffragist 
opposition also appealed to the war for vindication of their position. 
Willfred Lufkin (R-Mass.) claimed that conditions were too unsettled
34Josephson, Jeannette Rankin, 96; and U. S. Congress, House 
Extending the Right to Suffrage to Women, Hearings, on H. J. Res.
200, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 120, 57, 320, 245, 29.
33Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 772, 774.
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for deciding grave constitutional questions. Developing this theme, 
James Parker (R-N.J.) added that the House must avoid divisive issues 
in favor of proposals that unified the people and cemented the war 
machine together.3® Overall, the suffragists gained the advantage
because the war ideals, as phrased by Wilson, placed the opponents of
the amendment on the defensive.
On the second plane, both political calculation and social and 
moral ideals shaped a representative's vote. John Moon (D-Tenn.) 
explained that he opposed the amendment because the overwhelming 
majority of his constituents opposed it. J. Hampton Moore (R-Pa.), 
too, reduced the issue to a simple determination of his constituents' 
wishes. Questions of right or wrong aside, he declared that his 
voters' opinions determined his vote against the amendment.37 On the 
suffragist side, James Cantrill (D-KY), who had just conferred with 
Wilson on the amendment, counseled his Democratic brethren to vote for 
the amendment to ensure future party success at the polls. He ex­
plained his contention by pointing out that, in the 1916 election, 
Wilson carried the West because of the female vote. Particularly 
alarmed by the possible negative vote of Southerners, he reminded them
of their grave responsibility as the dominant element in the party
during a time when democracy demanded positive support.38
36Ibid., 790, 763-64.
37Ibid., 765, 778.
38Ibid., 764; and Stringer, "Aswell, Educator and Politician," 
86-87. At least one congressman voted against his constituents' 
expressed positions. John Esch in January, 1917, stated that he could 
not support women suffrage because his district had registered its 
disapproval in several recent ballots. Nonetheless, in January, 1918, 
he voted yea. See John Esch to Alfred L. Deves, January 13, 1917,
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Significantly/ Cantrill's advice and his reference to his con­
ference with Wilson brought prolonged laughter and jeers from fellow 
Democrats and Republicans alike. The House's response indicated that 
a congressman's attitudes and ideals were more fundamental than 
political considerations. Placing the whole movement in the context 
of democratic evolution, Miss Rankin linked the amendment to the basic 
democratic desires of the American people. She went on to say that 
the suffrage movement sought the realization of justice which would 
allow equal opportunity and equal freedom for both male and female. 
Similarly, Clyde Kelly (R-PA) pictured women's suffrage as fitting 
the new "epoch" that the war commenced because both asserted the 
ideals of equality and liberty. But he also talked, as did other 
suffragists, of the uplifting influence that women's suffrage would 
have on public morality. Women had already demonstrated their redemp­
tive quality in social work; their beneficial influence should spread 
to politics, also.39
At this point anti-suffragists showed a traditional and mascu­
line bias in their rebuttals to the suffragists' viewpoint. To critics 
women belonged not in public life but in the home; otherwise, the 
family unit would be destroyed. The female in their view lacked the 
strength, intelligence, and above all the firmness and hardness of 
the male. The world in their mind was divided between security and 
purity of the home and the battlefield of the business, political, and 
military worlds. Frank Clark of Florida cited Herbert Spencer as an
Esch Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 810.
39Ibid., 771, 769.
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authority on women's abilities. To Spencer women were emotionally and 
mentally incapable of carrying the burdens of government. If women 
left the home, the result would not only be the destruction of a 
safcred haven but also the weakening of the competitive and hardfisted 
world of men.40
It seemed to the suffragists that their opponents completely 
ignored the numerous new roles that women played in American society. 
Ira Hersey (R-Maine) noted that in the war women were serving in all 
branches of industry and on the battlefield as nurses. Having 
become more than either, the slave or the little angel of men, women,
i
Edward Little (R-Kans.) declared, were capable people who were helping 
to win the war. Although most proponents limited the woman's new role 
to war activities, several, who were often ardent prohibitionists, 
stressed the woman's moral role in the general advancement of mankind. 
They rejected the opponents' view of the world as necessarily evil. 
Besides, even if this were true, women should not retreat to the 
hearth but should, these suffragists argued, exercise their spiritual 
vitality and sympathy to help transform the world.41 While this 
argument was designed to attract the advocates of other reforms, 
suffragists at the same time believed that women had in truth de­
veloped a finer moral sense than males.42
40Ibid., 777, 763-64, 783-84.
I
41Ibid., 778, 791, 793, 796, 780-81, 771, 774, 798; and Nethers, 
"Simeon Fess," 320-21.
42See Alien S. Kraditor's, The Ideas of the Women Suffrage 
Movement, 1890-1920 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965),
Ch. 1, discussion of the suffrage movement's ideas.
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The suffragist debates were complicated by the concealment of 
anti-suffragists' real opinion behind a states-rights argument. 
Briefly, the states-rights thesis ran that the Constitution placed 
electoral matters in the hands of the states. The women's suffrage 
amendment was a "lawless invasion" of state privilege, which would 
jeopardize the integrity of the states. Proponents covintered by 
pointing out that the anti-suffragists had often voted for restric­
tions on states rights, for example*in the case of prohibition. Since 
most Southern representatives had voted for prohibition, they were 
forced to explain the apparent inconsistency. They did so by insis­
ting that a difference existed between the two amendments, namely, 
that the prohibition amendment dealt with police powers while the 
suffrage amendment involved voting powers.43
Though the South's states-rights argument accounted for the 
inconsistency, it nonetheless concealed a basic reason for their 
opposition to the amendment, which was their fear over the effect of 
women voting on race relations. To Southerners, prohibition would 
have beneficial effects on the Negro race since it would increase 
the black's economic potential while it also would help subdue and 
discipline his passions. In effect, prohibition would only increase 
the South's police power by strengthing its control over the Negro.44 
The situation reversed itself in the case of women's suffrage. Carter 
Glass wrote a constituent that there is "danger of permitting the 
federal authority to have anything whatever to do with the franchise
43Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 775-76, 764, 
765, 781.
44Ibid., 772, 789, 797-98, 805-06.
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....The only time there was ever federal intervention it took the 
extreme form of perpetrating the crime of Negro enfranchisement."45 
It is true that Southern opposition revealed a deep strain of anti­
feminist and traditionist sentiment which would oppose women's suf­
frage even by state amendment. Still, Southerner's fears were 
heightened by the specter of federal marshals at the polling places 
and Negro women in the voting booths.
After the conclusion of House debates, three roll calls occurred 
over the suffrage amendment. Since three other votes were taken 
during the session over other suffrage questions, the House recorded 
altogether six ballots. One roll call established the Women's Suffrage 
Committee and two others referred bills to the new Committee. Of 
the constitutional amendment roll calls, two represented attempts by 
opponents to undermine the amendment by inserting limiting clauses 
into it. The first required state conventions rather than state 
legislatures to approve the amendment, and the second limited the 
ratification period to seven years. Anti-suffragists supported these 
motions as a means to defeat the amendment on the state level. Suffra­
gists, who saw through the intentions of the anti-suffragists, opposed
A C
and defeated the two motions. The final ballot involved passage 
of the constitutional amendment itself, which won, just barely, the 
necessary two-thirds support of the House (Table 4-2:B).
These six votes were subjected to the usual quantitative tests.
As in the case of the prohibition amendment, the women's amendment
4^Glass to Mrs. S. J. Hartsook, January 16, 1918, Box 107,
Folder 1918, Glass Papers.
45Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 807-10.
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TABLE 4-2:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE
Scale
Position' Motion
VAR 109 To table motion discharging the committee on
territories from further consideration of H. R.
4665, granting to the Legislature of the Territory 
of Hawaii additional powers relative to elections 
and qualifications of electors and refering the 
same to the Committee on Woman Suffrage. 64-268;
+ = nay. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,
Pt. 4, 3491.
VAR 72 To refer the two Bills, H. R. 242 and H. R. 3371, 
protecting the rights of women citizens of the 
United States to register and vote for Senators of 
the U. S. and members of the House of Representatives 
by transferring same from the committee on election 
of President, Vice President, and Representatives 
in Congress, to the Committee on Woman's Suffrage. 
234-107; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 515.
VAR 77 To amend H. J. RES. 200, proposing an amendment to
the Constitution extending the Right of Suffrage 
to Women, by providing that the H. R. RES. be sub­
mitted to conventions in all states rather than 3/4 
of the Legislatures. 131-274; + = nay. Ibid., 807.
VAR 79 To adopt H. J. RES. 200. 274-136; + = yea. Ibid.,
810.
VAR 63 To adopt H. RES. 12, amending the rules of the House
of Rep. as follows: Amending rule X by adding a
subdivision to be numbered 51A as follows: 51A
on Woman Suffrage, to consist of 13 members," To 
amend rule XI by adding a subdivision as follows,
"51A all proposed action touching the subject of 
Woman Suffrage, to the Committee on Woman Suffrage." 
181-107; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt. 7,
7384.
VAR 78 To amend H. J. RES. 200, by making inoperative this 
article unless ratified as an amendment to the Con­
stitution by the Legislatures within 7 years from 
the date of submission to the states. 158-247;
+ = nay. Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 809.
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called into existence a discrete and single-issue voting coalition 
since its votes related with few other ballots. Women's suffrage 
has long been accorded status as a progressive measure by historians 
who generally describe progressivism as having at least a phase 
devoted to the spread of democratic forms. In terms of constitutional 
changes, this meant that progressivism sought the direct election of 
senators and the recall and the referendum, along with women's suf­
frage. Since the 65th Congress considered only the women's suffrage 
amendment, it would be logical to assume that no similar voting blocs 
would exist. Such was the case particularly since other progressive 
issues, such as taxation, generated a totally different set of 
ideas and sentiments and consequently a separate set of voting blocs. 
Further, other roll calls that included farm and war issues indicated 
no consistent relationships either.Women's suffrage mobilized 
a new, but not insignificant, voting alignment.
Because the votes correlated, a scalogram was computed, thereby 
indicating the degree of support for the amendment (Table 4-2:A). A 
quarter of the House membership rejected all votes that advanced the 
women's cause or agreed to only one ballot— this vote on a referral 
motion after the victory of the amendment. The anti-suffragists 
disproportionally represented the Democratic party: eighty-seven,
compared to sixteen Republicans. The overwhelming majority of these 
Democrats, sixty-nine, hailed from the Southern states, while seven 
more came from the Border states. The rest represented the
4^The Women's votes did correlate with two farm roll calls. 
Perhaps a small regional influence is thereby detected by this 
fact, since the particular farm votes won strong support from the 
West as did the women's amendment.
TABLE 4-2:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON 
WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 1 4 4 7 6 4 . .  _ 69 7 1 87 16
Medium 2 6 1 11 5 5 1 1 12 — 1 1 — —  — 22 24
High 2 14 15 37 12 47 9 27 17 3 26 7 8 6 5 10 94 151
TOTAL 5 24 20 55 23 56 10 28 98 3 34 9 8 6 5 10 203 191
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS ' MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 20 17 20 13 26 7 -  - 70 21 11 43 8
Medium 40 25 5 20 21 9 10 4 12 — 3 11 —  — —  — 11 13
High 40 58 75 67 53 84 90 96 18 100 76 78 100 100 1 0 0 1 0 0 46 79
The order of the roll calls is 109, 72, 11, 19, 63, 78 
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 10, 5, 3, 4, 12, 50 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = . 9 4 8
230
231
Northeast, the region from which fifteen of the sixteen Republican 
opponents were also elected. At the medium level of support, a small 
swing group of twelve percent is to be found. A close evaluation of 
the roll call scale order reveals an interesting point on the swing 
group: the roll calls at this medium level include the constitutional
amendment votes, while those at the high level consist of two suffrage 
motions that came before that roll call. Given this order, the swing 
group first tried to oppose the amendment but once finding that they 
could not defeat it, they voted for it. Otherwise, the swing group 
reveals no important party or geographical characteristics. Supporting 
the women's suffrage movement most consistently were the Republicans, 
who rallied seventy-nine percent of their members in support. Since 
forty-six percent of the Democrats similarly voted as did these 
Republicans, women's suffrage, in a strict sense, created a non­
partisan coalition. Yet, the Democratic divisions and the greater 
Republican solidarity clearly demonstrate which party more avidly 
backed women's suffrage. Regionally, the Western states (MS and PS) 
gave enphatic and total approval while the West North Central states 
also firmly sustained the women's cause.
In some respects the suffrage coalition showed a connection with 
the advocates of prohibition. Both prohibitionists and suffragists 
came from the Mountain and West North Central regions in dispropor- 
tional numbers, while the East North Central, Pacific, and Border 
states gave roughly average support. The greatest difference between 
the coalitions existed in the South, which voted for prohibition and 
against women's suffrage. In sum, women's suffrage mobilized a coali­
tion with a larger number of Republicans than Democrats who represented
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in greater percentages the Western and West North Central regions. The 
opposition consisted mainly of Southern Democrats, who were concerned 
over the effect of women's suffrage on traditional values, states 
rights, and race relations. Opponents also included some Northeastern 
Democratic and Republican congressmen who represented conservative- 
minded old stock Yankees and recent immigrants.
Conduct of the War 
The House, at the same time that it considered the democratic 
implications of the war, increasingly became embroiled in controversy 
over the conduct of the war. The vast appropriations for military 
mobilization, the decline of Allied fortunes in Europe during the fall 
of 1917, and the leisurely pace of the War Department fostered growing 
alarm among congressmen. In response to these apprehensions, the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee, on December 12, started a probe 
of the Ordnance office to determine if shortages of guns and artillery 
existed. General William Croizer, head of Ordnance, and other officers 
evaded the Senators' questions, denied failures, or shifted responsi­
bility— either toward Congress or in the direction of Secretary of 
War Baker. The testimony of Surgeon General William Gorges, however,
A Q
revealed alarming medical conditions in several army camps. On the 
House side, criticism also surfaced, though on a more muted note. The 
Naval Affairs Committee started hearings on conditions in the Navy 
Department, not because of any specific charges but as a parallel to
48Washington Post, September 4, 1917; New York Times, December 2, 
1917, Section VII, 2; December 12, 1917, 1; December 19, 1917, 1; and 
Lindsay Rogers, "Cooperation Between Congress and the Executive," 
Nation, CV (December 27, 1917), 714-16.
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the Senate's investigation of the Army. An interim report in early 
January, instead of criticizing the Navy Department, praised it.4*9 
Meanwhile several House Republicans, who had recently returned from 
France, issued a gloomy report on conditions overseas. According to 
Medill McCormick (R-Xll.) and George H. Tinkham (R-Mass.), American 
forces suffered from shortages of guns and ammunition. Fed by such 
charges, plus the finding of the Senate investigation, Administration 
antagonists prepared for a fullscale attack on the war program."
Congressional critics launched their assault by charging Secre­
tary Baker with incompetence and by demanding the reorganization of 
the war machine. Senator George E. Chamberlain (D-Org.), chairman of 
the Senate Military Affairs Committee, drafted a proposal for a 
minister of supply with cabinet status and requested that Baker appear 
before his Committee. Simultaneously, Horace M. Towner (R-Iowa) and 
William P. Borland (D-Mo.) introduced into the House bills similar to 
Chamberlain's, both of which would establish cabinet-level military 
ordnance departments.51 Coming before the Senate Committee on January 
10, 1918, Baker rejected the ministry proposal as overlapping with a 
new war council recently set up by the army. When the Committee 
questioned Baker on the alleged ammunition shortages and camp deficien­
cies, he categorically denied any problems out of the ordinary. From
49New York Times, December 20, 1917, 1; January 14, 1; and U. S. 
Congress, House, Conduct and Administration of Naval Affairs, Investi­
gation, Hearings before the Naval Affairs Committee, 65 Cong., 2 Sess.
" Washington Post, December 28, 1917, 2; New York Times, December 
19, 1917, 1; January 1, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 976.
51New York Times, January 4, 1918, 1; January 12, 1917, 3; and
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 980-81.
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the Senators' perspective, Baker's manner, which had been rather casual 
and offhanded, was irritating. They also thought that he withheld
CO
full information on military conditions. Criticism only intensified.
On January 17, Fuel Administrator Harry Garfield gave Administra­
tion critics more ammunition when he issued an order closing North­
eastern coal-burning factories (except munition plants) for five days 
and on Mondays for the next several weeks. Ostensibly, the order 
was designed to clear railroad coal car congestion and move coal to
the points experiencing the most critical shortages, the cities and 
53seaports. In the House, Republicans reaction was hostile: co­
leader Gillett introduced a resolution which would suspend the Garfield 
edict. In what developed as the first full-scale House debate on the 
war's conduct, Madden and Lenroot charged "absolute incompetency," 
and Gillett bewailed the repercussions of Garfield's order on war pro­
duction and on workers' wages. Democratic spokesmen, who largely 
stayed out of the debate, confessed that they did not know the exact 
reasons for the order, although Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) lamely added 
that "it must be needed." Criticism of the order continued for the 
next several days.154
With the political atmosphere highly charged, the opposition to 
the Administration started to coalesce around Chamberlain's proposal
^Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 80-89; New York Times, January 11,
1918, 1; January 13, 1917, 1; and January 16, 1918, 1.
33Ibid., January 17, 1918, 1.
^4Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 974, 973, 984,
990, 983, 993, 1038-44; Washington Post, January 18, 1918, 1; January 
19, 1918, 2; New York Times, January 18, 1918, 1; and January 19,
1918, 1.
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to reorganize the cabinet. Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.), 
leading Republican member of the Military Affairs Committee, told 
the National Security League that the War Department had collapsed.
Kahn also gave his endorsement to the Chamberlain proposal. While 
a few Democrats joined in the criticisms, Republicans met in caucus 
over whether or not to support the Chamberlain plan. Since they 
failed to reach an agreement,ex-president Teddy Roosevelt, who had 
long been predicting disaster, rushed to Washington. Conferring with 
leading Republicans at the home of his son-in-law, Nicholas Longworth 
(R-Ohio), Roosevelt argued for more "constructive criticism" of the 
Administration. House Republicans again caucused and this time agreed 
to support the establishment of a "director" of munitions, a suggestion 
that the President strongly opposed. However, they hesitated to take 
immediate action on their proposal and decided instead to allow the 
Senate to act first.
Up to January 20, President Wilson and House Democrats had not 
mobilized a counter-attack. Under the increasing pressure, they 
organized a series of blows that threw critics into disarray. Wilson 
initiated the offensive when, in a blunt letter to Chamberlain, he 
claimed that the Senator was guilty of "astonishing and absolutely 
unjustified distortions of the truth." Wilson also rejected the 
cabinet plan.^ While the President next conferred with Democratic
55Ibid., January 20, 1918, 1; January 16, 1918, 3; and Beaver, 
Newton p. Baker, 97.
56Washington Post, January 24, 1918, 1; and New York Times, 
January 24, 1918, 1.
^ L i v e r m o r e ,  Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 93. See 
chapter five and six for a general discussion of the War Department
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leaders, Baker requested another session before the Senate Military 
Affairs Committee. Shedding his former evasive manner, Baker master­
fully cited a ream of statistics which demonstrated that the War 
Department had not in fact collapsed. Shortly before his defense he 
had appointed Edward Stettinus, a widely respected financial leader, 
as Surveyor General of Army Purchase and had also reorganized some 
of army bureaus.®® Congressional response to Baker improved as 
a result of his new candor and more decisive action, and as the opposi­
tion started to break-up Wilson initiated the final counterstroke.
On February 6, Wilson called in Democratic Senators and gave them a 
bill that entrusted the President with power to organize the government 
in order to improve war coordination. Robbing the critics of their 
own plan while maintaining Presidential authority, Wilson's plan com­
pleted the regrouping of the Democrats behind the President and the 
rout of his opponents.®9
From then on criticism subsided: the Chamberlain plan passed
into oblivion, while the President's bill sped toward enactment.
Carter Glass defended the Administration in an extended House speech 
on February 7. Noted for not mincing his words, Glass accused Chamber- 
lain of "theatricism," called the criticism "foolish,” and declared 
the war program a success.®0 No appropriate rejoinder by the critics
Crisis. New York Times, January 22, 1918, 1.
58Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 97-100; New York Times, January 26, 
1918, 1; January 27, 1918, 1; January 30, 1918, 1; and Washington 
Post, January 26, 1918, 4.
59New York Times, February 7, 1918, 1; February 11, 1918, 1; 
February 14, 1918, 1; and Washington Post, February 7, 1918, 1.
®°New York Times, February 8, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
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followed, though a few more anti-administration speeches were heard 
in the House. Representative Fess, on the same day as Glass' speech, 
meekly suggested that the Administration required an infusion of new 
ideas. A.few days later Gillett, offering a disquisition on congres­
sional grants of power to the Executive, deplored Administration 
failures but was unable to suggest any alternative. On February 18, 
the final shot of the winter crisis was fired by Horace Towner, who 
insisted that his plan for a munitions department offered the best 
solution. No one listened, and soon the House, in a fit of near 
absent-mindedness, passed the President's proposal instead.
No direct roll call was demanded on the President's reorgani­
zation plan, but one did come over an effort to curtail the bill's 
power. In particular, opponents attempted to grant immunity to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission from the effects of the President's 
reorganizing power. Although the Commission enjoyed high prestige 
among members of both parties, the amendment vote, which enlisted the 
support of eighty-three Republicans but only eleven Democrats, clearly 
demonstrated that partisan considerations outweighed solicitude for 
the ICC (Table 4-3). Republicans in Southern, Border, and Western 
(MS and PS) states voted below that party's average support; however, 
the variation fails to signify significant discordant voting. More 
importantly, the Republican majority did not mobilize fully forty-two
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1819-28.
61Ibid., 1831-32, 2170-71; Pt. 3, 2290; New York Times, May 8, 
1918, 9; May 14, 1918, 12; and May 15, 1918, 1. Towner's speech con­
sisted of only a few remarks on the House floor, which he then extended 
in the Record. A few more speeches were made but they were proforma 
performances. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
2546, 2548.
TABLE 4-3
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S.3771: PRESIDENTIAL
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH*
Region and Pacty (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 14 — 16 1 28 16 4 1 4 4 5 83
Nay 4 7 12 15 18 15 7 7 70 2 27 5 8 4 3 4 149 59
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 67 — 52 5 65 70 5 33 44 50 3 58
Nay 100 33 100 48 95 35 100 30 95 67 100 56 100 100 100 50 97 42
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 7, 6521.
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percent of their membership. Throughout the winter attack on the 
Administration some Republicans adopted a moderate or neutral stance; 
consequently, the two Republican caucuses that assembled during this 
period failed to attract large numbers of the Republicans. Only ninety- 
five out of a possible 210 attended the first meeting, and it adjourned 
without reaching any decision on policy. The second caucus, which 
attracted a slightly larger attendance of 125, could agree only to a 
watered-down compromise bill instead of the Chamberlain bill. Appa­
rently, a sizable number of moderate Republicans feared charges by the 
press of partisan p o l i t i c s . in any event, the Democratic rout of the 
Administration's adversaries, as reflected in the roll call, was 
aided by disunity in Republican ranks.
Also enabling the Administration to finally triumph was the fact 
that House Democrats never broke into splinter groups, although such 
dissatisfaction existed over administration muzzling of military in­
formation and over autocratic direction of the war program that
go
Representative Borland even introduced a war cabinet proposal. House
N »
Democrats also showed their displeasure by not defending the Adminis- 
tration during Republican attacks. Yet, the Democrats knew that the 
Wilson Administration was their administration, and their success 
rested in Wilson's victory. In the end the Democrats rallied behind
New York Times, January 16, 1918, 3; and January 24, 1918, 1.
^Washington Post, January 26, 1918, 4; and New York Times,
January 12, 1918, 3.
®^A few Democrats spoke up for the Administration during the 
Garfield order uproar. However, they usually allowed the Republicans 
to blow off steam without interruption. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 973-93, 1038-44, for Democratic defenses of 
the Garfield order.
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Wilson, though their doing so came at the high price of granting the 
President additional powers.
While the major crisis of the war receded into the background, 
a mini-explosion flamed up in April. George Creel and his Committee 
on Public Information had long drawn the fire of congressmen because 
he acted as a propagandist not only for the war but also for the 
Administration. He also inflamed passions by his obvious doctoring 
of news stories, by his egotism, and by his inpulsiveness. Criticisms 
had, however, been sporadic before April, but he solidified opponents 
when he stated, "I will be proud to my dying day that my country was 
inadequately prepared when it entered the conflict." Congressmen 
pounced on this pacifist-like remark. Creel then increased his diffi­
culties when he denied charges by Representative Allen Treadway (R-Mass.) 
that the Committee on Public Information sent propaganda materials to 
soldiers in France. He declared the accusation to be "totally baseless" 
and added that Treadway should have checked his sources before flinging
charges.
The House, particularly the Republican side, hotly criticized 
Creel for his remarks. Longworth demanded Creel's resignation and 
other Republicans moved to censor him. Democrats rebutted a claim by 
Republicans that they always supported the Administration and pointed 
out that they actually attacked the Administration at every opportunity. 
The vote on motions to reject the report in which Creel made his reply 
to Treadway reflected the high partisanship behind the debate. Only
65New York Times, July 11, 1917, 8; July 15, 1917, 1; December 
15, 1917, 2; Washington Post, April 10, 1918, 3; April 12, 1918, 3;
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4973-77; and Gruber,
Mars and Minerva, 139.
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one or two members from either party broke ranks as ninety-nine percent 
of each party opposed the other. Since the Republicans had more mem­
bers on the floor, they won the rejection of the report.6® Further 
confrontations ensued after Creel attempted to have the last word; he 
told reporters that he would not "inquire into the heart of Congress" 
because he "did not like to go slumming." After this insulting remark, 
the House Rules Committee demanded an apology; Creel retracted the 
remark, but the House membership was not through with him. They de­
livered the final blow when they cut his Committee's appropriation 
from $2 million to $1.25 million.6^
Aliens and Dissenters
During the winter of 1918, a less than amicable atmosphere also 
prevailed in the House over a number of other issues, one of which was 
the status of alien "slackers." The issue arose because American 
treaty arrangements with Allied and neutral countries prohibited the 
conscription into the U. S. military of their nationals who resided 
in America. When many aliens refused induction based on their treaty 
rights, many American citizens demanded that these aliens, who re­
ceived the nation's benefits, should also shoulder its duties. Adding 
to the public's discontent was the fact that the draft based its 
quotas on the total population of a district without regard to its 
alien population. Thus, areas of immigrant concentration were forced
66Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4975, 4977-78, 
4980; and Washington Post, April 21, 1918, 10.
67Ibid., May 17, 1918, 17, 2; May 18, 1918, 2; June 18, 1918, 2; 
New York Times, June 14, 1918, 8; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7915.
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to draft a higher percentage of citizens than in regions of low 
alien population. Given these conditions, considerable demand 
arose outside of Congress and in Congress for harsher treatment of 
the alien "slacker.”68
In September, 1917, Reptesentatives John Burnett (D-Ala.) and 
John Rogers (R-Mass.) introduced a slacker bill that required 
the alien either to enter the military or face deportation. 7 
The bill was assigned to the Military Affairs Committee which first 
heard Secretary of State Robert Lansing and later the bill's sponsors. 
The Secretary acknowledged the inequalities in current conditions, 
but in extenuation he pointed to treaty obligations of the government. 
These, Lansing continued, would not permit a law requiring military 
service from aliens. To change current draft laws, he added, would 
adversely affect relations with neutral nations, drive out of the 
country skilled labor, and disrupt commercial activities. He con­
cluded by saying, however, that the Department was initiating discus­
sions with the treaty countries in order to revise the draft status of 
aliens. During Lansing's statement Military Affairs committeemen had 
interjected that the public was demanding action on alien slackers. 
Moreover, Frank L. Greene (R-Vt.) insisted to Lansing that the drafted 
native soldier risked his life while the alien remained at home in 
safety. John Q. Tilson (R-Conn.) added that the current draft law 
unjustly discriminated against districts with many aliens. The 
Committee implied to Lansing that the State Department must speed
I
68Washington Post, September 20, 1917, 6; and Cong. Rec., 65 
Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7384-85.
^Washington Post, September 20, 1917, 6.
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action on the treaties, or else the House would take matters into its 
7 0own hands.
After Lansing left the committee room, sponsor Rogers presented
several proposals to the committee which he had designed to meet some of
the Secretary's objections. He agreed with Lansing that the sections
on neutral and enemy aliens ought to be removed, but he insisted
that those on co-belligorent aliens should remain. With the bill's
application thus narrowed, he next advocated that aliens ought not
be drafted; however, the bill should continue to provide for the
deportation of all aliens who refused to be drafted. Earlier Greene
had asked Lansing about such a proposal. Diplomatically phrasing his
reply, the Secretary had answered that it would be most "unfortunate"
to deport aliens. Rogers acknowledged Lansing's position but rejected
it because he disliked the granting of special privileges to aliens.
Though some committee members agreed with Roger's nationalism, the
Committee decided that they would wait and see if Lansing actually
71revised the alien status treaties.
When the State Dejartment proved too dilatory, Burnett, Rogers, 
and others in January, 1918, revived the alien slacker bill. This 
time the legislation came under the auspices of the Naturalization and 
Immigration Committee, which Burnett headed. The Committee quickly 
agreed to the bill and won time on the floor for it in February, 1918. 
Henry Flood. (D-Va.), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, opposed
70U. S. Congress, House, Drafting Aliens into the Military 
Service, Hearings on H. R. 5289 and J. J. Res. 84, 65 Cong., 1 Sess.,
3-8.
7^Ibid., 16, 20-22, 30, 34, 8; Washington Post, September 27,
1917, 7; and September 28, 1917, 6.
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it as unnecessary. The State Department, he explained, was conducting 
its negotiations as rapidly as possible. He added that the bill’s 
principle was defective even if the Department was not conducting 
negotiations because it established a precedent that could be used 
against Americans residing in foreign countries. Disregarding these 
international ramifications, Burnett characterized the alien "slacker" 
as a "sinister parasite" feeding on the American nation. The concern 
for "justice" that had earlier been voiced in the Military Affairs 
Committee largely disappeared. In its place appeared a stark nationa­
lism that demanded the deportation of aliens regardless of the viola­
tion of treaty rights. Burnett even read into the Record a letter 
from the alien-baiting Patriotic Order of Sons praising the bill.
Not all opponents of aliens, however, lined up in support of the bill. 
For example, Albert Johnson (R-Wash.), a strong restrictionist, 
opposed the bill as rendering American treaties "mere scraps of paper." 
The majority, however, agreed with Burnett's aggressive nationalism, 
which permitted them to vent their rage not only against aliens but 
also upon the State Department. The bill won 234 to 130 on the key 
roll call.72
In the end the majority's singer turned to frustration as the 
State Department successfully sabotaged the bill in the Senate. Be­
fore the upper House could act on the alien bill, Lansing introduced 
the treaties. The Senate then stoped proceedings on the Burnett 
alien bill. After this happened, Lansing withdrew the treaties. With
7 ^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1764-66,
1769, 1772, 1779; and Pt. 3, 2748, 2766.
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the alien law thus sidetracked, Rogers vehemently protested Lansing's 
duplicity and the House attempted no further action.73
Similarly, two proposals on alien voting came to naught. In 
one case, Representative Flood introduced a bill which barred from 
voting aliens who had not taken out their first naturalization papers. 
Representative Montague introduced a constitutional amendment that 
removed all voting rights of aliens irrespective of the commencement 
of naturalization procedures. In both cases the proposals struck at 
the practices of ten states, including New York, which did not prohibit 
alien voting. Only the Montague scheme came to a hearing before the 
Judiciary Committee. Presenting the amendment as a protection device, 
Montague argued before the Committee that foreign elements could 
control or influence elections in eight or nine of the ten states.
This threatening condition, he postulated, must not be "acquiesced in” 
because the "preservation of our nation" hung in the balance.
Foreign countries, Montague continued, would purposely colonize 
America in order to control elections and to undermine American 
independence. Returning to more solid ground, he concluded that 
America had moved too rapidly in allowing immigrants into the country. 
Appaxently the Judiciary subcommittee did not agree with Montague's 
combination of apocalyptic fantasies and restrietionist sentiments.
At least, they failed to report the amendment out of the Committee.74
Behind Montague's apprehensions lurked the fear that aliens 
and "sinister" forces were nearly one and the same. In particular
i
73Ibld., Pt. 8, 7389-85.
74New York Times, March 12, 1918; and U. S. Congress, House, 
Limiting the Right to Vote to Citizens of the United States, Hearings 
on H. J. Res. 270, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-8.
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the alien and the "dangerous" anarchist had long been firmly linked 
together in popular thought. Laws as of 1918 provided that alien 
anarchists who had been in the United States less than five years 
could be deported. The Department of Labor and the Justice Department 
found the five-year law too restrictive. In its place, the Departments 
wanted a bill that provided an unlimited period of time for deporta­
tion. They also suggested that the bill contain a new and broader 
definition of anarchist, to include all those who believed in the 
violent overthrow of the American government. The Naturalization and 
Immigration Committee, which had jurisdiction on this proposal, agreed 
readily and reported the bill under the floor direction of Albert 
Johnson. In his analysis the bill supported one more "step on the 
part of the United States toward cleaning up its citizenship." Not 
unexpectantly, he pictured anarchists as "rats gnawing at the very 
foundations of our government." From his vantage point and also that 
of Jacob Meeker (R-Mo.), the war both roused Americans to the danger 
and offered the opportunity to rid the country of such freeloading 
and dangerous riffraff. John M. C. Smith (R-Mich.) rounded off the 
Americanism theme by asserting that the proposed law would further 
the development of a good, loyal, and "flag-waving" citizenry. If any
representatives disagreed with his colleagues’ prejudice^ he elected
75not to express his opinions. The bill passed without a division.
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 8109-8127. 
Congressman Smith was also advocating the adoption of a bill to 
punish "insults" to the flag. See Ibid., Pt. 6, 6176. The Alien 
Law of 1918 served as the basis for deportation of radical aliens 
after the war. See Robert K. Murray, Red Scare, A Study in National 
Hysteria, 1919-1920 (University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 14, 196,
247, 213-17, and Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 182-83, 193, 207,
218, for a discussion on the law's application.
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Notwithstanding such attitudes as those voiced on the Alien 
Deportation bill, the House did not always follow a repressive course 
on aliens. As the war progressed, particularly when Congress declared 
war against Austria-Hungary, problems arose over the status of "enemy 
aliens." First, the naturalization of all enemy aliens had ceased 
after April 6, 1917. Since this inadvertently blocked the completion 
of naturalization by enemy aliens who had taken first papers, the 
House received protests from aliens so affected. John Raker (D-Cal.) 
responsed to their demands and steered a bill through the House that 
rectified the situation. 7*> A second bill passed the House, without 
debate, concerning certain aliens from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Many in Congress did not believe that non-German nationalities of that 
Empire should be defined as enemy aliens. The bill, consequently, 
excluded them from classification as enemy aliens if they were serving 
in the American military.77
However, when Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.) introduced another bill 
favorable to aliens, it stirred up many congressmen's prejudice 
about the racial "purity" of the American stock. His measure provided 
that certain Czecho-Slovak and Polish troops could receive American 
citizenship. Now fighting in the Allied armies, these soldiers had 
in the past resided in the United States. Sabath's bill allowed these 
former residents, if they wished, to become naturalized citizens while 
still in Europe. Assigned to the Naturalization Committee, this 
seemingly simple proposal unleased a torrent of nationalistic bigotry.
7^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 3660-68.
77Ibid., Pt. 3, 3010.
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Everis Hayes (R-Col.) conjured-up horrid images of the Czechs and Poles 
marrying "undesirables" and returning to the United States with them.
To both Hayes and Albert Johnson, if such happened, the purging and 
cleansing of the American citizenry, which they named as the war's 
chief goal, would be undermined since these unions would propagate 
an ignorant and degenerated race of children that would subvert 
American institutions. Apparently, the whole Committee suffered from 
similar phobias about the contamination of American blood. At least, 
the Sabath bill did not win their endorsement.^®
Intolerance toward aliens fed upon itself and spread to attack
other parts of the population. It grew not so much because of the
breast-beating of the superpatriots, though they had their role, but
79because of long-term attitudes and wartime pressures for conformity.
When the war started, members could still counsel caution in the speed 
with which the House enacted restrictive measures. The House even 
dared in face of demands for full-scale war to turn aside newspaper 
censorship provisions, foreign wire censorship, and a broadly worded 
sabotage bill. Increasingly, the war climate swept away all restraints 
as the country realized that all its resources and, above all, its 
men, would be required to crush the enemy. The "badgering of Baker" 
in part flowed from a real patriotic emotion that demanded the utmost
78U. S. Congress, House, Amendments to the Naturalization Laws, 
Hearings on H. R. 10694, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 22, 24-30.
^9See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 186, 199-203; and Pres­
ton, Aliens and Dissenters, 85-87, for a discussion of prewar nativist 
and repressive tendencies. Both authors stress that immediately before 
the war deep and broad-based phobias had developed against aliens 
and radicals.
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dispatch and mobilization for war. Groups or individuals who appeared 
to block the weir or who refused to pledge one hundred percent support 
became un-American. In the early days of the war the patriots sought 
to entrap spies, but by the second session they wished to ferret out 
"traitorous" speech and groups. As a result, when Socialist Meyer 
London (N.Y.) called for greater freedom in expressing opinions, he 
became an object of attack by several members, as the Socialist party 
became suspect. Similarly, Clarence Miller (R-Minn.) singled out the 
Non-Partisan League of the Northern Plains states as anti-war group 
which ought to be suppressed. Others talked of "coward objections," 
"anarchists," "saboteurs" and related sinister forces supposedly at 
work in America which must be either suppressed, deported, or pun­
ished.8® If any members were predisposed to oppose the trend, the
fear of attack from fellow members and blasts from the press restrained
81their libertarian sympathies.
The Sedition Act was the congressional answer to the problem of 
disloyalty. Written by Attorney General Thomas Gregory and advisers in 
the Justice Department, the bill defined sedition as any means to 
excite discontent against the government or to disturb the public 
tranquility through inflammatory language. States had already passed 
similar laws, with the result that Congress had grown used to the idea
80Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 855, 862; Pt. 2, 1572, 
1872; Pt. 3, 2576; Pt. 4, 4214, 4242, 4281; Pt. 5, 4990, 5095; and 
Pt. 8, 7542, 8108, 8112, 8162. See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 112-13, 
116-18, and Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 181-199 for a general 
discussion of wartime and postwar attitudes.
8^That congressmen feared attacks from press and fellow members 
can be seen in the following citations; Cong. Rec., 65th Cong., Vol.
5, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 7320; Pt. 8, 8701; and Pt. 10, 10217, 10532.
of extreme measures.82 Thus when Representative Webb in January, 1918, 
introduced the bill, the House passed it after a short and uncontested 
debate. What discussion occurred made it abundantly clear that the 
House wanted legislation to silence hostile opinion and to curb
pO
radical groups such as the I.W.W. Sent to the Senate, the bill was 
expanded and then returned to the House. This time the House gave 
it slightly more attention, but the emphasis remained the same, the 
suppression of "loose" and "dangerous" speech. Meyer London attempted 
to describe the deleterious consequences of the bill, arguing that it 
would turn "people into cowards, hypocrites, and spies." But the 
House's nationalists rejected his libertarian argument and, instead, 
preferred to rout out, as Green of Iowa called them, the "pernicious 
vermin" who dared to attack the government. Behind the repressive 
attitude of the House was the war frenzy, which insisted, as Thaddeus 
Caraway (D-Ark.) said, that the country could not allow its young men 
to die in France while soap-box orators vilified the government. When 
the House voted on the conference report, London alone opposed the 
growing war intolerance, as the bill passed 293 to one.84
In general the House's majority had developed a harsh attitude 
toward aliens and dissenters by the late spring of 1918.85 From roll
82Peterson and Fite, Opponents of War, 212-13. See, also, Harry 
N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administration and Civil Liberties, 1917-1921 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 22-24, for a discussion on
the bill's background.
QO
Ibid., 214; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
2, 3002-04.
84Ibid., Pt. 6, 6179-87; Washington Post, April 6, 1918, 2;
May 7, 1918, 6; New York Times, April 25, 1918, 12; and May 5, 1918, 7.
85The House adopted other narrow-minded measures, and individual
call analysis of two ballots on the "alien slacker" law, some descrip­
tion of this majority can be given. The first vote on the bill, which
i
sought to postpone debated on it, united a non-partisan coalition of 
sixty-sevien percent of the Democrats and seventy-two percent of the 
Republicans in opposition to the motion (Table 4-4). The second 
ballot, which attempted to lessen the bills' severity by amendment, 
united a slightly lower percentage of both parties.86 Sixty-three 
percent of the Democrats and sixty-five percent of the Republicans 
refused to water down the bill (Table 4-5). This bi-partisan agree­
ment is notable because House Democrats went against the Administration 
position on the bill. However, since at least the 64th Congress when 
many had voted to override Wilson's veto of the immigrant literacy 
bill, House Democrats had followed their own course on such matters.
The voting pattern revealed that the Far West (MS and PS regions) 
which likely transferred its phobia against the Japanese to all aliens,
07
most strongly supported the anti-alien measure. Along with the South 
which was the next strongest advocate of the measure, the Far West had 
the fewest number of immigrants. Regions with the larger numbers of 
aliens, the Northeast and Midwest, usually either provided average 
support or below average support for the bill. It is most likely 
that representatives from districts with large alien populations
congressmen introduced confining legislation. See New York Times,
June 2, 1918, section IV, 12; and Washington Post, July 14, 1918, 4.
86Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1766; and Pt.
3, 2766.
P7
See Rogers Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japa­
nese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 65-68, 79, 85, for a
discussion on links between anti-Janapese prejudice and the support of
TABLE 4-4
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H.R. 5667: ALIEN
"SLACKER" DEPORTATION BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 4 4 15 14 14 4 12 20 — 14 1 1 3 — 2 59 51
Nay 2 18 8 31 7 37 6 17 69 3 18 11 7 3 4 9 121 129
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 50 18 33 33 67 27 40 41 23 — 44 8 12 50 — 18 33 28
Nay 50 82 67 67 33 73 60 59 77 100 56 92 88 50 100 82 67 72
*Cong. Rec./ 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 2, 1766.
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TABLE 4-5
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 5667: 
ALIEN DEPORTATION BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 9 2 24 16 20 4 6 29 13 1 1 1 — 3 67 64
Nay 4 17 15 28 7 32 5 17 58 3 17 10 6 4 4 7 116 118
Region and Party (Percent) <
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 33 35 12 46 69 38 44 26 33 — 43 9 14 20 — 30 37 35
Nay 67 65 88 54 31 62 56 74 67 100 57 91 86 80 100 70 63 65
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 3, 2766.
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adopted a cautious position on the bill. On the one hand, they wanted 
to appease the voters who were citizens; and on the other, they did 
not wish to alienate foreign residents who either could vote or might 
shortly be able to vote. Such district tensions operated most strongly 
on Democrats of the Northeast, particularly the East North Central 
states. In sum, Republicans evidenced little tension on the bill since 
there were only small regional variations in their voting. Basically, 
the same is true for the Democrats, though a greater tendency toward 
division existed. This variation, as was true of prohibition also, 
foreshadowed the cultural splits of the 1920's within the Democratic 
party since Northeastemers opposed the other regions. By the spring 
of 1918 a broadly based coalition upported restrictive measures.
Labor Policy
The wartime suspicion of divisive groups almost spread to include 
organized labor. A number of congressmen thought that the government's
Qp
policy toward labor was too generous. Forthcoming during the 
session as a result were a number of proposals to change the 
government's labor policy. These proposals encompased such areas as 
conscription of labor, farm labor, convict labor, and speed of work.
Not all suggestions rested on anti-labor attitudes, nor did opponents 
of labor win all the battles. In fact, the anti-labor attitudes of 
some House members was offset by the progressive orientation of other 
members. As a consequence, no coherent theme or labor policy emerged 
from House actions.
the return of all aliens.
88Washington Post, April 14, 1918, 4; and April 16, 1918, 6.
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In July, 1917, a threatened strike had come precariously close
to occurring in the critical shipbuilding industry, and rumors of
other strikes periodically recurred thereafter. When the Executive,
however, did not suggest anti-strike legislation, several congressmen
sought an opportunity to act on their own. In March, 1918, a bill
came before the House which was designed to control and regulate the
sale and use of explosives. Since the bill's purpose was to prevent
the destruction of war industries.8 9 Joseph Cannon thought that
"conspiracies" to prevent work were similiar to schemes to "destroy"
factories. Winning recognition on the floor, he offered an amendment
to bar conspiracies, claiming that labor conditions were upset by
"conspiratorial" organizations such as the Industrial Workers of the
World. He conjectured that his amendment would not affect loyal groups
such as the American Federation of Labor. Nonetheless, he conceded
that his amendment really stopped strikes by any group. Several
members protested. In their minds, Cannon's proposal not only was
90too drastic, but it also questioned the patriotism of labor.
The Cannon amendment came to a roll call call and won over­
whelmingly, 257 to fifty-nine. Immediately, George Y. Lunn (D-N.Y.), 
an ex-Socialist, offered a "clarifying" amendment which permitted 
"bona-fide" strikes for increased wages or improved conditions. Though 
this amendment, in effect, gutted the Cannon amendment, the House 
reversed its position and voted illogically for the Lunn Amendment,
273 to thirty-eight. Both were now included in one bill, which passed
89U. S. Congress, House, Regulation of the Use of Explosives, 
Hearings, on H. R. 3633, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 3-7.
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 3, 3113-3124.
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and went to the Senate.9 1  There the provision on explosives won 
acceptance, although those on strikes did not. A conference committee 
attempted to adjust the differences between the Senate and House 
bills but concluded that no harmony existed between the bills or be­
tween the Cannon and Limn Amendments. The conferees pared the amend­
ments and sent the bill back to the House. Returned to its original 
pristine status as a bill on explosives, it won acceptance from the 
House. Cannon closed the debates on the strike amendments by simply 
noting his confusion as to the House's conduct.9 2
Analysis of the strike amendment roll calls yields only a few 
conclusions, one of which suggests a pro-labor position by some 
members (Tables 4-6 and 7). When Cannon and Lunn votes are correlated 
with roll calls that affected labor, it is found that opponents of the 
Cannon amendment voted in favor of a commission to study unemployment, 
which indicates their solicitude for labor. Secondly, since the House 
reversed itself from the initial vote,it is clear that many members did 
not really understand the Cannon proposal. However, an element did 
grasp the issue at stake. These members responded in a consistent 
manner either by voting for the Cannon proposal and against the Lunn 
amendment or by adopting the pro-labor positions on those amendments.
The numbers in the two groups were small, fifty-six pro-labor members 
and thirty-eight Cannon supporters. Thirdly, no party or regional 
pattern emerges except among Northeastern Democrats who voted more
9 1 Ibid., 3124-26; and New York Times, March 5, 1918, 15.
9 2 Ibid., April 6 , 1918, 8 ; April 14, 1918, 12; Washington Post,
April 14, 1918, 4; April 16, 1918, 6 ; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol.
56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5093.
TABLE 4-6
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 383: 
CANNON CONSPIRACY AMENDMENT*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 3 19 5 32 16 34 7 20 69 1 27 3 2 3 4 8 133 120
Nay 2 — 4 7 4 13 1 4 4 3 5 5 3 — 1 23 33
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 60 1 0 0 56 82 80 72 87 83 95 100 90 38 29 50 1 0 0 89 85 78
Nay 40 — 44 18 2 0 28 13 17 5 1 0 62 71 50 — 1 1 15 22
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 3, 3124.
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TABLE 4-7
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 383: 
LUNN AMENDMENT*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 5 14 1 0 25 2 0 38 8 2 0 6 8  1 26 1 0 7 6 3 9 147 123
Nay — 5 9 1 7 3 7 5 — 1 — 14 24
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS
l
PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 0 0 74 100 74 95 84 100 87 91 100 84 100 1 0 0 1 0 0 .75 100 91 84
Nay — 26 26 5 16 —  13 9 16 25 9 16
*Cong. Rec. , 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 3, 3126.
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frequently than other Democrats with Lunn. In short, the strike 
question cut across parties and all regions except the Northeast, 
revealing a trepidation to either support conspiracies or oppose 
"bona-fide" strikes.
On a second front, labor adherents battled to retain the seven- 
hour day. Since the 64th Congress, William P. Borland (D-Mo.) had 
been carrying on a one-man crusade to increase the legal workday for 
Washington, D. C., government clerks from seven hours to eight hours. 
During the first session he had offered amendments to several appro­
priation bills, but opponents easily turned these aside. By the second 
session, he had gained adherents to his position because of increasing 
pressure for greater war production. In the words of a new supporter, 
the "war demands.. .more work." 9 3  Bred also by the war was a certain 
antagonism toward anyone who supposedly worked less than the norm.
Borland characterized his proposal as requiring an "honest day's" 
work and as giving a "square deal" to the American taxpayer. Similarly, 
during floor debates on the Borland amendment, Clarence B. Miller (R- 
Minn.) claimed that the government "coddled" its workers, while John
94A. Sterling (R-Ill.) added that all should do the same amount of toil.
The defenders of government employees rejected the emotionalism 
of the Borland advocates and turned the House's attention toward 
actual working conditions. Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) pointed out that clerks 
already could be required to labor more than seven hours a day with­
out overtime compensation. In fact, throughout the entire war period
9 3Ibid., Pt. 1, 308, 310.
9 4 Ibid., 308; and Pt. 4, 3563-64, 3558-59.
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they had continuously worked over the limit. Another labor advocate,
Edward Keating (D-Col.), added that government clerks would demand
overtime pay if the amendment passed, whereas before they did without 
95it. In any event, the opponent's factual case proved ineffective, 
even with the all-out backing of the American Federation of Labor. 
Borland succeeded in having his amendment attached to the Legislative, 
Executive, and Judiciary Appropriation bill, and then defeated efforts 
to have it removed. The Senate concurred with the Borland amendment; 
President Wilson, however, refused to sign the bill and returned it to 
the House. In an atempt to override the Wilson veto, Borland forced 
a final roll call on his proposal. His motion lost, 246 to fifty, as 
not many members chose to directly confront the Chief Executive.9®
In the end winning the seven-hour day fight, labor proponents 
proved equally successful in securing a wage increase for government 
employees. Since the tremendous inflation during the war period had 
eaten into the fixed incomes of government workers, Edward Keating 
introduced a bill that responded to their plight. Gathering the sup­
port of the American Federation of Labor, the bill also received the 
endorsement of the Appropriations Committee.9 7 Committeemen apparently 
concurred with William Wood (R-Ind.) that justice required the wage 
increase because of skyrocketing prices. In any event, once on the
9 ®Ibid., 3577; Pt. 8 , 8313-14; and Washington Post, February 7, 
1918, 5.
9 ®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3563-64; Pt. 7, 
6439; Pt. 8314; and Pt. 9, 8577, 8515.
9 7 U. S. Congress, House, Increased Compensation, 1919, Hearings, 
on H. R. 10358, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-11.
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floor, the proposal won the support of the House without extensive 
debate and without recourse to a formal roll call.9 8
Since postal workers came tinder a separate government employee 
classification and did not benefit from the wage hike, certain House 
members pushed a special pay raise for them. Seventy or more repre­
sentatives, along with the legislative representative of the American 
Federation of Labor, appeared before the Postal Committee to endorse
Q Q
the pay boost. With this backing, the bill secured time on the 
House floor in March, 1918. Debates clarified the need for the pay 
increase: the decrease in value of postal workers' salaries from
inflation, the drain of employees to wartime industries with their 
better salaries, and the importance of postal workers as representa­
tives of the government. However, a conflict in the proponent's ranks 
appeared over whether or not the pay raises ought to be permanent or 
temporary. Martin Madden offered an amendment to retain the higher 
wages even in peacetime. Opposing this motion was John Moon, (D-Tenn.), 
chairman of the Postal Committee, who described times as abnormal and 
argued that with the return of peace, their old salary of $1 , 2 0 0 a 
year would be sufficient. Henry Rainey agreed and added that Madden 
had organized the Republicans, with sufficient numbers of Democrats, 
for a "great salary grab." Cries of economy, however, did not deter 
the coalition, and they carried Madden's amendment on a roll call. 
Opponents quickly offered a motion to pare the Madden Amendment's
"Washington Post, January 3, 1918, 5; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 
Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3501.
"u. S. Congress, House, Salaries of Postal Employees, Hearings, 
on H. Res. 270, and H. R. 9414, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-35.
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increases, but the postal bloc remained intact and defeated it, 311 
to fifty-one.1 0 0
Later in the session another bill aided the lowest paid govern­
ment workers by establishing a minimum wage of three dollars a day.1 0 1  
Overall, on the wage front, the House responsed to the mounting in­
flation, though with increases less than the surge in prices. In the 
area of labor conditions, the House agreed with one position taken by 
labor backers and rejected another. The Senate had attached an amend­
ment to the Naval Appropriation bill which granted bonuses to govern­
ment shipyard workers for faster work. Seemingly, a benign measure to 
boost production in an all important war industry, it actually raised 
fundamental questions about labor conditions. Before the war, ship­
yard workers had won the establishment of maximum production levels 
beyond which they could not work. Advocates of the Senate provision 
portrayed the rules as restricting the productive capabilities of 
a laborer. With the bonus as an incentive, the shipyard worker, 
advocates maintained, would be motivated to greater efficiency and 
in the process earn extra money for his effort. An opponent, John 
Nolan (R-Cal.), connected the bonus to the Frederick W. Taylor "stop 
watch" method of production. Though Taylor’s method might speed work, 
it was, Nolan asserted, completely unsympathetic to workers; moreover, 
its introduction would exacerbate the already tense worker-employer 
relations of the shipbuilding industry. The majority agreed with 
Nolan that war time was not the proper occasion for the introduction
100Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3847, 3868,
3907-08, 3927, 4026, 4105, 4107.
101Ibid., Pt. 11, 10731.
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of innovations and turned down, on two separate roll calls, the speed- 
1 0 2up proposal. .
The second measure on the status of labor entailed the established 
of a cotton factory at the Atlanta Federal penitentiary. In hearings 
before the Justice Committee, a government witness presented the pro­
posal as a means to rehabilitate prisoners by employing them in produc­
tive work. Since the AFL opposed the bill, committee member Thaddeus 
Caraway (D-Ark.) suggested that prisoners should be employed in farm 
work rather than textile production in order to prevent their competing 
with textile workers. A government witness agreed, but he also pointed 
out that no farm land was located close by the prison. Andrew Volstead, 
in support of the government witness, interjected that labor unions 
should not be distressed because the bill protected free labor 
by requiring the sale of prisoner-made goods at market prices.
Volstead added that, the prison-produced cotton goods would go
103only to the government. After a favorable report by the Justice 
Committee, the bill went to the House floor. Labor supporter Leonidas 
Dyer (D-Was.) attempted to organize opposition against the measure 
on the grounds that convict labor would ultimately compete with free 
labor. The majority, however, agreed with the Justice Committee and 
passed the cotton factory bill on a roll call, 181 to seventy-four.
Analysis of the roll calls on labor questions was simplified 
because several of the measures scaled together. Usually scalograms
1 0 2 Ibid., Pt. 8 , 8016-8023, 8382.
1 0 3U. S. Government, House, To Equip the Atlanta Federal Peneten- 
tiary for the Manufacturing of Certain Government Supplies, Hearings 
on H. R. 8938, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-9, 25-26.
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are constructed on roll calls that encompass only one bill; in the case 
of the labor issues, two votes on wages, ballots on the Borland eight 
hour amendment, and three ballots on the Atlanta prison bill met the 
criteria for construction of a scale. By so doing, it indicates that 
not only a pro-labor bloc and an anti-labor group existed in the House 
but that they also operated together on several discrete measures. 
Seventy-four House merribers indicated an anti-labor position by their 
low scale position on the several roll calls (Table 4-8:A). They either 
rejected all pro-labor positions or they adopted only one such vote, 
the roll call recommitting the postal workers' pay raise. Politically, 
the Democrats showed a distinct anti-labor bias, since seventy-two 
Democrats and only two Republicans were found at this scale level.
These Democrats came predominantly from the South and Border states.
In the medium category, party support equalizes. Still, the Democrats 
were more likely to provide only lukewarm support, since seventy-two 
of them in comparison to thirty-nine Republicans were found in this 
category. In the high category, thirty-two percent of the House 
membership voted for all or in some instances six of the seven labor 
positions. These strong labor advocates were usually aligned with the 
Republican party, particularly the Northeastern contingent.
The high Republican support for labor positions does not fit 
their historic image. An explanation might come from the fact 
that all the roll calls involved labor policy of the government. Their 
old nationalistic outlook might have disposed them to favor a govern­
ment employee's policy of higher pay, shorter hours, and no prison 
labor competition against free labor, while they would have opposed 
such a policy in private industry. Another possible explanation is
TABLE 4-8:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION 
ON LABOR ROLL CALLS
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 1 mm MM 6 1 MM MM 49 MM 16 ~ 1 MM MM 72 2
Medium 2 2 6 5 1 1 13 7 10 29 — 8 3 6 3 3 3 72 39
High 3 16 17 MM 25 1 1 1 2 1 4 MM 1 5 5 81
TOTAL 5 19 6 2 2 17 39 7 21 79 2 25 7 7 4 3 8 149 1 2 2
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low MM 5 mm MM 35 3 MM MM 62 MM 64 — 14 MM MM 48 2
Medium 40 1 1 1 0 0 23 65 33 100 47 37 — 32 43 8 6 75 1 0 0 38 48 32
High 60 84 77 MM 64 -- 53 1 1 0 0 4 57 MM 25 MM 62 4 6 6
The order of the roll calls is 116, 115, 233, 153, 155, 150, 154 
Percent at each point on the scale 16, 11, 11, 9, 7, 14, 9, 23 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .950
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TABLE 4-8:B 
LABOR VOTES
Scale
Position Motion
1 VAR 116 To recommit to the Committee on Post Offices H. R.
9414, with instructions and report back with 
amendment that during the balance of fiscal year 
1918, and during fiscal year 1919, the increased 
allowance for Postal Employees in addition to the 
compensation now received by them shall be changed 
in several ways. 51-311; + = nay. Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4107A.
2 VAR 115 To amend H. R. 9414, by setting compensation for
various grades in the Postal Service. 262-97;
+ = yea. Ibid., 4105.
3 VAR 233 To amend H. R. 14078, (40 STAT-1213, Mar. 1, 1919),
by increasing the annual compensation of all civilian 
employees of the government of the United States who 
now receive a total annual compensation of $2,500 
or less. 202-79; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., 
Pt. 2, 1698.
4 VAR 153 To recommit Bill H. R. 8938, to the Committee on
the Judiciary with instructions to report the Bill 
back with an amendment that the rules and regulations 
governing the prisoners engaged in such work shall 
not give them any advantage over free labor, either 
for the government or independent manufacturers. 
117-142; + = yea. Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7,
6395.
5 VAR 155 To recede from the amendment to Bill H. R. 10358,
making appropriations for the legislative, execu­
tive and judicial expenses of the government for 
fiscal year 1919, by fixing a minimum number of hours 
of work per day for government employees. 131-159;
+ = yea. Ibid., 6439.
6 VAR 150 To adopt Bill H. RES. 335, providing for 1 hour de­
bate on Bill H. RES. 8938, (40 STAT-896, July 10, 
1918), relating to the manufacture of government 
supplies at Atlanta Ga. Penitentiary, and for the 
compensation to prisoners for their labor. 191-132;
+ = yea; + = nay.
267
9
TABLE 4-8:B (Cont'd)
Scale
Position Motion
7 VAR 154 To pass bill H. R. 8938. 181-74; + = nay. Ibid.,
6396.
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that the Republicans saw some partisan advantage in the positions 
they adopted. Though no partisan benefit would arise from opposing 
to the Atlanta cotton factory bill, the other measures with their 
pay hikes and seven-hour day would win the approval of government 
workers. On the other hand, the Democrats voted against positions 
espoused by the AFL and, on the Borland amendment, by the Administration. 
An explanation for the Democratic pattern is not readily determinable 
though it is true that at least on the Atlanta prison bill they were 
adhering to an Administration position. The other two positions that 
they adopted on the wage and hour proposals may have reflected a rural 
economic fundamentalism, particularly since the South and Border states 
gave the greatest support to these positions. In any event, House 
members followed no consistent labor policy, since they reversed them­
selves on the Cannon conspiracy amendment and voted against labor 
on the Atlanta prison measure and the seven-hour limit. Yet, the House 
voted for labor by adopting pay hikes for government employees and 
by rejecting bonuses for shipyard workers. Overall, the House's 
attitude toward labor, as reflected in roll calls and debates, ex­
pressed an anbiguity that called for the conscription of labor but 
also recognized that positive labor relations were essential to the 
American war effort. Meanwhile, the Administration created the truly 
significant features of wartime labor policy.*0 4
*04See William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Impact of the War on the 
American Economy," The Impact of World War I, ed., Arthur S. Link (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1969), 58-59, for a discussion of labor policy
during the war. See also John S. Smith, "Organized Labor and 
Government in the Wilson Era," Labor History, III (Fall, 1962),
265-86.
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Farm Policy
During the first session, the House had enacted the fundamental 
features on a farm program: legislation to authorize a survey of
existing food-stuffs, a food administration to conserve and regulate 
food products, and a guaranteed price of wheat. In the second session 
the House would add several particulars to the farm program. Namely, 
they would agree to increase credit sources for farmers, augment the 
normal agricultural appropriation bill, regulate conservation of food 
in greater detail, distribute seed grain to farmers, and raise the 
price guarantee for wheat. No consistent voting alignments formed on 
these proposals, but the basic issue remained constant: how much the
government would help the fanner as compared to the urban resident.
The drain of banking resources into liberty bonds put the 
fledgling Farm Loan Board out of business. Several congressmen also 
charged that Eastern speculators had attempted to comer the agency's 
bonds, thus driving the bonds below par. In either case, the Farm 
Loan Board, which had been created in 1916 to extend loans at reason­
able rates to farmers, found itself without funds to loan. To rectify
the situation, the Board proposed a bill which would authorize the
105Treasury to buy $100 million worth of bonds from the Board.
Sponsored by Carter Glass, the bill drew opposition from a 
portion of the Republican membership, who forced two roll calls over 
it. On the first roll call, which was a motion to postpone hearing the 
bill, sixty-seven percent of the Republicans, joined by just six percent
• ^ Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 589; Willian 
Stevenson to J. W. Miller, February 1, 1918, Southern Historical 
Collection, William Stevenson Papers, University of North Carolina; 
and Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement, 56-59, 225-26.
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of the Democrats, subscribed to the motion (Table 4-9). The Eastern 
wing of the party, led by Gillett who claimed that the Banking Com­
mittee should study the bill in greater detail, more strongly backed 
the motion than did the rest of the party.1 0 6 When Glass offered an 
amendment strengthening the bill, Republicans again attempted to 
defeat it. In their view the Board had already mismanaged its 
affairs by over loaning. Also, the whole proposition, some Repub­
licans claimed, was political because only Democrats served as direc­
tors of the Board. In rebuttal Glass argued that the bill was neces­
sary to meet abnormal war conditions. Otherwise, he stated that he
107would oppose the bill as "vicious" class legislation. In this final 
roll call, the same configuration of Eastern Republicans opposed the 
bill (Table 4-10). Most other Republicans and ninety-seven percent 
of the Democrats secured the amendment's10® victory, 217 to 69. The 
bill then passed without a roll call in early January, 1918.
In February the House considered the annual agriculture appro­
priation bill. Generally uncontroversial, the bill for fiscal 1919, 
however, generated divisions over two particulars. The first involved 
an expenditure close to the heart of many representatives, namely con­
gressional distribution of "valuable seeds" to constituents. Ezekiel 
Candler (D-Miss.) set the waters churning when he proposed an amendment 
which would add to the seed appropriation by fifty percent. The 
necessity, he stated, grew out of greater constituent demand for seeds.
1 0 6 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 537, 615.
1 0 7 Ibid., 592, 595, 597, 589.
1 0 8 Ibid., 615.
TABLE 4-9
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 7731: TO POSTPONE
HEARING THE FARM LOAN BROAD BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 17 2 27 2 28 1 0 3 4 — 1 1 9 87
Nay 3 8 2 17 1 2 9 14 65 2 27 1 7 5 1 6 137 42
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 25 100 2 0 93 1 0 70 42 4 80 — 50 14 6 67
Nay 75 80 7 90 30 100 58 96 100 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 50 8 6 94 33
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 537.
TABLE 4-10
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 3235: 
FARM LOAN BROAD BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D
m
R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea . 3 1 n 5 13 21 10 23 77 2 27 4 7 6 3 5 151 67
Nay 2 2 1 — 26 1 15 3 — 1 1 4 4 70
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 60 4 1 0 0 16 93 58 100 89 1 0 0 1 0 0 96 80 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 56 97 49
Nay 40 96 — 84 7 42 1 1 — 4 20 44 3 51
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 615.
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In rebuttal/ Meyer London (Socialist-N.Y.) asked if congressional 
distribution of seeds was the proper activity for legislators.
Agreeing with London, Joseph Walsh rejected the whole seed appropria-
1.09tion as a drain on the Treasury in a time of high costs from the war. 
Though not agreeing with the extreme view of London and Walsh, a 
majority of the House voted "nay" to Candler's proposed increase 
(Table 4-11). Seventy-two percent of the Democrats voted "yea" and 
eighty-four percent of the Republicans responded "nay. " 1 1 0 Southern 
Democrats and Western Republicans, both largely from rural areas, 
supported the seed proposition by a higher percentage than did the 
rest of their parties. On the other hand, Eastern and Midwest Demo­
crats, often from the cities, split with their party. Clearly, rural 
and partisan factors shaped this ballot.
The eradication of tuberculosis in stock cattle, particularly 
milk cows, attracted the active support of most Republican members.
As reported to the House floor by the Agriculture Committee, the bill 
appropriated a $250,000 sum to combat this disease, but William J.
Graham (R-Ill.) maintained that too many cows and hogs had the 
affliction for this small amount to be effective. When he offered an 
amendment to double the appropriation, Agriculture Committee spokes­
man James Young (D-Tex.) asserted that the Agriculture Department could 
not properly spend more than $250,000. One of the few Republicans 
to vote against the proposition was Gilbert Haugen, who agreed with 
committee colleague Young on the Department's inability to use the
109Ibid., Pt. 2, 1255, 1368-70.
110Ibid., 1600.
TABLE 4-11
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9054: 
DISTRIBUTION OF VALUABLE SEEDS*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 1 5 5 9 2 3 1 58 2 21 4 3 2 1 4 1 0 0 2 1
Nay 2 13 2 26 7 41 3 21 1 1 -- 9 4 3 2 1 6 38 113
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 7 71 16 56 5 50 5 84 100 70 50 50 50 50 40 72 16
Nay 1 0 0 93 29 84 44 95 50 95 16 — 30 50 50 50 50 60 28 84
*Cong. Rec./ 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,Pt. 3, 1600.
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extra funds. In the roll call that resulted from the division of 
opinion, the House parted along strict party lines, as ninety-six 
percent of the Republicans opposed ninety-four percent of the Democrats 
(Table 4-12). Why Republicans lined up behind this proposal is unclear 
from the sources, but it may reflect the greater concentration of 
Republicans in milk-producing regions in comparison to the Democrats. 
The amendment lost by the close margin of 142 to 139.111
A severe drought in the Great Plains states and the resulting 
plight of poor fanners brought the next farm bill before the House.1 1 2  
Sponsored by John Baer (D-N.Dak.), the bill proposed to aid farmers 
by extending fifty million dollars in credit to them to purchase 
seed for crops and feed for stock. A second provision alioted $2.5 
million for the recruitment of farm labor. With many of the nation's 
farmers drafted into the military, a major farm problem developed 
from the resulting acute shortage of farm labor. Congressmen had 
proposed solutions to the problem, including the conscription of "city 
idlers" and the transfer of soldiers to the farms during harvest time. 
Prior to the Baer bill, no proposal had reached the House floor. 1 1 2
Defenders of the bill acknowledged that during peacetime they 
would never consider it. They added, however, that the times prompted 
radical action, and though the bill's intention was paternalistic, 
even "socialistic," the Congress had been similarly paternalistic to 
industry. The situation, as Gilbert Haugen argued, simply overrode
1 U Ibld., 1259, 1262, 1269, 1342, 1601.
1 1 2 U. S. Congress, House, Seed Grain and Feed for Farmers and 
Stockmen, Hearings, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 78-82.
1 1 2 Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4152-53.
TABLE 4-12
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9054: ERADICATION
OF TUBERCULOSIS IN LIVE STOCK*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 14 — 29 1 41 3 20 1 2 3 10 4 1 0 8 130
Nay 3 7 1 15 2 4 2 71 1 25 7 2 134 6
Region and Party (Percent) -
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea —  1 0 0 — 97 6 95 43 91 1 67 1 1 1 0 0 —  1 0 0 —  1 0 0 6 96
Nay 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 94 5 57 9 99 33 89 — 1 0 0 ~ 1 0 0 — 94 4
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess.,Pt. 2, 1601.
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prewar considerations, since the winter wheat regions were starved
for seed and money. Objections to the bill reflected anti-patemalis-
tic sentiments. According to Joseph Cannon, the original American
pioneer farmer never would have asked for government handouts. Young
of Texas in addition appealed to regional interests when he claimed
that the measure would mainly benefit the farmers of the Northern
114spring wheat belt but no others.
Moved by Cannon's and Young's argument, opponents forced six roll 
calls over the bill. Since four of these votes scaled together, a 
scalogram was devised that defined the shifting pattern from support 
to opposition (Table 4-13:A). Exactly fifty percent of the House 
defended the bill against the critics' assaults on all roll calls. 
Seventy-four percent of all Republicans and twenty-nine percent of 
the Democrats lined up solidly for the bill. Regionally, two extremes 
existed, as only one Republican from the New England states voted for 
the bill, while one-hundred percent of both parties from the Mountain 
states united behind the bill. Given the bill's contents, these two 
regions stood to gain either the least or the most from the bill.
Thus, the supporters, though showing partisan differences, indicated 
regional orientations as well. In the medium category, twenty-seven 
percent of House members moved to eliminate the enabling clause, 
and then switched sides and voted for final passage. This swing group, 
who were almost instrumental in defeating the bill, was composed of 
fifty-five Democrats and thirteen Republicans. While these Democrats 
resided in all regions, they represented the Northeast (NE and MA
114Ibid., 4147, 4153-55, 4173-74.
TABLE 4-13:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 
7795: FARM RELIEF BILL
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 1 4 19 9 27 5 16 5 7 5 7 4 2 7 39 79
Medium 2 1 7 7 5 — 1 1 30 — 8 1 —  — 2 3 55 13
High 2 9 3 2 3 3 1 — 30 — - 3 1 42 15
TOTAL 4 1 1 14 28 17 30 7 17 65 — 18 7 7 4 4 1 0 136 107
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low „ 9 28 6 8 53 90 71 94 8 39 71 1 0 0 1 0 0 50 8 8 29 74
Medium 50 9 50 25 29 — 14 6 46 — 44 14 —  — 50 1 2 40 1 2
High 50 82 2 2 7 18 1 0 15 — 46 — 17 15 —  •• — * 31 14
The order of the roll calls is 120, 121, 123, 119 
Percent at each point on the scale 50, 8 , 19, 15, 8  
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .983
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TABLE 4-13:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 7795: . FARM RELIEF
Scale
Position Motion
VAR 120 To order the previous question on the amendment
requiring the chairman of the Committee on Agricul­
ture to report H. R. 7795 back eliminating the 
enacting clause. 120-123; + = yea. Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 4178.
VAR 121 To amend H. R. 7795, by eliminating the enacting 
clause. 106-144; + = yea. Ibid., 4179.
VAR 123 To pass H. R. 7795. 250-67; + * nay. Ibid.,
Pt. 5, 4297.
VAR 119 To adopt H. RES. 281 for the immediate consideration 
of a Bill reported from the Committee on Agriculture 
as a substitute for H. R. 7795, providing for 
National Security and Defense and an adequate supply 
of food, by authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture 
to contract with farmers in certain areas for the 
production of grain through advances and loans and 
otherwise, and by providing for the voluntary 
mobilization of farm labor, which substitute Bill 
appropriates $50,000,000 for the purchase of seed 
grain for live stock, the same to be supplied to 
farmers and stock men and also created boards in 
the several states to carry out the provisions of 
the act. 278-40; + *= nay. Ibid., 4151.
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regions), Southern (SS and BS), and Pacific sections in greater 
nuiribers. In the high category, the strongest opponents of the bill 
mostly represented the Democratic party. The only noticeable regional 
pattern was the greater concentration of opponents in the New England 
and Southern states. In sum, the Republicans generally supported 
the bill, while two-thirds of the Democrats opposed the bill. The 
Republicans and Democrats of the New England states provided the grea­
test opposition to the bill, as did the Democrats of the Middle Atlan­
tic and Southern states. Over ninety percent of Midwestern Republicans 
upheld the bill, while Midwestern Democrats tended to break party ranks 
and to vote with the Republicans. Finally, both parties of the drought- 
stricken Mountain states voted unanimously for relief.
Although the wheat farmers benefitted from the seed bill, the 
price of wheat was more important to them. The Lever Food Bill of 
1917 authorized the President to set a price for wheat, which Wilson 
eventually pegged at $2.20 a bushel. Since the propserity of three 
million fanners was affected by the price, the President's action un­
leashed a growing problem for the Democrats. Wheat fanners complained 
that the rising costs of farm production cut deeply into their pro­
fits. When they compared their situation to Southern cotton farmers, 
whose prices remained unregulated, they became convinced that they 
were treated unfairly by the Administration. Thus, wheat producers 
rained down demands on the President and Congress either for higher 
wheat prices or for fixed prices on all products.
HSLivermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 170; and 
U. S. Congress, House, The Spring Wheat Situation, Hearings, 65 Cong.,
2 Sess., 12-15.
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Response by the Administration and the House took separate 
courses. In his December message and later in a bill, Wilson re­
quested a proposal to control profiteering and to fix prices on the 
necessities of life. Coming during the winter military crisis and 
the Garfield order, such a proposal stood no chance of acceptance as 
Congress was in no mood to grant additional power to the President. 
Representative Lever, Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, imme­
diately buried the bill in his committee, knowing that its broad 
grant of power would cause its certain defeat. Since no action 
came on the industrial price front, Congress started to move in the 
direction of higher wheat prices. The Administration, however, 
strongly opposed higher prices because they would bestow windfall pro­
fits on grain dealers who were storing wheat. Moreover, the Adminis­
tration maintained that higher prices would adversely affect both the 
American consumer and the country's allies. Given these economic and 
political ideas, President Wilson on February 23 reset the mini­
mum price for wheat at $2.20 a bushel. In no mood to listen, the 
Senate attached a rider to the Agriculture Appropriation bill that 
added thirty cents to the President's price support.
When the House received the bill from the Senate, urbanites 
charged that the proposal imposed "outrageous" burdens upon industrial 
workers. Homer Synder (R-N.Y.) claimed that only U. S. Steel had
ll% e w  York Times, January 22, 1918, 11; January 23, 1918, 9; 
Washington Post, January 22, 1918; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 21-22.
Washington Post, February 21, 1915, 2; New York Times,
February 24, 1918, 1; and April 19, 1918, 6.
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reaped such huge profits as had the farmers.1 1 8  In the fanners defense, 
William A. Ayres (D-Kans.) pointed out that only wheat growers had been 
subjected to price controls. Additionally, William E. Cox (D-Ind.) 
told the House, the increase represented a mere "bagatelle" which would 
hardly hurt anyone but, on the other hand, would greatly spur wheat 
production. After further heated debate, a vote on the Senate 
provision was called. At this point, enough Democrats stayed with 
the Administration for the House to vote down $2.50 a bushel wheat, 180 
to 127.119
When the Senate conferees insisted upon $2.50 wheat, a long­
term deadlock ensued, lasting from May to July. During this prolonged 
stalemate, political pressures from wheat-producing areas intensified 
as Democratic congressmen increasingly believed that their political 
survival in the upcoming 1918 congressional elections depended on a 
high wheat price. As a result, the House conferees eventually acceded 
to a compromise price of $2.40 a bushel. The House readily passed what 
they thought a suitable solution to the impose by a roll call vote,
150 to 106.128 Placed on the President's desk, the bill provoked a 
Wilson veto because he was concerned about consumer and Allied dis­
tress from the hike. A number of wheat congressmen, greatly agitated
over their political self-preservation, demanded a roll call to over-
121ride the veto. They failed by the wide margin of 172 to seventy-two.
1 1 8Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5269-72.
1 1 9 Ibid., 5272, 5274, 5319; and New York Times, April 19, 1918, 6 .
1 2 0 Ibid., May 4, 1918, 6 ; July 2, 1918, 9; July 6 , 1918, 8 ; 
Washington Post, July 13, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8796.
1 2 1 Ibid., 9105.
283
Since the three wheat votes scale, it is possible to indicate 
shifting patterns of support (Table 4-14:A). Thirty-nine percent of 
the House voted against all efforts to increase the price of wheat.
Eighty of these representatives came from the Democratic party, while 
twenty-eight Republicans voted with them. Members in the low category 
more likely hailed from the Northeast (NE and MA) in both parties, and 
from the South among the Democrats. In the medium category, again 
more Democrats (forty-four) are found than Republicans (twenty-one).
This swing group, who voted for $2.50 wheat and $2.40 wheat, but who 
could not go along with overriding the President's veto, showed no 
significant regional concentration. The strongest advocates of 
higher wheat prices mostly represented the Republican party, eighty 
members as opposed to thirty-two Democrats. Since fifty-one percent 
of the Democrats voted three times against benefits to beleagured 
wheat farmers while sixty-two percent of the Republicans voted for all 
three, the balloting indicated a partisan difference of opinion on 
wheat prices. To a degree, Wilson's firm stand against higher wheat 
prices had made the voting partisan. However, regional patterns were 
still very significant, because members of both parties from the North­
east had no fondness for higher bread prices for their urban constituents. 
On the opposite side, both parties of the West North Central states, 
which included some of the leading wheat growing states, gladly sup­
ported higher prices. The Mountain states followed a similar pattern, 
while the other regions divided along a voting pattern that reflected 
partisan differences. Politically, the most potent issue to emerge 
from the voting came from the low support that Southern Democrats 
gave to the wheat increases. To Northern wheat growers, fair play
TABLE 4-14:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON 
H. R. 9054: WHEAT PRICE
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 3 1 0 9 1 0 9 5 2 47 9 1 2 1 __ 80 28
Medium 1 1 1 8 4 6 1 2 25 — 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 44 2 1
High 4 1 1 1 6 30 7 18 4 1 8 4 5 4 1 8 32 80
TOTAL 4 15 1 1 29 19 41 8 2 2 76 1 27 6 8 6 3 9 156 129
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 75 67 82 34 47 1 2 9 62 _ _ 33 17 25 „ 33 51 2 2
Medium 25 7 9 28 2 1 15 12 9 33 — 37 17 1 2 33 33 1 1 28 16
High 26 9 38 32 73 8 8 82 5 1 0 0 30 6 6 63 67 34 89 2 1 62
The order of the roll calls is 189, 138, 192 
Percent at each point on the scale 3 9 , 22, 17, 22 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = . 9 7 1
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TABLE 4-14:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AMD REGION ON H. R. 9054: WHEAT PRICE
Scale
Position Motion
0
1 VAR 189 To have the House recede from its disagreeing vote
on the amendment to H. R. 9054, making appropria­
tions for the Department of Agriculture for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1919. 150-106; + =
yea. Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
9, 8796.
2 VAR 138 To concur in the Senate amendment to H. R. 9054,
making appropriations for the Department of Agri­
culture for fiscal year 1919, which amendment pro­
vides that the President in an emergency fix the 
price of wheat products in the U. S. guaranteeing 
a certain profit to the producers thereof; that 
guaranteed price of 1918 wheat shall not be less than 
its equivalent of #2 northern spring wheat at $2.50 
per bushel, the same to be binding until Dec. 1,
1919. 127-180; + = yea. Ibid., Pt. 5, 5319.
3 VAR 192 To pass, over the Presidents veto, H. R. 9054,
making appropriations for the Department of Agri­
culture for fiscal year 1919, the President's 
objections to the Bill being that Legislative price 
provisions should not be administered in a way 
advantagious to producers or consumers. 72-172;
+ = yea. Ibid., Pt. 9, 9105.
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demanded that Southerners vote for the increase because their cotton 
farmers enjoyed unregulated cotton prices. Their failure to do so, 
gave the Republicans an excellent campaign issue. Democratic farm 
policy failed to satisfy wheat farmers.■L2^
Wartime Social Policy
At times during the session the House directed its attention 
toward the social welfare needs of war workers and others. Industrial 
centers, particularly Eastern cities, became jammed with laborers 
from all parts of the country. Houses became overcrowded and rents 
shot skyward. The shortage of housing caused family separations, low 
morale, and high job' turnover among war workers. Conditions were most 
acute in the shipbuilding industry and certain other war industries, 
which led concerned government officials and congressmen to propose 
solutions. For shipyard workers, the Shipping Board advocated a 
fifty million dollar appropriation to build either dormitories for 
single men or small homes for families. The government also suggested 
a similar appropriation for munition workers. Witnesses before House 
committees supported both proposals because of the industries inability 
to retain workers who were unable to find proper housing. They also 
elaborated on the failure of private enterprise to fill the gap. In
short, the witnesses' theme stressed the necessity for government
123action because of wartime conditions.
122Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 174-76.
123Washington Post, February 8 , 1918, 1; April 13, 1918, 7; U. S. 
Congress, House, Housing for Employees of Shipyards Building Ships for 
the U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, Hearings on S 
3389, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-8, 24, 47-49; and U. S. Congress, House, 
Public Buildings and Grounds, Hearings on H. R. 9642, H. R. 10265,
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On the House floor, defenders presented the proposal as a 
straight forward war measure. In an effort to defuse any possible 
criticism, they denied any "socialistic" intentions, though they ack­
nowledged that the structures ought to be well built and useful after 
the war. Critics voiced more concern over possible graft and waste 
of money than over government giveaways to workers. Representative 
J. Hampton Moore, playing his normal role as Republican partisan, 
implied that the money would go to contractors who were friends of the 
Administration. From another single John W. Langley (R-Ky.) found 
distressing the ease with which Congress dispensed the fifty million 
dollars. Probably reflecting the astonishment of some other colleagues, 
Langley noted how Congress spent billions as casually as it had formerly 
appropriated millions. Ultimately, however, these critics realized 
that the measure was vital for war production, and they dropped their 
opposition. Passing without recourse to a roll call, both measures met 
war conditions and only indirectly represented efforts at solving 
long-term social distress.^2^
Meanwhile, the rental situation aroused Ben Johnson (D-Ky.), who 
became inflamed over exhorbitant increases in house rentals. Washing­
ton, which became a boom town because of the war, reported a series of 
evictions and rent gouging cases. Examining the situation, Johnson's
65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-10, 18.
•*2^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4463, 4395; and 
Pt. 2, 1953. See Allen F. Davis, "Welfare, Reform and World War I," 
American Quarterly, XIX (Fall, 1967), 517-20, for a general discussion 
of the aims of wartime housing. Davis notes the influence of housing 
experts, such as Lawrence Veiller, on the construction of the houses. 
Davis does not comment on congressional attitudes. The House realized 
that the homes ought to be well-built, but they definitely rejected 
long-term goals in so building them.
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House Committee on the District of Columbia called a number of witnesses. 
Captain Julius Peyser of the Army housing division cited cases of the 
proverbial sick and old widow evicted by the heartless landlord, while 
others testified to similar distressing cases. In order to correct 
the situation, Chairman Johnson authored a bill that taxed excess war­
time profits from rental property in the District of Columbia.12^
By the time the Johnson bill came to the House floor in February, 
1918, most members readily agreed that legislative action was demanded. 
Several congressmen, nonetheless, withstood the prevailing sentiments 
and voiced doubts about the effectiveness of the bill's technical 
features. Allen Treadway (R-Mass.) also claimed that the rental 
problem came from customers bidding up prices, not just landlords 
arbitrarily raising prices. Angry blasts from Johnson against rent 
profiteers, however, checked any tendency among members to vote for 
the landlords. The bill passed on a roll call, 221 to 101.1 2 6
Less directly tied to war conditions, another social welfare 
measure proposed a minimum wage board for Washington's working women. 
Before a House committee, Edward Keating, who sponsored the bill,
i nc
U. S. Congress, House, Housing in the District of Columbia 
Hearings, on S. J. Res. 152 and H. R. 9248, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-11,
16; and New York Times, March 17, 1918, Section V, 1.
1 2 6Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 2110, 2118;
Pt. 4, 3333, 3390. The rent bill never became law. Since the Senate 
passed a much different bill, the conferees had a difficult time working 
out differences. Representative Johnson charged that the Senators were 
really in league with the landlords and did not want to help the "humble" 
citizen. His denunciation of the Senators became so strong that the 
Senate passed a motion refusing to confer further with the House if 
Johnson remained on the Conference Committee. Eventually, Johnson 
resigned but still no action was taken. See ibid., Pt. 8 , 7808, 8359- 
60; Washington Post, June 23, 1918, 2; June 25, 1918, 3; and November 
19, 1918, 1.
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described the proposal as a social protection measure. Since women 
usually were unable to organize unions, the board, Keating elaborated, 
would ensure an irreducible minimum living wage which their present 
disheartening living conditions indicated they did not receive. Taking 
the highest plane possible, Keating added that American democracy 
must fulfill its promises for'all of its citizens. Keating and legal 
expert Felix Frankfurter told the committee that the bill followed the 
lines of an Oregon law which the Supreme Court had declared constitu­
tional in 1908. Safe from attack on that ground, the bill also gained 
security by the surprising support of Washington's commercial interests. 
A spokesman for the Merchant's Association, who justified the bill on 
grounds other than Keating's social democratic ideals, told the com­
mittee that his group endorsed Keating's plan as a means to improve
127employer-employee relations.
With this backing, the bill gained a hearing on the House floor. 
Socialist Meyer London spoke in favor of the bill, something that did 
not recommend it in the minds of some members. Ex-Speaker Cannon 
opposed the bill because wage levels should increase only from bar­
gaining between employee and employer. He further argued that the 
bill would be difficult to implement and would also violate the funda­
mental principle that all individuals must care for themselves. Most 
members apparently did not concur since the House passed the bill with­
out a formal roll call. At least for the District of Columbia, congress-
128men were inclined to violate the workings of the free market system.
127u. s. Congress, House, Minimum Wage for Women and Children, 
Hearings, on H. R. 10367 and H. R. 12098, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-4, 6 , 8 .
^ ^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8871, 8886, Pt.
10, 9537; Washington Post, July 9, 1918, 6; and August 27, 1918, 6.
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Because the country experienced a tremendous wartime boom, some 
congressmen were frightened over a possible postwar economic recession.
In order to prevent this possibility several suggestions were presented, 
only one of which reached the stage of a final House roll call. Intro­
duced by Meyer London, this proposal created a commission made up of con­
gressmen and experts who would study the feasibility of unemployment in­
surance. In committee Samuel Gompers strongly objected to the bill 
as inimical to labor unions. Most of the committee disagreed with 
Gompers and sent it to the House floor. During the ensuing House de­
bate, Medill McCormick (R-Ill.) argued that conditions might shortly 
require Congress to have information on unemployment. Showing little 
ability to look beyond immediate conditions, many House members agreed 
with Henry Rainey's question that "in abnormal times why make investi­
gations for normal times?" Similarly, J. Hampton Moore claimed that 
sufficient information already existed on the subject. Moore also 
brought to light another inhibition working against the bill, namely a 
belief that a commission would foster tensions between capital and 
labor. The House was not already to listen to advanced social ideas, 
and consequently representatives voted down the bill, 199 to 133.-1-29
Partisanship did not operate on the balloting (Table 4-15). 
Sixty-two percent of the Republicans joined by fifty-nine.percent of 
the Democrats opposed a study of unemployment insurance. At least in 
this instance neither party demonstrated any greater tendency than
■^^Keating, The Gentleman From Colorado, 365-66; Charles Merz,
"At the Capital," The New Republic, XIII (January 26, 1918), 381; and 
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 903-907. Moore may have 
been thinking about the Commission on Industrial Relations. See Wein­
stein, The Corporate Ideal, 190-91, for its impact on public opinion. 
Conservatives may have bulked at the idea of any other similar commis­
sions .
TABLE 4-15
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. RES. 189:
UNEMPLOYMENT COMMISSION*
Region and Party (Numbers)
NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTALV vlc i
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 15 3 25 7 31 3 13 69 2 14 7 1 1 — 5 98 99
Nay 4 2 8 13 9 2 2 7 14 14 1 16 1 5 4 4 4 67 61
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 0 8 8 27 6 6 44 58 30 48 83 67 47 87 17 20 — 56 59 62
Nay 80 1 2 73 34 56 42 70 52 17 33 53 13 83 80 1 0 0 44 41 38
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 906.
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the other toward support of social welfare schemes. Regionally, a 
definite pattern emerged. Republican support of the commission was 
abnormally high in the Midwest (ENC and WNC) and the Far West (MS and 
PS). Greater than average opposition among Republicans surfaced in 
New England and the Border states, both light industrial areas that 
seemingly would want protection for their workers. On the Democratic 
side, all regions voted for the proposal except the Southern states, 
whose predominance in the party swung them into opposition against the 
measure. Democrats from other regions often strongly favored the 
measure, such as the over eighty percent advocacy by New England, 
Middle Atlantic, and Pacific state delegations. In any event, the 
Southern Democrats, probably because of their strong rural and anti­
labor bias, contributed significantly to the proposals defeat. In 
genera], social welfare proposals received a measure of support from 
the House. War conditions provoked a potentially far-reaching housing 
program and experimental rental plan. Further, local District of 
Columbia wage rates warranted action, and national unemployment condi­
tions, in the minds of many, were at least worthy of study. Some hint 
of future social measures could be detected, but in the main House
action was shaped more by war conditions than by an ideology favorable
130to a social welfare state.
130Clarke A. Chambers, Seedtime of Reform; American Social 
Service and Social Action, 1918-1933 (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1961), 20-22, records evidences for a confidence 
among social workers that social welfare goals would be advanced by 
the war. At least during the second session, little evidence of 
a positive attitude toward social welfare can be found among Con­
gressmen .
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Industrial Policy
The Wilson Administration progressively evolved a wartime pro­
gram for the organization of industry. During the first session of 
Congress the Administration usually acted on its own initiative, though 
it did seek authorization from Congress in a few limited areas. In 
the second session, a war-induced industrial crisis would force the 
Administration to seek legislation from Congress in several important 
spheres of economic activity. From the summer of 1917 to the winter 
of 1918, war demands increasingly pressured vital components of the 
economy as railroad transportation slowed, mineral prices continued 
skyward, and credit sources for corporations dried up. Adding to the 
war-related dislocations was the severest winter in years, which hit 
the manufacturing Northeast the hardest. The railroad industry became 
the first to collapse from the combined war and weather pressures. 
President Wilson responded when he ordered a government takeover of 
the railroads late in December, 1917. Placing them under the control 
of a railroad administration, he conferred dictatorial power to run 
the roads upon his son-in-law, Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo.
At the same time, the President announced his intention to address
Congress on the railroad crisis after it reconvened from the holiday 
131recess. A
When Wilson addressed Congress on January 4, 1918, he listed 
several specific results that would accrue from government administration
131New York Times, December 6 , 1917, 1; December 7, 1917, 1; 
December 8 , 1917, 1; December 11, 1918, 1; and January 1, 1918, 1.
See McAdoo, Crowded Years; The Reminiscences of William G. McAdoo, 
447-61; John F. Stover, American Railroads (University of Chicago 
Press, 1961), 185-88; and Walter D. Hines, War History of American 
Railroads, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), 20-23, for a
discussion of railroad conditions before the government's take over.
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First, all properties could be used without injuriously discriminating 
against any particular railroad companies. Second, the government 
would have, unrestricted use of all railroad properties. Third, the 
government would be better able to finance railroad improvements. 
Half-way measures, such as private control with a head traffic director, 
would fail to infuse the necessary coordination and efficiency into the 
railroad system. Government interference, then, was due not only to 
wartime confusion but also to railroad decentralization. Wilson con­
cluded his message with an outline of a bill that Congress eventually 
passed. The Railroad Act of 1918 provided that the government estab­
lish a fund for improvements and that it also compensate railroad
132owners during the period of the take-over.
Setting the pattern for the House, the Interstate Commerce 
Committee argued over the necessity and implications of government 
control. ICC Commissioner George W. Anderson pointed out to the 
Committee that tremendous increases in operational expenses, partly 
as a result of duplication of services under private control, was one 
reason for the take over. He also covered the bill's provisions 
which established the principle of "just compensation" and set the 
rates for reimbursement on the base years of 1914-1916. Sam Rayburn 
(D-Tex.), showing concern for the railroad corporations, asked Ander­
son why railroads should not be allowed boom profits such as other 
industries then received. Railroad executives who came before the
1 32
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 586-87; and 
New York Times, January 5, 1918, 1. See Austin Kerr, "Decision for 
Federal Control: Wilson, McAdoo, and the Railroads," Journal of
American History,LIV (December, 1967), 550-560, for a discussion of 
the ideas behind the takeover of the railroads.
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Committee also wanted a high return. In particular, they asserted that
the government's date for deciding compensation worked against their
profits. As one executive told the Committee, the railroads had made
low profits during 1914-16; if the House allowed the increased profits
133of 1917, the railroads would be justly compensated.
Throughout the hearings railroad officials displayed greater 
distress about the possibilities of government ownership after the 
war than over "unjust" compensation. Since some congressmen had de­
cided predilections in favor of government control or outright 
nationalization, railroad executives and their congressional allies 
pressed for a clause limiting the takeover to one year after the war's 
end. On the other hand Director General William G. McAdoo, who proba­
bly favored government ownership, told the Committee that he opposed 
any fixed date for the return of the railroads to private control. To 
set a date, he maintained, would make an orderly and rational deter­
mination of compensation difficult. He also intimated that detailed 
legislation should be passed after the war that would replace the old 
system of railroad 'competition with a rationalized and centralized 
railroad administration.Committee members viewed McAdoo's sugges­
tions as the symbolic battle point on the disposition of the railroads 
after the war. When they consequently decided fifteen to six to set a
two-year postwar limitation on government control, it represented
135a partial victory for the corporations.
1 3 3 U. S. Congress, House, Federal Operation of Transportation 
Systems, Hearings,on H. R. 8172 and H. R. 9685, 65 Cong., 2 Sess.,
6 , 2 2 , 118-22.
•*-3 4 Ibid., 183, 105, 333, 915, 589-99; New York Times, January 
15, 1918, 8 ; and Washington Post, January 5, 1918, 3.
1 3 5 Ibid., February 2, 1918, 1; and New York Times,
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As soon as the bill reached the House floor# supporters of greater 
government control attempted to reverse the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mittee's decision. Thetus Sims# who was chairman of that Committee# 
directed this campaign. He argued that the railroads' transfer from 
private to government control was necessary because of the inefficiency 
and decentralization of the railroads. If these deficiensies were to 
be corrected# the House# he maintained# had to formulate bold and new 
legislation when the war ended. The two-year limitation on government 
management would impede the adoption of such legislation. However# 
these and similar arguments failed to convince the House membership.
As a result# when Sims and like-minded colleagues endeavored to pass 
an amendment which removed the limitation# they were easily defeated. 
Sims did not force a formal roll call over his amendment.-1-3 6
After the defeat of the Sims Amendment, the more corporate- 
minded representatives attempted to modify the bill. They rallied be­
hind John Esch (R-Wis.), who wanted two changes in the bill. First, 
he opposed allowing the President power to fix railroad rates, pre­
ferring instead that the ICC maintain control over rates. He supported 
the ICC's control because of that body's long-term experience in 
establishing rates. Perhaps a more basic reaxon for his position was 
that he objected to a further extension of Presidential power.
Second because of his preference for private control, he argued 
that the two-year return provision gave the government too much 
time and that Congress could enact the needed legislation in one
February 3# 1918, 2.
^ ^ Cong. Rec.# 65 Cong.# Vol. 56# 2 Sess.# Pt. 3, 2236-38, 2346,
2464.
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year. Although other issues— -such as the fate of the short-line 
railroads— also engendered the lively interest of some congressmen ,■*•37 
the two issues as defined by Esch became the storm centers over which 
the House fought its roll call duels.
Barton E. Sweet, an Iowa Republican, forced a roll call over the 
Esch proposal to delegate the rate-setting power to the ICC. His 
motion lost 210 to 165 as seventy-three percent of the Republicans 
voted for the transfer while eighty-five percent of the Democrats 
voted to retain Presidential control over rates (Table 4-16). Middle 
Atlantic Republicans split off from the party position. Since most 
Republicans expected the President to increase railroad rates if granted 
the power to do so, the deviation of Middle Atlantic Republicans ap­
parently resulted because they believed that such a power would benefit 
their region's railroads.^-3 8 On Esch's proposal for the early return 
of the railroads to private control, eighty-seven percent of the Repub­
licans voted for it (Table 4-17). But the Democrats, who refused to 
decrease the possibilities for congressional legislative action after 
the war, demonstrated even higher cohesion and defeated the Esch 
Amendment, 205 to 164. No significant geographical pattern emerged 
among either the Democrats or Republicans. In general, the two roll 
calls evidenced a clear partisan division, with only Middle Atlantic 
Republicans indicating any significant geographical alignment on the 
two votes. The Republicans stood squarely for the retention for as
1 3 7Ibid., 2465-70, 2564-65, 2569, 2358.
138New York Times, February 2, 1918, 1; February 6 , 1918, 9; and 
February 9, 1918, 9. House conferees agreed to a Senate provision 
granting the ICC review power over government rate increases. See 
Ibid., March 8 , 1918, 1; and March 15, 1918, 4.
TABLE 4-16
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9685: ICC RATE
CONTROL AMENDMENT OF THE RAILROAD BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 19 — 15 2 49 28 24 2 1 8 1 6 1 1 0 29 137
Nay 6 6 17 39 19 5 1 0 6 6 1 32 7 3 160 51
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 76 — 28 1 0 91 —  1 0 0 27 67 3 100 13 100 25 100 15 73
Nay 1 0 0 24 1 0 0 72 90 9 1 0 0 73 33 97 87 75 — 85 27
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, Pt. 3, 2834.
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TABLE 4-17
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 9685: TIME LIMIT
AMENDMENT OF THE RAILROAD BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 25 — 48 — 45 2 0 7 3 1 7 — 4 — 9 8 161
Nay 6 — 17 7 2 2 6 9 6 82 33 1 8 2 4 1 181 23
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea —  1 0 0 — 8 8 — 8 8 77 8 1 0 0 3 8 8 — 67 — 90 4 87
Nay 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 100 23 92 97 12 1 0 0 33 1 0 0 1 0 96 13
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 3, 2835.
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much of the old system as possible, either in rate matters or in the 
immediate return of the railroads to private hands after the war. 
Striking a more progressive stance, the Democrats advocated greater 
centralization and rationalization of the railroad industry. Both 
parties were drawing the battle lines over the postwar disposition of 
the railroads.
At the same time that the Administration struggled to reorganize 
the overburdened railroads, a shortage of credit started to plague 
corporations, particularly railroads. For nine months the government 
had staged liberty loan campaigns in order to finance its war programs. 
By the winter of 1918, normal bank funds had been largely diverted to 
the government and the bond market had gone to pieces. While this was 
happening, ever larger capital outlays were required because of wartime 
plant expansion. Not able to borrow the money from the banks or 
securities market, corporate leaders turned to the government for aid. 
In response William McAdoo, the financial wizard of the Administration, 
devised a scheme whereby a War Finance Corporation (WFC) would lend 
money to war industries.
As McAdoo explained the plan, the Corporation would have a
capital of $500 million. Based upon this sum, the Corporation could
furnish up to four billion dollars in loans to bankers. From the
bankers, the money would find its way to the credit starved war in- 
139dustries. Designed strictly to aid wartime industrial expansion, 
the WFC proposal stood above partisan cavil. The specifics of the
•^•^ Ibid., January 29, 1918, 1; January 30, 1918, 4; and U. S. 
Congress, House, War Finance Corporation, Hearings on H. R. 9499, and 
S. 3714, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3—4, 23—24.
301
plan, however, particularly its broad concession of powers to Secre­
tary of the Treasury McAdoo, threw the Banking and Finance Committee 
into a frenzy. Stepping in to expedite its passage, Majority Leader 
Kitchin placed the bill under his Ways and Means Committee rather than 
under the disaffected Banking Committee.•L4°
In hearings before Kitchin's Committee, the bill still continued 
to draw fire over its particulars. Paul, Warburg, Vice-Governor of the 
Federal Reserve Board, admitted that the bill smacked of an undesirable 
paternalism but was a necessary weirtime expedient. John Garner (D-Tex.) 
interpolated that Congress had unfortunately had to pass many undesira­
ble bills. When Secretary MgAdoo appeared, Congressman Hampton Moore 
grilled him over the "tremendous grant of power" the bill gave McAdoo. 
Other congressmen described McAdoo's positions, that of Treasury head 
and Railroad Director, as being already beyond the capacity of one 
man. Wishing to lessen McAdoo's burden's, Martin Madden (R-Ill.) 
suggested a board of managers to supervise the WFC. Since the Senate 
in fact had substituted a board appointed by McAdoo for one appointed 
by the President and the Senate, the Committee agreed to this cutback 
in McAdoo's powers. They also reduced from four to two billion 
dollars the amount that the WFC could lend.141 The bill won the 
unanimous approval of the Committee loans.
Pleased by the Ways and Means Committee's courage in revising 
an administration bill, Republican Nicholas Longworth pronounced the
140flew York Times, February 5, 1918, 1; February 9, 1918, 14; 
and Washington Post, February 5, 1918, 2.
■^■^House, War Finance Corporation, Hearings on H. R. 9499, 39-
41, 61, 92-95, 104; Washington Post, February 22, 1918, 2; March 10, 
1918, 2; New York Times, February 19, 15; and March 9, 1918, 5.
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bill as much improved by the Committee's handiwork. Still, some
House members were struck by the hitherto undreamed of actions that
they were taking in wartime. To these and like-minded colleagues the
bill required more revision, such as prohibiting loans to individuals,
allowing the Federal Reserve Board to increase its loan power, and
placing more checks on Secretary McAdoo's power. Republican leader
Frederick Gillett (Mass.) continued his long standing lament over
congressional grants of power to the Executive. Paraphrasing Lord
Acton, Gillett said that the possession of power in truth did corrupt
those who possessed it. Gillet did not, however, propose any revisions,
preferring instead his role as "constructive critic" to actual creator 
142of legislation. Joseph Fordney, leading Republican member of Ways 
and Means, agreed with Gillett that powers had flowed to the Execu­
tive; he nonetheless argued that this unfortunately must continue 
because American corporate institutions required financial assistance. 
Apparently, the House agreed with Fordney's viewpoint. After a few 
futile efforts at amendment, the bill passed the House as written by 
the Ways and Means Committee, 370 to two.'*'4 3
Another important economic proposition arose out of the war's 
massive demands on the mineral resources of the country. The United 
States suffered from critical shortages of certain minerals. These 
included managanese, pyrite, and chrome, of which the U. S. did not 
produce enough for its own needs. These minerals, because of their
142cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3619-20, 3718, 
3716, 3786, 3661, 3793, 3727.
143Ibid., 3613-17, 3609, 3793, 3807, 3843. New York Times,
March 19, 1918, 10; and March 20, 1918, 12.
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scarcity, had spiraled in price. In order to deal with this problem, 
the Administration introduced in March a bill that encouraged mineral 
production and controlled prices. The goal, as Bernard Baruch told 
the House Mining Committee, was the economic self-sufficiency of the 
nation in war and in peace.1 4 4
Since the provisions on production favorably appealed to the 
sentiments of economic nationalism, they easily secured the approval 
of most members when the bill was presented to the House in late 
April. The price-fixing sections, on the other hand, distressed the 
already frayed sensitivities of congressmen. Concerned about the fate 
of private enterprise, members turned to the injunctions of the classi­
cal economists against price-fixing. As a result, many House members 
argued that the market system, though under severe strain, would yield 
not only the right prices but also increase production. If the govern­
ment, however, intervened and set prices, the bill's production 
provisions would be contradicted. The critics also rejected the new
(and what they considered dictatorial) powers that the bill granted to 
145
the President.
When the House voted on the bill's price section, a combination 
of Republican partisanship, opposition to further delegations of power 
to the President, and southern cotton advocacy defeated its inclusion 
in the bill, 156 to 150.146 Eighty-three percent of the Republicans
144New York Times, March 27, 1918, 20; and Congress, House,
Minerals and Metals for War Purposes, Hearings on S. 2812 and H. R.
11259, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3-7, 23, 33.
145Ibid., 95, 99, 149; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56,
2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5794.
^^Ibid., 5844; and New York Times, May 1, 1918, 24.
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massed in opposition to the price control provisions (Table 4-18).
They were joined by twenty-two percent of the Democrats, while the 
rest of the party adhered to the Administration's position. Although 
it was a decided partisan ballot, there were regional variations of 
significance. Almost all the Democrats who broke from their party's 
stance hailed from the Southern states (thirty of the thirty-four 
came from the South). Apparently, a number of Southern Democrats 
were apprehensive that the bill's principle would be applied to un­
regulated cotton prices, which were then experiencing wartime inflation. 
Members of both parties in the Mountain states supported price controls 
on minerals, probably because they believed that the Administration 
would increase prices for their minerals. Overall, the Republicans 
continued their opposition toward the Administration, while the 
Southern Democrats' action signaled to the Administration that they
bitterly opposed any price control which might even remotely be con-
147strued as a reason to regulate cotton prices.
The spread of governmental regulation seemed checked by the late 
spring of 1918. Upsetting this more congenial trend was a threatened 
strike among Western Union employees because that corporation denied 
its employees the right to join the Commercial Telegraphers' Union.
In response to this crisis, Representative George R. Lunn (D-N.Y.) 
proposed a bill establishing government control of all telegraph and 
telephone companies. He told the press that this was necessary in 
wartime and that he believed it wise in peacetime. As an argument
•^^Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 173-76, 
portrays the Southerners as stoutly resisting any measures that 
smacked of price controls on cotton.
TABLE 4-18
•VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 11259: 
MINERAL PRICE CONTROL AMENDMENT*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 1 — 32 1 32 17 30 1 3 10 — 2 — 5 34 120
Nay 3 1 1 2 18 1 0 9 7 44 26 — 8 4 5 1 124 24
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea —  1 0 0 — 94 5 76 71 41 100 1 0 1 0 0 — 33 — 83 22 83
Nay 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 95 24 100 29 59 90 — 1 0 0 67 1 0 0 17 78 17
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5844.
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for this proposal, Lunn pointed out that no European country allowed 
private control of wire services. When the strike danger continued, 
Wilson, on July 1, conferred with his cabinet and decided on an exten- 
sion of government control to the wire services. Simultaneously, 
administration supporters introduced a resolution, which was sent to 
the Interstate Commerce Committee for hearings.
First, attempting to determine the reasons for the take over, 
committeemen questioned Secretaries Baker and Daniels and Postmaster 
General Albert Burleson. These witnesses cited the strike threat as 
the proximate cause for action, but Daniels stressed a second reason. 
There was, he argued, a real danger of "spying" on government communi­
cations with the wire services under private control. The legislators 
turned the questioning in a second direction when they asked the wit­
nesses about government ownership after the war. Daniels and Burle­
son replied that they favored postwar government ownership for two 
reasons: that the wires were a public utility and that sedition could
be more efficiently suppressed by government control. Committee 
members, though voicing no desire to protect free speech and communi­
cation, did not want further intrusions by the government into the 
private economic sector. The government witnesses and the Committee 
agreed to restrict the resolution exclusively to war-induced condi­
tions .1 4 9
The Committee directed the resolution to the House floor, where 
a number of congressmen protested its possible danger to private
148New York Times, June 5, 1918, 17; and July 3, 1918, 1.
14 9 U. S. Congress, House, Federal Control of Systems of Communi­
cation, Hearings on H. J. Res. 309, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 3, 6 , 13, 19, 
29, 33, 36-38; and New York Times, July 3, 1918, 1.
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ownership after the war and to free exchange of communications during 
the war. They won a voice vote which would have sidetracked the bill
except that supporters of the resolution demanded a roll call of the
150House and won, 197 to 107. The voting on the motion indicates that 
partisan factors had only nominal influence, since sixty-eight per­
cent of the Democrats and fifty-eight percent of the Republicans 
supported the motion (Table 4-19). Only the Middle Atlantic and East 
North Central regions manifested a tendency to vote above their par­
ties' average percentage against the resolution. These regions con­
tained the great wire service companies that might have been adversely 
affected by the resolution. Otherwise, the divisions over it indicate 
no distinguishable pattern. Throughout the House's consideration of 
economic measures, the membership nervously viewed the postwar impli­
cations of their actions. If their conduct indicated any clear 
preference, it was to return the country to "normal" conditions as 
fast as possible after the war without additional government regulation.
Military Policy
During the first wartime session, Congress had passed most of 
the vital military measures. A portion of this work, however, had 
been done in such an incomplete fashion that it generated a number of 
problems that would require House attention. A modification of the 
draft law was necessary in order to correct oversights and to obtain 
enough men to fill the ranks of the Amy. Then there were other 
matters stemming from the aircraft and the machine-gun program.
Normal and extraordinary appropriations for the army and navy would
150cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8727, 8715,
8648-51; and New York Times, July 5, 1918, 1.
TABLE 4-19
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. J. RES. 309: 
WIRE SERVICE BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 14 8 2 1 1 2 17 6 13 50 2 20 5 5 4 2 4 104 80
Nay — 4 7 16 8 19 2 1 1 23 — 4 3 2 1 3 4 49 58
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 0 0 78 53 57 60 47 75 54 69 100 83 63 71 80 40 50 6 8  58
Nay — 2 2 47 43 40 53 25 46 31 — 17 37 29 2 0 60 50 32 42
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 8651.
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also require the close attention of the House committees involved. A 
lengthy list of appropriation bills poured into the Appropriation, 
Naval, and Military Committees.
Even though the frenzy of the first days of the war had declined, 
House committees still processed billions of dollars of appropriation 
requests in a matter of days, and the full House scrutinized matters 
less closely. Still, the committees did often subject witnesses 
and bills to hostile scrutiny. Thus during the attack on Baker in 
the winter of 1917-18, Representative Kahn lashed out at the military's 
failure to transport troops to France faster. He, along with William 
Gordon (D-Ohio), also criticized camp conditions and conjectured that 
the whole problem came from the Administration's anti-preparedness 
stance before the war. When major political crises were not occurring, 
witnesses received more deference and more straight-forward technical 
questions. Even then they did not escape unscratched, since the 
committees were adamant that the government secure the best buy 
possible for its money. Specific contracts, on such supplies as 
woolens, tents, guns, and clothes, were reviewed in order to ensure 
that private contractors were not gathering windfall profits from the 
government. At times congressmen also displayed apprehensions that 
some of their local manufacturers were mistreated by the War Depart­
ment's purchasing system. On occasion the committees also criticized 
the method of making contracts. Richard Olney (D-Mass.) thought that 
the National Council of Defense hampered contract-making since counci1- 
men were dollar-a-year businessmen who, he claimed, sought to protect 
the interests of big business. Additionally, committee members
310
frequently inveighed against the cost-plus system that the military
151used for determining costs and profits on contracts.
At times, the detection of government failure led to full-scale
investigations. In May, the inadequacy of army machine-gun production
came to light which resulted in close investigation by Julius Kahn (R- 
152
Cal.). More far-reaching in its repercussions was the failure of
the aircraft program. Secretary of War Baker had initiated an air
program shortly after American entry into the war and then placed it
under the Council of National Defense. The Council originally envisioned
a modest program of 5,000 planes, but this soon multiplied into 20,000
planes and a $600 million cost. Congress, fascinated by a vision of
American air power, voted to appropriate the money after a short 
153debate. Planning proved much easier than actual implementation, 
and the whole program rapidly ran into numerous problems. When Gutzon 
Borglum, a famous sculptor and also an aircraft enthusiast, revealed 
the distressing conditions to the Senate, Republican senators and 
Senator Chamberlain (D-Oreg.) pounced on the War Department and
t.
started an investigation. Meanwhile, the House, as it often did when 
such investigations of the Administration arose, sat on the side lines 
and commended its sister body for its discovery of fraud and mis­
management in the war program. Senator Chamberlain revived the old
1 5 1 U. S. Congress, House, Army Appropriation Bill, 1919, Hearings, 
on H. R. 12281, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 51, 204-05, 425, 609, 685, 1368,
679, 155, 898, 681-85; U. S. Congress, House, Council of National 
Defense, Hearings on H. R. 3971, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 9, 16-17, 95; and 
U. S. Congress, House, First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, Hearings 
before the Appropriations Committee, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 98-102.
152New York Times, May 7, 1918, 1.
^•^Beaver, Newton D. Baker, 57-58.
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Weeks Resolution and called for a general investigation of the War 
Department. Wilson moved deftly to head off the proposed Senate 
inquisition of the war program when he appointed a Justice Department 
investigation under the former Republican standard-bearer, Charles 
Evans Hughes. The Senate, completely out-maneuvered, still authorized 
a lesser investigation, while the House refused to become involved 
at all.1 5 4
In addition to preventing military waste, the House on occasion 
became a component of the military policy-making process.15  ^ The 
defects of the original draft law engaged the House's attention at 
several points during the session. First, the Administration requested 
that the House enact legislation to remove "inequalities" in the selec­
tive service system. The bill redefined the classification system, 
thereby allowing exemptions of persons with dependents or with critical 
occupations. It also corrected the basis for determining draft-age 
populations in a district by removing foreign aliens as part of those 
counted for the draft. Overall, the supporters hoped that it would 
more efficiently use manpower and that it would prevent the drafting 
of married men with dependents. It also greatly enhanced the mili­
tary’s power since it allowed classification of civilians by the 
draft boards.^56
154New York Times, April 11, 18, 1; April 12, 1918, 13; May 3
1918, 3; May 5, 1918, 6 ; May 8 , 1918, 1; May 16, 1918, 1; May 23,
1918, 1; May 30, 1918, 9; and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War 
Congress, 119, 133-34.
155flew York Times, February 15, 1918, 4; and March 15, 1918,
4.
156ibid., March 14, 1918, 1; March 15, 1918, 5; and Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4981, 5036-38.
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Because some representatives saw the measure as a step toward 
universal military training and military control, it stirred up the 
still controversial issues from the previous year's draft debates.
Again Representative Hubert Dent (D-Tenn.), head of the Military 
Affairs Committee, deserted the President and supported instead a 
plan that Ashton C. Shallenberger (D-Neb.) had drawn up. Consisting of 
two amendments, Shallenberger's plan first provided that draft quotas 
should be based on the total registered population of military age and 
that Congress, rather than draft boards, would classify the draft- 
age population. The second amendment gave districts credit for 
volunteers. Advocates of the Shallenberger proposals commended such 
measures on the grounds that they would prevent non-industrial states 
from having to make up quotas for states granted deferments because 
of a large labor force in war industries. This agrarian state argu­
ment was coupled with an attack on the military. The Administration's 
plan, asserted Samuel Nicholls (D-S.C.), allowed the army to set quotas 
and classes; thereby, it delegated the military immense power over 
individual citizens. Only Congress, he maintained, should make such 
decisions regarding the exemption and non-exemption of different 
citizens.
Although this draft bill was complicated by several other pro- 
158visions, the three basic roll calls on it came over the Shallenberger
1 5 7 Ibid., 4984-86, 5028-29, 4989-90; New York Times, April 13, 
1918, 11; April 14, 1918, 6 ; and Washington Post, April 11, 1918, 4.
158A draft exemption for divinity students caused divisions. 
Eventually, the House insisted on their continued exemption. Also, a 
provision on placing twenty-one year olds at the botton of Class one 
created difficulties. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt.
6 , 5625; New York Times, May 9, 1918, 9; and May 10, 1918, 10.
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proposals.1 ^ 9 The first vote can be defined as a partisan vote because 
fifty-seven percent of the Democrats opposed ninety-two percent of 
the Republicans (Table 4-20). More significantly, the majority 
position of the Democrats represented a revolt against the Adminis­
tration's stance while the Republican majority voted for the War 
Department's proposal. Such a division lent credence to Republican
charges that Democratic obstructionists blocked the war program since
160the Shallenberger amendment was defeated only by Republican aid.
Most of the Democratic rebels came from the West North Central, the 
South, and the Mountain areas. As was true during the first session, 
the industrial Northeast gave nearly unanimous support to the draft.
In general, the voting pattern reflected the appeal made by the 
Shallenberger forces for the quota and classification amendment: 
rural-oriented areas tended to support it,' while industrial regions 
opposed it.
The second Shallenberger roll call, which was demanded on the 
proposal granting to the states credit for volunteers, followed a non­
partisan pattern as it carried by a vote of 293 to sixty-six. Nonethe­
less, fifty-five of the opponents came from one party, the Republican, 
while only eleven Democrats joined them (Table 4-21). A geographical 
relationship was also evident in this ballot since most of the fifty-five 
Republicans, who upheld the strongest pro-draft stance, represented
159Two of the three votes scale together, the third does not.
It appears that after the first two votes, which came in April,
1918, and the third, which came in May, Wilson's change on the 
credit proposals caused a realignment. Wilson always opposed the 
quota amendment. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 
5058-59; and Pt. 6 , 6291.
^•^Hew York Times, April 6, 1918, 6.
TABLE 4-20
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. J. RES. 123:
SHALLENBERGER AMENDMENT TO DRAFT BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 5 4 5 7 3 68 3 13 5 2 2 1 104 14
Nay 5 26 14 49 17 46 1 18 22 16 11 2 4 2 9 79 163
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R ^ D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 26 19 10 87 14 75 100 45 71 33 50 10 57 8
Nay 100 100 74 100 81 90 13 86 25 55 100 29 67 50 90 43 92
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 5058.
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TABLE 4-21
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. J. RES. 123: 
CREDIT FOR VOLUNTEERS*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 4 15 16 33 19 35 7 16 87 3 26 10 6 5 3 5 168 122
Nay 1 11 3 16 2 16 6 1 3 1 — 1 5 11 55
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 80 58 84 67 90 69 100 73 99 100 90 91 100 100 75 50 94 69
Nay 20 42 16 33 10 31 27 1 10 9 — 25 50 6 31
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., pt. 5, 5059.
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the Northeast. The third roll call, again on the credit 
principle, came a month later and showed the influence of changed 
conditions (Table 4-22). Prior to the first ballot on the volunteer 
credit provision, the President had maintained a neutral position; 
however, between the first and second ballot pressure from his military 
advisors forced Wilson to adopt a definite position against it. When 
a conference report on the draft bill returned to the House, most Demo­
crats agreed with the President's new stance and now voted against 
the a m e n d m e n t . L e s s  mindful of Presidential alterations in policy, 
forty-one percent of the Republicans still voted for the Shallenberger 
credit proposal. Overall, the three ballots, even though they do not 
correlate with each other, indicated a strong preference by the North­
east, particularly the Republicans of that region, for the military's 
position on the draft. Southern and Western Democrats usually reacted 
negatively to the military's plans. In any event, significant ele­
ments of both parties demonstrated that they stood ready to adopt an 
independent course on draft questions.
Later in the second session a second draft controversy arose
when the Administration sought authorization for a larger army.
Various Republicans, including Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, General
Leonard Wood, and Congressman Julius Kahn, started a campaign in the
spring of 1918 for an army of five million. Their plan would augment
the then current size of the army by two million, an increase which they
T62believed absolutely necessary for an Allied victory. The
161Ibid., Pt. 6, 6289-91.
•^2New York Times, June 14, 1918, 4; Washington Post, March 28, 
1918, 3 and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson, 177-78.
TABLE 4-22
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. J. RES. 123: 
CREDIT FOR VOLUNTEERS*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 16 7 23 18 25 3 11 76 29 7 5 1 3 6 143 89
Nay 4 6 3 14 3 21 5 9 6 2 2 2 3 4 1 5 27 63
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 33 73 70 62 86 54 37 55 93 93 78 63 20 75 54 84 59
Nay 67 27 30 38 14 46 63 45 7 100 7 22 37 80 25 46 16 41
*Cong. Rec■, 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 6291.
Administration reacted slowly to the clamor, but after Secretary Baker 
returned from a European fact-finding trip, the Administration asked 
Congress to remove any legislative limitation on the size of the 
a r m y . Rumors that the Executive would soon ask for much larger 
military appropriations and a change in draft ages mounted during the 
summer months. On August first, the War Department finally announced 
plans for a five million man army and at the same time requested an 
extension of age limits for the draft to include all males between 
eighteen and forty-five.
Response from Capital Hill demonstrated a continued mixed 
attitude toward military draft planning. Representative Kahn, who 
saw the age proposal as a step toward universal training, supported it 
as a result, but Chairman Dent again opposed the War Department. He 
and like-minded colleagues rallied behind a compromise counter-pro­
posal that John C. McKenzie (R-Ill.) had drawn up. His plan provided 
that the eighteen-year old age group would be called only after the
nineteen to forty-five category. Secretary of War Baker, however,
164rejected the McKenzie compromise plan.
After Baker's refusal to compromise, a controversy erupted over 
deference to the military's position. Representative Kahn and his 
cohorts advocated following the military in technical matters. To 
representatives such as Dent, the whole idea violated their belief 
in the civilian creation of military policy for the p u b l i c . I n
W^ashington Post, May 2, 1918, 6; and May 3, 1918, 1.
-*-6% e w  York Times, June 27, 1918, 1; August 2, 1918, 1; August 4, 
1918, 1; August 6, 1918, 1; August 21, 1918, 11; and Washington Post
165New York Times, August 23, 1918, 11; August 24, 1918, 1; and
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9363-65, 905-06.
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this case the anti-militarist bloc, however, represented a minority, 
as they lost the critical motion, one to recommit, 194 to 147. Again 
partisan differences were manifested on a draft vote (Table 4-23).
Fifty-three percent of the Democrats voted with Dent, while sixty-six 
percent of the Republicans agreed with an Administration position. 
Nonetheless, the low cohesion indicates that neither party achieved a 
coherent party line. Proponents of the military position more likely 
resided in the Northeast (NE, MA, and ENC) and the Pacific states. 
Opponents hailed from the other regions. While this vote does not 
correlate with other draft roll calls of the second session, on a 
regional level it did display a consistency, particularly for the 
Northeast with its strong conscription advocacy. Overall, the balloting 
on draft legislation demonstrates that in the only area in which Congress 
participated directly in the formulation of military policy, significant 
numbers of representatives stood opposed to military and Administration 
directives. When this fact is related to the often aggressive and 
critical questioning of the House hearings, the military clearly did 
not win the approval of many congressmen. Although a majority suppor­
ted the military's plans, many of these did so with ill-temper, and a 
significant proportion refused all support. The House was permeated 
by a strong anti-military bias, which alerted its members to any 
possible abuses of power by the military.
Revenue and Water Power 
By late May, the House could look forward to an end of their 
labors. With the primary elections in the offing, the solons were 
anxious to leave Washington for the hustings. However, these plans 
were in danger of being disrupted by the necessity for additional
TABLE 4-23
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. R. 12731:
AGE CLASSIFICATION ON DRAFT BILL*
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS • PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 1 1 4 9 9 19 6 14 51 2 14 9 4 3 2 3 91 60
Nay 5 24 18 41 13 27 3 9 28 1 11 1 1 2 3 9 82 114
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 17 4 18 18 41 41 67 61 65 67 56 9.0 80 60 40 25 53 34
Nay 83 96 82 82 59 59 33 39 35 33 44 10 20 40 60 75 47 66
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9506.
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revenue. With war costs mounting, the old revenue bill became more 
inadequate in maintaining the desired high ratio of taxes to bonds. As 
a result Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo met in early May with Demo­
cratic leaders Kitchin and J. Swagar Sherley, telling them that new 
taxes were imperative in the light of financial conditions. They and 
other congressional leaders vociferously objected and insisted that 
new taxes were not required until 1919, and that bonds could properly 
finance the war. But behind their distress was the apprehension that 
all the maneuvering necessary to pass the bill would wreck their 
party's chances in the November elections.
Notwithstanding these objections, McAdoo maintained his position,
and in the ensuing deadlock Wilson was forced to step-in to break the
impasse. Meeting with Republican and Democratic leaders in several
conferences, he devised various compromise plans, such as for a special
session to start November 11. House Ways and Means leaders Kitchin
and Fordney accepted one proposal, but the Senate Republicans rejected 
167it. Now completely deadlocked, the House was startled by Wilson's
request to address a joint session of Congress on May 27.
With a clarion call to duty that thrilled the public and that 
compelled the Congress to fall into line with his wishes, Wilson 
pressed home the necessity for new taxes. He also outlined the taxes 
he had in mind: a higher excess profits tax, a new war profits tax,
and a more stringent tax on luxuries. In the midst of his speech,
166wew York Times, May 11, 1918, 1; May 14, 1918, 12; May 21, 
1918, 11; Washington Post, May 11, 1918, 2; and May 22, 1918, 2.
167Ibid., May 24, 1918, 1; May 25, 1918, 6; May 26, 1918, 1;
New York Times, May 25, 1918, 1; May 26, 1918, 1; and May 27, 1918,
4.
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he interjected what became its most memorable phrase, namely that 
"politics is adjourned.8 Meant not as a literal statement but as 
relating only to the framing of the revenue bill, Wilson's remark 
was misinterpreted by the press as a plea for a general truce in 
political infighting. Though incorrectly understood, it served the 
immediate purpose of forcing congressmen to give up their desires 
for campaigning. Many did so, however, with much ill-grace and deep 
resentment toward McAdoo.
The day after Wilson's speech, Kitchin, unhappy at the prospects
of writing a tax bill, accused Secretary McAdoo of falling under the
influence of the powerful publisher's lobby who wished to keep Congress
in session until the rates on second-class mail had been repealed.
Kitchin also "breathed fire" against the monied interests supposedly
favored by McAdoo and threatened higher taxes on their ill-gotten
war gains. Slightly better feelings returned when Kitchin and the
White House agreed to brief summer vacations while Congress remained
technically in session. Nonetheless, hearings on the tax bill got
169underway m  an atmosphere of resentment.
The Ways and Means Committee's original plan was suggested by 
Secretary McAdoo. Its basic premise rested on the theory that good 
public financing required a bond to tax ratio of three to one or a 
tax bill of eight billion dollars. Since this figure represented 
about a four-billion dollar increase over the old revenue bill, McAdoo
*88Ibid., May 28, 1918, 1; Washington Post, May 28, 1918, 1; 
and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 136-37.
^88Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 7163-64;
New York Times, May 29, 1918, 1; and Washington Post, May 29, 1918,
6.
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proposed to raise the difference by a new eighty percent war profit 
tax to be superimposed on the existing excess profit taxes. He also 
suggested that normal income taxes should be increased from six to 
twelve percent and that additional heavy taxes should be placed on 
luxuries. The clear intention of the taxes, McAdoo implied, was to 
reduce the huge profits that contractors had garnered from war pro­
duction. Although Republicans mostly concurred with the proposals, 
Fordney wanted more consumption taxes and a higher tariff.-*-^ ® Past
tax measures, along with McAdoo and Fordney1s recommendations, pro­
vided the basis for the proposed bill and for remarks by witnesses
before the Ways and Means Committee.
During the hearings Chairman Kitchin and John N. Garner (D-Tex.) 
told R. C. Leffingweld, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, that they 
disliked McAdoo's new tax plan. They suggested, instead, a dual plan 
by which the excess profit tax would be raised to the same eighty- 
percent level as the war profit tax. Their scheme proposed that which­
ever of the two taxes yielded the most revenue from a company, so long 
as it was not more than seventy percent of the net income, would be 
the tax used. Kitchin desired this formula because it would tax as 
much as the market would bear, thereby preventing business from 
escaping taxation. Rejecting their suggestion, Leffingwell argued that 
the war tax would accomplish the task alone. This tax also had the 
advantage, he maintained, of permitting the government to make con­
tracts with manufacturers that would allow room for mistakes. Thus,
170Ibid., June 1, 1918, 1; June 7, 1918, 1; New York Times, June 
3, 1918, 1; June 4, 1918, 9; June 7, 1918, 1. U. S. Congress, House 
Proposed Revenue Act of 1919, Hearings on H. R. 12863, 65 Cong., 2 
Sess., 9-11.
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on the one hand,a war contract would not bankrupt a company and, on 
the other hand, the tax would not permit huge profits from it. He 
concluded with a theme repeated throughout the hearings: the war
tax was the most patriotic tax because it prevented war profiteering.1^1
Spokesmen from such diverse businesses as oil exploration and 
apple-growing paraded before the Ways and Means Committee. Although 
they all affirmed their patriotic desire to pay taxes, they also claimed 
that the proposed taxes would work unfairly against their own conpany 
but not their conpetition. They then proceeded to list a number of 
defects in the excess profit tax, some of which included a failure to 
differentiate between normal prewar profits and war profits and between 
capital expenditures and costs and an improper taxation of the "high 
risk" coal and oil industries, both of which their spokesmen asserted, 
deserved a depletion allowance. Other witnesses, some of whom repre­
sented farm groups, demanded confiscation of incomes over $100,000.
When Garner asked one farmer spokesman if such high taxes might not 
kill the "golden goose/" he replied that Garner's implication was that 
the country's men of great wealth were unpatriotic. A host of other 
special interest groups claimed that proposed taxes on cars, firearms, 
candy, and movies threatened the welfare of the American people as well 
as their industry. The most insistent special interest group was the 
second-class mail lobby, Kitchin's antagonists. To them, the added 
postal taxes restricted information, burdened them with difficult 
administrative procedures, and violated the expressed opinions of
*^1Claude Kitchin, "Who Will Pay the New Taxes?", Forum, LX 
(August, 1918), 149-154; and U. S. Congress, House, Proposed Revenue 
Act,55, 65, 75.
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172Presidents Washington and Lincoln in favor of low cost mail. By 
the time the Ways and Means committeemen closed public sessions, 
they were fully informed that any tsixes they levied would offend many 
while pleasing few.
Writing the bill in secret, the Committee proceeded in an un­
usual fashion. Normally, the majority party wrote the bill by itself, 
then let the minority make its futile suggestions for change after 
the bill was written. This time, the parties joined together and 
drafted the bill in a non-partisan fashion. Though a few disliked
this additional step, the committeemen also designated Kitchin as tbe
173only authorized spokesmen for the Committee. Working in this manner, 
the Committee first rejected a number of the luxury taxes suggested 
by the Treasury Department as unsuitable for heavy taxation. When 
the Committee next turned to the corporation provisions, more radical
I
members attempted to regain the losses on luxury taxes with an increase 
from sixteen to twenty percent in the corporation tax. The Committee 
members turned this recommendation down, but they did agree to an 
eighteen percent tax. J. Hampton Moore, who insisted that the 1917 
Revenue Act treated the rich too liberally, pressed for higher 
income tax assessments on larger incomes.
The main proposal under discussion by the Committee was Kitchin's 
plan to remove the war profits tax and to insert a higher excess
172Ibid., 203, 208, 231, 437, 542, 544, 611, 629, 730, 775, 154-57, 
955, 988, 1037, 1089, 1127, 1711, 1758, 1869, 1956, 2003, 2101-02, 2242.
•L73Washington Post, July 15, 1918, 2; New York Times, July 21,
1918, 15; and July 23, 1918, 19.
174Ibid., July 18, 1918, 8; August 5, 1918, 11; July 24, 1918,
17; July 26, 1918, 1; August 6, 1918, 14; and August 7, 1918, 15.
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profits tax in its place. At one point the Committee adopted Kitchin's
tax plan, but then the Administration mounted a campaign for the war
tax. McAdoo told the press that a war profit tax would heavily
assess all profiteers and also would have the added advantage of
raising more money. Buttressing McAdoo's stance, Wilson issued a
strong statement against profiteers in which he also supported his
son-in-law's proposals. Kitchin, however, refused to retreat from
his position altogether. Instead, he and other members insisted on
a compromise system of excess and war profit taxes. In their plan,
war profit taxes would apply if a company escaped from the first
tax. Since Kitchin and not McAdoo dominated the Committee, McAdoo
had to give way. The bill also differed from the Secretary's desires
over the flat eighteen percent corporation tax and its failure to
175distinguish between earned and unearned income.
Unanimously reported in early September by the Ways and Means 
Committee, the bill was explained by Kitchin for two days, the longest 
speech in House h i s t o r y . L i t t l e  criticism surfaced during his 
discussion or in subsequent debates from Republicans. GOP leader 
Fordney told the House that he disliked particulars of the bill, 
such as parts of the excess tax provisions, and wished for the in­
clusion of a protective tariff. Yet, he quickly added that he was 
pleased by the bill and that any defects could be worked out by the 
Senate. The only partisan controversy during the debates arose over
175Ibid., August 7, 1918, 18; August 13, 1918, 8; August 20,
1918, 6; August 27, 1918, 1; August 31, 1918, 9; September 3, 1918,
1; and Washington Post, August 5, 1918, 3.
176cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Appendix, 661-702.
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a maneuver by Moore. In his latest foray against the Democrats, 
he offered the old Weeks resolution, under yet another of its manifold 
guises, as an amendment to establish a congressional commission which 
would investigate the expenditure of money raised under the Revenue 
Bill. Though the chair quickly ruled the amendment not to be
177germane., Moore scored another partisan point for the Republicans.
On the Democratic side, a few members complained that the bill 
unfairly taxed the country, but they offered no counterplans. Party 
opposition to the bill disappeared, and though neither party was 
pleased with levying huge taxes days before the fall elections, they 
had to console themselves with the thought that the government required 
the money. An element of the House members, mainly progressives, liked 
those provisions which taxed the wealth of the country in an equali- 
tarian fashion. These and the less sanguine Democratic and Republican 
members, joined together and voted unanimously for the bill 349 to 
0.178
The Administration seized the time allowed by the prolonged 
session to advocate several other measures, the most important of 
which was an emergency power bill. For several years hydroelectric 
interests and public groups had been pushing for legislation to
179allow development of electrical power plants on navigable rivers.
177Washington Post, September 7, 1918, 2; September 21, 1918, 1; 
New York Times, September 7, 1918, 6; September 10, 1918, 5; September
21, 1918, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 10, 10089 
10339, 10547.
3-^ Ibid.; and "The Revenue Bill," New Republic, XVI (September 14, 
1918), 183-185. The Senate did not complete the tax bill until the 
third session. The bill's story will be taken up in the next chapter.
1 7QSee Samuel P. Hayes, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency;
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President Wilson brought this question again before the House in his
December, 1917, address when he advocated the development of resources
on the principles of conservation. In January, he and House leaders
organized a special committee on water power. At this time he also
voiced his objections to the Senate's Shields water power bill because
it did not protect the public's rights in conservation. Having already
passed the Senate, the Shields bill provided for private development
of electrical power and state control of rates. Its specific provisions
established a difficult procedure for government "recapture" of water
sites from companies and required a high rate of reimbursement to the
180companies by use of the formula of "just compensation." Behind the
specific provisions of the Shields bill was a controversy over the
proper use of America's natural resources. Congressmen such as Scott
Ferris (D-Okla.) advocated a government managerial policy: the
government should use public property for undertakings designed to be
of the widest application to the public. Another group, as represented
by the Shields bill, pushed natural resource development through
private means, though they would accept a few government restrictions.
Coloring the whole issue was the attitude of congressmen toward
government regulation, corporate power, scientific management, and
181rational planning.
The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959), 238-40, a discussion on the bill's background.
^Washington Post, January 6, 1918, 7; ibid., January 17,
1918, 6; January 18, 1918, 2; Charles Merz "At the Capital," New 
Republic, XIII (January 12, 1918), 316; New York Times, January 19,
1918, 6.
181see Robert Lowitt, "A Neglected Aspect of the Progressive 
Movement: George Norris and Public Control of HydroElectric Power,"
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The new Water Power Committee started its hearings with testimony 
from O. C. Merrill, an employee of the Forestry Bureau, who had helped 
prepare the Shields bill. He presented the bill as one which fully 
protected the public interest and the natural resources of the country. 
Nonetheless, the emphasis of his statement stressed private rights more 
than public ones, a fact that caused Ferris to question Merrill 
closely about the Vrecapture” clause. According to Ferris, this pro­
vision, which granted licenses for fifty years and easy renewal terms 
at the end of that period, tied the hands of the government. Other 
members expressed to Merrill a skepticism about such provisions as the 
rate controls which were to be administered by the states, and the 
determination of the real costs of the power plant investment.
Merrill took a corporation view on these matters, arguing that capital
182required moderate terms to encourage its investment.
The parade of corporation witnesses who followed Merrill agreed 
with the Shields bill or suggested even easier terms for power com­
panies. When one company spokesman advocated the strengthening of 
the renewal rights at the end of fifty years, a lively discussion 
ensued. Frank Doremus (D-Mich.) doubted if any city would grant
Historian, XXVII (May, 1965), 350-365, for a discussion of the basic 
ideas behind water power development plans. See also James Penick,
Jr., Progressive Politics and Conservation: The Ballinger-Pinchot 
Affair (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 185-88; and
Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, 238-40, 81. Hays notes 
that the Pinchot conservationist school advocated a water power bill 
based on the concept of multiple-purpose development, which meant the 
development of power, flood control, and irrigation, all in the same 
river program. The 1918 water bill, however, did not embody this 
principle, and as such it represented, Hays writes, a partial defeat 
for the Pinchot conservationists.
182U. S. Congress, House, Water Power, Hearings on S. 1419,
65 Cong., 2 Sess., 14-18, 29-32, 51-52, 68-69, 87.
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fifty-year licenses to street car companies, while Miss Rankin ques­
tioned the spokesman's concept of "just compensation" at the end of the 
fifty-year period. William LaFollette (R-Wash.) interjected that the 
corporations' proposal would only enmesh the government in protracted 
litigation over what was just. Chairman Thetus Sims closed the ex­
change with the observation that the public's position must be con­
sidered, particularly since the government was granting the companies 
an opportunity to make money that it need not permit at all. The 
Committee opposed liberalizing the bill in favor of the companies; 
yet, the "just" compensation section remained too favorable to cor­
porations for the tastes of some members, most notably Chairman 
183Sims.
Since all sides agreed to the necessity of power development, 
discussion on the House floor continued to revolve around the balance 
between public and private interests. Sims, the bill's floor director, 
argued that the House had improved the Shields bill by providing for 
rate charges on the use of water sites and by clarifying the fifty- 
year provision. This latter provision now read "not to exceed" fifty 
years, whereas before it had provided for a flat "fifty years." Sims 
added that the bill, in his opinion, still required more modification, 
particularly on the recapture find compensation sectors. President
183Ibid., 160, 167, 175, 199-207, 247, 427, 457. The bill's 
basic provisions as reported out of committee included the following 
points. Federal jurisdiction of hydroelectric power was established on 
navigable waters. Leases were not to exceed fifty years. State and 
local political units were given preference over private companies on 
selection of power sites. A federal power commission was set up con­
sisting of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture. Recap­
ture by the government of the lease was permitted under certain restric­
tions. The federal government on recommendation of the commission was 
allowed to develop water power sites on its own initiative.
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Wilson concurred with Sims, who likewise objected to the recapture 
principle of "net investment," and instead favored a provision based 
on the principle of "fair value not exceeding cost."184 Ferris summed 
up the argument by claiming that the net investment principle meant 
that the government would have to "pay back every penny" put into the 
power site. On the other hand, fair value would never exceed actual 
cost and would best serve the public interest. Supporters of the net 
investment section, as reported by the Committee, maintained that the 
provision was much different from that described by the opponents 
since various items under the "net value" concept would be deducted 
from total costs. Representative Esch also pointed out to the House 
that "net" investment was a clearly defined term in the courts. In 
contrast, the "fair value" concept was a poorly defined legal term.
The debate became highly technical but behind the details stood two 
varying interpretations of development and conservation: the supporters
of the fair value principle pictured the public as suffering too long 
because of give-aways by the government; and the advocates of the net 
investment section wanted to see rapid development of hydroelectric 
power and failed to find danger in generous concessions to corpora­
tions .185
When balloting began on the recapture section, House Democrats 
rallied behind the Administration, and the Republicans united in favor 
of the corporations. The roll call, which would have permitted the 
substitution of the fair value principle for the net investment
i fi4
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 9, 9037-38, 9042; 
Pt. 10, 9657-58, 9799; and New York Times, August 30, 1918, 10.
185Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 10, 990, 9954-70.
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concept, found the Republicans victorious, 133 to 128.186 Handi­
capped by the greater unity of the Republicans, who organized ninety- 
two percent of their party in comparison to the eighty-seven percent 
of the Democrats', the Administration lost this close ballot (Table
4-24). When the roll call is analyzed from the geographical perspec­
tive, no evidence of party disloyalty can be found that indicated the 
influence of regional considerations. By 1918, the controversy over 
water power found both parties united on most details of water power 
legislation, but the decided partisan division over the compensation 
clause indicates differences over the role of the private and the public 
sectors in water power development. The Democrats urged greater pub­
lic control, and the Republicans advocated increased incentives for
187private enterprise.
Retrospect
When the second session ended in November, 1918, the House, 
during a period of over eleven months, had considered a succession of 
fundamental issues that often caused heated debate. Whenever these
186Ibid., 9971, 1052.
187Of the different historiographical perspectives on the 
conservation movement, James Penick's viewpoint appears to best explain 
the division over the condensation clause. Briefly, Penick rejects 
the old view of conservation as a battle between one group favoring 
conservation and the other opposing it. Rather, conservation issues 
generated conflict between groups with different perspectives on con­
servation, one with a scientific and regulatory viewpoint, the other 
with a development and individualistic one. The Water Power Bill of 
the 65th House did not spark one group opposing it and another in 
favor of it. The division came from differing perspectives, one 
favoring greater government control and the other advocating more pri­
vate control. Both sides agreed to government involvement on the one 
hand and corporate development on the other. The division came over 
the balance between private and public sectors. See Penick, Pro­
gressive Politics, 185-88.
TABLE 4-24
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON S. 1419:
WATER POWER BILL
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 8 17 4 6 2 56 23 2 4 1 3 2 117 11
Nay 1 19 3 25 1 35 1 21 4 2 5 1 3 1 9 17 119
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D ' R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 73 94 10 86 9 86 100 29 80 25 75 18 87 8
Nay 100 100 27 100 6 90 14 91 14 100 71 20 75 25 82 13 92
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 10, 10052.
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questions came to a roll call, the resulting voting bloc frequently 
operated only on that issue. Nonetheless, these individual coalitions 
often expressed decided regional influences. Neither prohibition nor 
women's suffrage, two of the primary reforms of the Progressive Era, 
enlisted coalitions that also operated on other measures. In their 
case, the most notable pattern was found among Southern Democrats, 
who evidently were knitted together in support for prohibition and 
against women's suffrage in part because of the race question. 
Similarly, voting on farm, draft, and alien legislation created dis­
crete blocs which often eclipsed partisan divisions: special regional
interests, plus a decided element of partisanship, organized several 
diverse voting blocs on the farm proposals of the session; the new 
draft directives of the Administration aroused the opposition of 
ideologically committed members along with some members made unhappy 
over the mechanics of the draft system; and alien deportation legis­
lation galvanized nativists into support and Northeastern Democrats, 
who represented immigrant constituencies, into opposition.
Besides regional influences, partisan factors frequently operated 
on roll calls. At the level of fifty percent versus fifty percent, a 
majority of Republicans rejected Democratic positions on forty percent 
of all roll calls (Table 4-25). At the highest level of partisanship 
(ninety percent versus ninety percent), the second session displayed 
what appeared to be a highly amicable state of affairs because only 
three percent of the votes were recorded at that level. In comparison 
to other sessions, partisan voting increased slightly over the first, 
but was markedly lower than in the third session. In comparison 
to other Congresses of the Progressive Period, the forty percent of
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TABLE 4-25 
PARTISAN VOTING
Level of 
Partisanship
First
Session
Second
Session
Third
Session
Average for 
All Sessions
50 v 50 39 40 56 47
90 v 90 2 3 22 11
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partisan voting at the fifty percent versus the fifty percent level
188was much below the normal average of sixty percent.
The obvious interpretation of this data would be that the 
general wartime unity caused a decline in partisanship. The second 
session recorded thirty-one percent of its roll calls as unanimous, 
a very high percentage. The first session voted unanimously twenty- 
four percent of the time, and the third session did so nineteen percent 
of the time. The large percentage of unanimous votes in the second 
included roll calls of both procedural motions of small consequence 
and votes over fundamental war measures. In this latter category, 
the War Finance Corporation and the Revenue Bill were agreed to by the 
House without division. The unanimous votes, then, would further 
collaborate the interpretation that partisanship declined.
However, this thesis is only partially correct because it overlooks 
afundamental fact about the roll calls. When the unanimous votes are 
removed, the data suggests that many measures of a non-war character 
or even war nature did spark partisan voting. Fully forty percent of 
the remaining sixty-nine percent of the roll calls divided along 
partisan lines. In short, partisanship remained, but the high level 
of unanimous votes effectively hid it from view.
Another analytical tool for the study of roll calls measures 
the degree of unity within parties. First, by use of the Rice Index, 
the average score can be determined for the session. Democrats 
recorded a score of seventy-one while the Republicans posted a score
188See Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive 
Era," 571-76; and see, also, Chapter two, table twenty-one for more 
information on other Congresses.
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of sixty-eight (Table 4-26). In comparison to the average cohesion 
score for all sessions, the Democrats displayed less and the Republi­
cans more. Though in both cases the difference from the average was 
slight, it indicated that issues tended to separate the Democrats 
internally, even given the large number of unanimous roll calls on war 
measures which should raise the cohesion average score. For the Repub­
licans this pattern was not as evident. However, when some individual 
issues are calculated for the Rice Index Score, Republicans at times 
showed marked disunity. Policy on aliens and wheat prices considerably 
disrupted Republican cohesion, while railroad measures and to a lesser 
degree economic and postal policy issues moderately fragmented them.
In the case of the Democrats, divisive issues were women's suffrage, 
alien policy, and wheat prices. When the cohesion of the two parties 
is compared, the Republicans showed higher cohesion than the Democrats 
on women's suffrage and prohibition, while the Democrats displayed 
greater internal unity than the Republicans on wheat and railroad 
policy. Of course, despite these variations, it should be remembered 
that both parties showed high levels of cohesion, as seen in the 
table. As in the first session, both parties were comparatively 
united overall and on most issues, a fact that helps to account for 
much of the House voting behavior during the second session.
Finally, a number of measures raised questions of progressivism. 
In the case of labor issues with progressive implications, voting 
patterns tended to show the Republicans more favorably inclined 
toward labor than were the Democrats. On the most important labor 
votes, those on the Cannon amendment to bar labor "conspiracies,” 
the House evidenced near total confusion as it first voted against
TABLE 4-26
SELECTED ISSUES BY PARTY 
(Rice Index Score)
_______________DEMOCRAT______________  REPUBLICAN_____________
Second Session All Sessions Second Session All Sessions
Average Cohesion Average Cohesion Average Cohesion Average Cohesion
1. Overall 71 73 68 67
2. Prohibition 52 52 68 68
3. Women 10 10 65 65
4. Postal Tubes 69 69 61 61
5. Aliens 31 31 37 37
6. Strikes 77 77 75 75
7. Wheat 42 42 25 25
8. Railroad 85 85 51 51
9. Labor 53 53 61 61
10. Progressive 58 63 64 56
11. War Legislation 73 73 65 64
12. Economic 58 54 61 57
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labor and then for labor. A more clear-cut pattern emerged on the 
railroad bill/ wherein the Democrats favored the progressive position 
while most Republicans opposed it. Again on price controls of minerals 
and on greater public control of water power development, the Democrats 
struck the more progressive stance. But since most of the progressive 
votes expressed a strong partisan or regional influence, the ideological 
significance of the parties' stance can be questioned. Overall, the 
House formulated its roll call decisions in the context of partisan­
ship, moderated by the extenuation of war circumstances, the demands 
of regional interests, and the ideological requirements of particular 
measures.
Apart from these influences shaping roll calls, House delibera­
tions were also directed by a pattern of attitudes and emotions.
When the House reconvened in December, 1917, patriotic concern for 
the war program initiated investigations and several proposals 
for a partnership between the President and Congress. While the 
Republicans directed these thrusts, Democrats indicated their alarm in 
more subtle fashions. The Administration resolved the winter crisis, 
which it also did when beset by several smaller ones later in the ses­
sion; but the patriotic and partisan attutudes behind them were never 
successfully channeled by the Administration into more productive direc­
tions. As a result representatives fixed their attention only on mili­
tary victory and never turned to a fruitful discussion on the postwar 
world. Notably absent from House debates were clear and forward looking 
speeches on a better national and international future.^®
IS^Many congressmen made war speeches of one type or another,
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Because of this failure to express generous sentiments, war 
emotions more often found outlet in rancor and intolerance toward 
minorities and dissenters. Aliens, in particular "alien slackers," 
along with political radicals, received their share of verbal abuse. 
More importantly, the House, with hardly a word of objection, nailed 
down the final features of the repressive war program when it passed 
the Anarchist Deportation Bill and the Sedition Act. In such an 
atmosphere, congressmen ceased being concerned with civil liberties 
and, instead, became afraid that their own records might be cri­
ticized by the press or by fellow members as insufficiently patrio- 
tric. Nonetheless, partisanship continued to play the dominant role 
even in the midst of emotions of intolerance. In fact, the desire 
to defeat the opposition party often turned patriotism and intolerance 
to its own uses. Criticism of the Administration, though based 
on real conditions, ebbed and flowed more on the impulses of par­
tisan advantage than on a clear-cut analysis of the situation.
Too much was at stake in the war for either side to allow the other 
to reap the accolades of the public. As the session dragged toward 
the fall elections and adjournment, the dominant accent became not 
war, patriotism, intolerance, or ideology but the partisan campaign 
appeals.
but these did not rise above mere discussions of war accomplishments, 
causes of the war, or banal generalities of war aims. Amazingly 
only one congressman made a speech on Wilson's Fourteen Points for 
months. See the following as evicences of typical war-related 
speeches: Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 664,
984; Pt. 2, 1224; Pt. 5, 4745, 4436; Pt. 6, 5526, 5561, 5565, 5888; 
and Pt. 7, 7267.
190por some evidences of partisan speech making late in the 
session see ibid., Pt. 8, 7689, 8204, 8207; Pt. 10, 9601, 9606, 9615, 
10125, 10257, 10572; Pt. 11, 10709, 11291, 11324, 1332.
CHAPTER V
THIRD SESSION OP THE 65TH HOUSE
In the final session the House confronted the new and demanding 
problems of postwar reconstruction, which was similar in importance 
to the war mobilization issue of the first session. Several measures 
were only partially completed when peace was suddenly declared. 
Congress was forced to deal not only with these carry-over issues 
but also with the complex questions of postwar reconstruction. The 
departure of President Wilson shortly after the beginning of the third 
session for the Paris Peace Conference removed the main guiding force 
for the development of reconstruction measures. Cut adrift from 
leadership but compelled by circumstances to confront the problems of 
reconstruction, the House lost its direction and became entangled in 
a web of partisan, ideological, and regional confusion.
Defeat of the Reconstruction Commission 
Although peace had returned, members' tempers were clearly on 
edge as the session opened. Republicans, who were the victors in 
the November, 1918, congressional elections, viewed Wilson with sus­
picion because of his October 25, 1918, press release. In this 
statement Wilson had called for a Democratic Congress, had declared 
the Republicans, though pro-war, anti-administration, and had charged 
them with designing to gain control of the Executive. Republicans,
341
342
besides turning the statement ot their own partisan advantage, angrily 
denied the validity of the statement. •*•
When the President failed to include Senators or important
Republicans in the delegation to the Parish Peace Conference, he
deepened congressional hostility toward himself and his program. As
a consequence, Representative William A. Rodenberg (R-Ill.) introduced
a resolution which declared the Presidency vacated if Wilson, as was
rumored, decided to attend the Conference himself. Although Minority
Leader Mann opposed such malevolent steps, congressmen were not in a
receptive mood when Wilson appeared before them on December 2, 1918,
2
to deliver the State of the Union Address.
After citing the military accomplishments of the nation, the 
President in his speech praised .the organizational abilities and the 
spiritual qualities of the soldiers and the people during the war. 
Wilson then discussed his ambitions for the future, which he defined 
as "justice and fair dealing." As a first step toward the achievement 
of these goals, he officially announced his decision to attend the 
Peace Conference. Since the Allies and the Central Empires accepted 
his Fourteen Points as the basis for the conference's negotiations, 
the President stated that his presence was essential to the proper 
interpretation of the points. Wilson was determined to influence
•^New York Times, October 26, 1918, 1; October 27, 1918, 10; 
October 28, 1918, 1. See Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War 
Congress, 220ff for an extensive discussion of the October appeal 
and its implications.
^Washington Post, December 1, 1918, 1; December 3, 1918, 6;
and December 4, 1918, 6.
I
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personally the peace negotiations, and, for him this transcended all 
other interests;^
Although Wilson took little interest in the home front, he did 
note some problems stemming from postwar economic and industrial read­
justment. He rejected "any general scheme of reconstruction" because 
business and labor would never be pliant enough to accept direction. 
He, instead, proposed several pieces of legislation that would aid 
the transition process. One such bill would fund a public works 
program for veterans. Entirely recommended by Secretary of the 
Interior Frank Lane, this bill called for the employment of veterans 
in the development^of arid, swamp, and cut-over lands. Wilson claimed 
that this proposal was necessary because business would not be able 
to provide immediate employment for all returning veterans. He then 
turned to industrial reconstruction. The government, he pointed out, 
was already removing most controls over industry, but the shipping 
and railroad industries still required government direction and 
reorganization. The war demonstrated that the railroads were not 
capable of handling the immense transportation demands placed on 
them. Blaming this failure on the legally compelled competition be­
tween railroads, he suggested both an extension of government manage­
ment and an appropriation for improvements. He also implied that 
he favored long-termed plans which would increase government regula­
tion while decreasing "wasteful" competition. Finally, he advocated 
that the Senate pass the House-approved tax bill, though iri a revised 
form. With the war's end, the need for revenue decreased; he
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 12-15.
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recommended that the Senate slash the House1s tax proposals from 
eight billion to six billion.4
Wilson's leadership of the third session largely ended with his 
speech.5 While he became enmeshed in the details of international 
reconstruction, the House was left to develop its own legislation for 
domestic reconstruction. During the second session Representative 
Barton L. French (R-Idaho) had introduced a reconstruction proposal 
that paralleled reconversion plans of some foreign countries. Its 
provisions established a minister of reconstruction in the President's 
cabinet and a commission composed of congressmen to propose legis-
g
lation. Other congressmen made similar suggestions, and in the 
Senate, John Weeks (R-Mass.) submitted a proposal for a special 
congressional committee on reconstruction. Since its sponsor was 
known as a bitter anti-Administration Republican, Week's plan became 
a highly charged partisan issue, particularly when a conference of 
Senate Republicans endorsed it. Seeing the design as one more 
Republican effort to wrestle the direction of the government from 
Wilson's hands, Senator Overman (D-N.C.) introduced a bill to provide
7
for executive predominance on a reconstruction commission.
4Ibid.
5
See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 48-52, for a discussion as to 
the reasons why Wilson failed to provide leadership for domestic 
reconstruction.
6Ibid., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4687-88; Washington Post, 
November 8, 1918, 6; New York Times, June 12; 1918, 6; and Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 2 Sess., Pt. 11, 11151, 11377.
^New York Times, September 28, 1918, 11; October 2, 1918, 12;
October 4, 1918, 12; and November 14, 1918, 1.
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After the November election victory of their party, Senate Re­
publicans again agreed to work for the establishment of a reconstruc­
tion commission. They now proposed one strictly under the control of 
their party. When Wilson in his State of the Union address failed to 
break the deadlock over proposals, reconstruction plans became hope­
lessly tangled in partisan controversy and never emerged from congres­
sional committees. The House was left without a central committee for 
reconstruction planning.8
"Benefits for the Doughboys"
The start of the House's piecemeal consideration of reconstruc­
tion programs was prompted by the return of veterans from France. 
Congressmen advanced plans for securing the veteran's financial 
security. During the first session, the Congress had authorized a 
Bureau of War Risk Insurance. Through the services of this agency a 
soldier could gain protection in three different ways. First, he was 
required, if an enlisted man, to have half his pay deducted. If the 
enlistee had dependents, the Bureau then multiplied the soldier's 
deduction by the number of his dependents. This sum, along with the 
original deduction, was sent by the Bureau to the enlistee's family.
If the enlistee had no dependents, the Bureau deducted half of his 
pay for forced savings. The allotment system ended at the close of
Q
Ibid., November 20, 1918, 1. Plans for reconstruction were 
common after the war, but the failure to create a reconstruction 
commission and Wilson's decision to remove himself to Paris never 
permitted them to get off the ground. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Big 
Steel and the Wilson Administration(Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1969), 152, 304-05; and Noggle, Into the Twenties, 31-34,
46-49. The House could have filled the gap, but in large measure 
they failed to do so.
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the war. Second, a government insurance program paid premium to a 
soldier's dependent's in case of his death, or, in the case of injury, 
provided for the complete cost of his rehabilitation. Third, the 
soldier could increase his insurance by taking out a life-insurance 
policy worth up to $10,000. The policy's attraction came from 
its greatly lower premiums in relation to those of private companies. 
If a veteran wished to continue the insurance after the war he could
, Q
pay premiums to a government-operated insurance corporation.
The House praised the bravery of the troops and made plans to 
implement the rehabilitation provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act. 
The House's concern for the care of the injured and sick did not, 
however, extend to a bill which would establish a tuberculosis sani­
tarium at Dawson Springs, Kentucky. Sponsored by a Kentucky Democrat, 
David H. Kincheloe, and supported by the Democratic leadership, the 
bill was rejected by the Republicans because they wanted a compre­
hensive bill on hospital care for veterans. They also complained that 
it was a scheme pushed by a representative for his constituents, which 
would benefit them much more than the veterans. Democrats countered
that the Dawson Springs proposal was sanctioned by the Public Health 
•>
Service. Further, they noted that the government would save money 
because at least 1000 acres had been donated to the government by the
^William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years; The Reminiscences of William 
G. McAdoo(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), 428; U.S. Congress,
House, To Amend the Bureau of War Risk Insurance Act so as to Insure 
the Men in the Army and Navy, Hearings on H. R. 5723, 65 Cong., 1 
Sess., 32-33, 39, 41, 126; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 55, 1 Sess., Pt.
7, 6754-60; Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 142. The War Risk Bureau
generated considerable criticism during the third session because of 
operational failures. See New York Times, January 11, 1919, 6; Cong.
Rec.,65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 1110; and Pt. 2, 1405.
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Dawson Springs community for the hospital. The bill barely passed, 
as the House divided along strict partisan lines, ninety-nine percent 
of the Democrats opposing ninety-five percent of the Republicans.3’0
Because Republicans opposed a piecemeal approach to rehabilita­
tion, the House recorded a similar partisan division over a bill 
transferring a sanitorium from the Public Service to the War Depart­
ment.11 The developing partisan split over rehabilitation policy, 
however, ended when the Democrats formulated and brought to the House 
floor comprehensive hospital legislation for discharged veterans.
But agreement on a general hospital plan did not preclude controversy 
over other aspects of rehabilitation policy. For example, some 
representatives advocated buying hotels and using old army camps and 
converting them into hospitals, while others suggested that the 
government ought to build new facilities. In the case of the actual 
rehabilitation programs for the disabled, several representatives 
pushed training not only for manual labor but also for professional 
education, a plan that Congress did not accept until after World War 
II. The final legislation incorporated provisions for a rehabilitation 
program that called for building new hospitals, utilizing camp hospi­
tals, and providing vocational training.12
10Ibid., Pt. 1, 45-46, 48-49, 159. The bill did not pass the 
Senate. See Ibid., Index 254, on H. R. 12917.
11Ibid., Pt. 2, 1786.
*2U. S. Congress, House, Public Buildings and Grounds, Hearings 
on H.R. 13026, 65 Cong., 2 Sess., 1918, 1821, 29-30; Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 8, 7585-86; Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 
2059; and Pt. 3, 2151, 2155.
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Representatives also aided the return of the veteran to peace­
time activities by granting him a discharge bonus. The original plan 
involved a bonus equal to one month's pay, which for enlisted men 
would have been thirty dollars. George Huddleston (D-Ala.) protested 
the "gross inadequacy" of the sum, and its "unfairness" to the en­
listed men in comparison to the officers, who received a much larger 
monthly salary. Insisting that officers rendered no more service to 
the nation than enlisted men, he proposed instead that all receive 
six consecutive monthly payments of thirty dollars each. He defended 
his plan by claiming that it would help prevent revolution and the 
spread of Bolshevism, a possible danger that increasingly loomed in 
the minds of some congressmen. That Huddleston himself was actually 
haunted by the spectre of revolution can be doubted, but the sudden 
cancellation of war contracts and the return of four million veterans 
to the employment market had caused some congressmen to predict wide­
spread unemployment and unrest. Adding to their unease was the 
Communist Revolution in Russia which some conservatives saw as a 
possible forerunner of revolution in the States. Huddleston seized 
upon these anxieties and used them to support his claims that the 
bonus would stimulate the veteran's gratitude toward the government 
and render the work of the agitator more difficult. Apparently, 
not many congressmen agreed with Huddleston's "safety-valve" thesis; 
instead, they believed that the Treasury could not afford the drain 
of money. On a non-roll call vote his amendment, a precursor of the 
famous bonus schemes of the 1920's, failed to be adopted. Later in
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the session the House, in a more generous mood, did raise the bonus 
to sixty dollars.13
Another plan for helping unemployed veterans involved the simple 
expedient of giving qualified veterans preference over other equally 
qualified applicants for government positions. The preference plan 
passed without opposition,14 but the session's other major employment 
scheme failed to pass. Proposed by Secretary of the Interior Frank 
K. Lane and-recommended by President Wilson, the plan sought to 
establish veterans in organized farming communities. Under this 
scheme the government would grant veterans acreage in swamp, cut-over, 
or arid regions which the soldiers would improve through the assistance 
of government loans and advice. Cost for the program was tagged at 
$100 million by Lane during hearings on the proposal. He told the 
Public Lands Committee that it not only would decrease postwar un­
employment but it also could help solve the problems of vice, poverty, 
crowded cities, and unused lands. Warming to his subject, the 
Secretary also argued that land grants for veterans would increase 
the numbers of property owners and would proportionately decrease the
number of tenant fanners. In an appeal to the Jeffersonian tradition,
15Lane concluded that farm-owning veterans would be better citizens.
Several members of Congress offered similar proposals such as 
the one advocated by Dick Morgan (D-Okla.). His plan eliminated the
13Ibid., Pt. 1, 955-57; and Pt. 3, 3010.
14Ibid., 2326-28; and New York Times, January 30, 1919, 3.
-*•5Ibid., January 11, 1919, 4. U. S. Congress, House, Work and 
Home for Returning Soldiers, Hearings on H. R. 15993, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 
3-14; and ibid., Farm Land for Soldiers and Sailors, Statement of the 
Honorable Franklin K. Lane, Hearings, on H.R. 15993, 65 Cong., 3 Sess,
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communal features of the Lane proposal and established a corporation 
to loan money for individual plots of land. All such proposals 
aroused the hostility of congressmen who opposed large scale recon­
version schemes. To these representatives Lane's plan seemed a 
"cooddling" operation wherein the government would destroy the ini­
tiative of young Americans by giving them handouts and telling them 
what to do. To some other members the plan was easily susceptible 
to speculative purposes, for they feared it would benefit special 
interests groups much more than the intended beneficiaries. The 
critics' anxieties were based on the fact that Southern marsh land 
owners, land-owning railroads, the owners of cut-over lands were 
conducting a well-organized lobby campaign for the measure. Perhaps 
the critics' main objection stemmed from a skepticism as to the sound­
ness of the venture. Bertrand H. Snell (R-N.Y.) voiced tiiis viewpoint 
during hearings on the bill when he told Lane that he doubted the 
ability of veterans with no prior experience to make a success out of 
marginal lands. Although the plan appealed to nostalgic sentiments 
for a passing agrarian America, the Public Lands Committee still 
refused to report the Lane proposal to the House floor. Congressmen,
wearied by the increase in executive power, remained unaffected by
16the postwar enthusiasm for government programs.
1 6 Ibid., 7-8, 11, 14. For a discussion of the land proposal and 
for the reasons of its failure see, Bill G. Reid "Proposals for Soldiers 
Settlement During World War I," Mid-America, XLVI (July, 1964), 172- 
186; and ibid., "Agrarian Opposition to Franklin K. Lane's Proposal For 
Soldier Settlement, 1918-1921," Agrarian History, XLVI (April, 1967), 
167-179. Reid in the latter article stresses the role of Midwestern 
and Northeastern farm organization, fearful of over-production, in 
bottling up the measure. He, however, overlooks the bill's relation to 
reconstruction and congressmen's adversion to government schemes.
351
Military Policy
Although neither comprehensive legislation nor consistent voting 
blocs emerged on veteran issues, the House's obvious solicitude for 
the "doughboy" pointed toward its policy during the 1920's. Similarly, 
the House's action on military matters indicated congressional policy 
for the twenties. Foremost in the minds of many congressmen was the 
desire for rapid demobilization of the army. In part, their attitude 
reflected the longings of parents and relatives and soldiers themselves 
to return to civilian pursuits.1"^ Getting the "boys" home also en­
compassed a deep strain of hostility toward the War Department and 
its military leadership. Though battlefield victories had brought 
some praise to the military organization, the attacks of the earlier 
sessions on inefficiency, waste, corruption, and general incompetency 
continued unabated, and new charges in fact were added to the old 
ones. The military justice system was censured by Royal Johnson 
(R-N.D.), a member who had served in the army as a private. In his 
condemnation of military justice, Johnson even dared to attack General
1 O
John Pershing for "partial, lawless, and harsh" military sentences.
The system of military promotion also received a severe indictment 
from James A. Gallivan (D-Mass.). He charged that regular army 
officers were systematically excluding National Guard officers from
^Washington Post, January 3, 1919, 6; January 23, 1919, 6;
Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 962; Pt. 4, 3229, 
3560-61.
*8New York Times, February 28, 1919, 5; January 3, 1919, 14; 
March 4, 1919, 10; March 5, 1919, 11; Washington Post, January 16,
1919, 6; February 16, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1927-28; Pt. 3, 2247, 2303; Pt. 4, 3478-79, 5032;
and Pt. 5, 4502.
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the higher ranks and advancements. Gallivan and other like-minded
congressmen believed that regular army officers formed a military
clique which utilized its power to abuse the rights of both the
National Guardsman and the enlisted man.19
Two roll calls pointed out the strength and the sources of
criticism toward the military. The first roll call came over a
faux pas by Major General B. B. Buck, commander of the Houston
military post. His office had issued orders that officers were not
to attend social functions to which enlisted men were also invited.
If officers, the order added, did inadvertently attend such a social
function, they were to leave immediately. When this order came to the
attention of Representative Huddleston, he soundly denounced it on
the House floor. Such an order would undermine, he maintained, the
very democracy that Americans had just secured, since it would create
90an un-American caste system. Although General Buck quickly rescinded 
the order, Huddleston and like-minded colleagues wanted to prevent 
similar orders in the future. They demanded inclusion of an amend­
ment in the Military Appropriation Bill which would prohibit payment
of salaries to officers who issued discriminatory orders. They forced
21a roll call on the proposal, which won, 191 to 71.
The vote mobilized an interesting coalition in support of the 
amendment (Table 5-1). Although it won bi-partisan support, a greater
19New York Times, February 2, 1919, 17; February 4, 1919, 2;
February 14, 1919, 8; February 16, 1919, 10; Washington Post, February 
2, i919, 6; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 1408, 1409, 
1410; Pt. 3, 2304, 2543; and Pt. 4, 3198, 3294-95, 3299.
20Ibid., Pt. 3, 2248; and Pt. 4, 3300, 3301.
21Ibid., 3735-36.
TABLE 5-1
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE
HUDDLESTON AMENDMENT
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 3 8 8 15 29 3 17 63 3 18 5 3 3 3 3 115 71
Nay 1 8 6 16 3 11 9 7 — 1 1 1 — 6 19 51
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 67 27 57 33 83 73 100 65 90 100 95 100 75 75 100 33 86 58
Nay 33 73 43 67 17 27 35 10 5 25 25 — 67 14 42
*Cong. Rec ., 65 Cong. , Vol. 57, i Sess., Pt 4, 3736.
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percentage of Democrats than Republicans cast their ballots for 
Huddleston's amendment. Eighty-six percent of the Democrats voted in 
favor of the amendment while only fifty-eight percent of the Republicans 
supported it. Northeastern representatives (NE, MA) went against the 
majority position, particularly the Republicans of that region.
Except for Pacific state Republicans, members of both parties in the 
other regions lined up solidly for the Huddleston amendment.
The second roll call resulted from Representative Albert 
Johnson's (R-Wash.) efforts to launch an investigation into the army's 
treatment of Colonel E. L. Rice. According to Johnson, Rice, who 
had saved the army money by uncovering and reporting the misuse of 
army supplies, had not been given just reward by the army. Instead, 
the military high command, Johnson told the House, had "outrageously" 
abused Rice by assigning him to an isolated post and by ignoring his 
findings. A resolution had earlier been introduced to investigate 
Rice's treatment, but the Military Affairs Committee had bottled it 
up. Johnson, in order to force action, proposed that the resolution 
be withdrawn from the Military Affairs Committee and requested that 
the War Department furnish records of the Rice case directly to the 
House. This maneuver in the form of a resolution won, 167 to 152 
(Table 5-2). The voting breakdown differed radically from the Huddle­
ston vote since the roll call divided along strictly partisan lines.
One hundred percent of the Republicans voted for the resolution while
22ninety-eight percent of the Democrats opposed the motion. An ex­
planation for the variation in the party voting over the Huddleston
22Ibid., Pt. 5, 4348-50.
TABLE 5-2
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE JOHNSON
RESOLUTION: H. RES. 541
Region and Party' (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 21 44 47 23 2 10 — 5 3. 8 3 160
Nay 5 — 16 — 18 — 8 76 — 20 6 — 1 150
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 100 —  100 —  100 -- 100 -- 100 —  100 — 100 75 100 2 100
Nay 100 — 100 100 100 100 100 — 100 — 25 — 98
*Cong. Rec ., 65 Cong. , vol. 57, :) Sess., Pt . 5, 4349.
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and Johnson motions is readily apparent: the first vote involved a
rebuke to officers for their status pretensions; the second vote 
involved not only an attack on officers but also a slap at the opera­
tions of the War Department.
Together the two votes clearly delineate the House's attitude 
toward the military and the War Department and the voting groups 
behind the attitudes. During the war the Republicans had repeatedly- 
attacked the military management of the war by the Administration 
while the Democrats attempted to counter the GOP's assaults. Both 
stances were largely dictated by partisan considerations. However, 
segments of the Republican party, mainly from the Northeast, believed 
that military failures came from a shackling of the military by the 
Administration. These Republicans upheld the military tradition and 
opposed Huddleston's reprimand. A number of other Republicans rejec­
ted their colleagues' reverence for the military. Although these 
Republicans usually supported attacks on the Administration's war 
management, they also gladly joined the Democrats in checking the 
pretensions of the officer class. Democrats supported the Administra­
tion not because of any endearment for military officers but because 
their party held the reins of power. Given a discreet opportunity to 
attack, they unanimously voted against the military. They and many 
Republicans agreed with Dan V. Stephens' (D-Nebr.) comments to a con­
stituent that "the military the world over, not just the German
23military, was a threat to freedom.
23Stephens to Frank Dolezal, May 5, 1917, Box 27, Folder 189, 
StephensPapers.
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In this frame of mind the House started the task of dismantling 
the military machine. Before the Armistice the House had been appro­
priating vast sums for the army and navy. The military's insatiable 
demands were driving expected expenditures for fiscal 1919 upward to 
twenty-four billion dollarshowever, the cessation of hostilities 
put a brake on the upward thrust of appropriations. Representative 
Sherley, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, demanded that all 
departments cut their future appropriation requests to the bone. He 
also wanted departments to stop the spending of money already appro­
priated but not yet committed. At the same time, Representative 
Simon Fess for the Republicans advocated that the House should adopt 
a resolution to block the ejq>enditure of the unspent funds.
Immediate savings were instituted by departments, but, according 
to military witnesses appearing before Sherley's Appropriation Com­
mittee, several factors slowed down a complete cut back to peacetime 
levels. The most important one was that the army and navy could not 
be demobilized all at one time. These officials told Sherley's Com­
mittee that it would take months to transport the two million soldiers 
in France back to the United States. Committee members interjected 
during the witnesses' testimony that they wanted prompt demobilization, 
but added that they realized it would take time. Another factor, 
according to Secretary of War Baker, involved the technical qualities 
of a military contract with a company. If the production of the goods
^ New York Times, September 17, 1918, 17; September 20, 1918,
1; October 5, 1918, 17; October 17, 1918, 1; and December 3, 1918,
15.
^ Washington Post, November 24, 1918, 2; and November 27, 1918,
2.
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was nearly complete, the military favored honoring the contract 
rather than cancelling it. Sherley agreed with Baker's principle, 
but the Committee often thought the military should have cut contracts 
on specific items sooner. Finally, Baker suggested that a judicious 
cutback in government expenditures would help prevent economic depres­
sion and high unemployment. The country, he pointed out, was passing
* *
through a transition period and the government had a responsibility 
not to unsettle conditions any more than absolutely necessary. Sherley 
again concurred with Baker's idea but added that a quick return to 
peacetime conditions would not engender massive disruption in the 
economy. Expressing an attitude frequently repeated in the months 
ahead, Sherley stated that business could take care of itself during 
the transition period.
27The push for economy and the desire for normal peacetime 
conditions shaped House debates on the naval appropriation bill.
During the war Secretary of the Navy Daniels had proposed a naval 
building program costing $600 million. It duplicated the 1916 program 
that built ten superdreadnoughts and six cruisers. Similar to the 
earlier program it was to be completed in a three-year period. After 
the signing of the Armistice Daniels continued to advocate the three-
20
U. S. Congress, House, Hearings Before Subcommittee of House 
Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 15140 and H.R. 16187, 65 Cong.,
3 Sess., 504-05; ibid., Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1917, 
Hearings on H.R. 16187, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3-7, 27-28, 48, 355-56,
589-90, 844-47, 1067, 1122-25.
27See Washington Post, February 16, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec..
65 Cong., Vol. 57, Sess. 3, Pt. 1, 3198-3204, for discussions on 
military and House cut backs in expenditures. The military appro­
priation bill for fiscal 1920 was lowered from the astronomical 
sum of $19 billion to $1.1 by combined action of the military and the 
House.
359
year program and even requested that appropriations remain at the
28wartime level of over $2.4 billion.
The House Naval Affairs Committee reacted in disbelief that naval 
plans were still the same in spite of peace. Daniels argued before the 
Committee that the United States required a navy second to none. A 
navy of that size, he elaborated, would enforce, with England, the 
proposed League of Nations treaty provisions on the freedom of the 
seas. The Committee, however, rejected the Navy's plans for expending 
$2.6 billion, and even reduced a revised Navy Department budget of 
$903 million to $746 million. Opposition to the battleship phase of 
the naval program came mainly from Republicans Thomas S. Butler and 
William Browning. Nonetheless, when Wilson sent an urgent and secret 
appeal from Paris requesting passage of the three-year program because 
it was necessary to strengthen his hand in disarmament negotiations, 
even these Republicans swung into agreement. Consequently, the Com­
mittee reported the bill to the House floor with greatly diminished
29funding but retaining the three-year program.
Proponents of a small navy, who noted the incongruity between 
Wilson working for disarmament in Paris while simultaneously demanding 
more warships at home, sharply criticized the bill. These members, 
particularly the Republican element, were angered by Wilson's inter­
vention into the debate. Adding to their sense of outrage was the
28New York Times, October 23, 1918, 1; November 20, 1918, 4; 
and November 21, 1918, 13.
29Ibid., December 13, 1918, 1; December 31, 1919, 1; January 
26, 1919, 11; January 28, 1919, 1; January 31, 1919, 1; February 1, 
1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 2674,
2680, 2682, 2685.
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fact that Wilson sent his appeal as a secret cablegram only to the
Naval Committee, and members of that Committee refused to divulge the
message's details. From an anti-militarist viewpoint, Congressman
Huddleston could not understand the reasoning behind the program,
since America had entered the World War to end armament races. While
he also called it imperialistic and militaristic, James A. Frear
(R-Wis.) described the bill as a drain on the Treasury. The House
would not only have to appropriate $740 million for fiscal 1920, but
the program would, he stated, commit the government to spending $415
million more in the next two years. Martin Dies, Sr., (D-Tx.) ended
the small navy argument with the contention that a large navy violated
30the American tradition of isolationism.
Countering the arguments of the opponents, navy supporters, 
voiced a desire to back up President Wilson at the Paris Conference. 
Henry I. Emerson (R-Ohio) declared that he would vote for the naval 
program because the President asked for it at a critical juncture in 
the peace negotiations. He noted that he did not want the responsi­
bility for defeating it when Wilson agreed to accept all the blame for 
any negative results. Other supporters of the President's position 
added that the bill carried a provision for cancellation of the pro­
gram if the peace conference reached a disarmament pact. But some 
Naval proponents advocated a large navy on its own merits, without 
reference to the President. Patrick H. Kelley (R-Mich.) drew a 
completely different lesson from the war than the anti-militarists, 
namely that America had to arm herself fully for her own protection.
30Ibid., 2682-85, 2691, 2771, 2908-09, 2844, 3149, 3151, 3159; 
and New York Times, February 7, 1919, 14; February 11, 1919, 1.
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Kelley's nationalism received support from Percy E. Quin (D-Miss.), 
who argued that the United States should never again be unprepared.
He also added that a navy second to none was necessary to prevent 
Great Britain or any other nation from "bullying" the United States 
in the future.
The varying interpretations of the work of the peace conference 
and America's naval role in the postwar world resulted in three roll 
calls, all of which scale together (Table 5-3). At the low scale 
position eight percent of the Democrats and thirty-four percent of 
the Republicans opposed all motions that favored the three-year 
naval program. Regionally, the only noticeable pattern of opposition 
that developed was among Republicans from the interior states who 
showed more signs of dissatisfaction with large naval expenditures 
than their colleagues from coastal regions. In the middle scale posi­
tion representatives demonstrated only lukewarm support by voting for 
passage of the bill after opposing the critical ballot on the three 
"year building program. Again the Republicans predominated as the 
moderate supporters of the bill.. Regional factors had no discernable 
influence on the voting pattern of this level. At the highest level 
of support for the naval bill, eighty-four percent of the Democrats 
joined together and acceded to Wilson's appeal. They were supported 
by twenty-seven percent of the Republicans, who since they voted 
against their party's majority, can be labeled big naval supporters.
No evident regional voting blocs existed at this level. The Navy's
^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 3080, 2686,
2682, 2690, 2782, 2718, 3143, 3152; and Washington Post, February 26,
1919, 2.
TABLE 5-3 :A
i SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE NAVAL
BILL: H. R. 15539
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 3 1 5 2 18 11 7 1 4 1 4 2 14 45
Medium — 14 1 23 1 22 1 13 6 1 3 5 — 2 2 2 14 82
High 5 7 17 10 17 10 8 3 72 1 26 3 5 2 6 152 40
TOTAL 180 167
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 13 5 13 10 36 41 8 33 33 17 67 20 8 34
Medium — 58 5 61 5 44 11 48 7 33 10 42 — 33 50 20 8 49
High 100 29 90 26 85 20 90 11 85 33 90 25 83 50 60 84 27
The order of the roll calls is 254, 252, 253 
Percent at each point on the scale 17, 24, 4, 55 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .995
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TABLE 5-3:B 
NAVAL BILL
Scale
Position Variance Motion
0 254 To pass bill H.R. 15539. 280-50; + = nay.
Cong. Rec. , 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 
3172.
1 252 To adopt bill H.R. 566, being a privileged reso­
lution from Comm, on Rules for the consideration 
of H.R. 15539 and providing that after adoption 
of the rule it is in order to consider new legis­
lation in the bill notwithstanding the general 
rules of the House. 205-148; + = nay. Ibid., 
3152.
3 253 To amend bill H.R. 15339, by providing that
"enrolled men so transferred shall be entitled 
to receive the same pay, rights, privileges and 
allowances in all respects as now provided by 
law for men regularly discharged and reenlisted 
immediately upon expiration of their full four 
years enlistment in the regular navy or marine 
corps." 194-142; + = nay. Ibid., 3171.
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support showed definite weaknesses because most Republicans opposed 
the naval program and significant elements of the Democrats undoubtedly 
only voted in favor of the three-year program because of the appeal 
from Wilson.32
While the Wilson Administration secured passage of the naval 
bill/ it failed to win House approval of the Army Appropriation Bill 
for fiscal 1920. In his explanation of the bill to the House, Chair­
man Dent of the Military Affairs Committee noted that Secretary of 
War Baker had told his committee of the military's need for a peace­
time army of 537,000 men, raised by voluntary enlistment. Baker had, 
Dent related, justified this force size, which greatly exceeded the 
prewar army of 175,000, as necessary to carry out the peace treaty as 
well as regular military duties. Although Baker had described the 
537,000-man a n y  as a transitional force, most Military Affairs 
committeemen feared that once sanctioned by law it would remain at 
that level. They inserted, Dent explained further, a clause which 
stated their intention to restrict the 537,000-man force to one year, 
after which the army would return to the prewar level. J
Dent had no fondness for the bill, and it soon became evident 
that many congressmen wanted to establish immediately the size of the 
peacetime army at a lower number. The military's proposal, Democratic
32See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 29, for a discussion on 
reduction of the Navy by future Congresses.
U. S. Congress, House, Army Reorganization, Hearings on H. R. 
14560, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 13, 18-21, 64; Washington Post, February 16, 
1919, 1; New York Times, January 17, 1919, 7; January 28, 1919, 1; 
February 11, 1919, 2; February 13, 1919, 8; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3198-3205. For a discussion of Congress and 
postwar military policy see Noggle, Into the Twenties, 27.
365
critics argued, cost too much money. Moreover, they disliked the whole 
idea of a large peacetime army because they saw it as a threat to 
liberty, and instead favored a small regular army which would be 
supported by a strong National Guard. A general assault on the bill 
developed, and in a startling roll call vote ninety-six percent of the 
Democrats voted against the War Department, thereby defeating the 
proposal for a 537,000 man army (Table 5-4). In its place they substi­
tuted the prewar limit of 175,000 men. Interestingly enough, ninety- 
two percent of the Republicans found themselves in the peculiar 
position of supporting the War Department. Republicans voted this way 
not out of a desire to support the Administration or necessarily 
because they believed in a larger army. Rather their stance, as 
explained by Minority Leader Mann to the House, was dictated by a 
desire to bring the troops home from Europe in the fastest way 
possible. Mann did acknowledge that some soldiers would necessarily 
remain in Europe for some time after the war, but volunteers should 
be substituted for draftees. This changeover was now impossible 
because the Democratic action, mann stated, cut the army's size so 
severely that there were not enough troops for European and regular 
army activities at the same time. Since the reduction did not affect 
the wartime army, the Administration, which Republicans distrusted, 
would use this as an excuse not to bring the "boys" home. Mann's 
eaqplanation clarified the fact that the Republican majority had no 
desire to maintain a 537,000-man army.34 Thus when the Democrats, who
34Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3287, 3296, 
3711-14, 3716-18, 3720, 3724; Washington Post, February 19, 1919, 1; 
February 24, 1919, 6; New York Times, February 19, 1919, 11; and 
February 26, 1919, 2.
TABLE 5-4
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON THE ARMY
BILL: H. RES. 593
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 2 16 2 21 4 6 3 79 — 22 3 7 4 1 157 13
Nay 2 20 — 40 48 23 3 3 5 5 — 9 5 153
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 50 100 5 100 8 100 12 96 100 38 100 100 10 97 8
Nay 50 100 — 95 92 88 4 100 62 —  100 — 90 3 92
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3718.
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did not share the GOP's distrust of the Administration, voted for the 
reduction, they were registering the long-range goal of the over­
whelming majority of the House. A direct appeal from President Wilson 
on the naval bill did secure the assent of the House to a position 
many did not in fact favor. When no such appeal was made on behalf 
of the Army bill, even the Democrats could revolt against the War
3 5Department in their eagerness to check the power of the military.
International Affairs
President Wilson, who had allowed the reduction of the military
phase of the Great Crusade, actively attempted to guide the House from
isolationism to internationalism. He first pointed out that the House
should respond to the plight of the European masses. The aftermath
of the war in Europe left millions destitute, and the likelihood of
mass starvation, particularly in Russia, confronted the war-tom
European countries. Revolution and civil war had also broken out in
Russia and appeared imminent in many other European countries as well.
With Europe on the verge of collapse and anarchy, Wilson cabled from
Paris that Congress should enact a bill appropriating $100 million
3 6toward the purchase of grain for European food relief.
35The Army Appropriation Bill was among the many bills that 
failed to make its way through the Congress. A Senate filibuster 
blocked its passage. The 66th Congress thus would have to deal with 
the subject. See ibid., March 9, 1919, 1; and Noggle, Into the 
Twenties,27-29.
36New York Times, January 5, 1919, 1; and January 14, 1919, 1. 
See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 150-51; and Gary Dean Best, "Food 
Relief as Price Support: Hoover and American Pork, January-March
1919," Agricultural History, XLW (October, 1970), for a discussion 
of Administration motives behind food relief.
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Representative Sherley immediately introduced a bill and brought 
it to the House floor on January 7, 1919. Republicans blocked action 
on it that same day, but Sherley soon secured a special rule from the 
House Rules Committee which returned it to the floor. He and fellow 
supporters presented the bill as a humanitarian response to the plight 
of the European pe'ople. Christian charity, James C. Cantrill (D-Ky.) 
told the House, demanded that the United States not be stingy with its 
money in this crisis.
On a more pragmatic level, Sherley pointed out the benefit that 
the bill would have on the price of wheat and other grains. With 
prices on the verge of collapse, the bill would, he argued, bolster 
the grain market. Some Democrats also perceived the measure as 
upholding the President while he negotiated the peace treaty. They 
claimed that opposition to the measure wanted to discredit Wilson and 
his proposed League of Nations. Several Republican supporters of the 
measure responded to the Democrats' implication of partisan rivalry. 
These Republicans maintained that their party never wished to em­
barrass the President; however, they did not like his high-handed 
methods of ’cabling for action without supplying specific information. 
Other Republican supporters, among them Minority Leader Mann and ex- 
Speaker Cannon, who had often refused to join in the partisan thrusts 
of some party members, argued that America had a moral responsibility 
to feed the Europeans. People were starving, said Mann, and action was
37New York Times, January 8, 1919, 3; January 10, 1919, 1; and
January 12, 1919, 7.
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needed to relieve suffering. Cannon also emphasized that "hungry 
stomachs" caused riots and fostered the spread of bolshevism.38
J. Hampton Moore (R-Pa.) rejected such arguments, saying it was 
time "to put a stop to this universal altruism." Other opponents, who 
were almost exclusively Republicans, insisted that the bill opened 
up an entirely new area of public ejqpenditures. The United States, 
Bertrand H. Snell (R-N.Y.) argued, had already contracted a huge 
public debt. The taxpayers, he added, could not stand the extra 
burden of feeding Europe. But the Republican critics' main objection 
stemmed from a basic dislike of Wilson find of his League of Nations. 
James N. Good (R-Iowa) bitterly attacked Wilson for "usurpation" of 
powers and claimed that since the bill contained no restriction on 
how the President would spend the money, Congress was unfortunately 
permitting the continued expansion of his authority. The incoming 
Speaker of the House, Frederick Gillett (R-Mass.), stressed that the 
House needed to start acting the part of a legislative body and not 
that of a rubber stamp. Congress had no obligation, the Republican
39leader implied, to enhance Wilson's standing at the Peace Conference.
Republican opponents forced two roll calls on the relief 
measure. In an effort to restrict the bill, they moved to give the 
American Red Cross rather than the President the control of the relief 
fund. They failed to carry their motion by the margin of 202 to 117. 
Seventy-six percent of the Republicans voted for Red Cross super­
vision while the Democrats voted unanimously against it (Table 5-5).
38Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1339-43, 1345,
1349, 1358-59, and 1369.
39Ibid., 1340-43, 1351-52, 1359.
TABLE 5-5
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON EUROPEAN 
RELIEF: H. R. 13708
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 18 — 20 34 20 1 1 7 — 2 11 1 113
Nay 6 3 17 8 18 16 9 4 82 1 23 — 5 3 5 — 165 35
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea — 86 — 71 68 83 1 50 —  100 — 40 —  100 1 76
Nay 100 14 100 29 100 32 100 17 99 50 100 100 60 100 99 24
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1373A.
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The twenty-four percent of the Republicans who aligned themselves 
with the Democrats did not form any noticeable regional bloc. Re­
publican opponents also forced a roll call over passage of the bill, 
which they lost, 242 to seventy-three.40 A majority of Republicans 
(fifty-eight percent) voted with ninety-four percent of the Democrats, 
which indicated that many Republicans did not oppose the principle 
of the bill (Table 5-6). The Republican opposition tended to represent 
the West North Central and Border states in greater numbers than 
other regions. Because Democrats solidly supported their President 
and significant numbers of Republicans recognized humanitarian and 
political benefits in the bill, internationalism won over isolationa- 
lism.
President Wilson, who was much less able to direct the House on 
other phases of his European policy, provoked angry and bewildered 
remarks from several congressmen by his dispatch of American troops 
to Russia in the summer of 1918. Ernest Lundeen (R-Minn.) charged the 
Wilson with hypocrisy because he violated his own doctrine of self- 
determination by attempting to dictate the type of government for 
Russia. According to William E. Mason (R-Ill.), the Bolshevik menace 
was no worse than the Czar. Even if the Bolsheviks were establishing 
an undemocratic regime, the United States held no mandate to overthrow 
them. He concluded that Congress must reclaim its rightful powers, 
and he introduced a resolution that called for the withdrawal of the 
troops. Although the resolution never reached the House floor,
40Ibid., 1373A and 1373B.
TABLE 5-6
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON EUROPEAN 
RELIEF: H. R. 13708
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 6 16 16 19 17 33 9 8 73 1 23 2 5 4 4 5 153 88
Nay — 5 — 13 2 18 —  14 6 1 1 5 — 1 — 6 9 63
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 100 76 100 59 90 65 100 36 92 50 96 28 100 80 100 46 • 94 58
Nay — 24 — 41 10 35 64 8 50 4 72 — 20 — 54 6 42
*Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1373B.
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no members defended the Wilson Administration's Russian policy.41
In apparent contradiction to House sentiment that opposed in­
tervention in Russian internal affairs, Representative Thomas Galla­
gher (D-Ill.) won approval of a resolution that instructed the American 
peace commissioners to work for Irish freedom. Supporters of the 
Gallagher resolution, however, saw no contradiction, claiming instead 
that the Irish fitted perfectly the principle of self-determination. 
They were, James A. Gallivan (D-Mass.) told the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, an oppressed minority whose condition was very,similar 
to that of the Czech people. Gallagher presented the Committee a 
massive petition of 600,000 names in support of Irish freedom, which 
clearly demonstrated the political implications of the resolution. 
Opponents, who most likely had only a small Irish-American electorate 
to confront, thought the resolution meddled in the affairs of an 
ally. Though critics could not defeat the resolution, they did 
secure a revision of it by the Committee. As reported by the Com­
mittee and eventually passed by the House, the resolution simply 
requested that the peace conference "favorably consider the claims 
of Ireland." It passed without a roll call, 216 to forty-five.42
41Ibid., Pt. 4, 4066; Pt. 3, 2639, 2543. Criticism of Wilson's 
Russian policy was bi-partisan since leading Democrats, among them 
Edward Pou (N.C.), Chairman of the Rules Committee, called for the 
troops' removal. See ibid., Pt. 2, 1876-80; Pt. 3, 2543, 2630, 3242.
See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 142-48, for a general discussion on 
postwar American-Russian relations.
42U. S. Congress, House, The Irish Question, Hearings, on H. J. 
Res. 357, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3-4, 5, 9, 20, 31; Washington Post, 
February 7, 1919, 6; and March 2, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 5026, 5042.
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Although the House never took a roll call on the League of 
Nations, Wilson's chief design for international relations was the 
subject of several speeches. Maintaining that a temporary alliance 
of the victors would enforce peace better than the League, Richard 
W. Parker (R-N.J.) compared it to the Articles of Confederation 
government. Each, he asserted, lacked any real mechanism to enforce 
its decisions. The League, consequently, would prove powerless to 
make Germany pay an indemnity or prevent German and Russian Bolshevik 
designs for conquest and revolution. America, he concluded, had a 
role in world affairs that a temporary alliance system, such as the 
one suggested by ex-President William Howard Taft, could fulfill 
better than the League. Similarly, Representative Mason believed 
that while the United States should become more involved in world 
affairs, he rejected the League as the proper forum for American 
participation. Instead, he favored American membership in a world 
court which would render impartial decisions for humanity.43
Another group of critics found the League objectionable because 
of a belief that it restricted American sovereignty. To these nationa­
list congressmen the League threatened American freedom of action 
because a majority of nations could out-vote the United States and 
make binding decisions. Simon Fess, Republican Congressional Campaign 
Chairman, claimed that as a consequence the United States might lose 
control over her own immigration policy and merchant marine. Other 
Republicans, among them J. Hampton Moore, singled out the League's 
possible danger to the protective tariff, believing that the Democrats
43Ibid., Pt. 1, 209; and Pt. 2, 1416.
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were using the League to advance free trade. But to many critics, 
such as Charles H. Sloan (R-Neb.), the League simply violated America's 
customary foreign policy. As in many such traditionalist speeches,
Sloan quoted Washington's Farewell Address on the liabilities of 
"entangling alliances." In general the League's antagonists, because 
of their nationalist, protectionist, or traditionalist sentiment, 
demanded that the peace treaty in no fashion impair American 
sovereignty.44
To the supporters of the League, the opponents' viewpoint 
ignored the course of recent history. Hatton W. Simmers (D-Tex.) 
portrayed the war as drawing America out of its past isolationism 
into world affairs. He further emphasized that President Wilson had 
not, as some claimed, manipulated the country into joining the maelstrom 
of international politics; instead, the tide of human history had forced 
a new direction. Accordingly, Earl H. Beshlin (D-Pa.) maintained that 
America should seize the league as a tool to bring together the world's 
nations. The League would, he claimed, extend to the world the Monroe 
Doctrine's principle of the self-determination of nations. The League 
also offered the opportunity, Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.) said, of breaking 
down trade barriers and the economic rivalries behind them. Since 
such a development, Hull conjectured, would bring world prosperity, 
it thereby would help to promote world peace. Other League proponents 
spoke in similarly idealistic terms, advocating proposals such as a 
people's referendum on all declarations of war.4^
44ibid., Pt. 4, 3801, 2845; Pt. 1, 221, 454; Pt. 4, 4942, 4948; 
Nethers, "Simeon Fess: Educator and Politician," 232-33; and New
York Times, February 20, 1919, 3.
4^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1824-25, 1839-
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Although the exact position of House members found no formal 
expression, it was clear that many Republicans and some Democrats 
opposed the League of Nations. The isolationist attitudes of most 
congressmen did not easily facilitate agreement with the promptings 
of Wilsonian liberalism.
Civil Liberties, Allens, and Un-Americanism
That the House's attitude was restrictive was starkly revealed 
on questions concerning civil liberties, aliens, and patriotism. Up 
td the end of the session, when pressing business prevented off-the- 
subject remarks, representatives frequently referred to the Bolshevist 
and the radical menace. In the mind of at least some members, 
radicalism confronted the nation with a real crisis and imperiled its 
security. William R. Green (R-Iowa), however, criticized his fellow 
members for distorting the danger. He implied that the word "Bolshe­
vism" had become devoid of meaning and little more than a scare word. 
Congressman Meyer London, the Socialist member, also dismissed the 
Bolshevik danger. The real threat, he argued, lay in the attempt 
to repress supposed radicals by unconstitutional means. But more 
members apparently agreed with Percy E. Quin (D-Miss.) that radicals 
existed in abundance and were seeking to stir up discontent. He 
advocated their suppression even now that the war had ended. °
40; Pt. 4, 3955-60, 3972; and Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 100-01. 
Other actions of the House showed its general isolationist and hostile 
attitude toward Europe. For example, even though Secretaries McAdoo 
and Glass requested half a billion more for loans to the allies, 
the Ways and Means Committee refused to grant it. See Cong. Rec.,
65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 4273.
4^New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3202-7, 3230-03; Pt. 2, 1667-68; Pt. 1, 761,
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Two bills that went far toward meeting Quin's desires reached 
the House floor via the Unanimous Consent Calendar. The first bill, 
recommended by the State Department, amended the Espionage Act. It 
provided for the punishment of persons who "knowingly lied" to the 
State Department. J. Hampton Moore, who was not a noted defender of 
civil liberties but who was always ready to stop the flow of powers 
to the Executive, argued that the country already had too many restric­
tive laws. The bill's broad definition of falsehood, he added, could 
readily be utilized by the government to jail those committing innocent 
mistakes of memory. The second bill, much wider in scope than the 
first, declared unlawful those associations which proposed by the means 
of physical force, violence, or injury to bring about any governmental, 
social, or economic change in the United States. Supporters pointed 
out that several states had recently found it necessary to adopt 
similar antisyndicalist laws. Since both bills required unanimous 
consent to pass, they were easily blocked by members who had retained 
a sense of respect for minority views.47
Aliens were also the targets of several bills. One bill, 
introduced by the Justice Department, provided for the deportation of 
aliens, usually enemy aliens, who had been detained during the war 
for their supposed dangerous attitudes toward the United States. 
Defenders of the bill claimed that the aliens had no political rights 
under the Constitution; however, Harold Knutson (R-Minn.), during
961; Pt. 3, 2718, 2756; and Joseph W. Fordney to William B. Mershon, 
April 23, 1918, Box 12, William B. Mershon, Michigan Historical Collec­
tion. These references are not intended to be exhaustive. Other topics 
will also note the influence of the Red Scare in congressional action.
47Ibid., Pt. 2, 1125.
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hearings before the Immigration Committee, showed a marked hostility 
toward the internment policy, closely questioning the Justice Depart­
ment's witness regarding the numbers and legal rights of interned 
aliens. John E. Raker (D-Cal.), who did not oppose the bill, wanted 
the writ of habeas corpus included in it.4® A second bill, also heard 
by the Immigration Committee, pointed toward the restrictive immigra­
tion laws of the 1920's. It provided that immigrants, except in a 
few cases, could not enter the country for four years. Part of the 
reasoning behind the bill flowed from the common fear that unemploy­
ment was engulfing the country. However, Adolph Sabath (D-Ill.) 
described the belief in an oversupply of labor as false propaganda 
disseminated by corporations in order to justify a cut in wages. On
the other hand, the American Federation of Labor lobbyist Frank 
Morrison believed that the boom conditions and the demobilization of 
the troops foretold the arrival of depression and consequently an 
over-supply of labor. Several committee members agreed with Morrison, 
but Benjamin F. Welty (D-Ohio) disrupted this seemingly mundane 
discussion and insisted that the real reason for the bill did not 
arise out of the labor problem. Rather, he stated, "we have taken up 
this bill because we are afraid of the spirit of bolshevism.. .We do 
not want to be the recipient of that element here." Later in the 
hearings Albert Johnson's (R-Wash.) outburst against immigrants who 
would "swamp" America with inferior blood indicated another phobia 
of the Committee. In fact, committee members were beset by a number
4®U. S. Congress, House, Deportation of Interned Aliens,
Hearings on H. R. 13965, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3-17; and New York Times, 
January 24, 1919, 8.
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of nightmares. They envisioned an American society not only overrun 
by radicals and degenerated by racial intermarriage, but also crowded 
into polyglot cities and depressed economically by an oversupply 
of labor.49
Political developments contributed to the House's repressive 
attitude toward civil liberties. During the 1918 congressional cam­
paign the National Security League, a militant pro-preparedness and pro­
war organization, had drawn up a list of eight "acid test" roll calls, 
including several of the major war issues. The League then compared 
the voting records of congressmen with what they defined as the proper 
position on the roll calls. Those members failing to meet the League's 
standards were labeled as pacifist or pro-German. Since only forty- 
seven congressmen had spotless records and many of both parties had 
poor records, the House did not appreciate the League's impugning of 
its loyalty. Congressmen claimed that only two of the acid test 
votes were straight issue votes, while the other six were complicated 
parliamentary maneuvers that did not accurately reflect a congressmen's 
final position on a subject. Nonetheless, the League's computations, 
which were published across the nation, apparently influenced voters, 
thereby causing the defeat of several incumbents to close elections.
The victims of the "acid test" returned to Washington in a sour 
mood and poured out their woe to a sympathetic House, On October
49Ibid., January 10, 1919, 4; January 31, 1919, 4. U. S.
Congress, House, Prohibition of Immigrant, Hearings on H. R. 13325,
H. R. 13669, H.R. 13904, and H.R. 14577, Cong. 65, 3 Sess., 5-6,
13, 23, 31-32, 46, 130, 139, 148, 168, 142, 216, 175, 189, 218,
269, 278, 287, and 296.
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4, 1918, the House ordered an investigation of the League but post­
poned the start of the inquiry until the third session.50
Conducted by a special House Committee, the investigation 
offered a possible opportunity to explore the true meaning of loyalty 
and patriotism. It, however, soon diverted into attacks on Wall 
Street, quests for the economic interests of League contributors, 
and occasions for the venting of anger toward the League. Pat Harri­
son (D-Miss.) questioned the League's President, Charles E. Lydecker, 
if he represented as a lawyer any steel companies or munition makers.
The committee also questioned the proper interpretation of the eight 
acid test votes. Their questioning brought out the League spokesmen's 
unfamiliarity and confusion over the parliamentary situation behind 
the individual roll calls. Consequently, C. Frank Reavis (R-Nebr.) 
reprimanded League witnesses and told them that the manner in which 
an issue came to a vote made a tremendous difference in interpretation. 
The acid test issues, Edward W. Sanders (D-Va.) added, simply did not 
reflect preparedness and war issues. Frequently, the committee 
turned the questioning to the League's financial backers. They 
found that the Carnegie Corporation, J. P. Morgan and Company, 
munition makers, and large corporations had contributed to the League. 
Because the League had these financial supporters, it was not sur­
prising that S. Stanwood Menken, the League’s ex-President, deplored 
criticism of large corporations. With these discoveries the committee's
50Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 56, 2 Sess., Pt. 11, 10219-20,
10530-36, 10663-68, 10683-84; Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 97-100. See 
Robert D. Ward, "The Origin and Activities of the National Security 
League, 1914-1919," Mississippi Valley Review, XLVII (June, 1960),
51-65, and Livermore, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 165-168,
for general discussions on the League's activities.
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questioning assumed a populist tone, which implied that the rich had 
financed the League and had used the people's patriotism to promote 
selfish interests.^
The committee's real concern, however, was neither the list of 
acid test votes nor the names of financial contributors but the 
charge of un-Americanism that the League leveled against Congressmen. 
Committeemen heard League spokesmen charge that a congressman was 
pacifistic, disloyal, and provincial if he failed to vote as the 
League dictated. A few congressmen responded to such charges by 
trying to determine the League's definition of loyalty. Sanders 
asked a League witness whether a congressman who studied an issue, 
consulted his conscience, and still voted wrong on an acid test 
measure would be disloyal? For most congressmen loyalty as a matter 
of conscience was not as important as was the charge of disloyalty, 
which they viewed as a personal insult and a threat to their political 
careers. Joseph Walsh (R-Mass.) expressed outrage at the League's 
defamation of character when he argued that their criticisms of 
congressmen actually helped to undermine the government. In particu­
lar, Reavis pointed to a League publication which attacked the House 
for "pork barrel" politics as the type of material that the Bolsheviks 
would print. When several congressmen, who were defeated in the 1918 
election partly because of League propaganda, testified, committee 
members commiserated with their distressed colleagues and joined 
them in condemning the pernicious political influence of the League.
Cl
U.S. Congress, House, National Security League, Hearings 
on H. Res. 469, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 25, 30, 35, 39, 41, 45, 49, 84,
55, 81, 138, 258, 317, 927, 465, 721, 1085, and 2043.
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Their attitude cannot be construed as unusual because Edward W. Pou
(D-N.C.) had set a precedent for the hearings when he introduced the
resolution for the investigation. To the applause of the House
he had said at that time, "I spit in the face of any man who impugns
my patriotism," and had added that "our patriotism has been attacked."
Although the hearings discredited a superpatriotic organization,
congressmen nonetheless failed to use the investigation as a means to
educate the public to a better understanding of what constituted 
52loyalty. In fact, the members' anxious defense of their loyalty,
along with other attitudes and actions, created an atmosphere in
53which others would also have to defend their Americanism.
Economic and Social Reconstruction 
The House, besides proving itself unequal to the task of fostering 
a healthy postwar political climate, showed itself unable to enact a 
balanced economic and social reconstruction program. That economic 
conditions were unsettled and uncertain congressmen did not doubt. They 
knew that during the war the government had extended wide controls over 
the economy, and businessmen now wondered if the regulation would con­
tinue in peace. The House had to determine which parts of the wartime
52Ibid., 82, 885, 1189-94, 378, 435, 775, 1753-54, 991, 1763,
1766, 1847; and Cong. Rec.,^65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 259- 
60; and Pt. 5, 5035.
53Historians have studied the origins of the Red Scare from 
several different perspectives and, consequently, have suggested a 
number of reasons for it. The role of Congress has been overlooked 
by these studies, a failure which misses the importance of leadership 
in creating mass psychological reactions. Congress' inability to forge 
a constructive reconstruction policy and its negative attitudes toward 
civil liberties had to operate as one of the early catalyst to the 
panic. For a review of literature on the Red Scare see Noggle,
Into the Twenties, 160-64, 218-19.
383
programs should be dismantled, what modified, and what left intact.
Above all, the House had to decide what was the proper role of the
government in the economic system. In whatever direction the House
chose to go on these issues, they also had to consider the problem of
wartime inflation and the likelihood of postwar deflation, depression,
and unemployment. However, the House's ability to respond adequately
to these difficulties was hindered from the first by lack of planning
54and leadership and by the shortness of the legislative session.
Economically, the House started to "mop-up" war operations by
approving a bill on war contracts. Shortly after the end of the war
the Comptroller of the Treasury had declared illegal all contracts
which the military had not formally completed with contractors. Since
the Comptroller's action had stopped payment of the incompleted or
"verbal" contracts, contractors without agreements were often placed
in a precarious financial position. They demanded special relief
legislation from Congress on the grounds that the military had re-
55quested them to start the projects without contracts.
Congressional apologists for the bill stressed that there was 
nothing illegal about the contracts in a criminal sense. The military, 
in an attempt to cut red tape, had simply asked that contractors start 
projects before written agreements had been completed. Fair play, 
they concluded, demanded that the contractors, who were often on the
5^New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1; and January 5, 1919,
II, 1.
^ Washington Post, December 18, 1918, 6; and U. S. Congress,
House, Relative to Contracts, Hearings on H. R. 13274, 65 Cong., 3 
Sess., 4-6.
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56verge of bankruptcy, received their pay from the government.
Critics of the relief proposal saw- the contractors not as innocent 
and honest businessmen but as highwaymen presenting the government 
with trumpted-up claims. Underlying this attitude was a belief that 
the war had allowed munition makers huge profits. But the critics' 
attitude also expressed a doubt as to the ability of the War Depart­
ment to pass fairly on the appeals because of the overly friendly 
ties between the contractors and the military. At this point, some 
of the opposition veered into partisan politics. Republican J.
Hampton Moore, still up to his usual partisan antics, suggested that 
a congressional board hear the contractors' appeals for relief. He 
thought that such a board would often discover criminal conduct on 
the part of contractors and negligence on the part of the War Depart­
ment. Even Minority Leader Mann opposed Moore's latest assault, and
when his proposal came to a vote as an amendment, it was easily
57defeated on a non-roll call vote.
Once the contractor's relief bill passed the House, the Senate 
added an amendment to the bill, which resulted in further opposition.
The Senate amendment provided for payment of mining operations begun 
under the Rare Mineral Act of 1918. The House conferees had rejected 
the amendment because they believed that it allowed claims with no 
real government obligation behind them. Led by Chairman Dent of the 
Military Affairs Committee, the conferees and likeminded congressmen
56Ibid., 9-11; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
Pt. 2, 1136-40.
57U. S. Congress, House, Relative to Contracts, Hearings, 34;
and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1141-42, 1183,
1187-91, 1209-12.
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expressed a deep distrust of private capitalists and government bureau­
crats. They first won a roll call to support the conferees' opposition 
to the amendment; however, when the Senate insisted on it, some of the 
original House opponents accepted a compromise that tightened up 
procedures for deciding the mineral claims. In this modified form 
the amendment survived the two roll calls that the uncompromising 
opponents demanded.58
In a scale of the three roll calls, the strongest supporters of 
the amendment represented the two parties in nearly equal percentages, 
though a slightly higher percent of Democrats supported the miners' 
claim than the Republicans (Table 5-7;A). Much more significant was 
the regional alignment displayed among the strongest supporters. Since 
the bill favored Western mining interests, congressmen from the Pacific 
and Mountain states supported the amendment. The moderate supporters, 
who voted against the amendment before it was altered and then switched 
positions after its revision, represented the Republican party in a 
slightly higher percentage than the Democrats. The bipartisan pattern 
of the voting continued among congressmen who refused to vote for the 
amendment. These strong opponents tended to represent the East and 
West North Central states and the Democratic South more than the other 
regions. Although the opponents succeeded only in modifying the bill 
rather than defeating it, they, nonetheless, expressed one of the 
strongest motivations behind reconstruction, namely that the close ties 
between business interests and government could spawn corruption and 
therefore must be ended.
58Ibid., Pt. 3, 2760, 2770; Pt. 4, 3355-62; and Pt. 5, 4258,
4266.
TABLE 5-7sA
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WAR
CONTRACTS: H. R. 13274
Region and Party (Numbers)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 2 8 5 15 7 13 5 4 28 2 10 4 7 4 5 11 69 61
Medium 2 11 5 21 3 15 1 8 20 1 9 5 — 1 —  — 40 62
High MM 4 4 7 7 26 1 13 37 — 5 1 54 51
TOTAL 163 174
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
LOW 50 34 36 35 41 23 61 16 33 67 41 40 100 80 100 100 42 35
Medium 50 48 35 49 18 29 14 32 23 33 38 50 — 20 —  — 25 36
High MM 17 29 16 41 48 15 52 44 21 10 33 29
The order of the roll calls is 248, 255, 262 
Fercent at each point on the scale 22, 17, 30, 31 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .986
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TABLE 5-7:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON WAR CONTRACTS: H. R. 13274
Scale
Position Variance Motion
248 To have the House instruct the conferees to agree
to the section of the Senate amendment to Bill 
H.R. 13274 providing relief when formal contracts 
have not been made in the manner required by 
law, which section relates to contracts for war 
supplies prior to Nov. 12, 1918, but if agree­
ment does not comply with statutory requirements, 
the Secretary of War is authorized to waive such 
non-compliance. 71-226; +■ = yea. Cong. Rec. ,
65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 2770.
255 To recommit the conference report on Bill H.R.
13274, validating certain war contracts and pro­
viding relief where formal contracts have not 
been made in the manner required by law, to the 
committee with instructions not to agree to the 
section of the Senate amendment relating to 
contracts for war supplies prior to Nov. 12,1918, 
and creating a War Contracts Appeals Amendment. 
214-117; + = nay. Ibid., 3361.
262 To amend a motion to instruct the managers on the
part of the House to concur in the Senate 
amendment to Bill H.R. 13274, providing relief 
in cases of contracts connected with the prosecu­
tion of the war and for other purposes, which 
amendment instructs managers not to agree to the 
section of the Senate amendment relating to 
contracts for war supplies prior to November 
12, 1918. 118-215; + = nay. Ibid., Pt. 5,
4266.
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When the Revenue Bill passed the House in September, 1918, it 
provided for eight billion dollars in taxes, levied mostly on personal 
income and on excess and war profits of corporations. With the Senate 
still debating the bill when the Armistice was declared, Secretary of 
the Treasury McAdoo told the Congress that the return of peace reduced 
government expenditures and the urgency for revenue. Accordingly, he 
suggested that the Senate cut taxes from eight to six billion dollars 
for fiscal 1919; he further recommended that the bill apply also for 
fiscal 1920, at which time taxes ought to be cut to four billion by 
eliminating the excess profit tax. In December, 1918, the Senate re­
vised the bill, agreeing with McAdoo's recommendation for fiscal 1919 
but rejecting his suggestion for fiscal 1920. In addition, the Senate 
adopted other changes, the most important of which was a tax on goods 
produced by child labor for interstate commerce. After the Senate 
completed its revisions, the bill went to the conference committee, 
where the Senate and House conferees eventually reconciled all dif­
ferences.59 _...
When Majority Leader Kitchin presented the final bill to the 
House, he described it as progressive legislation designed to halt 
the growth of the national debt and to capture the excess gain of war 
profiteers. If congressmen voted against the bill, they would, he 
claimed, be protecting the swollen profits of big corporations rather
5% e w  York Times, November 14, 1918, 3; November 15, 1918, 1; 
November 16, 1918, 1; November 19, 1918, 1; November 30, 1918, 1; 
December 4, 1918, 10; December 7, 1918, 1; December 19, 1918, 17; 
January 14, 1919, 4; January 28, 1919, 1; and February 7, 1919, 1.
The House conferees had to bring the bill back twice in order to 
receive House support against some Senate amendments. See Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 927; and Pt. 3, 2452-63.
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than helping individuals. If the bill, he added, had shortcomings, 
it came from its leniency toward business. Kitchin then described 
the tax on products produced by child labor as following the majority 
viewpoint of the House, although some controversy existed over it. 
Joseph Fordney, ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, 
next defended the bill as improved over the original measure passed 
in September. With Republicans and Democrats in agreement, the con­
ference report passed 312 to eleven. The token opposition consisted of
four Republicans, along with seven Southern Democrats who were unhappy
60over the child labor tax. Decisive leadership by McAdoo, Kitchin, 
and Fordney helped to formulate the unanimity, but more fundamental 
was the fact that public opinion and both parties had reached a tem­
porary truce in favor of graduated taxation.61
Railroads legislation also did not generate significant divisions 
on roll calls. The reason, however, was not because of mutual accord 
on policy but because of a decision by the House to postpone final 
action until the 66th Congress. In his December, 1918, address 
President Wilson told the House that he had no plans for the railroads. 
He did, however broadly sketch the main alternatives from which Con­
gress could choose, namely government ownership, increased government 
control, or return to prewar conditions. Secretary of the Treasury 
McAdoo, who was also Director General of the Railroads, held more 
definite ideas regarding the immediate future of the railroads.
60Ibid., 3003-12, 3035; and New York Times, February 9, 1919, 1.
^See Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 53-54, for a discussion of 
tax policy during the 1920's— which was much different from the war 
years.
390
Writing to Thetus Sims, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, 
he advocated that the government retain control of railroads until 
1924. During this five-year period Congress would have the opportunity 
to evolve new legislation which would incorporate the lessons learned 
from the war. In conclusion, he told Sims that although the short 
third session of the 65th Congress prohibited general legislation, 
the House would have time to pass the five-year extension along with 
a $750 million appropriation for the operation of the railroads.®2
The House Appropriation Committee agreed with McAdoo's recom­
mendation to consider only the appropriation and extension aspects 
of the railroad question. However, this decision did not stop 
congressmen from viewing McAdoo's recommendations in terms of their 
implications on government control.®3 Consequently, in hearings on 
the bill, Chairman Sherley argued that the $750 million appropriation 
implied a failure on the part of the railroad corporations because 
their profits were not large enough to finance improvements. Accor­
ding to Sherley, the long-term solution to capital investment problems 
was to be found in consolidation, though not in government ownership. 
Several committee members, who feared that the five-year extension 
would lead to government ownership, defended the railroads and 
reoriented Sherley's thesis. Gillett's questioning of witnesses 
suggested that the request for money showed that the government had
®2New York Times, December 3, 1918, 1; December 12, 1918, 1; 
Washington Post, December 12, 1918, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 
57, 3 Sess., Pt. 1.
®3See New York Times, November 23, 1918, 1; December 6, 1918, 14; 
January 5, 1919, II, 16; January 8, 1919, 1; January 12, 1919, 18; 
February 7, 1919, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt.
2, 1423-28 for various plans on the reorganization of the railroads.
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mismanaged the railroads. Siding with Gillett's position on the 
extension, the Committee rejected Sherley's, refused to revise the 
twenty-one month provision already in the Railroad Act of 1918, and 
agreed to the $750 million appropriation.®4
Since the appropriation for the railroads was never in doubt,
House floor debates focused on government control. Republican opponents 
seized the debates as another opportunity to attack the Administration. 
Accordingly, William J. Graham (R-Ill.) asserted that the Administra­
tion had managed the railroads poorly during the war; they would have 
operated better had they remained under private control. Led by Sam 
Rayburn (D-Tex.), Democratic opponents joined the Republican critics 
and proposed an amendment which stipulated that the railroads would be 
returned to private control by December 31, 1919. The split within 
the parties over the issue became apparent when Democratic proponents 
of strong government regulation countered by proposing a compromise 
amendment for a three-year extension. Increasing the confusion were 
Republican advocates of regulation. They advanced a third amendment 
which prohibited the President from relinquishing control until July 
1, 1920. With the House divided into contending factions, the result 
was the predictable defeat of all three amendments on non-roll call 
votes.®® At this point after the war, the House displayed marked 
confusion on future railroad policy. A desire for a modification of 
railroad laws was evident, but whether this meant greater government
®4U. S. Congress, House, Appropriation for Federal Control of 
Transportation Systems, Hearings on H. R. 16020, 65 Cong., 3 Sess.,
72, 132, 146, 3-6, and 129.
®®Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3890, 3895-
96, 3900.
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regulation was still unclear. In the meantime, the railroads would 
continue to operate under the Railroad Act of 1918.
In the quest for the restoration of peacetime economic conditions, 
the House reached a definite policy on wheat prices. Before the 
Armistice, President Wilson had issued a proclamation guaranteeing the 
price of wheat at $2.28 a bushel and calling on the nation's farmers 
to plant mo^e wheat. In response, farmers sowed more wheat in expecta­
tion of high prices, but when the Armistice was declared, doubts were 
raised regarding government wheat policy. As a consequence, many con­
gressmen demanded that the government support wheat prices, predicted 
a severe break in prices otherwise, and introduced bills to protect the 
farmer.66
During Agriculture Committee hearings on the guarantee, Repre­
sentative Gilbert Haugen (R-Iowa) pointed out that only farmers had 
been governed by price controls. As a result they were entitled, he 
insisted, to good prices because laborers and munition makers and even 
grain dealers had received handsome compensation during the war.
Haugen implied that the farmer had been unfairly treated, but some 
witnesses rejected the idea of a guaranteed wheat price because they 
favored lower bread prices for consumers and restoration of the free 
market system. A majority of Committee members, however, agreed with 
Haugen, since they believed that the government had pledged its word 
to the farmer. Questions concerning methods by which the government 
would guarantee the price, still protect the consumer, and
^New York Times, January 1, 1919, 12; January 20, 1919, 4;
February 4, 1919, 4; and February 6, 1919, 14.
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stabalize farm markets remained unresolved when the hearings 
closed.®7
The bill as finally reported by the Committee appropriated 
one billion dollars to make up for any difference between the 
guaranteed price and the market price. It also conferred wide powers 
on the Food Administration Grain Corporation to control markets, 
establish corporations, and license grain dealers. In this form the 
bill gave the consumer the benefit of the market price if it happened 
to be lower than the guarantee. Chairman Lever of the Agriculture 
Committee justified the two-price system on the grounds that many 
poor people could not afford high wheat prices. He also argued 
that the government should accept the burden in order to prevent 
civil disorder— a thesis often heard during House debates. His 
final observation was that the government probably would not expend 
much of the one billion dollars because world demand for wheat would 
remain strong through 1919. Congressman George Huddleston, one of 
the few critics of the bill, continued to voice populist sentiments 
when he rejected Lever's arguments and charged that the bill utterly 
failed to protect poor people from high prices. It was much more 
likely he asserted that the poor would actually suffer because the 
Grain Corporation would manipulate market prices in order to avoid 
paying the farmers the guaranteed price. Since the consensus in 
favor of giving the farmer a "fair share" of the economic pie overroad 
such criticism, the bill passed on a roll call vote, 278 to fourteen.®®
®7U. S. Congress, House, Wheat Guaranteed by Congress, Hearings 
on H. R. 12596, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 39, 48, 87, 136-37, 19, 140, 51,
62, 72, 84, 92, 107, 155, 193-96.
®8New York Times, February 7, 1919, 4; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
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Congressmen, who saw the wheat bill as a necessary obligation, 
found that a number of wartime-initiated social measures entailed no 
responsibility but instead impeded the return to peacetime conditions.
On one hand, the House rejected the perpetuation of non-statutory war­
time programs in job placement, housing, and employment of women in 
industry. Even though they received a number of requests, particularly 
in relation to the government-run Eirployment Service, for their continu­
ance, members believed that postwar conditions demanded retrenchment. 
Further, Chairman Sherely of the Appropriations Committee argued that 
House rules did not permit the consideration of appropriations that had 
no general or enabling legislation behind them. Edward Keating (D-Col.) 
tried to protest this narrow interpretation of House rules and attemp­
ted to prompt a more humanitarian reconstruction. However, the House 
more readily agreed with the conservative position of Minority Leader 
Mann, who maintained that the House would establish a dangerous prece­
dent if it passed appropriations without statutory backing. The 
Sundry Appropriation Bill, consequently, passed without money for 
these wartime social programs.®^
Similarly, the House failed to initiate new programs in the areas 
of adult illiteracy, maternity hygiene, infancy care, rehabilitation 
of victims of industrial accidents, and rehabilitation of the deaf and
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3939-42, 3944, 3954, 3991, 4051.
S. Congress, House, Sundry Appropriation Bill, Heiarings on 
H.R. 15140, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 210; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 4, 4057-70; (Appendix) 229-30, 213; and New York Times, 
February 22, 1919, 3. Joseph W. Fordney (R-Mich.) wrote that he opposed 
the Employment Service because "it is aid to the I.W.W., anarchy, and 
socialism and nothing else." Fordney to W. B. Mershon, April 23, 1919, 
Box 13, Mershon Papers.
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dumb. Congressmen advocated the literacy bill because immigrants 
and others would learn to read English and thus become better citizens. 
Jeannette Rankin (R-Mont.) advanced a humanitarian argument for the 
maternity bill when she told a House committee that justice demanded 
action to decrease the high infancy mortality rate among lower income 
families. But the most persistent theme which congressmen expressed. 
during the hearings was a utilitarian concern that human resources 
should be properly developed. Although the war had likely created an 
increased awareness of wasteful uses of resources, the committees
70failed to report the bills addressing the problem to the House floor. 
House rules, the shortness of the session, and the general attitude 
which opposed innovation blocked action.
To many congressmen the war had disrupted commerce with foreign 
countries and had increased competition between nations. If America 
was to restore prosperous and advantegeous trade conditions, Congress 
needed first to enact a bill appropriating three million dollars for 
the construction of consulates. Advocated also by the Chamber of 
Commerce and other business interests, the bill aimed to promote the 
penetration of American goods into foreign lands. However, the bill
70U.S. Congress, House, To Promote the Education of Native 
Illiterates of Persons Unable to Understand and Use the English 
Language, Hearings on H.R. 15402, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 3, 8; U.S. Congress, 
House, To Require the Commissioner of Education to Desire Methods and 
Promote Plans for the Elimination of Adult Illiteracy, Hearings on 
H.R. 6490, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 9, 15; U. S. Congress, House, Hygiene 
of Maternity and Infancy, Hearings on H. R. 12634, 65 Cong., 3 Sess.,
5, 37; U. S. Congress, House, Promotion of the Vocational Rehabilita­
tion, Hearing on H. R. 12880, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 7-10; U. S. Congress, 
House, Vocational Rehabilitation of Persons Disabled Industry, Hearings 
on S. R. 4922, 41; and U. S. Congress, House, To Create a Bureau for 
the Deaf and Dumb in the Department of Labor, Hearings on H. R. 244.
65 CongT, 3 Sess., 3-12.
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sparked an adverse reaction among economy-minded House members. More 
concerned with retrenchment than expansion of trade, they mobilized a 
voting bloc large enough to defeat the proposal, 173 to 106.7^ Since 
sixty percent of the Democrats and sixty-five percent of the Republi­
cans voted against the bill, partisan influences did not shape the 
House's opposition to the construction of consulates (Table 5-8). Some 
regional influences can be detected because coastal state representa­
tives, particularly among the Democrats, voted in favor of the bill. 
Undoubtedly, attitudes toward economy in government coupled with 
calculations of regional benefit determined the voting pattern on the 
consulate bill.
Another trade proposal was sent to the House by Secretary 
McAdoo, who suggested that Congress extend the life of the War Finance 
Corporation for six months, during which time the WFC would channel 
up to one billion dollars of its funds into loans for the disrupted 
export business. Although favorably reported by the Ways and Means 
Committee, the bill was assailed by Joseph Fordney, ranking Republican 
on that Committee. Another billion dollars used for exporting goods 
would, Fordney maintained, increase the money supply by that much, 
thereby adding to the already high rate of inflation. Even though the 
measure involved no restrictions on business, Fordney also objected 
because it furthered direct cooperation between government and business. 
Gaining the endorsement of several other Republicans, Fordney instead 
desired to end these close ties and to restore the old separation. His 
opposition may also have been influenced by his support of the
7^Washington Post, October 27, 1918, 4; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong.,
Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1818-23.
TABLE 5-8
VOTE BY PARTY AND REGION ON H. RES. 504
Region and Party (Numbers)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS ' BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Yea 3 14 5 12 6 15 4 6 22 1 7 5 — 2 2 54 50
Nay 5 6 17 9 30 3 17 48 1 13 10 1 5 1 6 81 91
Region and Party (Percent)
VOTE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
D R D R D R D R D R D R D R * D R D R
Yea 100 74 46 41 40 33 57 26 31 50 35 — 83 — 67 25 40 35
Nay —  26 54 59 60 67 43 74 69 50 65 100 17 100 33 75 60 65
*Cong. Rec ./ 65 Cong., Vol. 57, : Sess., Pt 2, 1822.
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protective tariff and, consequently, by a hostile attitude toward any 
measure that might promote, even indirectly, free trade. J. Hampton 
Moore moved to strike the WFC provision from the bill, but in this
7?
case the advocates of an aggressive export policy won, 240 to 111.
Many congressmen saw the war-initiated ship building program as 
another means to foster American trade. Although the shortness of the 
session prevented any comprehensive action, the House did have oppor­
tunity to consider an appropriation of $660 million for the Shipping 
Board. This fund was to be used to complete contracts on partially- 
built ships and to convert troop carriers into ships suitable for 
peacetime trade. Not wishing to lose the initial investment on the 
partly built ships, representatives also hoped to use the ships to 
create a merchant marine capable of competing in world commerce. As 
a result, it passed without a roll call as part of the Sundry Appro­
priation Bill.^
Although the House had not followed a consistent trade policy, 
the tendency pointed toward a more aggressive role for the government 
in the export trade. Similarly, the House moved toward greater activity 
for the government in the field of highway construction. Secretary of 
Labor Wilson advocated to Congress "buffer legislation, in particular 
a $200 million highway program, to prevent postwar unemployment and
72Ibid., pt. 5, 4273-78, 4283, 4288, 4342. All but two oppon­
ents came from the Republican ranks, which indicates that anti- 
Administration and anti-free trade sentiments probably operated on 
the ballot. See Noggle, Into the Twenties, 57, for a discussion 
on the postwar evaluation of the WFC.
73New York Times, January 5, 1919, II, 1; and Cong. Rec., 65
Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 4058-61.
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the spread of radical ideas.74 Senators agreed with this reasoning,
attached an appropriation amendment to the postal bill, and gained
the concurrence of the House conferees to the amendment. When the
conference report reached the House, economy-minded members, led by
"Uncle" Joe Cannon, opposed it. Arguing that it was time, after a
period of huge government expenditures, to retrench, Cannon demanded
75a roll call on the amendment, but his motion lost, 267 to seventy.
Among the economic reconstruction measures were two proposals 
for government ownership. During the War, Secretary of the Navy 
Daniels had seized control of radio communications and had purchased 
ship to shore wireless stations. When peace returned, Daniels 
recommended government ownership of wireless communication, mainly 
because of a desire to develop radio for military and corporate uses.
In pursuit of this goal, Daniels proposed a bill before the House 
Merchant Marine Committee which established a government monopoly of 
radio. His basic contention was that radio wave lengths could be 
interferred with and thus a central agency had to monitor use of the 
waves. Minority leader Mann took a dim view of Daniel's actions, 
particularly his employment of the Navy's uncommitted fund to buy 
the ship to shore stations. In a blistering House speech, Mann called 
for Daniels' impeachment, whereupon the House deleted the radio 
purchase money from a naval appropriation bill. A few months later
74New York Times, January 31, 1919, 1.
75Ibid., February 18, 1919, 6; February 20, 1919, 19; and Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3780-89. Most of the 
opponents, fifty-six, represented the Republican party, indicating 
that Cannon was able to influence a number of his colleagues.
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Daniel's last pleas for his plan fell on the unsympathetic ears of 
the House.
The second plan for government ownership originated with another 
cabinet officer, Postmaster General Burleson. During the war, Con­
gress had approved the control of the telephone, telegraph, and cable 
systems by the government. After the Armistice Burleson suggested 
that the communication systems remain under government control for 
two more years and then be returned to private ownership. However, 
Burleson actually wanted more, namely permanent goverr&tent ownership 
of the wires. In a letter to Representative John Moon, Chairman of 
the Postal Committee, he argued that the Constitution necessarily 
allowed government ownership under the defense and postal powers.
He also condemned private ownership for mismanagement and high rates, 
claimed greater efficiency from government ownership, and denied 
any danger of government invasion of privacy. Although critics 
immediately denounced the plan, Burleson had a sympathetic supporter 
in Representative Moon. As a result, his proposals for a two-year
extension and for the takeover went to Moon's committee for a 
7 7hearing.''
William H. Lamar, solicitor for the Post Office, presented the 
bill to the Committee, first noting that the two proposals were
7 6 Joseph L. Morrison, Joseph Daniels; The Sroall-d Democrat 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1966), 109; New York Times, 
November 25, 1918, 1; November 26, 1919, 3; December 13, 1918, 6; 
January 30, 1919, 3; January 31, 1919, 3; February 8, 1919, 10; U.S. 
Congress, House, Government Control of Radio Communication, Hearings 
on H.R. 13159, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 5-30; Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 3, 23-2-03, 3172-73; and (Appendix) 32-37.
^New York Times, December 10, 1918, 1; December 15, 1918, 7;
January 15, 1919, 10; and Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess.,
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separate. He, however, closely connected the two ideas, since he 
argued that the extension of government control would permit time for 
the consolidation of the wire companies. Under the present competi­
tive economic conditions, the public received bad service while the 
companies also were unable to turn a fair profit. Lamar added that 
a period of government control, though not ownership, was even approved 
by most of the wire companies. At this point in Lamar's testimony, 
Martin B. Madden (R-Ill.) brought up the chief objection to continue 
government management, namely that it was to the companies' interests 
since the federal government granted their demands for increased 
rates. Rapid restoration of competitive conditions would, according 
to Madden, lower rates as well as eliminate a number of people from 
the government payroll. The majority of the Committee agreed with 
Madden, but since the companies and Burleson requested some time to 
adjust affairs, the Postal Committee set the date for relinquishment 
eleven months hence, on December 31, 1919. As true in other similar 
cases, congressional insistance on the restoration of prewar compe­
titive conditions overrode desires for centralization, either through
78government regulation or ownership.
In February, 1917, Congress had approved an investigation by the 
Federal Trade Commission into the meat packing industry. The purpose 
was to discover the reasons for the high cost of meat and to determine
Pt. 1, 452, 462-64.
*^ ®U. S. Congress, House, Government Control of the Telegraph 
and Telephone Systems, Hearings on H. J. Res. 368, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 
3-5, 7-11, 18, 148, 392-94, 93, 306-07, 223, 125-27. New York Times, 
January 22, 1919, 1; January 29, 1919, 1. Although the Postal 
Committee reported the bill, the House never considered the bill.
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if the five leading meat packers controlled prices and markets in
violation of the anti-trust laws. Directed by Francis J. Heney, a
colorful California progressive, the investigation lasted for over a
year, during which time it amassed a large quantity of evidence
against the packers. At its conclusion, the FTC decided Heney's
findings warranted legislative action and prevailed upon Thetus Sims,
Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, to introduce a bill.
Though the measure did not propose to nationalize the slaughterhouses,
it did aim to break the control of the packers by taking over their
rolling stock and cold storage plants. Since these capital assets
served as the means to monopolize the packing industry, government
ownership would break the monopoly and restore competition. Chairman
79Sims called hearings, which started in January, 1917.
The hearings revealed that the five major companies controlled 
the industry, set the prices, and divided up the purchase of cattle.
Also uncovered were further abuses, among them the employment of 
marketing pools and the control of bahk credit. William B. Colver, 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, told the Committee that the 
upshot of their practices was higher food prices for consumers. In 
response, Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) indicated that he did not doubt the 
findings, but he characterized the proposals as "drastic" and the 
"very last thing to do" to remedy the situation. What was implied by 
many of the committee members' remarks, especially those of John S.
Snook (D-Ohio), was a fear that the "public may get carried away and 
apply it (government ownership) to all industries." Since the hearings
7 Q
Washington Post, February 25, 1919, 4; New York Times, Decem­
ber 21, 1917, 1; April 1, 1918, 1; and December 11, 1918, 17.
403
dragged on to the middle of February, it became impossible to pass a 
bill during the third session. However, the attitude of the Committee, 
though it pointed away from government ownership, suggested that the 
FTC findings were valid and that some type of action should be taken 
against the packers.80
In contrast to the House's reluctance to adopt proposals for 
government control and ownership, it did, at times, accept schemes 
which permitted private development of natural resources.8* In one 
case, the possible existence of large deposits of metalliferous min­
erals on Indian lands caused Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.) to introduce legis­
lation which would allow prospectors to lease land from the Indians. 
Arguing that it would aid mineral development, Hayden also claimed 
that Indians favored the proposition because they would receive a 
five percent royalty on any finds. Several members viewed Hayden's 
bill as outrageous, maintaining that it would enable the Anaconda 
Copper Corporation to grab all the land. Other Congressmen, such as 
Minority Leader Mann, contended that the House should also consider 
how resources ought to be expended. In the future, "our grandchildren,"
80Ibid., January 23, 1919, 5; June 24, 1919, 1; and U. S. Congress, 
House, Government Control of Meat Packing Industry, Hearings on H. R. 
13324, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 4-8, 14-28, 79, 35-45, 776, 834, 874, 975- 
81, 1028, 2058. In the 1920's, the Packers and Stockyards Act passed 
Congress which gave the Department of Agriculture substantial powers 
over the meat packing industry. See John D. Hicks, Republican Ascen­
dancy, 1921-1933 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 55.
81Some other bills, at least in the minds of individual legis­
lators, raised questions of government ownership. For example, a bill 
to establish a plant for the testing of lignite coal drew charges 
from William H. Stafford (R-Wis.) that plans for government ownership 
had "gone wild". Other legislators did not agree and approved the 
bill. But Stafford's anxieties were widely shared on more clearcut 
cases of government ownership. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57,
3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1114-19.
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Mann pointed out, "would also need some resources." In reply to 
Hayden's argument that the Indians would benefit, Mann insisted that 
the bill, in fact, would adversely affect the Indians since they would 
lose control over the leased lands. Mann added that the five percent 
net royalty was "sheer robbery” of the Indian by the "greedy" white 
man. Since the bill operated under a special House rule, it required 
a two-thirds majority to pass. Consequently, Mann and other represen­
tatives concerned about Indian rights were able to mobilize enough 
members against the Hayden bill, defeating it on a roll call vote.82
A much more controversial resource development bill sought to 
encourage the exploration for coal, oil, gas, phosphate, and sodium 
resources. In particular, the bill provided, as explained by Scott 
Ferris (D-Okla.), for the replacement of the old system of patenting 
lands with government supervision and royalties. Under the new system, 
land would be leased to individuals or companies for different time 
periods, depending upon the resource. The bill also covered the claims 
that resulted from President Taft's 1909 order stopping all private
oil exploration on the oil reserve lands of the navy. Opposed by
Secretary of the Navy Daniels, this provision would allow oil men who 
had lost oil claims because of the order to take out new leases, for 
which they would pay the government royalties. Ferris claimed three 
advantages to the bill: it would change the old give away system for
one that granted the government some rights; it encouraged the develop­
ment of resources; and it cleared up the dispute over Taft's order.83
82Ibid., Pt. 3, 2634-38.
83Ibid., Pt. 4, 3698-3700; and Pt. 5, 4316.
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In agreement with conservation groups outside of Congress,®4 
William Stafford (R-Wis.) described the bill as the "triumph....of 
the exploiters of the public domain." For him and other critics, 
Ferris' contention that the government increased its rights by the 
bill ignored its real results, which were to alienate large sections 
of the public domain, allow sale of land to companies, and permit 
payment of royalties on net profits after the deduction of production 
costs. James Frear (R-Wis.) closed this phase of the argument by 
citing the opposition of Gifford Pinchot to the bill because it allowed 
the plundering of the public. In another phase of the critics' 
argument, John M. Baer (D-N.D.), who rejected Ferris' contention that 
development of resources was immediately required, insisted that the 
bill would lead to the rapid depletion of the country's resources, 
thereby robbing future generations of its potential for economic 
well-being. Winning some modifications in the bill by amendment, the 
proponents of public rights and conservation were still unsatisfied 
with its provisions. They attempted to defeat it but could not, as 
two roll calls on conference reports passes, 232 to 109, and 221 to 
seventy-seven.85
Just days before the close of the session, the House considered 
another resource bill, this one on water power. Passed by the House 
during the second session, the bill, Thetus Sims told the House, had
84The New Republic severely criticized the bill. See Charles 
Merz, "At the Capital," New Republic XIII (January 19, 1918), 349.
88Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 4, 3701-11; and 
Pt. 5, 4489-90, 4497, 4717. The leasing bill did not pass the Senate, 
partly because of Daniels' opposition to it. Also, Senator LaFollette 
filibustered the bill. See Judson King, The Conservation Fight: From
Theodore Roosevelt (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), 54-55.
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been changed in two significant ways by the Senate and House conferees. 
First, a "fair value" recapture clause had been added, thereby modifying 
the original "net value" provision. Second, the bill more clearly 
defined "navigable waters," one of the types of water areas covered by 
the legislation. The first alteration recast the bill in the direc­
tion of President Wilson's desires and thus silenced some critics of 
it. The second substitution, however, drew the objection of Minority 
Leader Mann because the conferees had defined navigable waters too 
narrowly. Otherwise, little criticism surfaced, and only the action
of die-hard opponents forced a roll call on the conference report.
86It passed easily, 263 to sixty-five.
None of the resource measures, it should be noted, were direct 
responses to post war conditions since they had antecedents before the 
war. However, the resource bills in a real sense, reflected postwar 
attitudes because they emphasized a return to normal profit-making 
pursuits with only minimum government restraints. That the House had 
such viewpoints can be seen in their reaction to government-directed 
measures. Bills of this nature, among them the wire services proposi­
tion, rarely emerged from committee or, if they did, they usually 
failed on the House floor. Yet, to say that this atmosphere reflected 
absolute opposition to government direction would be a distortion.
The supporters of development, even though they opposed extensive 
government roles in resource development, did recognize the right of 
government supervision of development. They also undoubtedly wished
86Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 4630-40; King,
The Conservation Fight, 51-55; and Hays, The Gospel of Efficiency,
121, 238-40.
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to conserve some resources for future generations. With these quali­
fications, it was clear that the rapidly evolving House consensus 
opposed centralized direction by the government and favored restora­
tion of more traditional and competitive patterns of resource use.8'7
Since the four resource roll calls associate, it was possible to 
scale congressmen as to their attitude toward the bills. While fifty 
percent of the Republicans supported efforts to defeat or to amend the 
resource measures, only four percent of the Democrats voted against 
them (Table 5:9). East North and West North Central Republicans 
voted in above average numbers for greater government control. The 
moderate members, who agreed to three of the four motions in support 
of the bills, represented both parties in nearly equal numbers. No 
discernible geographical pattern developed except among Middle Atlan­
tic Republicans. The strongest supporters of private development were 
the Democrats, since seventy-four percent voted for the measures while 
only seventeen percent of the Republicans adhered to the same stance. 
Both parties of the Western states supported the measures, indicating 
that the Westerners saw advantages to private development. Regional 
factors helped to shape the ballot, but more surprising was the sup­
port of the Republicans for greater government supervision of re­
source development. Normally, Republicans are pictured as advocates
87The question of centralization and competition is one to which 
the recent historiographical literature has given considerable atten­
tion. The more general works, such as Wiebe's The Search for Order, 
tend to argue that government was promoting greater concentration. 
Several articles, among them Robert F. Himmelberg, "The War Industries 
Board and the Antitrust Question in November 1918," Journal of Ameri­
can History,LII (June, 1965), 59-74, take a different stance, claiming 
that after the war government agencies moved away from the permanent 
adoption of controls. See also Noggle, Into the Twenties, 57-65.
TABLE 5-9:A
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON
RESOURCE LEGISLATION
Region and Party (Numbers) '
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D ' R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 1 5 7 1 33 —  17 1 1 1 4 1 4 68
Medium — 7 3 18 2 9 2 3 17 1 6 7 — — — 4 32 45
High 3 3 2 6 11 2 4 2 58 1 13 2 8 3 3 4 102 23
TOTAL 4 15 5 31 14 44 6 22 78 3 20 7 8 4 3 8 133 134
Region and Party (Percent)
SCALE NE MA ENC WNC SS BS MS' PS TOTAL
POSITION D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R D R
Low 25 33 23 7 75 —  77 1 33 5 57 25 3 50
Medium — 47 60 58 14 20 33 14 24 33 30 14 — — — 50 23 33
High 75 20 40 19 79 5 67 9 75 34 65 29 100 75 100 50 74 17
The order of the roll calls is 268, 236, 256, 245 
Percent at each point on the scale 13, 14, 4, 23, 46 
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .957
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TABLE 5-9:B
SCALOGRAM BY PARTY AND REGION ON RESOURCE LEGISLATION
Scale
Position Variance Motion
268 To agree to the conference report on the dis­
agreeing votes of the two houses on the amendment 
of the House to Bill S. 1419, amending an act 
entitled "an act to regulate the construction of 
dams across navigable rivers," the report 
recommending that a commission be created to be 
known as the Federal Power Commission. 263-65;
+ = yea. Cong Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., 
Pt. 5, 4640.
236 To amend H.R. 14746, making appropriations for
the current and contingent expenses of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs for fulfilling treaty stipula­
tions with various Indian tribes for fiscal year 
1920, by eliminating the words part of the appro­
priation shall be expended for uncontested 
"excluding oil and gas leases" from the provision 
that no leases to the Secretary of the Interior 
for approval, because the inspectors of the Indian 
Department make investigations of such leases 
and it is not necessary to include them in the 
prohibition. 198-68; + = yea. Ibjd., Pt. 2,
2032.
256 To agree to the conference report on S. 2812,
encouraging the mining of coal, phosphate, gas, 
and sodium on the public domain. 232-109; + = 
yea. Ibid., 3710.
4 245 To pass Bill S. 385, authorizing mining on the 
unalloted lands in Indian reservations. 168-90; 
+ = yea. Ibid., 2638.
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of private initiative, but, at least in this case, Democrats played 
that role.
Retrospect
Although the House had enacted no overall or bold reconstruction 
program during the third session, a clear theme can be discerned from 
its actions. Undoubtedly aware of the veterans’ potential electoral 
power, congressmen adopted several measures beneficial to them— al­
though they, at the same time, refused to consider Secretary Lane's 
comprehensive plan for employment of veterans. When representatives 
turned to military policy, they rejected the Army's plans and would 
have similarly blocked the Navy's program except for a timely appeal 
from Wilson. Forced to consider, albeit only indirectly, matters of 
international affairs, the House was divided as to America's role in 
restoring peace; nonetheless, it was clear that many congressmen dis­
trusted Wilson's peacemaking plans. Economically, the House readily 
agreed to the revised Revenue Bill and to several proposals which were 
designed to increase American trade. But the House preferred to post­
pone railroad legislation and rejected implementation of plans that 
involved government intervention in the economy and close business 
and government relations. When representatives did agree to active 
economic programs, as they did on several resource development pro­
posals, the bills largely envisioned a program of economic develop­
ment directed not by the government but by competitive capitalists 
seeking personal welfare under minimum government regulation. Above 
all, the House spurned the social implication of the war, rejecting 
appropriations for housing, employment, and rehabilitation projects.
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In general, congressional attitudes favored retrenchment and restora­
tion rather than reconstruction.
To find the sources for the House's attitude it is necessary,
first of all, to note the failure of partisan leadership and the
revival of partisanship. When Wilson left for Paris, leadership 
devolved directly to House Democrats Kitchin and Clark who had no 
desire to develop a program. Undoubtedly, they also thought that by 
assuming the President's role for the party they would be exceeding 
their authority. Though Republicans did not suffer from absentee 
leadership, the factional infighting for the speakership seat likely 
diverted attention from reconstruction. In any event, party leader­
ship did not function for the creation of conprehensive programs;
yet, the parties were able to mobilize their cadres for a number of
highly partisan roll call votes.
. Such a development could have indicated the push for a recon­
struction program by one of the parties and the ensuing battle over 
it. Clearly, this was not the situation, since both parties battled 
for partisan advantage over often trivial measures, such as the bill 
on the Dawson Springs sanitorium for veterans. On more fundamental 
matters, the parties' internal cohesion often broke apart, proving 
them incapable of sustaining the strain of complex questions. On 
the significant issues of progressivism and internationalism, the
pO
Republicans recorded their lowest cohesion scores.00 Democrats were 
more unified, but they were divided over government policy for
pp
Allen and Clubb found Republican unity lower "on more issues 
that were clearly relevant to Progressive reform" than the Democrats 
during the Progressive years. See Allen and Clubb, "Party Loyalty 
During the Progressive Years," 574-75.
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railroads and nationalization of the wire services. Civen the negati­
vism of the partisanship, the failure of the House to draft bold 
departures in policy was not surprising.
"Party Voting," defined as fifty percent or more of one party
in opposition to fifty percent or more of another party, significantly
increased from thirty-nine percent of the first session and from forty
percent of the second session to fifty-six percent (Table 5-10).
Similarly, party voting at the level of ninety percent in opposition
to ninety percent shot,up:. In the first and second sessions extreme
partisan voting nearly disappeared as only two percent and three
percent respectively were recorded at that level. In contrast, the
third session recorded twenty-two percent of its votes at this high
level. As a result of the increased party voting the third session's
voting record returned to patterns more in line with those of the
first Wilson Congress, which registered seventy-four percent of its
89votes at the fifty versus fifty level.
Internal cohesion of parties remained high, even with a greatly 
reduced number of unanimous votes. During the first and second 
sessions, approximately thirty percent of all roll calls received 
the complete support of both parties. In the third session, the per­
centage of unanimous votes declined to nineteen percent. This lower 
percentage of unanimous votes should have removed a basis for high 
internal unity within the parties, since a roll call of this type gave 
a party a high cohesion score. Yet, the Democrats' cohesion score 
went up from seventy-four and seventy-one in the first two sessions
®^Clubb and Allen, "Party Loyalty During the Progressive 
Years," 571.
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TABLE 5-10
PERCENTAGE OP PARTY VOTES AND AVERAGE PARTY 
UNITY SCORES BY SESSIONS
1st
Sessions
2nd 3rd Overall
Percentage "Party Votes"
50 v. 50 39% 40% 56% 47%
90 v. 90 2%* 3% 22% 11%
Average Cohesion Score
Democrats 74 71 76 73
Republicans 66 68 64 67
*The score does not include the House organizing votes; with 
them included, the percentage was sixteen.
414
to seventy-six in the third. The Republican’s cohesion score did 
decline from sixty-six and sixty-eight to sixty-four.
Cohesion on selected individual issues varied significantly 
between the Republicans and Democrats (Table 5 - 1 1 ). The Democrats 
recorded Rice Index scores of sixty or above on war contracts, 
veterans, progressivism, war, and European relief. Only economy 
issues divided the Democrats, as they registered a score of forty- 
six. In contrast, the Republicans achieved high unity only on war 
issues and average unity on war contracts, veterans, and economy 
issues. Two issues, European relief and progressivism, divided them 
sharply, as their cohesion score fell below forty. Clearly, the 
Democrats during the third session maintained higher levels of unity, 
both overall and on most individual issues: their cohesion score
was more than ten points higher than that of the Republicans on all 
issues except war contracts and economy.
In the first two sessions the high cohesion partly resulted 
from wartime-induced unity, as witnessed by the high percentage of 
unanimous votes. Although war related measures continued to influence 
the high cohesion of the third session, cohesion was usually a function 
of partisan voting. That this is true is seen from the increase of 
partisan voting, which jumped from forty to forty-six percent. With 
the return of peace, competitive desires of one party to defeat the 
other resulted in high internal cohesion.90
90Ibid., 5 7 1 -7 6 . Allen and Clubb discuss high cohesion as a 
function of strong party competition. The first and second sessions 
followed to a degree an unusual pattern while the third returned to 
a more normal course.
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TABLE 5-11
AVERAGE COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUES, 
3RD SESSION
Republican
Average Cohesion Score
Democrat
1. War Contracts
2. Veterans
3. Progressive
4. War
5. Economic
6. European Relief
55
58
37
71
50
35
61
71
72 
77 
46 
84
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A second factor hindering the creation of a positive reconstruc­
tion program was the absence of any ideological group supporting a 
reconstruction program. Cohesive voting groups that operated on more 
than one bill rarely developed, particularly if they were not essen­
tially a partisan grouping. As such, a group that mobilized in support 
of a progressive position, for example on taxation, did not perceive 
a community of interests on other issues. Underlying this failure were 
the vague ideas that representatives possessed on the rationalization 
of industry and economic planning. At times, congressmen told their 
colleagues of the virtues of efficiency and social welfare, but only 
in the area of railroad legislation did advocacy for centralization 
find wide currency. Questions involving railroads had antecedents 
long before the war, and few if any congressmen were ready to extend 
principles of railroad regulation to new areas of social and economic 
activities. As Joseph Fordney told the House, the country could take 
care of itself without centralized action and close business and 
government relations. In the absence of a coherent liberalism, 
the tendency of the House was to replace government control for the 
old competitive order.
Finally, the emergence of anti-radicalism, which would eventually 
lead to the famous Red Scare, foretold the defeat of reconstruction 
proposals. In a counter productive fashion, advocates of recon­
struction proposals attempted to suggest that radicalism could be 
blunted by their schemes. Such an appeal, however, only deepened
9^Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., Vol. 57, 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 3015.
92Ibid., pt. 3, 2718, 2756, 3230 for examples of the House's 
attitude toward communist radicalism.
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apprehensions which were relieved more easily by rejecting change
than in responding positively to the supposed danger of Bolshevism.
Of course/ an atmosphere of tension and anxiety was not favorable to
the passage of bills protecting the rights of dissenters and radicals,
and few representatives, in fact, did show any interest in the fate
93of such extremists. As the press of legislative business in the 
last days of the session crowded upon the House, congressmen neglected 
both the dangers of radicalism and the problems of reconstruction as 
they attempted to complete the appropriation bills on the legislative 
calendar. Their failure to do so, along with the generally unimpres­
sive record on reconstruction, left the country frustrated and un-
94happy with the third session's performance.
William E. Mason (R-Ill.) defended conscientious objectors 
and decried the way the military treated them, but most congressmen 
remained silent or spoke against un-American elements. For Mason's 
speech and others, see ibid., (Appendix) 229-30, 131-34, 291.
Q A
The House closed on a note of surface harmony as Uncle Joe 
Cannon led the House in "God be with you till we meet again." Below 
the surface tempers were not so placid. See ibid., Pt. 5, 4913, 4672, 
4022-23; and New York Times, March 5, 1919, 1. Many critical comments 
were voiced by the press against the third session. See February 28, 
1919, 12; March 5, 1919, 1; March 9, 1919, III, 5-8; Washington Post, 
March 3, 1919, 1; March 5, 1919, 1; Lindsay Rogers, "Short Session of 
Congress," American Political Science Review, XIII (May, 1919), 251-63; 
"Deeds and Misdeeds of Congress," Literary Digest, LX (March 15, 1919), 
16-17; and "Editorial— Close of Congress," New Republic, XIII (March 
8, 1919), 162.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
To summarize the history of the 65th House presents many diffi­
culties because the war spawned much confusion and many tensions. Yet, 
due to this very tension, it is possible to describe the House by the 
word "paradox." While institutional arrangements such as long tenure 
and seniority increased stability, they also created independence 
and conflict among powerholders. The party system, the bedrock of 
House decisions, united large numbers of representatives and yet 
pitted groups of members against each other. On some issues parties 
voted together as evidenced by high cohesion scores and by low "party 
voting." But on other paramount issues, parties either split inter­
nally or fought each other bitterly. On taxation and reconstruction, 
the House followed a consistent position. Yet, on other issues, no 
coalition stayed together for more than one or two bills, and the 
parties struck no uniform conservative or progressive stance. Having 
entered the war under the guidance of President Wilson, the House 
rejected his leadership immediately after the war. Present at all 
times in the 65th House was an undercurrent of emotion and anxiety 
that flowed from the war and the postwar situation. Bound together 
by the feelings of patriotism and idealism, as well as fear and 
bigotry, the House adopted bold war programs, then later rejected 
progressive reconstruction plans.
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In light of these paradoxes, how can the interpretations of 
historians on this period be evaluated? It is evident from the com­
plexity of House attitudes that the schools of interpretation on 
American intervention have over-emphasized their particular theses: 
German intrigue against American liberty, munitions makers' profits, 
German submarine warfare, or German plots against world security. 
Individually, these explorations fail to account for the conplexity 
of representatives' motivations, but together they help to explain 
why the House voted to enter the war. Any history of American inter­
vention written exclusively within the framework of defense of liberty 
overestimates the idealism of congressmen and underrates their prag­
matic orientations. The munitions makers thesis as a general approach 
captures the interest and economic motivation of some congressmen but 
fails to consider properly the emotional and political climate in which 
they reached their decisions. The submarine theory is best, partly 
because it recognizes the German threat to American rights and to 
American prosperity created by the U-boat warfare. But it is also 
valid because it emphasizes the historical context for House actions. 
Given the sinking of American ships, the mounting frenzy, and the 
ringing appeal for war by President Wilson, representatives had to 
vote "yea" on the war resolution. And finally, all these theses over­
look a significant factor shaping the vote for war. Albert Johnson 
(R-Wash.) told his House colleagues that America entered the conflict 
to prevent "the pollution of American blood." Other congressmen spoke 
as though the war should purge American society of aliens, radicals, 
and dissenters. From the very beginning, motivations were confused
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and tarnished, even though Wilson tried to establish a noble purpose 
for American involvement.
Since representatives supported intervention because of a 
variety of motives, pro-war coalition soon broke apart. Some.evidence 
of the coalition can be found on the vote for the draftee army, but 
throughout the rest of the sessions congressmen formed only single 
issue voting blocs on war legislation. For example, the coalition of 
Republicans and Democrats which formed to pass the postwar European 
food relief bill had no ties with the prewar interventionists and non­
interventionists. Likewise, the blocs that voted to demobilize the 
army and reduce the navy represented different interests. It is true 
that a partisan influence can be found in these postwar decisions 
since some Republicans supported isolationist and nationalist positions 
by opposing food relief and favoring a larger navy and army. Yet, 
it is equally a fact that a consistent isolationist bloc can not be 
delineated because different Republicans voted against European relief 
and for larger armies. The evidence demonstrates that a coherent 
voting group did not operate on questions of intervention and inter­
nationalism.
A corollary to this thesis is that voting between international 
and domestic ballots followed no consistent pattern, a fact that has 
definite implications for the historiography on the Progressive Move­
ment. Since William E. Leuchtenburg's pioneer article in 1952, 
historians have conducted a lively debate over the stance of progres­
sives toward intervention and non-intervention and postwar interna­
tionalism. In light of this study's quantitative evidence, a question 
that historian William Trattner has asked is highly relevant: is it
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not anachronistic to speak of progressivism and its relation to 
foreign affairs? Although this study agrees with his implication, it 
nonetheless must be qualified because the non-interventionists later 
voted for the progressive position on several non-foreign policy 
issues. Moreover, to expect consistency among progressive congressmen 
on both international and domestic questions fails to recognize the 
complexity of each issue, the often discrete events and ideas behind 
it, and the different political and regional interests affected by 
such issues. As a result, progressivism could have been a real in­
fluence on his roll calls and House attitudes on foreign policy, but 
other factors overshadowed its influence. Yet, to make these latter 
comments only emphasizes the failure to find links between progressi­
vism and international policy. Even though the evidence is incomplete 
— largely due to the paucity of roll calls directly on foreign affairs 
— it still must be concluded that Trattner has correctly questioned the 
soundness of the historiographic debate on foreign affairs and domes­
tic progressivism.
Since no consistent voting bloc existed on foreign affairs, it 
might be supposed that no definite ideological positions were arti­
culated by congressmen. John Milton Cooper, however, has cogently 
argued that debates took place within the structures of very definite 
ideological presuppositions. He breaks these down into two main 
positions, isolationism and internationalism. Each has two sub­
divisions— idealism and nationalism. Congressmen such as Simon Fess 
(R-Ohio), who favored American intervention and then opposed the 
League of Nations, can be labeled, in Cooper's terms, international 
nationalists. Cordell Hull (D-Tenn.) pursued an idealistic
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internationalist course that led him from support of intervention to 
vigorous advocacy of the League of Nations. Cooper presumes that most 
congressmen followed consistent courses similar to Fess and Hull, and, 
as a result, ideological positions were held by distinct groups of 
representatives. But, as discovered by the roll call analysis, many 
did not vote consistently, and instead changed their positions much as 
did William Mason (R-Xll.). Voting first against the war, Mason later 
came to favor American membership on a world court, but not the League 
of Nations. This phase of Cooper's thesis also ignores the bundle 
of conflicting, partisan, economic, and regional interests behind 
debates on wartime policy, postwar army and naval policy, and 
European relief. Consequently, the flux of events and proposals 
rendered the expression of an ideological position by groups of con­
gressmen nearly impossible.
To note these points is not to deny Cooper's thesis altogether, 
but, on the contrary, to emphasize the usefulness of his categories.
On the level of ideological expression he has brilliantly delineated 
the viewpoints within which House debates revolved. Throughout the 
three sessions, foreign policy and its complement, naval and army 
planning, were discussed within the context either of American ideals 
or American self-interest. From his description of conflicting 
ideologies, a paradox develops that highlights the House's inability 
to forge a postwar policy: ideological consistency could exist on
the level of expression, but on the level of decision-making the 
complexity of events caused the formulation of separate voting 
combinations for each issue.*
*The apparent inconsistency of House voting patterns could
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Equally paradoxical was the fate of domestic and progressive 
reform. Until Arthur Link's article in 1959, historical literature 
had assumed that progressivism disappeared before or during the war. 
More recently, a series of articles has sketched a vibrant and crea­
tive phase among laborers, social workers, and intellectuals, at least 
in planning if not in actually achieving concrete goals. Charles 
Hirschfeld, in one of these articles, has pointed out that the war 
experience generated a new awareness of the importance of planning. 
This heralded the arrival of a new "liberalism." That the Hirschfeld 
thesis is correct in the sense that progressivism continued into the 
65th House cannot be doubted. Without this assumption, House debates 
on taxation, natural resources and conservation, and govemment- 
business cooperation become largely unintelligible. In another sense, 
evidence, however, does not support the thesis that a flowering of 
progressive thought and plans occurred during the war or after.
During the first session the war forced the House into a new 
and bold direction. For some representatives the Revenue Act of 
1917, which Democrats and Midwest Republicans passed against the
partly result from the deficiencies of the type of computer analysis 
used by this study. It should be emphasized that computer programs 
have definite limitations in pinpointing voting blocs. As a result, 
the question of whether or not progressives were isolationists or 
interventionists can not be absolutely determined. When the war 
vote was taken only fifty members opposed intervention, and from the 
analysis of that vote it appears that some of the opponents were 
progressives. But it was difficult to trace the influence of this 
group in later votes that had some implications for isolationism.
The European food relief bill and the navy bill did indicate a Mid­
western regional connection between the war resolution ballot and the 
isolationist position on food relief and naval policy. Although 
computer analysis indicated that they were not the same representa­
tives, a small element of congressmen could be consistent and computer 
analysis still might not find them.
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stubborn opposition of Northeastern Republicans, was the harbinger 
of future reforms. On the other hand, House Democrats adopted the 
repressive Espionage Bill. Overall, congressmen of both parties 
agreed to the regimentation of the country as they enacted measures 
to organize the food supply, the transportation network, the financial
system, and the industry and the labor of the nation for war. Planning
and centralization slackened during the second session, but the House 
now approved progressive issues when it passed the prohibition and 
women's suffrage amendments. Advocates of both measures claimed that
the war had set in motion forces which would improve the nation and
held that prohibition and women's suffrage represented the ideals of 
the war. However, representatives, who also capped the loyalty 
program begun by the first session with the Sedition Act, suggested 
no new plans to achieve the democratic objectives of the war. During 
the third session the possibilities for progressive reform were again 
present. The House considered legislation for a reconstruction 
commission, veteran benefits, railroads, natural resource development, 
communications, and government social aid in housing and employment.
A few congressmen apparently had a new awareness of the government's 
potential for action, believing that economic and human resources 
ought to be better managed than they were before the war. Moreover, 
congressmen did not object to government help for foreign trade or 
natural resource development, but their position on these issues was 
neither progressive nor was it part of a design to stabilize and 
rationalize capitalism (as Gabriel Kolko argues). Rather the House 
favored government intervention because it aided economic recovery 
and restored prewar competition. To the House membership the goal
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of reconstruction was not enacting new programs but dismantling war­
time restrictions.
This study not only investigated postwar progressivism, but 
also the very nature of progressivism. Historians have gone in two 
distinct and separate paths on this subject, some arguing the exis­
tence of a unified movement and others claiming that the movement was 
highly variegated with at best only a central desire for reform. To 
the first, the movement represented the struggle between the corpora­
tions and the people, the revolt of the middle class, the design of 
businessmen for a bureaucratic order, or the establishment of corporate 
capitalism. To the latter, progressivism was made up of politicians 
seeking the votes of the disgruntled, high-minded social reformers 
attempting to abolish poverty, and businessmen and laborers desiring 
benefits for their particular interest groups. This research does 
nothing to lessen the emphasis on the many-sided complexion of 
progressivism, arguing that no consistent ideological bloc formed. 
Instead, groups supported only one progressive issue at a time and 
then melted away.
On one level this thesis must apparently be qualified because 
partisan groups tended to follow a consistent position on progressi­
vism. Howard Allen and Jerome Clubb note for earlier Wilsonian 
Congresses that progressives tended to be split between parties. Occa­
sionally, reformers were able to overcome this division and pass legis­
lation. Although this thesis is valid for voting on some progressive 
issues (a case in point is the Revenue Bill of 1917), Allen's and Clubb's 
further contention that most progressives were in the Democratic 
party is wrong for at least the 65th House. It is true that many
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Republicans opposed the 1917 Revenue Bill, but they adopted the 
progressive side on the second tax bill. The progressive issues of 
prohibition and women's suffrage found the Republicans more unified in 
support than the Democrats. While the GOP objected to several features 
of the espionage laws and loyalty program, Democrats supported greater 
restrictions. Similarly, Republicans tended toward progressivism on 
labor and conservation with Democrats opposing them. Allen and Clubb's 
thesis does not reflect the reversal of party positions on progressi­
vism during the war years.
On another level, the parties' positions did not reflect a con­
sistent ideological stance since statistical roll call analysis found 
no uniform correlations over a number of separate issues. Rather, the 
parties' voting behavior demonstrated the pull of discrete stances, 
events, and proposals. Consequently, Republican support of progressive 
positions cannot be construed as reflecting an ideological position, 
but the result of seeking partisan advantage on a series of indi­
vidual issues.
Contrary to the arguments of some historians, such as Dewey 
Grantham, regional groups displayed weak progressive tendencies. 
Occasionally, progressive ideals had some influence on the votes of 
a region's representatives, but more normally economic and social 
interests shaped their ballots. As a case in point, Midwestern 
Republicans broke from their party and voted with the Democrats on 
the 1917 Revenue Act, not so much because of the influence of pro­
gressive ideals as because of the distribution of the tax burden—  
which fell more on the industrial Northeast than the agrarian regions. 
In another instance, Northeastern Republicans struck a progressive
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pose on some conservation measures, mainly because the West stood to 
gain from government payments to mining interests while their region 
would not. In truth, one of the weaknesses of progressivism was that 
it was often dependent upon regional interests for its strength. Only 
when other interests merged with progressivism, which occurred on a 
few individual issues, did it become a viable factor on roll calls. 
Allen and Clubb noted the role of constituent influence on progressi­
vism, but in their efforts to find indications of progressivism they 
failed to pursue the ramifications of the thesis.
Another reason for progressivism's inability to forge a co­
herent bloc was that many congressmen found much of the organization 
for war reprehensible. Historians (among them Allen Davis, Gabriel 
Kolko, James Weinstein, and Robert Wiebe), who make much ado about 
the consummation or the resurgence of progressivism, completely 
misjudged the House's reaction to the war experience. Since congress­
men wrote the laws, their attitudes were more important than those of 
social reformers or businessmen. Doubtless, Idle forces of rationaliza­
tion and centralization inherent in capitalism and war accelerated 
rapidly in the crisis. But, for many representatives the new regimen­
tation contrasted too sharply with the prewar role of government in 
economic and social spheres. Robert Cuff, writing about the War 
Industries Board, has pointed out that traditional methods continued 
to have a strong influence in shaping attitudes against the bureau­
cratic state. Additionally, the House had other reasons for rejecting 
planning and social programs. They disliked the shift of power from 
Congress to the Executive Branch, the overly rapid implementation of 
government-business cooperation in less than two years, and the
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apparent radicalism of the plans. In short, a progressive and con­
servative stance is impossible to define because representatives 
overwhelmingly favored the end of wartime economic management and 
social programs. Ironically, progressivism did not surge into a 
dynamic phase of development during the war for progressive ideals.
The first and second sessions witnessed a sharp decline in 
partisan voting from other Congresses of the Progressive Era, and, 
at the same time, parties achieved near-record internal cohesion.
Some historians interpret such a trend as indicating the burial of 
partisan animus. However, Seward Livermore in Woodrow Wilson and the 
War Congress has correctly described the bi-partisan voting as a 
camouflage of the protracted struggle between the parties. In the 
first session Republicans began maneuvering against the determined 
opposition of the Democrats to establish a congressional committee 
on the conduct of the war. This conflict increased in the second 
session. At the same time, parties battled each other over a number 
of individual issues, although it is true that the voting divisions 
were not as sharp as during earlier Wilsonian Congresses. In the 
third session partisanship dropped its covert characteristics. With 
all pretense gone, parties clashed over control of reconstruction and 
party voting returned to higher prewar levels.
Historians and political scientists agree that parties are the 
paramount influence on roll calls and in the creation of policy. In 
some ways, this magnifies the significance of parties during the 65th 
House because partisanship often focused on trivial economic and 
procedural measures. With more substantial issues the parties fre­
quently failed to pursue a clear policy. For instance, on the water
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power bill, Democrats in the second session supported greater federal 
control while the Republicans opposed it. But during the third session 
the parties reversed stances on federal regulation. Even on the war 
program, the parties usually followed the leadership of Woodrow Wilson 
who directed the House on what measures to consider. When the war 
came to a halt, parties did not so much create reconstruction policy 
as follow the general mood of the House, for almost all members, 
irrespective of party, favored scrapping wartime innovations.
Yet, the truth is that the role of parties cannot be completely 
dismissed. For one thing, partisanship, even if regional and ideo­
logical forces were combined, was the most inportant factor shaping 
divisions on roll calls. More significantly, partisanship embittered 
House-Presidential relations and caused, for instance, much of the 
hostile criticism of the War Department. Also, during the third 
session, partisan rivalry had much to do with the defeat of the recon­
struction commission and the blockage of individual progressive 
proposals for the postwar world. Again paradox can be noted: while
the war and the President overshadowed and shaped the parties' actions, 
parties nonetheless frustrated the creation of postwar policy.
Viewing the 65th House from the perspective of paradox allows 
an unusually fine opportunity to explore the evolution of the most 
tragic of the wartime tensions, President Wilson's call for the 
victory of democracy and his demand for the enactment of repressive 
measures. At first, the House— particularly Republicans who feared 
that the laws would be used against their newspapers— hesitated to 
adopt all the features of the espionage and loyalty program. By the 
second session, the mounting war hysteria overrode all opposition,
i
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and the Sedition Act and Alien Deportation Act passed with hardly 
a word of opposition. By the third session, the war-induced distrust 
of aliens and dissenters had grown to include radicals. The House did 
not enact new and bold legislation, partly because of its anxiety 
about subversive elements.
Historical research offers several reasons for the growth of 
intolerance and each one is useful in understanding House acceptance 
of restrictive measures. A long tradition that demanded conformity 
and objected to the presence of radicals, dissenters, and aliens in 
American life is described by William Preston in Aliens and Dissenters. 
Preston argued that these traditional forces of bigotry, combined with 
the ever-increasing war tensions, overcame the few forces impeding the 
advance of repression. When the war drew to a close, congressmen's 
attention shifted from pacifists and pro-Germans to political radicals.
H. C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite in Opponents of War pictured how the 
government decided to mobilize the people for war by combining re­
pression with education. And finally, wartime anxieties and tensions 
and the failure of executive leadership induced a postwar reaction, 
a theme which Burl Noggle developed for the reconstruction period.
While it is clear that all these generalizations are useful 
to account for postwar intolerance, it would be highly unsatisfactory 
to let the matter rest there. It is necessary to say a word about the 
importance of congressmen in generating this anti-radicalism. Atti­
tudes favoring moderation in the House always had a weak base since 
they often rested on Republican fears. Once Republicans saw that 
suppression held little danger to their interests, they also joined 
the attack against radicals, thereby augmenting the already large
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forces working for restrictions. The House, which was constantly 
learning about the requirements of modem warfare, came to realize 
that the war would utilize not only material but also human resources. 
Correspondingly, demands increased that no individual or group in any 
fashion block the full equipment of the troops— a thesis that congress­
men sold to the nation. But most significant was their advocacy 
of suppression and their defeat of a bold and generous reconstruction 
program immediately after the war. By so doing, the House added to 
the nation’s postwar confusion of purpose and direction. This helped 
to generate the anxieties and tensions necessary for mass hysteria. 
Historians should not only dramatize Wilson's role in the debacle of 
progressive plans for the postwar world, but they should also empha­
size the House's part in the postwar reaction.
When Congressmen heard President Wilson's war address on that 
solemn night of April 2, 1917, they little realized all the tensions 
which the acceptance of war would generate. At the same time that 
members fell to the task of mobilizing the nation for war, they also 
longed to return to "normal" conditions. Representatives became 
supporters of measures that in peace time they would vehemently 
oppose, and opponents of measures they normally advocated. All the 
while disliking the necessity of doing so, representatives voted for 
centralization and planning and even social aid, but given the first 
opportunity when peace returned, they promptly sought to reestablish 
economic competition. Congressmen employed progressive ideals for 
the aims of the war, and supported repression in the name of democracy. 
While the nation's history has been filled with paradoxical events, 
there have been few times when generous values and repressive measures
have combined so forcibly to unleash hysteria and disillusionment. 
The House fully shared in the tragedy of the war for democracy that 
led initially to the Red Scare and eventually to "normalcy."
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APPENDIX
EXPLANATION OF THE BIOGRAPHICAL AND CAREER TABLES 
OF UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES
The Table of Social Origins 
The ranking of this table and most of the other tables is adapted 
from David Rothman's Politics and Power.1 The key to defining the 
social status of a person was the extent of aid the family could pro­
vide for the success of their children. The "elite" designation was 
reserved for those whose fathers had wealth and position, whose status 
made it likely that their children would some day enjoy leadership and 
power. The "substantial" category includes fathers who earned com­
fortable livings and who could provide advantages for their children. 
Still, success was chiefly up to the child. Lastly, the "subsistence" 
family was defined as one unable to provide social or economic advan­
tages for their children. It should be noted that these are not exact 
categories, nor are they indicative of "class". The interest centered 
on aid that fathers could provide to their offspring.
Table of Educational Experience 
Classifying educational experience proved difficult, mainly 
because lawyers need not have gone to college or even conpleted high 
school. The scheme devised takes this into consideration. Those 
placed in the lowest category had no formal education, either by tutor 
or schools. Those ranked second had a primary education (grades 
ranging from first to eighth). In the third level are those who
•'■David Rothman, Politics and Power, The United States Senate, 
1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 271-73.
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attended high school, but need not have graduated. The fourth level 
includes members who graduated from a high school or similar institu­
tion and then went on to read law in a law office. In the fifth level 
are the congressmen who attended college, perhaps graduating. If they 
did not graduate but went on to study law, they were counted on this 
level. The final level includes men who graduated and then went on 
to graduate training and professional training. If they studied law, 
either by reading in a law office or through training in a law school, 
they were counted at this level.
Table of Occupation 
ttiis is a straight-forward scale, though deciding how to classi­
fy individuals did pose some problems. Representatives in ranks one 
through seven were considered to have one predominant occupation. In 
this category individuals could have some other activity, but it would 
be minor. Categories eight and nine include individuals with two or 
more main activities. Lawyers with multiple occupations deserved a 
special category (category eight). The final category included a 
variety of individuals, some with two main activities, while others 
had multiple interests.
Hie Table of Extent of Political Experience 
House members who served in key political offices for over six 
years before coming to the chamber were designated as having consider­
able experience. Those who spent three to six years in key offices, or 
over six years in secondary posts— state legislature, state cabinet, 
or state supreme court— or over a decade in less significant positions, 
such as prosecuting attorney, were considered to have average
experience. Members with moderate experience served less than three 
years in important posts or less than six in secondary posts. Men 
designated as having little or no experience had held office only 
briefly or not. at all. Congressmen who were elected before March 4, 
1905, were given a one-level advancement over whatever their prior 
experience would have otherwise entitled them to. By 1917, the mem­
bers elected before 1905 had acquired great experience in the ways of 
the House and of parties.
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